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"These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers."

President Nixon

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Reflections on the Quarter

U.S.-Soviet Summitry

THE cordial spirit and congenial atmosphere of the summit meetings between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev held in the United States from June 16 to 25 were probably foreordained by the needs of both leaders. From Nixon's viewpoint the talks served as a welcome, if only temporary, counter to his Watergate-inspired political difficulties. Brezhnev also benefited from the goodwill atmospherics. Brezhnev's foreign policy line, to which Soviet spokesmen seek to impart an aura of consistency and high principle by citing its origins at the Twenty-fourth Party Congress of the CPSU in the spring of 1971, is prompted as much by strategic developments and pressing domestic problems as by principle. Concern over China, the technological backwardness of the Soviet economy, and intractable agricultural problems have created a situation in which the Soviet leadership is inclined to place high priority on improved relations with the United States.

The numerous accords concluded by the two leaders reflect a slow but persistent movement away from a predominantly adversary relationship to one marked by restrained conflict and limited cooperation. Nevertheless, none of them provided a resolution of the fundamental conflicts of interest that for more than a generation have divided the two nations.

The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, despite the official U.S. description of it as a "landmark agreement for the whole world," is long on rhetoric but surprisingly short on substance. Encompassing the same renunciation of force provision contained in the UN Charter and therefore previously endorsed by both parties, and adding little that was not present in the 1971 U.S.-Soviet accord on preventing accidental nuclear war, the agreement largely formalizes the unwritten practices of both superpowers. Its most significant item is Article IV, which provides for prompt U.S.-Soviet consultation should developments anywhere in the world "appear to involve the risk of nuclear conflict." No binding machinery is established as part of the agreement, and, as Dr. Kissinger himself pointed out, if either nation seeks an excuse for war it will undoubtedly still find one.

Despite the lack of substance in the nuclear accord, it has had an unsettling effect on U.S. relations with other countries. European states, already uneasy about their changing relationship with the United States, are inclined to see the agreement as further evidence of the diminishing reliability of the U.S. nuclear guarantee, even though Article VI declares that the obligations of the signatories to third countries are not impaired.

To the extent that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is perceived as decoupled from the security of U.S. allies, the more important the conventional military balance becomes. In the case of Japan and Western Europe, the asymmetries between their own conventional military capability and that of their potential adversaries are striking. As a result, the bilateral U.S.-Soviet accord on nuclear consultation is likely to be destabilizing for U.S. relationships with allies.

However, the dynamics of the global Washington-Moscow-Peking relationship may motivate the power that is left out of a bilateral meeting to make new overtures to one of the participants. Chinese anxieties were evident in the lengths to which both Washington and Peking went to underline their warming relations. During the summit Chiang Ching, Politburo member and wife of Chairman Mao, made an unusual public appearance with David K. E. Bruce, U.S. envoy to Peking; later, China's senior diplomat, Huang Chen, was flown to San Clemente by Presidential jet for a meeting with President Nixon.

The widely acclaimed agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is ambiguous in several respects. While establishing 1974 as the target date for a permanent treaty limiting strategic arms, the principles offer no conclusive evidence that the two parties agree on even the broad outlines of a desirable outcome for SALT II. They state only that "the limitations *can* apply both to quantitative aspects, as well as to their qualitative improvement" (emphasis added), without pledging the parties to sign a future accord prohibiting a qualitative arms race. The accord provides instead for the "modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms . . . under conditions which will be formulated in the agreements to be concluded." Nor do the principles commit the two sides to reach an agreement based on rough numerical equality in offensive missiles, as required by the Jackson Amendment. They specify only that both sides will recognize each other's "equal security interests."

From the U.S. viewpoint the SALT negotiating principles have the virtue of accelerating the pace of the talks. By setting 1974 as a target date for agreement, they may assure that permanent limits on offensive arsenals will be negotiated before the Soviets can take full advantage of their options under the Interim Agreement signed in Moscow in May 1972. Under that agreement the Soviet Union is allowed a 2,359 to 1,710 margin of numerical superiority in offensive missiles by 1977. But a 1974 agreement could foreclose a Soviet effort to replace 200-odd pre-1964 land-based missiles with an equal number of advanced SLBM's on the twenty additional submarines permitted the USSR under the Interim Agreement.

In a concession to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the principles commit both parties to confine verification of the terms of

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the permanent treaty to "national means." Once the Soviets flight-tested missiles with independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV's) —as disclosed by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in August—the United States lost whatever opportunity it had to negotiate a verifiable prohibition on Soviet deployment of MIRV's, since deployment, unlike testing, is not susceptible to detection by "national means," i.e., satellite reconnaissance. Thus, the Basic Principles and Soviet MIRV tests diminish prospects for significantly limiting the qualitative arms race.

Finally, the principles make no mention of the issue of forward-based systems (FBS). The Soviet Union had demanded that a permanent treaty embrace all of the U.S. quick-reaction fighter-bombers stationed in Europe and in the Mediterranean since such aircraft are capable of reaching Soviet territory, on one-way missions at least, while carrying nuclear payloads. The U.S. position has been that FBS are not "central strategic systems" and should not be included in any SALT agreement, particularly since any bilateral limitation on their deployment would cast doubt on the United States' commitment to the security of its European allies.

Another major item on the summit agenda was the improvement of trade relations. Again, atmospherics exceeded substantive achievements as Brezhnev wooed prominent American businessmen with a style that prompted one listener to exclaim, "Mr. Brezhnev could be one of the world's supersalesmen." Senators and Congressmen were similarly impressed with the General Secretary's performance in seeking to cajole the U.S. Congress into granting most-favored-nation status to Soviet exports and permitting the extension of long-term credits to the Soviet Union. Without MFN and long-term credits, the near-term growth of Soviet-American trade will be limited by the USSR's shortage of hard currency reserves and the generally low quality of its potential manufactured exports.

Although the Senators and Representatives who were Brezhnev's guests at a three-hour lunch at Blair House expressed their admiration for the Soviet leader's public relations talents, they generally remained skeptical of his claim that 95 per cent of the Soviet Jews making application to emigrate can do so. Spokesmen for the National Council on Soviet Jewry called Brezhnev's statistics "distorted," and Senator Jackson pointed out that the essence of Soviet emigration policy is to intimidate and often imprison citizens before they apply for an exit visa.

This, of course, is a contest of linkage diplomacy. Senator Jackson, the Soviets know, has overwhelming Congressional support for his amendment to prohibit the extension of government-backed credits and MFN status to the Soviet Union if the President determines that the right to emigrate is restricted by either fiat or onerous taxation. Brezhnev's willingness even to discuss what is, after all, an internal Soviet matter constitutes a victory for Senator Jackson's approach.

But linkage diplomacy is a two-way street, as the Soviet entourage demonstrated during the visit. Leonid Zamyatin, Brezhnev's chief spokesman and TASS head, sought to turn the tables on U.S. efforts to extract political concessions for an improvement in trade relations. Zamyatin noted that long-term, multibillion-dollar trade deals would "create a tremendous potential of trust." Referring to SALT, he added that "it is always easier to settle such questions . . . when there exists trust." In short, the Soviet spokesman served notice that his government might be prepared to link a permanent treaty limiting offensive nuclear weapons to U.S. trade concessions. This linkage would pose no serious threat to U.S. interests were it not for the fact that the Interim Agreement codified the Soviet advantage in numbers of offensive nuclear missiles and therefore weakens the U.S. bargaining position in seeking to redress the imbalance in a permanent treaty. The United States could lose some of the leverage it has on trade issues because of the less than fully satisfactory outcome of the first SALT negotiations.

The flurry of activity at the summit also shed new light on the Administration's strategy of creating "vested interests" in the USSR in favor of improved U.S.-Soviet relations. The weakness of such a strategy was evident in Brezhnev's cultivation of American corporate executives eager to do business with the Soviets: during his visit the National Association of Manufacturers announced that it would press Congress to accord MFN status to the Soviet Union.

No new trade agreements emerged from the summit despite reports that Brezhnev keenly desired to obtain a "declaration of intent" to flourish before Soviet officials he has accused of footdragging on the issue. Instead, two minor protocols were signed, one arranging for the establishment of a Soviet-American Chamber of Commerce and the other providing office space for commercial representatives in each country.

A series of relatively minor accords approved cooperation in various fields, including transportation problems, oceanographic studies, and the peaceful use of atomic energy. Other accords will expand airline service between the two countries and reduce income tax liabilities for citizens of each country living and working in the other.

Two further agreements deserve brief mention. The agricultural agreement should prevent a repetition of the experience in 1972 when the Soviet Union bought large quantities of soybeans and wheat from the United States while U.S. farmers and grain dealers remained unaware of the prospective total size of Soviet purchases. As a result, the Soviets bought their way out of an agricultural crisis at bargain rates, the U.S. government paid $300 million in export subsidies to grain dealers, and the American consumer suffered the consequences of the upward pressure on grain and livestock prices. Under the new agreement the

Soviets are obliged regularly to exchange statistical estimates on agricultural production, demand and trade — information that would alert U.S. farmers and grain dealers to future Soviet needs and purchases.

Finally, a long-term cultural exchange agreement was signed for the first time, to last through 1979. The two-year renewal of the academic exchange agreement was rephrased to assure that a minimum rather than maximum of fifty graduate students and scholars from each country will have the opportunity annually to live and study in the other country.

In the joint communiqué at the conclusion of the summit, the two leaders touched briefly on problems of European security. President Nixon conceded that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could be closed by meetings "at the highest level," provided progress is made at the conference to the mutual satisfaction of the parties. With respect to the reduction of military forces in Central Europe, the communiqué raised more questions than it answered. It stressed the "great importance of the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures," to begin on October 30, thus dropping the requirement, heretofore insisted upon by the United States, that mutual force reductions be "balanced" to take account of geographical and force asymmetrics favoring the Soviet Union. While the full meaning of this omission has yet to be explained, it would appear that significant slippage has occurred in the U.S. negotiating position. The communiqué may reflect an agreement to try for a limited MFR accord to reduce forces on a one-for-one basis, rather than a more ambitious MBFR accord requiring negotiation of a complex formula for the withdrawal of larger numbers of Soviet than American forces.

In specific results, the summit meeting seems to have made only a modest contribution to building the "structure of peace" proclaimed as the Nixon Doctrine goal. Although accords on limited cooperation were reached in a number of functional areas, no major agreements were signed comparable to those concluded in Moscow a year earlier. Nonetheless, the summit contributed to the ongoing process of regular U.S.-Soviet contacts. Whether this process will gain momentum depends on many factors, not least of which is the Soviet interpretation of the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972. Although those principles state that "the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries," Soviet efforts to turn the accord on preventing nuclear war into an anti-Chinese (and anti-NATO) vehicle would belie the spirit of this commitment. If a "generation of peace" is to be more than a rhetorical expression, concessions in trade and other issues by the United States must be firmly tied to concrete measures by the Soviet Union to reduce political and military confrontation at both the global and regional levels.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

WHEN the long-gestating Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) finally opened in July with the meeting in Helsinki of thirty-five foreign ministers, it marked the initial phase of a lengthy series of three-stage negotiations aimed, ostensibly at least, at easing tensions on the European continent. The five-day meeting of foreign ministers followed months of preparatory talks designed to work out a conference agenda and agreed-upon procedures (all decisions at the conference are to be reached by unanimous agreement).

The foreign ministers arranged for a second stage of talks in September, to be held on the working level. Committees were to be formed to consider four clusters of issues: (1) security, (2) economic and scientific cooperation, including trade and technology exchange, (3) freer movement of people and ideas between East and West, and (4) implementation of agreements reached on these substantive issues, including the possibility of establishing permanent consultative machinery. Provided substantial progress is made on substantive issues, Western states may yield to the Soviet proposal that the CSCE be crowned by an East-West heads-of-state meeting, possibly by year's end. Because Western negotiators have made real progress at CSCE and the MBFR talks a precondition for a summit, the prospective duration of the CSCE is difficult to predict.

The idea for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has a long history, dating from a proposal made at Geneva in 1954 by then Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. The Soviet minister called for a conference to reduce tensions and affirm the post-World War II territorial status quo in Europe, but the conference he proposed would have excluded U.S. and Canadian participation and would have granted *de facto* recognition to East Germany. It thus reflected two basic and continuing Soviet foreign policy goals: formal international recognition of the status quo in Central Europe and the loosening of U.S. ties to Western Europe. By the 1960's, a third goal was added in the form of Soviet proposals for increased economic and technological cooperation, designed to secure for the USSR access to Western technology.

In the mid-1960's the Soviet Union again put forward the conference idea, this time at meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee held in Warsaw and Bucharest in January 1965 and July 1966. Although the West was still fearful that a conference would force it to acknowledge the division of Germany and Europe, the Bucharest declaration made the proposal somewhat more palatable by not explicitly ruling out participation by the United States and Canada.

From the Western perspective, a major step toward convening the CSCE was taken in 1966 when the newly formed West German Grand Coalition, which included both the

CDU and the SPD (the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party), reversed the long-standing policy of the Federal Republic on German reunification. From Adenauer's basic premise that progress on reunification had to occur before any reduction of tensions with the East could be considered, the coalition and its SPD-dominated successor government shifted to an *Ostpolitik* based on the assumption that reunification was possible only as the *result* of a long-term relaxation of tensions in Europe. Thus the *Ostpolitik* became fully compatible, in principle at least, with the idea of a CSCE. In fact, Bonn obligated itself to promote the CSCE idea in the negotiations leading to the Moscow Treaty of August 1970, in which the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic concluded a non-aggression treaty and signed other agreements providing for increased trade.

Yet until mid-1970, several unresolved problems dampened Western enthusiasm for such a conference. Chief among these was the question of Western access to West Berlin. Western recognition of the existing territorial status quo in East Central Europe without prior guarantees of transit rights to and from West Berlin—and of the enclave's status—would have placed allied access at the whim of the East Germans.

In addition to the question of access, however, West Berlin became a barometer of Soviet intentions. Once the West German *Ostpolitik* had defused the issue of the *de facto* recognition of East Germany, the West began to pursue a delicate combination of several objectives in its negotiations with the East, linking the freer exchange of ideas and people to the reduction of East-West political tensions. The Western governments sought tangible evidence, in advance of preparatory talks, that the CSCE would result ultimately in more than "cosmetic" agreements. Accords affirming only general principles would not be adequate. They would engender a milieu of détente in the West leading to public pressure for cutbacks in defense spending without requiring the Soviet bloc to resolve outstanding political issues, remove barriers between Eastern Europe and the West, or reduce their military forces.

The Berlin question was considered a barrier to CSCE negotiations and a test of Soviet willingness to resolve outstanding security issues in Europe. In June 1971, the NATO ministers officially made the convening of CSCE contingent on a "satisfactory agreement" in the quadripartite negotiations on Berlin that had begun in March 1970. In September 1971, after the Berlin outline agreement had been signed by the four powers, the Western side insisted that an accord had to be reached between the two Germanys before a "satisfactory agreement" on Berlin could be said to exist. Finally, when the two Germanys signed the accord on access arrangements in December 1971, the West agreed that preparatory talks on CSCE could begin, but only after the four powers had signed the formal protocol on Berlin. At this point, Moscow insisted that the protocol could take effect only after West Germany ratified its goodwill treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. In May the Bundestag approved the treaties, and at the Moscow Summit President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev agreed that preparatory talks on CSCE would begin in conjunction with those on force reductions in Europe.

No sooner had the preparatory talks convened in November 1972, however, than a major dispute developed over the highly sensitive issue of the freer exchange of people and ideas in Europe. Throughout the early discussion, the Soviets insisted that any freer interchange of ideas and people had to be modified by "due respect for the sovereignty, laws, and customs of each country." This, to the West, meant that human contacts, for all practical purposes, would be confined to rigidly controlled "cultural exchanges." On January 5, 1973, *Pravda* branded as subversive any suggestion that Europeans should be allowed to meet each other more freely and exchange ideas. By late May, however, the Soviet Union, for temporary tactical reasons, had dropped its insistence that the exchange of ideas and people be subject to national customs and sovereignty. With these apparent, and short-lived, Soviet concessions, the preparatory talks concluded on June 8.

The agreed-upon agenda stipulated three major discussion areas and two additional ones. The major areas encompass: (1) security, including general principles for reducing military-related tensions in Europe and the Mediterranean as well as "confidence building" measures; (2) human contacts, including proposals for the freer movement of ideas and people on "an individual, a collective, a private or an official basis," and (3) economic concerns, including proposals and specific recommendations to enhance East-West cooperation in economic affairs, science and technology. Subjects considered less pressing but still important were the relationship between security in Europe and the naval balance in the Mediterranean and problems of transportation and communication among participating countries.

Besides preparing an agenda, the preparatory talks paved the way for the convening of the first phase of CSCE, the meetings of foreign ministers held in Helsinki in July. Here the problems likely to arise in future hard bargaining were clearly discernible beneath the rhetoric. The ministers' immediate tasks were modest: to ratify the agenda and to fix a date for the beginning of Phase II in Geneva. Both were accomplished. Although Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's lead-off speech appeared to have reopened the human contacts issue, the agenda was ratified and the commissions were established and authorized to convene in Geneva in September.

Gromyko's address, as expected, set the tone for the Helsinki meeting. It also drew the battle lines by proposing a new charter on relations among European states, a general East-West summit to ratify the conclusions reached in Geneva, and permanent machinery to implement the accords. Subsequent speeches by Western foreign ministers took issue with each of these points, and it became obvious that hard bargaining lay ahead in the Geneva phase of the talks.

Gromyko's proposed charter, entitled "General Declaration on the Foundations of European Security and the Principles of Relations Among States in Europe," contained several general tenets but few specific proposals. Included were provisions (1) prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, (2) espousing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, (3) prohibiting political or economic aid to "states committing acts endangering international peace and security," and (4) declaring the absolute inviolability of the present frontiers in Europe.

The Soviet minister's speech and the charter it set forth were attacked by German Foreign Minister Scheel as a collection of "noncommittal generalities." The force with which French Foreign Minister Jobert, in particular, took issue with the vagueness in the Gromyko proposals surprised observers. Many diplomats had expected the French Foreign Minister to pay glowing tribute to the success of détente diplomacy. Instead, Jobert echoed West German misgivings.

Most alarming to Western ministers was Gromyko's re-emphasis of the principles of national sovereignty as limiting human contacts to highly selective cultural exchanges. In general, however, as speeches by both Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Secretary of State Rogers made clear, the West objected most strongly to the ambiguity of the Soviet proposals. The British Foreign Secretary, for example, called for specific practical measures to encourage the freer movement of people and information between East and West, including uncensored circulation of European newspapers and linked television programs devoted to discussions of foreign affairs. Foreign Minister Scheel also presented specific proposals for the Geneva phase of the CSCE that called for increasing industrial cooperation, lowering frontier barriers for separated families, improving working conditions for foreign journalists, and creating a forum where European intellectuals could meet frequently.

Western officials reacted negatively to Gromyko's proposal for a short Geneva phase capped by a summit conference before the end of the year. The *Economist* reported that Brezhnev in his Rambouillet meeting with President Pompidou, just after the Soviet leader had met with President Nixon, found the French President unreceptive to an advance commitment to hold a summit meeting as the CSCE capstone. Britain and the United States both opposed the year-end deadline. A dispute over whether to stress speed or deliberation in approaching the work of the commissions thus seems likely, pointing up another fundamental cleavage in Geneva.

The lack of progress in the MBFR talks could provide a further impediment to CSCE. Although Nixon and Brezhnev agreed that force reduction talks should begin in Vienna on October 30, Western dissatisfaction with previous Soviet obstructions could delay progress on CSCE until the Soviet Union shows greater willingness to negotiate seriously on force reductions.

The prospects for the final, or post-Geneva, phase of the CSCE appear to be contingent on Western perceptions of progress both in Geneva and in the MBFR talks. In Helsinki, all four major Western ministers expressed a willingness to eliminate the summit meeting if specific practical measures are not forthcoming in Geneva or if the Soviet Union continues to stall on MBFR. As Minister Scheel put it: "It [the termination of CSCE without a final summit conference] would not be a catastrophe for Europe, nor would it be the end of the process of détente. It would simply mean conditions are not yet mature enough." In sum, the upcoming Geneva phase will determine whether the CSCE can be considered by the West to be a positive step toward easing political tensions and producing a freer movement of people and ideas in Europe, or merely a bad propaganda bargain.

Allende and His Opponents

THE Chilean legislative elections on March 4 assumed considerable importance, given the narrow victory margin of Salvador Allende's coalition in the general elections of September 4, 1970. At that time, in a tight three-cornered race with two more conservative opponents, the Socialist candidate received a bare 36.3 per cent plurality. In accordance with Chilean political tradition, Allende was inaugurated as President after a confirming congressional vote a month later. His coalition, however, remained a distinct minority in both houses of the legislature.

Despite "minority status" handicaps and the profound antipathy of the opposition to his Marxist principles, the President pressed ahead with his programs. He accomplished some needed social reforms, but his tenure was marked by a sharp deterioration of the nation's overall economic condition and an intense polarization of the political situation. Unable to block Allende's program, increasingly disaffected by both its intended and unintended consequences, and fearing the evolution of a "Marxist dictatorship," the moderate-reformist Christian Democrats combined with the conservative Nationalists in bitter denunciation of the regime.

Nor did Allende have any estimable success on the international scene. His government's economic policies resulted in severe balance-of-payment problems and a mounting inability to service the nation's $1.7 billion foreign debt. In addition, it was involved in a continuing feud with the United States over compensation for nationalized U.S.-owned firms. This in turn increased Chile's difficulties in attaining internationally sponsored loan funds.

The months before the March election were punctuated by demonstrations and violence, culminating in a paralyzing twenty-six-day strike in November 1972. Only Allende's move to bring three respected military officers into his cabinet averted a complete societal breakdown and civil war. The entry of the military significantly cooled tempers and apparently provided an effective guarantee to opposition elements that elections would be held as scheduled. Thus the March 1973 elections shaped up as a crucial test of the relative strength of the government and its powerful opposition. At stake were half of the Senate seats and the entire Chamber of Deputies.

The opposition Christian Democrat-Nationalist coalition, CODE (Confederation for Democracy), sought to characterize the elections as a "morally binding plebiscite." While implying that achievement of 50 per cent of the vote would demonstrate repudiation of the Allende Government, it set its sights on acquiring a two-thirds majority in both houses of the legislature. Realization of these large majorities would have halted the Allende program and raised the specter of impeachment proceedings—a course often threatened by more extreme opponents.

The government's campaign emphasized achievements, urged further reforms and blamed current difficulties on malicious reactionaries and an international conspiracy headed by the United States (a claim that gained credence with the revelation of ITT's efforts to manipulate the Chilean political process).

The election results appeared to favor the Allende Government slightly, but not decisively. The incumbent Popular Unity coalition received 43.4 per cent of the popular vote, gaining two seats in the Senate and six in the Chamber of Deputies. CODE received 54.7 per cent, losing a total of eight seats. The new lineup in the legislature, however, still reflects a solid, though somewhat smaller, CODE majority (30 to 20 seats in the Senate, 87 to 63 in the Chamber). Some observers felt that the government emerged from the election immeasurably strengthened, since it survived a severe crisis. Certainly the administration felt sufficiently secure to request the retirement of the military from the cabinet.

While Allende had hoped after the elections to consolidate the government's position, improve the economic outlook and prepare his coalition for the presidential election of 1976, the economic and political situation in Chile continued to deteriorate. For example, inflation, which reached a rate of 160 per cent in 1972, is currently running rampant at an annual rate of 240 per cent. It may be necessary to inaugurate a food rationing system in the near future. A three-months strike of the El Teniente copper miners has deprived the country of sorely needed hard currency; and when the government refused to allow the striking miners to hold a meeting in Santiago, two days of rioting resulted. Moreover, Congress has successfully impeached four cabinet ministers, the governor of Santiago and eight provincial governors. A shutdown of the conservative daily *El Mercurio* for six days backfired when the courts reversed the decision. While the government was charging that the Fatherland and Freedom movement and other opposition groups were assembling arsenals, the opposition offered incontrovertible evidence that Czech and Soviet arms were being distributed to left-wing paramilitary groups of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).

Amid this gathering storm, the armed forces stood aside. Allende's coalition took every opportunity to praise the military both for their "support" and for their forty-two-year-long tradition of noninterference in constitutional government. The opposition continued to urge that the military attempt to moderate Allende's programs and not enforce some constitutionally-disputed decrees. Far Right leaders consistently urged the military to remove Allende forcibly from office.

When the future of the regime appeared most bleak, the bungled coup of June 29 gave it an important boost. The Second Armored Regiment, led by Colonel Roberto Souper, evidently thought the time had come to overthrow Allende, but the attack on the presidential palace failed when General Carlos Prats, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, personally led troops loyal to the government against the insurrectionists. As virtually the entire leadership of the Fatherland and Freedom movement quickly sought asylum, the government's credibility soared, for Allende had long proclaimed that the opposition was seeking to overthrow the government and was pushing the country into a civil war. It was not coincidental that, shortly after the attempted coup, the copper miners returned to work, thereby solving Allende's single biggest economic problem.

Sensing that he might effectively seize the initiative at this point, the President requested congressional approval to declare a six-months state of siege. But even though it was on the defensive, the opposition succeeded in rejecting this measure, which would have allowed the government to detain civilians without trial and move them to any part of the country.

The bungled coup boosted the regime's sagging fortunes only fleetingly. A paralyzing truckers' strike gripped the nation for more than a month. With both the political and the economic situation in the country deteriorating alarmingly, Allende turned to the military once again. On August 9, the President announced that Admiral Raúl Montero Cornejo had become Minister of Finance, General César Ruiz Danyou, Minister of Public Works, and General Carlos Prats, Minister of Defense. But the new "Cabinet of National Security" was unable either to resolve the truckers' strike or to defuse the explosive political situation. Under increasing pressure from within the armed forces, the military ministers abandoned the government on August 23. Allende managed to piece together a makeshift cabinet composed in part of junior military officers; however, its lifespan was brief.

On September 11, virtually the entire Chilean military rose against the Allende regime. Army units rapidly seized strategic points in Santiago and after a short but bloody encounter occupied La Moneda, the presidential palace. A communiqué from the military announced that Allende had committed suicide rather than surrender. A state of siege was quickly declared, communication with the outside world was cut, a curfew was evoked, and demonstrations for or against the takeover were forbidden. Nevertheless, there were widespread reports of fighting between Allende's supporters and army units.

The consequences of Allende's overthrow and death remain unclear at the present time. The uncertain nature of the current situation recommends a cautious and watchful attitude on the part of the United States. This is particularly true in view of the United States' cool relations with the Allende regime and the inevitable but ill-founded speculation that Washington may have had a hand in the coup. Before any definitive U.S. policy toward post-Allende Chile is formulated, a period of careful reassessment is likely to occur. In the meantime, the U.S. stance will probably be characterized by meticulous noninvolvement in Chile's internal affairs.

Argentina: The Return of Peron and Peronism

IN March, voters in Argentina cast their ballots in an election heralding a significant change in the manner in which they had been governed for almost two decades. To the distress of the ruling military group, the election demonstrated conclusively that Juan Perón's charismatic appeal had not been seriously eroded despite eighteen years in exile.

General Alejandro Lanusse's decision in late 1972 to permit the restoration of an elected constitutional government was an admission of the military's inability to govern the nation effectively. Confronted by deteriorating economic conditions, urban terrorism and political isolation, Lanusse was forced to schedule elections, although he attempted to control their outcome by nullifying the candidacy of Perón and by harassing Perón's party, the Justicialistas. His efforts proved futile. Perón's response was to secure the nomination of the obsequious Hector Cámpora, which gave rise to the slogan "Cámpora to the Presidency, Perón to power." All these maneuvers occurred amid persistent rumors that the military might cancel the elections.

The March 11 election results amply justified both Perón's confidence and the military's fears. In a field of nine, the Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI) captured 49.56 per cent of the popular vote. The four conservative-liberal parties divided among themselves roughly half of the remaining vote: the Alianza Popular 14.9 per cent, the Alianza Republicana 2.9 per cent, the Nueva Fuerza 2 per cent, and the Democratic Socialists .9 per cent. The other 21.3 per cent went to the Nationalist Populist Party—the Radicals. FREJULI gained an absolute majority in both the Senate (45 seats) and the House (145 seats) and is only a few votes short of a two-thirds majority in each chamber. The Radicals, FREJULI's nearest rivals, have only 12 seats in the Senate and 51 seats in the House. Thus Perón, apparently in spite of himself, engineered a smashing victory for his coalition. Although there was pressure from some circles to intervene, the military accepted the outcome and allowed Cámpora to take office on May 25.

Cámpora's renunciation of the Presidency two months later, on July 13, will have little effect on the direction of Argentine domestic and foreign policy initiatives. His election campaign had left little doubt that Perón would actually exercise power. There is, however, some significance in the unexpected haste with which he abandoned his figurehead position so that Perón might assume the office after duly held elections. A primary factor in Cámpora's sudden departure was undoubtedly his government's demonstrated inability to subdue continuing and often violent clashes between left- and right-wing forces in the nation. Labor's demand that Perón assume the Presidency also made an exit seem prudent.

Perón's strategy for coping with the domestic unrest is already indicated. Apparently he has no intention of satisfying the demands of the Radical Left by imposing a revolutionary social order on Argentina. In view of the coincidence of interests among the armed services, the Radical Civic Union (a moderate, middle-class party), and moderate elements of the Peronist movement, it is likely instead that radical dissident groups such as the People's Revolutionary Army (ERA) will be successively isolated and crushed.

Perón also confronts severe economic problems. The annual rate of inflation reached 64 per cent in 1972 and is continuing at an extremely high level. In the first five months of this year, prices jumped an estimated 32 per cent. Unemployment is running at an unacceptably high level of 7 to 10 per cent, and many Argentines can find only part-time work. Balance of payments deficits continue unabated. Unless Argentina can quickly renegotiate its foreign debt repayment schedule, the nation will be required to repay almost half of its more than $6 billion debt this year. The deteriorating situation urgently requires adoption of the stringent economic policies the military was unwilling or unable to introduce while it held power. The long exiled ruler's reputation as a friend of the working class and memories of the liberal social welfare policies that prevailed during his first term will undoubtedly make the imposition of stringent measures difficult for Perón. However, there is little room for choice. He no longer has the comfortable cushion of substantial foreign exchange reserves that he enjoyed during his earlier tenure. Recent restraints on wage increases, restrictions on imports, and the decision to control some prices while allowing others to rise offer evidence that the Perón regime will attempt to take steps to strengthen the economy despite the risk of alienating some supporters.

The probable Peronist foreign policy positions were in evidence as early as June. President Allende of Chile and President Dórticos of Cuba were invited to attend Cámpora's inauguration, and Argentina officially recognized Cuba three days later. The Cuban ambassador, Emilio Aragones Navarro, arrived in Buenos Aires in June and promptly reported that Perón had been invited to visit Havana. The Argentine representative at the OAS reform talks pushed for Cuba's inclusion in the Latin American community and suggested the formation of an exclusively Latin American organization. Concurring, President Cámpora stated in his inaugural speech, "The OAS is undergoing a real crisis. Basically the problem is that the OAS has failed to promote the liberation of our peoples. On the contrary, it has contributed to maintaining these peoples in their present state of dependency and underdevelopment. Everything indicates that Latin American problems should be solved within our own area. . . ."

The anti-American orientation evident in such statements becomes even plainer when U.S.-Argentine relations are viewed in the context of the traditional Argentine-Brazilian rivalry for regional primacy. The new Argentine leadership apparently believes that the United States is encouraging Brazil's drive toward pre-eminence in South America.

This belief will undoubtedly encourage Perón to maintain an outwardly hostile attitude toward the United States, most likely manifest in support for tariff preferences, the 200-mile territorial sea limit, and other claims that conflict with U.S. interests. However, Argentine policy may zigzag as expediency demands. Perón has previously demonstrated his willingness to maintain amicable relations with the United States when he perceived these to be in his interest.

The Peronist intention to step up competition with Brazil will pose some difficulties for U.S. policy in South America. Cámpora quickly denounced the New York agreement on the exploration of water resources that the Lanusse Government had concluded with Brazil last September. Another harbinger of future bilateral conflicts is Argentina's recently announced decision to initiate closer contacts with the Andean Pact nations, indicating that she will attempt to give this South American grouping an anti-Brazilian bias. Rivalry between the two nations in Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay has reached the point where Brazilian influence is waxing as Argentina's wanes.

Perón has made clear his aim to expand contacts with Western Europe in order to increase both Argentina's visibility on the international scene and European trade with and investment in Argentina. Joint European/Argentine investment in which Argentina holds a controlling share is desired because of its favorable effects on the balance of payments and the state of Argentine technology, as well as for its value as a counterweight to U.S. investments.

A major unknown in speculating about the country's political and economic future remains Perón himself. At seventy-eight he is reportedly in poor health and requires frequent consultations with his physicians. The viability of Peronism without Perón is doubtful, as Cámpora's hasty resignation indicates. A Perón-less situation, especially happening before economic and political stability is established in Argentina, would in all likelihood mean a return to military rule.

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CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: THE UNRESOLVED SUCCESSION CRISIS*

by Franz Michael

THE Cultural Revolution appears to have been the most momentous and extensive phase — so far — in Mao Tse-tung's struggle to assert his power and policy over the Chinese communists. This struggle has continued ever since Mao assumed his leading position at the Tsunyi conference in 1935 and later in Yenan days. What distinguishes the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from the many previous purges within Chinese communism is not only its size, the number of victims and the violence accompanying it, but also the shift of target from the realm of personalities to the fundamental institutional structure of communism: the Communist Party.

To understand the post-Cultural Revolution phase in China it is essential to recall some of the factors that led to this extraordinary — even unique — move by a communist leader to tamper with the chief ingredients of Lenin's recipe for communist revolution and power control; i.e., Mao's decision to place himself above the basic doctrinal concepts of Marxism-Leninism by challenging the role of the party as the vehicle of historical truth.

I

Mao's deviation from communist orthodoxy can be traced back to the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in 1956 and Khrushchev's secret speech denouncing Stalin for excesses and the cult of personality. As a Chinese Stalinist, Mao found himself under fire. The Eighth Chinese Communist Party Congress in the same year rewrote the Chinese party statutes, eliminating the Thought of Mao from the preamble and introducing collective leadership. Mao's attempts to obtain from Khrushchev at the Moscow interparty conference in 1957 the right to participate in world communist policymaking in order to protect his power in China failed, and he returned home determined to go it alone. Forcing upon his colleagues the adventurous Great Leap Forward, he hoped to be able to do without the economic support Khrushchev was using as a lever to keep the Chinese comrades in line. At the same time, through the application of will power and mass organization, Mao hoped to accomplish a short cut to the goal of establishing a communist society, "bypassing the Soviet Union on the way to communism," and thus challenge Moscow's leadership over the communist camp.

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The Great Leap proved to be a disastrous failure, and Mao got into deeper trouble with Moscow as well as with his own party. On December 10, 1958, at the time of the party's first retreat from the Great Leap, he was deprived of the Chairmanship of the Republic, and was treated from that time on as a "parent at his own funeral," to quote his words. The attack against him went further. At the Lushan Central Committee meeting in July-August 1959, his responsibility for the Great Leap and the resulting disaster was criticized by the top military officer and Minister of Defense, P'eng Teh-huai, with obvious support from among the party leadership and Moscow.[1] Mao fought back. Under the threat of organizing new forces to challenge the party and the army leadership, he succeeded in obtaining the removal of P'eng Teh-huai and some of his military and political supporters and gained the appointment of Lin Piao, regarded as Mao's most loyal paladin among the military, as Minister of Defense.

Thus began the Lin Piao era — which ended so dramatically in 1971. Lin, the head of the former Fourth Field Army of civil war fame, must be regarded as Mao's chief instrument in the Cultural Revolution.

II

It is understandable that Mao turned to the PLA (People's Liberation Army) in his search for a reliable means to secure his power, laying the foundation for the status accorded the military during the Cultural Revolution which still holds today. Mao's chief experience in his ascent to power and in the communist victory and takeover of China had been related to the special role played by the military. This role resulted from the strategy of national liberation movements or wars of national liberation devised by Lenin for the communist move into the nonindustrial world of Asia. Differing from the strategy of "proletarian revolution" used in the West, this second communist plan of prolonged warfare required not only rural-based organization but a close integration of army and party, indeed a party-army structure.

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[1] *People's Daily,* August 16, 1967.

This merger was in strong contrast to the subordination of the army practiced in the Soviet Union and preached in Western communism. Mao's famous dictum, "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," was derived from Stalin's statement about "the revolutionary army" in China to which Mao himself referred, and when Mao also declared that "the party controls the gun" he meant the party organization in the army that had been his special work and responsibility during his rise from political commissar of the Chu-Mao force to leadership of a party-army organization in China. The army dominated the communist governments in Kiangsi and Yenan times and actually administered China's regions during the initial years following the conquest of 1949.[2] Even with the rapid growth of a civilian party and administrative structure after 1953, military men filled many of the highest political and administrative posts. It was therefore easy for Mao to return to the party-army concept of war and civil war times and use Lin Piao to gain needed support for his showdown with the party.

Through Lin, Mao gained two essential ingredients for his victory in the confrontation: the guarantee of a decisive power base in the PLA and the acceptance of his special role above and independent of the party. The Cult of Mao was established when Lin, in a number of major speeches beginning in 1959, emphasized Mao's special eminence and built for him an ideological leadership position outside and superior to the party. In this concept Lin had the support of others, especially Mao's secretary and ghost writer, Ch'en Po-ta. But it was Lin Piao who selected Mao sayings for the Little Red Book, who wrote a preface for the book and used it to indoctrinate the PLA in accepting Mao as the source of all wisdom and truth. From the PLA, which was soon held up as a model for all Chinese, this indoctrination spread to the people at large. Over 800 million copies of the Little Red Book were circulated in China and abroad. Mao's well-known advice on this very tactic in psychological propaganda warfare was included: "To overthrow a political power, it is always necessary first of all to create public opinion, to do work in the ideological sphere."

But Mao's claim to a superior wisdom in all matters could not be accepted by the party leaders for practical power as well as doctrinal reasons. By more or less open attacks, party writers and propaganda officials ridiculed and challenged the idea of his infallibility, and the battle was joined over what became the chief "cultural" issue in the so-called Cultural Revolution, the acceptance of Maoism by the media, literature, the arts and the theater.

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[2] See Ezra F. Vogel, *Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital 1949-1968* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), as an example.

From Shanghai, where Mao had retreated when his position in Peking became tenuous – actually he spent much time in nearby Hangchow – the opening shot was fired by his new literary supporters, Yao Wen-yüan and the latter's sponsor, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (brought to Mao's attention by his wife, Chiang Ch'ing). This group formed independently and came to represent a different retainer faction in Mao's camp from that of the chief military organizer, Lin Piao. Two Maoist factions thus emerged in the preparatory stage of the Cultural Revolution. They were soon joined by a third faction, that of Chou En-lai. In judging the present power lineup it appears essential to recall the chief events of the Cultural Revolution in their relationship to these three main factions and their leaders.

The storm troopers of the Cultural Revolution were the Red Guards, the college and high school students, eleven million youths brought to Peking with military logistic support to hail and worship their leader Mao and then sent out to the provinces to attack and destroy the provincial and local party and government administrations. When local groups, formed by local party leaders, defended their patrons, the PLA was told to "support the left"— the Red Guards. When local garrison forces tended to stand behind the local leaders under attack, central army and air force units were moved in by Lin Piao to back the revolutionary forces. Lin provided the indoctrination, the logistics and the power leverage for the young attack forces.

The Red Guards, however, paid homage to other idols. Their worship of Mao was channeled through the leftist leadership of Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan in the Cultural Revolution Group of the party's Central Committee. Chiang Ch'ing also became adviser to the Cultural Revolution Group of the PLA. Together with such radical left-wingers as Wang Li, Kuan Feng and Ch'i Pen-yü, she became the patroness of the Red Guards and other young revolutionaries. Her recasting of the Chinese theater served as an ideological backdrop for Mao's revolutionary agitation.

Somewhat different was Chou En-lai's role in the Cultural Revolution. Far from resisting it, as often thought, he moved it into his direction. When the Red Guards were ordered to seize power in the provinces and met with the top party leadership, it was Chou En-lai who gave them explicit instructions about whom to attack and whom not to attack.[3] Chou also supervised the Cultural Revolution in key ministries in Peking, especially the second to seventh Ministries of Machine Building, the administrative organs for the military production of rockets, nuclear weapons, electronics and the like, which he maintained in working order and under his control.[4] Though he himself came under fire, and though he had to sacrifice some lesser ministerial figures to the Red Guards, he succeeded in keeping central military production intact and was also able to protect some of the military leaders in the provinces, thus collecting loyalties that would serve him well later on.

In these conflicting roles and policies of the purge can be found some of the seeds of the later dissension within the leading factions. But it was during the subsequent rebuilding of the political structure that the conflicts sharpened.

III

Mao's original plan for the Cultural Revolution was to replace the Communist Party which had turned against him with a mass organization of his own. It appears doubtful that he had from the outset a grand design for all his actions. He may rather have had to improvise as unfavorable situations and emergencies arose. But when he decided to turn against the party, he had to provide some new institutional framework that he could control. His leading "the masses" slogan had to be given some form, especially since it became clear that most of his "little revolutionary generals," the Red Guards, were not required to belong to the party. The answer to the problem of creating a nonparty revolutionary organization responsive to himself was a "mass" structure modeled after the Paris Commune of 1871. By allegedly accepting a system that Karl Marx had once regarded as a proletarian mass organization, Mao pretended to stay within the framework of Marxism – though he quietly abandoned Lenin's party concept.

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[3] For a detailed analysis of Chou's role in the campaigns of the Red Guards and the power seizure during the winter of 1966-1967, see Thomas W. Robinson, "Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution in China," in Thomas W. Robinson, editor, *The Cultural Revolution in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 178-215.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 198-210.

References to the Paris Commune of 1871 were introduced in a *Red Flag* article on March 24, 1966, and this was later reproduced in *Peking Review*.[5] According to the author, the principle of the Paris Commune constituted the basic theory of the proletarian revolution. In Paris, the proletariat had taken up arms and had directly engaged its enemy in a struggle to seize political power. The article dwelt with great emphasis on the link between the proletariat and the armed forces, and next stressed what may have been the main reason for Mao's interest in the Paris Commune, the fact that this was a proletarian revolution without a communist party. In spite of "reactionary slanders" criticizing the Commune because of the absence of a Marxist political party, it had been a working-class movement, as stated by Marx himself.

The description of the Commune's functions reveals Mao's own ideals for his proletarian revolution: The masses were the real masters. They elected representative members by universal suffrage, and made them subject to recall at any time. They were organized on a wide scale, and discussed important matters. They carefully checked on the work of the Commune, and the elected members paid great attention to the views of the masses and attended their meetings. All this was in contrast to the privilege system established by the "leading clique of Khrushchev revisionists," who had completely ignored the important experience of the Paris Commune.

Not long after this article had laid the theoretical foundation, the political basis for the acceptance of the Paris Commune system was established in Article 9 of the sixteen-point decision regarding the Cultural Revolution formalized on August 8, 1966.[6] This fitted into Mao's strategy of a direct approach to the masses through their fanatical indoctrination in the Thought of Mao Tse-tung.

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[5] See Cheng Chih-szu, "The Great Lessons of the Paris Commune," *Red Flag*, March 24, 1966; *Peking Review*, April 1, 8 and 15, 1966.

[6] The respective paragraphs read:

"It is necessary to institute a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune, for electing members to the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates to the cultural revolutionary congresses. The lists of candidates should be put forward by the revolutionary masses after full discussion and the elections should be held after the masses have discussed the lists over and over again.

"The masses are entitled at any time to criticize members of the cultural revolutionary groups and committees and delegates elected to the cultural revolutionary congresses. If these members or delegates prove incompetent, they can be replaced through election or recalled by the masses after discussion." *Peking Review*, August 12, 1966, p. 10.

On January 1, 1967, when the time to seize power appeared to be at hand, a *Red Flag* editorial called for the establishment of people's communes on the Paris model. The communes were to be controlled by the proletariat, which would elect its representatives and could recall them. In this way, Mao's proletarian revolutionists could indeed replace the party.

Several attempts were made in January and February to establish such communes. The most important, the Shanghai Commune, was formally set up on February 5, 1967 by a number of Maoist revolutionary groups, but soon abandoned. Another was established on February 16 in Harbin, as reported by Harbin radio. On February 13, wall posters in Peking announced that Hsieh Fu-chih was heading a Peking people's commune, which seems, however, never to have become operative. A February 7 attempt to form a commune in Honan Province was opposed by the PLA.[7] Mao's plan to introduce a Paris Commune-type political structure was thus abortive wherever it was tried. Why did it fail?

The most instructive case for evaluating the experiment was Shanghai. A Shanghai People's Commune was actually established at a mass rally of one million rebels, revolutionary people and the PLA on February 5, 1967, only to be abandoned with considerable embarrassment on February 24 at another "Oath-taking Rally for holding high the Great Red Banner of Mao Tse-tung Thought and further developing the Struggle for Seizure of Power." What had happened in between?

The key figures in the Shanghai episode were Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan. Following their attack on the anti-Maoist party writers and leaders, they had participated in the August Central Committee meeting in Peking and were then entrusted with the revolutionary takeover in Shanghai and sent there in January 1967. The Maoist takeover was made possible through the support of the Shanghai garrison commander, Liao Cheng-kuo, and his officers, and that of commanders of naval and air force units stationed in Shanghai. They were backed up by two additional PLA units sent to the Shanghai-Nanking area.

The main problem appears to have been the question of sufficient support from the workers in Shanghai who had been organized by the contending forces. The Maoist workers were only a small minority of several thousand, while the "Workers' Red Militia" organized under the Party Municipal Committee (but with military aid) numbered 800,000.[8] These worker militias cut off water, electricity and communications and created chaos until they were brought in line after the party offices were taken over by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao with military support. But when the commune was set up, the Maoists had obviously overreached themselves. Whether a system based on a mass movement could be established by a minority of the so-called masses was shown to be questionable. More questionable still was the assumption that the PLA officers who had been instrumental in establishing the revolutionary authority and who had now become a dominant force could be expected to abandon their newly gained role in favor of a hazy concept of authority that promised continued anarchy.

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[7] Parris H. Chang, "China's Revolutionary Committees: Two Case Studies, Heilungkiang and Honan," *Current Scene,* June 1, 1968.

The importance of the military was crucial since they had a hand in organizing the "revolutionary rebel" units of young workers who, replacing the Red Guards as the attack forces, were to carry Mao's revolution first to the factories and eventually to the educational institutions. These largely uneducated "workers and poor peasants [making up] Mao-Thought indoctrination teams" were used by the PLA as political shock troops and moved into factories, rural communes and offices in small teams "in an organized and planned fashion," accompanied by military personnel.[9] It was these teams, not the Red Guards, that accomplished the seizure of power in the rural and urban communities, in industry and agriculture, and ultimately in the educational institutions. They restored order in Shanghai. If there was resistance to the new Paris Commune-type structure, it must have come from these groups under their military leadership.

The decision on the kind of future institutional order to be established was obviously of utmost importance. Before abandoning his dream of the Paris Commune, Mao invited Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and Yao Wen-yüan to Peking to question them and review the commune problem. According to Red Guard papers and Chang's report, he was asking for them before they reached the airport and was waiting at his door to greet them. He had several lengthy talks with them and was "highly concerned about and understood Shanghai." Mao "subsequently summoned and presided over meetings of the Central Committee, at which the question of Shanghai and other work was discussed and a series of decisions was issued," and on the eve of their return to Shanghai, he again received Chang and Yao.[10]

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[8] According to a report by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao quoted in Kung Kung-shih, "Chang Ch'un-ch'iao chung-pai su-hsiu," *Chan Wang* (Hong Kong), August 1, 1969, pp. 22-23.

[9] See *China News Analysis* (Hong Kong), January 20, 1967, p. 3.

Thus, when Chang and Yao returned to Shanghai on February 23, the decision had been made in Peking to discard the Shanghai commune organization and transform it into a Revolutionary Committee, the structure adopted for the entire country as the new political system. It was left to Chang to explain the change at a mass rally on February 24. This he did with rather forced arguments.[11] Then, however, he noted that a real takeover, not merely of buildings but of a functioning government, required the backing of military power and the expertise of the cadres. From this explanation one may infer that both the military and the Chou faction had balked at Mao's commune plan.[12]

The result of the failed experiment was a compromise in which each faction was to participate. The new structure would consist of Revolutionary Committees formed by three elements – the so-called three-in-one combination. The military would provide the power leverage, the "revolutionary" cadres the professional expertise, and the Maoist revolutionaries – the Red Guards – the "political left" ingredient. The shift to the Revolutionary Committees was therefore not only to the advantage of the military, but also of benefit to Chou's faction representing the cadres and the experts.

The three-in-one combination fell short of being a lasting compromise, however. The Red Guards were for the most part eliminated, sent to the countryside to "merge with the peasants," and told to carry on the Maoist revolution there. The Revolutionary Committees in practice became a two-in-one combination of the military and the "revolutionary" cadres, and the military emerged as the dominant factor, as indicated by their proportional participation in the Central Committee and as chairmen, deputy chairmen and members of the Revolutionary Committees.[13] When party core groups were formed within the Revolutionary Committees, the same military leaders combined their administrative positions with new functions as party secretaries, replacing the traditional communist system of divided hierarchies.

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[10] See *Survey of Mainland China Press* (*SMCP*), March 27, 1968, p. 2.

[11] Mao had allegedly indicated that if the country set up communes, the Chinese People's Republic would have to change its name to the Chinese People's Commune, and Chairman Mao would become a Commune Director. Chang, however, pointed out that there would also be the question of recognition or nonrecognition by foreign countries, i.e., the Soviet Union, and that a party was still needed (see *ibid.*, pp. 1-10). How much the Maoist faction would have preferred the Paris Commune system can be seen from a statement made by Yao Wen-yüan at a Red Guard reception in Peking as late as April 1967, when he described the Revolutionary Committees as only temporary organs of power, whereas the Cultural Revolution Committee and groups "which came after" were of mass nature and permanent; "the former cannot use the Paris Commune method of election, but the latter can."

[12] According to Chang: "In Shanghai the vast majority of over 600 cadres holding the rank of department heads, and of over 6,000 cadres with the rank of section chiefs, were good, and those rebel organizations who had done away with section chiefs had been wrong. Chairman Mao had explicitly stated: 'We shall not be able to survive for a few days if we do away with even deputy section heads.'" *Ibid.*, p. 4.

IV

The predominance of the military in this new order might not have created a crisis had it not been that Lin Piao clearly overreached himself. In a letter to Chiang Ch'ing allegedly written by Mao Tse-tung on July 8, 1966,[14] Mao accuses his "friend" – Lin Piao – of having built up the Mao cult beyond all proportion. He even states that "they," obviously the Lin Piao group, want "to overthrow our Party and myself." Whether such a letter was written by Mao at that time is not certain. But the suspicion that Lin Piao was using Mao for his own final ascent to power may well have been in Mao's mind from the outset of the Cultural Revolution. Like Stalin, Mao appears to have become more wary with age. The letter, whether written in 1966 in this form or at all, seems to be genuine, however, as regards Mao's thinking in 1972. Its whole tenor is based on a *Weltanschauung* assuming continuous conspiracies and purges occurring in cycles of seven or eight years, with Mao alone as *der ruhende Punkt in der Erscheinung Flucht* (the stable center in the flight of events). Nothing could demonstrate better than this letter that Mao, despite his denial of his own "fantastic magic," regarded himself as the only source of truth.

Mao's suspicion of Lin Piao as another challenger to his supreme power might have developed at that time, July 1966. The failure of the Paris Commune system in January 1967 and the probable opposition to it by Lin Piao and the military would have sharpened this suspicion. But Mao then had no choice. The use of the PLA and the Cult of Mao had plainly been his strategy; if the instrument he used got out of hand, he would have to bide his time and discard it later.

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[13] The term "three-in-one combination" was not abandoned—such terms rarely are—but was explained as a teaming up of "the old, the middle-aged and the young."

[14] See text and reference in Chinese Information Service, *Background on China,* B 72-76 (New York, November 16, 1972).

The main factor that forced an abortive end to the power struggle of the Cultural Revolution was the Soviet threat. The buildup, over a year and a half, of forty-nine fully equipped Soviet divisions (close to a million men) along the Chinese borders of Manchuria, Mongolia and Turkestan undoubtedly frightened the Chinese leadership, especially after the Czechoslovakian invasion demonstrated that the Soviets might be in earnest in maintaining both communist orthodoxy and their supremacy. The situation was far too serious to permit a new power struggle at the top, least of all involving the Minister of Defense and his coterie in the central military hierarchy.

The Ninth Chinese Communist Party Congress in April 1969 therefore saw Lin Piao and his supporters at the height of their power. The new party statutes established Mao as leader and Lin as Mao's successor, denoting a "monarchical" rather than a communist system in Soviet judgment. Everywhere propaganda posters and pictures portrayed Mao together with Lin Piao, closest comrade-in-arms, anointed successor and most qualified interpreter of Mao Tse-tung Thought.

But Lin's strength could already be understood as shadowy and shallow. Though he manipulated the Mao cult, his own charismatic appeal was questionable, his language dull and crude. The power he commanded was more on the surface than in depth, not comparable to the hold Chou, his presumed major rival, exercised over central and, where possible, regional administrations. Most important, Lin was not fully in control of the whole military establishment. The leaders of the former Second and Third Field Armies, men like Ch'en Hsi-lien in Manchuria, Hsü Shih-yü in Nanking, Li Teh-sheng in Anhwei, or lesser figures in West and Central China were not beholden to Lin. In the end, it was more a game of military and secret police action than an organizational power struggle that cost Lin Piao his life.

However, the showdown had to wait until the ominous danger of Soviet intervention was less acute. A new foreign policy was mandatory. It began with the meeting between Kosygin and Chou En-lai at Peking airport in September 1969, initiating Sino-Soviet negotiations that had limited success but took some of the sting out of the conflict. In April 1970 Chou moved to counter the danger of Soviet encirclement by opening new lines of cooperation with Pyongyang and establishing Peking's guardian role over the "peoples of Indochina." China became host to deposed Sihanouk, strengthened its support to Hanoi, and offered to be the "reliable rear area" for communist revolutionaries on its northeastern and southern flanks. Then, as the response to the U.S. initiative seeking more agreeable relations was taken up by Peking, the successor struggle in the regime moved into its final stage.

V

From an alleged report of talks given by Mao Tse-tung on a journey between mid-August and September 12, 1971, and from other documents supposedly circulated among the Chinese communist leaders, we may conjecture the background of this power struggle.[15] The accounts are *post facto* and their reliability in describing events is suspect. Many of the accusations heaped on Lin Piao seem implausible and much is obviously omitted. The framework of events, however, appears plausible enough, and the style of the accounts as well as the description of the tactics applied are unmistakably Mao's.

To Mao the battle with Lin was a continuation of the struggles of the past, which he recounts with the satisfaction of the winner. The conflict between the two lines, the proletarian and the bourgeois, with Mao cast as the infallible defender of the proletarian faith, and his enemies as the bourgeois spoilers, is, in his view, a never-ending battle that recurs in regular cycles. If throughout the Cultural Revolution he was wary of Lin's use of the Mao cult for his own ends, and was unhappy about the failure of his Paris Commune plan and the over-powerful role of the military under Lin, now the time had come for action.

The opportunity was the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee Meeting at Lushan in August 1970. The issue was the cult and Mao's (projected eventually to heir Lin Piao's) appointment to Chairmanship of the Republic. Mao laid down the challenge by declaring: "Someone is seeking the state chairmanship and attempting to split the party and seize power." The someone was Lin Piao, but the surrogate was Ch'en Po-ta, Mao's long-time supporter and secretary, who may have sided with Lin in the exaggerated expansion of the cult. Although Ch'en became the first victim of the new purge, the main fire was clearly directed against Lin Piao and his faction. According to Mao, the Lin faction had moved to propose the creation of the state chairmanship without consulting or informing Mao beforehand, thus seeking to force his hand.

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[15] See *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), July 1972, pp. 95-97.

The immediate clash focused on the extravagant use of the word "genius" by Lin, who claimed (again according to Mao) that a genius had appeared only once in the world in the last several hundred years, and in China in the last several thousand years. Mao pointed to Marx, Engels and Lenin, and to Sun Yat-sen, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan and other great men in China in appearing to disclaim the reference to himself as a "genius," but at the same time he did not want the term to be dropped. It should rather, he maintained, be connected with the party, on which "a genius must rely."

While censoring Lin Piao, Mao thus soothed the party cadres and Chou En-lai. To pacify this group further, he added that only one per cent of all cadres were bad and no more than three per cent questionable, and that not all "good cadres" had yet been rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution. In his attack on Lin's military clique, he clearly sought the support of Chou's party group, and later he stated openly that the suppression of the Lin Piao faction had only been possible with Chou En-lai's support.

There is no indication – even in the material subsequently circulated by the Central Committee – that the aborted move by the Lin faction at the Second Plenum was actually directed against Mao. That it was meant to strengthen the faction's position for the succession is less debatable, and one may even wonder whether Chou's hand could not be discerned behind the power play.

The next moves were described thus by Mao: "I adopted three measures: one was to cast stones, one to blend with sand and one to dig up the cornerstone." The casting of stones led to the purge of Ch'en Po-ta with the help of the Thirty-eighth Army and the Tsinan Military Region. The blending with sand was Mao's jocose reference to packing the Military Affairs Committee (MAC) with men more dependent on him than on Lin Piao. And the digging up of the cornerstone was the reorganization of the Peking Military Region.[16] The latter was accomplished at the North China meeting in December 1970, when Mao had obviously obtained enough support within and outside the MAC to remove the commander and the political commissar of the Peking Military Region, Cheng Wei-shan and Li Hsüeh, respectively, who were presumed to be Lin Piao supporters, and replace them with officers he and Chou En-lai could rely on. All these measures dealt with and affected the use of military force, the decisive issue in this struggle. Mao had to take direct military command out of Lin's hand and put it in his own.

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[16] *Ibid.*, September 1972, p. 68, and the *New York Times*, December 17, 1972.

Yet, seemingly, the Lin Piao faction acted to counter the danger only when it had already been accused of following the bourgeois line, castigated for its "ideological mistakes," deprived of its military support at the center, and openly threatened with a purge. We have fragmentary documents allegedly circulated by the victors to justify their actions in the blood-purge of Lin and his group. According to one account, Lin Piao, his wife Yeh Ch'ün, and his son Lin Li-kuo met in Soochow in February 1971 to "map a counterrevolutionary plot." In the fragmentary document, 571 *Kung-ch'eng chi-yao,* the Central Committee disclosed some details of the conspirators' plans. Both documents dealt with military action, mainly planned by Lin Li-kuo, and involved Lin Piao only to the degree of having ordered "a plan" made. The proposed action assumes different scenarios, from open takeover in the Shanghai area to retreat into the mountains for guerrilla warfare in case of failure. Chief support was to come from air force units, commanded by former Fourth Field Army officers, and other units apparently trusted by the conspirators.

There is no way today to check on these Maoist accusations. In essence, much of the plan appears plausible enough – though it is doubtful that the assassination or destruction of Mao was contemplated. Most surprising, however, if the documents are genuine, is Mao's willingness to circulate among his supporters some of the conspirators' allegations which can only be regarded as damning statements. Mao is described as

> always playing off one side against another, today using this group to attack that group, and tomorrow vice versa. Today he is saying sweet things to one group and tomorrow he condemns them to death for a non-existent crime; today he treats them as honored guests, and tomorrow they are cast into prison. For the past several decades, has anyone whom he has pulled up not been sentenced to a political death later on? . . .

His major policies are likewise bitterly attacked:

> The send-down program for intellectual youths is nothing but labor reform under another name.
>
> The Red Guards were hoodwinked, utilized, and turned into cannon-fodder during the first half of the Cultural Revolution, and were the scapegoats during the second half.
>
> In the simplification of government agencies, sending cadres to the May 7 cadre school was equivalent to compulsory unemployment.

Freezing the wages of workers (especially young workers) is nothing more than exploitation in disguise.[17]

Apparently what mattered to Mao was control of the PLA as the source of actual power. In his "talks" during August-September 1971, he claimed to have taunted Huang Yung-sheng, the Chief of Staff, and leading supporter of Lin Piao, about Huang's inability to enlist military support.[18] By that time, Mao must have felt quite sure of his control over the unit commanders of the army. It was Lin Piao's "command" of the PLA, leaving Mao only the prestige of being its "creator," that proved to be his undoing. With strong suspicions of being used as a figurehead, Mao decided to take command into his hands alone.[19]

VI

The coup, which reached its dramatic climax at the meeting of the Central Committee on September 11 or 12, 1971, is still shrouded in mystery. The official story of Lin Piao's death in a plane crash in Mongolia is not convincing, nor have Mongol and Soviet statements that the bodies found at the crash site belong to younger men been disproved. The alleged confessions of lesser participants, the story of the intercepted helicopter flight to Canton, may or may not be true. Yet from the terse acknowledgments emanating from Peking, we can assume that Lin Piao is dead, his faction shattered, its members arrested or killed. How the discoveries, the arrests and the elimination of Lin and his family were possible becomes a matter of speculation. Wang Tung-hsing, the head of Mao's personal security staff, must have played a key role with or without the cooperation of Chou En-lai, who has had his own training and experience in secret police work.

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[17] Document of the CCP Central Committee, *Chung Fa* (1972), No. 4, in *Issues and Studies,* May 1972, pp. 77-83.

[18] "I don't think our army will rebel, nor do I believe that you, Huang Yung-sheng, can command the Liberation Army to rebel. There are divisions and regiments under the army; there are also commanding headquarters, political and logistics departments. Will they all listen to you?" *Issues and Studies,* September 1972, p. 69.

[19] Perhaps for this reason no new PLA commander has appeared following Lin Piao's purge. The position of Minister of Defense has not yet been filled. Yeh Chien-ying, of Chou En-lai's faction, is merely Acting Minister of Defense. Furthermore, Yeh carries out Mao's orders as Vice-Chairman of the MAC, of which Mao is Chairman and to which he has added some of his close supporters, rather than in his role as Acting Defense Minister, which is part of the administration under Chou. The general staff, the army's general political department and the general logistics department are also directly responsible to the MAC, not to the Ministry of Defense. For the time being Mao thus appears to be in firm control of the military, in spite of—or perhaps because of—the decimation of its leadership. See Chien Tieh, "A Study of a Document Concerning the Lin Piao Incident," *ibid.,* p. 41 ff.

Equally to be noted here is the factionalism within the PLA. The purge affected almost exclusively officers of the former Fourth Field Army, Lin Piao's own. The Second and Third Field Army groups may gain from the loss of their military competitors. Their leaders, men like Ch'en Hsi-lien and Hsü Shih-yü, and especially Li Teh-sheng, either kept out of the struggle or were from the outset more attached to Mao than to Lin. Officers of this group were obviously willing to replace Lin's men in Peking and provide the military backing for Mao's coup.

By January 1973 it appeared that the purge of Lin Piao had been successful without major disruption of the political and administrative fabric of the regime. In retrospect, this was a formidable operation in which a number of factors favored Mao's plans. Of primary importance must have been Chou En-lai's tacit or open support. Without a rebuilt administrative structure and the readiness of its head and its members to accept their part in taking over, the military control system established by Lin Piao could not easily have been eliminated. Chou's following among the PLA – Yeh Chien-ying, Nieh Jung-chen and others – should have facilitated the shift.

But the chief credit must be given to Mao himself, that master of the game who boasts of his acts with grim humor, both for the earlier purge of Liu Shao-ch'i and now Lin Piao's. In Lin's case not only was the planning, the psychological operation, the trapping of victims and the military execution of the purge superbly carried through; the timing was also more than a matter of good fortune. The Sino-Soviet tension had abated, frontier incidents no longer occurred, and while built-up Soviet military forces remained in place on the frontiers, politically and ideologically the Maoist attacks against the propagators of the extreme Mao cult could not easily be disapproved by Moscow. This may explain the Soviets' inability to exploit the rapidly developing crisis to their advantage.

Lin Piao was later charged with "illicit relations with a foreign power" and accused of having intended to "surrender to Soviet social revisionism, unite with the Soviet Union and the United States, and oppose China and communism." He was also denounced for importing a large number of "secret service tools" from foreign countries.[20] But the very role he had played in building up the Mao cult made a quick shift of alignment difficult for him, while the speed of Mao's maneuver left little time for preparation in Moscow to back this Chinese military faction if indeed Soviet leaders wanted to be involved. At the same time, the moves for a normalization of relations between the Chinese People's Republic and the United States greatly strengthened Mainland China's international position. Thus a dangerous game was successfully played in the skillful exploitation of a complex domestic and international situation.

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[20] *Ibid.*

VII

The post-Cultural Revolution scene in China is considerably changed. The military leadership has been decimated, and though the PLA still predominates in the Revolutionary Committees and the new party positions, there is no commanding military personality who could challenge the Maoist supremacy. On the other hand, Chou's faction has gained in the new party-army conglomerate and Chouist policy is in the ascendancy.

The purge has led to a complete shift in domestic and foreign policy. In the economic sphere, more emphasis is being placed on production and incentive. Private plots in agriculture and work-points according to labor performed are again being stressed. In foreign policy the intention is apparently to maintain an independent line, balancing between the Soviet Union, Japan and the United States, and dealing in regular diplomatic and economic relations with the governments of the Afro-Asian world, over which the People's Republic claims leadership — without abandoning the identifiably communist ideological and organizational support of revolutionary wars and terrorist activities. Nuclear development and the military buildup continue, and so does the militarization of the population.

On the surface at least, there has been no letup in the political and intellectual control of the mass of people. It is astounding for anyone not familiar with the workings of a totalitarian system to observe the seeming ease with which a people can be prevented from questioning the rapid shifts of course in almost all fields of life and convinced to accept the official dictum regarding events as well as personal behavior. To induce whole sections of the population to rebel when rebellion is called for and submit again when ordered is no mean accomplishment. Yet one wonders how deeply indoctrination has penetrated the minds of people living under this system, and how stable the present power structure actually is.

There is no reason to assume that the power struggle and the purges have ended. This is not even suggested by Mao himself. Fissures remain in the political structure. As in the past, one may speculate about factional groupings. The Maoists, i.e., Chiang Ch'ing, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan, some military supporters like Li Teh-sheng, and the Maoist security apparatus under Wang Tung-hsing, have been strengthened by victory over Lin Piao's faction. Chou En-lai and his supporters, including many cadres and scientists who were persecuted or under a cloud during the Cultural Revolution, appear to be in closer control of the administration. In expanding his power until he became the main architect of economic, military, industrial and foreign policy, Chou seems so far to have escaped Mao's suspicion; perhaps this accounts for his obvious attempt to avoid the number-two spot in official listings.[21] Currently, these two organizational groups at the center may be cooperating as did the Maoists, the Chouists and the Lin Piaoists until recently.

The problem of unity is, of course, not limited to the center. As a result of the Cultural Revolution, the organizations in the military regions and the provinces have gained in importance. A study of regional military and political administrations reveals a wide variety of past connections and present attitudes in applying Peking's shifting line. Aside from military and party officials who owe their careers to demonstrated loyalty to one of the two main factions, former intimates of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao still hold some important posts. The Lin Piao purge, though it has affected approximately forty leading military officials at the center, has by no means been carried through in the provinces. Regional military leaders of the former Second and Third Field Armies, for example, avoided siding with any group in the Cultural Revolution until events demonstrated the stronger side. They may well be cautious again.

The question of future leadership remains unanswered. Any system that depends so decidedly on the life or death of one or two men cannot be regarded as stable. Mao's life span and his continued mental ability are unpredictable variants — as is the future after his death. We cannot assume that Chou En-lai will necessarily survive Mao. Will there be a collective leadership, as Chou assures us, when it so clearly did not work before? If we cannot foresee the leadership, it is even more difficult to envisage the main line of future policy. Will the Cult of Mao survive the leader? How deeply has their indoctrination penetrated the thinking of the majority or even a strong minority of the Chinese people? How strong is the alienation in the masses which, according to the Maoists, the Lin Piao group tried to exploit? Will an orthodox Marxism-Leninism be reintroduced under Chou En-lai? Is the new emphasis on the communist classics a trend in that direction? Or will there be a strengthening of Chinese tradition, a "nationalism" under whatever name? Will there be a violent power struggle, even a breakup of unity? Any of these potential developments could be argued, and any could decisively affect foreign as well as domestic policies.

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[21] Chou's recent comment to a group of American journalists, naming Yao Wen-yüan as one of the younger men in the line of succession, could be interpreted in several ways.

There remains the Soviet military buildup along the Chinese border. It has been a threat and leverage for Soviet political pressure. The situation is now static, but would it be too far-fetched to assume that, in anticipation of an uncertain future following the death or decline of Mao, this military force remains in position to effect either an understanding between Moscow and Peking or an intervention in Chinese affairs?

SALT II: THE SEARCH FOR A FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

by Joseph Kruzel

SHORTLY after 11:30 p.m. on May 26, 1972, in Moscow, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed the first agreements to impose limits on strategic arms. It was fitting that this historic moment should have occurred so close to midnight. The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (now *Science and Public Affairs*) has traditionally measured mankind's nearness to nuclear catastrophe in terms of minutes before midnight on its "doomsday clock." To commemorate the signing of the SALT agreements, the *Bulletin's* doomsday clock was moved back two minutes. It now stands at twelve minutes to midnight.

Not everyone shared the *Bulletin's* endorsement of the initial SALT agreements. The ABM Treaty garnered some adverse comment, but most critics reserved their special wrath for the Interim Agreement on strategic offensive systems. Paul Warnke, a former Defense Department official who participated in the original planning for SALT, said he believed the Interim Agreement was "slightly worse than no agreement at all."[1] Other witnesses who testified before Congress were considerably harsher in their criticism, and almost no one except the officials who negotiated it had any kind words to say on behalf of the agreement on offensive forces.

The Nixon Administration anticipated much of this unfavorable reaction. The temporary nature of the Agreement is evidence that the White House realized such limitations would not be acceptable as a longer-term settlement. Although President Nixon may have been unhappy with the document, he was publicly committed to negotiating agreements on offensive as well as defensive forces. The Interim Agreement, however disappointing, at least fulfilled that commitment.

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[1] Warnke's statement is contained in United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements* (92nd Congress, 2nd Session), p. 179. Other relevant hearings were conducted by the United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, and published as *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* (92nd Congress, 2nd Session). An excellent and highly readable description of the SALT I negotiations, written by John Newhouse, is entitled *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

At first reading the Agreement, along with its associated protocol, agreed understandings and unilateral statements, may seem hopelessly complex, but the substantive provisions of the entire package are in fact quite simple.[2] The Agreement limits each side to the number of launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) that were operational and under construction when it was signed. A supplemental provision permits each side some right to replace old ICBM's with new SLBM's. The United States is allowed 1,054 ICBM's and 656 SLBM's, with the option of retiring 54 old ICBM's and adding the same number of SLBM's. The Soviet Union has 1,618 ICBM's and 740 SLBM's, with the right to trade in up to 210 old land-based missiles for new sea-based missiles. These are the only substantive limitations contained in the Interim Agreement. All the other provisions either clarify, supplement or elaborate these basic limitations.

Congressional opposition to the Agreement was led by Senator Henry Jackson, one of the most knowledgeable men in the Senate on defense issues. Jackson also wields considerable influence in the Nixon White House on such matters, as he amply demonstrated during the course of SALT I. His influence waned only in the final days of negotiation when the President decided definitely to conclude the agreements. Perhaps this loss of influence at a critical point explains the Senator's highly publicized displeasure with the SALT accords.

Jackson's central objection was that the Interim Agreement signified a voluntary and formal U.S. acceptance of numerical inferiority in each class of weapons limited. The United States granted the Soviet Union a three-to-two superiority in ICBM's, and an advantage of well over 100 sea-based missiles. Even in the trade-off option the Soviets came out ahead: they could exchange four times as many old ICBM's for new SLBM's as the United States.

The Nixon Administration conceded Jackson's point but tried to minimize its significance. Officials emphasized the great U.S. advantage in nonlimited systems such as heavy bombers and the number of missile warheads. They repeatedly stressed that the Agreement would impose significant limitations on Soviet strategic forces without affecting any ongoing U.S. strategic programs. In his address to Congress on the results of the Moscow summit meeting, President Nixon declared his belief that the Interim Agreement was a good bargain. Over the next five years, he said, the Agreement would forestall a major new round in the arms race that otherwise "would have worked to our disadvantage since we have no current building program for the categories of weapons which have been frozen and since no new building program could have produced any new weapons in those categories during the period of the freeze."[3] The real issue, as the Administration saw it, was not U.S. inferiority under the terms of the Agreement, but the even greater inferiority that would have obtained later in the 1970's had there been no interim accord. In any case, the agreement on strategic missiles was a temporary measure. Negotiations began almost immediately to replace it with a more comprehensive and equitable accord.

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[2] The complete texts of the SALT agreements, the agreed interpretations, and the unilateral statements by the two sides can be found in the *New York Times*, June 14, 1972, p. 18.

During the first six months after SALT II convened in Geneva on November 21, 1972, the two sides devoted themselves largely to exploratory discussions. It became clear during these early talks that some framework was needed to guide the negotiations. Without such a framework, SALT II could easily be reduced to a forum for unproductive exchanges of propaganda. When Secretary Brezhnev visited the United States in June 1973, the two sides agreed that a statement of general principles could give new impetus to the stalled negotiations. Accordingly, the "Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" were signed on June 21, 1973 with both leaders expressing the hope that these new guidelines would establish a framework making it possible to reach agreement sometime in 1974.[4]

The two delegations have since returned to Geneva, and presumably are hard at work on their appointed task of converting the Interim Agreement into a permanent treaty. What should we expect from their deliberations? What are the issues confronting the two sides in SALT II, and what are the prospects for negotiating mutually acceptable solutions to these issues?

Arms Control Policymaking

A first clue to U.S. intentions in SALT II may come from examining the machinery for arms control decision-making in the U.S. government. How the Nixon Administration goes about making and executing arms control policy, and especially the changes made in that process since SALT I, furnish some indication of its general attitude toward the new round of SALT. Two changes are immediately apparent: one relates to the U.S. delegation negotiating at SALT II; the other concerns a realignment of arms control responsibilities within the Washington bureaucracy.

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[3] President Nixon's address is reprinted in *ibid.*, June 2, 1972, p. 3.

[4] See *ibid.*, June 22, 1973, p. 12, for the text of the "Basic Principles."

The most notable feature of the SALT II delegation is the conspicuous absence of holdovers from SALT I. Of the five full-time senior officials on the first U.S. delegation, only one — Paul Nitze — retained his position. Nitze, who represents the Secretary of Defense, has had a long and distinguished career of public service. His continued tenure on the delegation may be more a reflection of his reputation in Washington than of the Administration's desire to maintain continuity in SALT. Some turnover in personnel was certainly to have been expected; SALT I lasted nearly three years, and many delegation members were eager to move on to less frenetic endeavors. The number of new faces in SALT II is too large to be a matter of pure chance, however. It is a poorly kept secret in Washington that a mini-purge was conducted by the White House, at Senator Jackson's urging, in a deliberate attempt to start SALT II with a new team of officials unsullied by association with SALT I.

Ambassador Gerard Smith, who headed the U.S. delegation at SALT I, resigned in January 1973. Although Smith had been in government for four full years and well deserved a rest, close associates feel that he might have stayed on the job had it not been for the "shabby treatment" he received from Kissinger and Nixon after the signing of the first SALT agreements.[5] Smith's successor as chief U.S. negotiator is U. Alexis Johnson, a career diplomat close to retirement who has had no previous experience in arms control and manifests no particular enthusiasm for it. Johnson's appointment has been interpreted as another part of the Administration's strategy to develop a tougher bargaining stance with the Soviet Union.

During his four years in Washington, Smith served simultaneously as head of the SALT delegation and as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Johnson has assumed only Smith's role as top negotiator. In the future, the chairmanship of the delegation and the directorship of ACDA will be in separate hands — an organizational change that may have significant implications for arms control.

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[5] *Ibid.*, January 5, 1973, p. 3.

The new director of ACDA is Fred Iklé, a former Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who came to ACDA from the RAND Corporation. Iklé has long been interested in issues of arms control and nuclear strategy, and shortly before his appointment he wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?"[6] Essentially the article challenged the traditional strategic doctrine of assured destruction lying at the foundation of the initial SALT agreements. Americanologists in the Kremlin must surely be pondering what lies behind the appointment of such a strategic Doubting Thomas to the top arms control post in the U.S. government.

ACDA has lost not only its dominant role in the arms talks; it has also suffered a drastic cut in its new budget. The agency's appropriation for Fiscal Year 1974 is almost one-third less than its budget for the preceding year. In addition, several top-level assistants and political appointees — some of whom have been with ACDA since its founding — have been told to look for new jobs. As might be expected, the agency's loss runs deeper than men and money. The morale of those who have stayed on is disastrously low.

These organizational changes do not in themselves determine U.S. policy for SALT II, and there is a danger of reading too much into them. However, one thing is clear. The new delegation and its bureaucratic tail in Washington have interpreted the changes as a signal from the White House to adopt a more cautious, more conservative and less independent approach than their predecessors did at SALT I.

MAJOR ISSUES

The problems the SALT II negotiators face at the bargaining table are varied and complex. The first and perhaps the most significant issue is what *qualitative* limitations should be imposed on missile technology; specifically, whether there should be any restriction on multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's). A second question is related to the first: whether the *quantitative* limits on ICBM's contained in the Interim Agreement need to be revised with an eye toward reduction of force levels. A third issue has less strategic import but may pose an even more vexing problem: what should be done about so-called forward-based systems, those U.S. forces that by virtue of their deployment around the periphery of the Soviet Union are capable of striking the USSR with nuclear weapons? A fourth issue concerns the limitations to be applied to heavy bomber aircraft, which were not limited by the Interim Agreement.

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[6] January 1973, pp. 267-285.

Three other issues of secondary importance will be discussed briefly: procedures for verification, the modernization of strategic offensive forces, and the transfer of strategic forces to third countries. While limitations on antisubmarine warfare may or may not be discussed at SALT II, they are nonetheless an important issue in arms control and deserve attention here.

A final issue is unrelated to offensive force limitations, but it has been widely discussed and may be brought up in SALT II. Under the terms of the ABM Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union are each permitted to build two ABM sites — one to protect the national capital and one to protect an ICBM field. At present each side has one site. The Soviets have one around Moscow; the United States is building a site at Grand Forks, North Dakota to protect the ICBM's deployed in that area. Many have suggested that the two sides should agree to defer construction of the second ABM site permitted by the treaty.

MIRV

MIRV was originally approved for deployment by the United States as a means of penetrating a Soviet ABM defense, if one should ever be built. The Soviets constructed only one ABM site, and by the terms of the ABM Treaty they are permitted to build only one more. Thus the system that prompted the United States to deploy MIRV's has never been built, and now, under the ABM Treaty, it never will be. Yet U.S. deployment of MIRV continues apace. The U.S. ABM program was also aborted by the treaty, but in August 1973 the USSR successfully flight-tested multiple warheads on two of its largest and newest ICBM's.

Why this continued interest in MIRV? Even the Pentagon's former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, admitted that with a treaty on ABM's there would be no need to continue MIRV deployment. The paramount motivation for continuing deployment under these circumstances (and it is no surprise that Dr. Foster failed to mention it) is that MIRV multiplies the number of enemy targets an offensive missile force can hit. One ICBM can attack as many separate targets as it has warheads — in the case of U.S. missiles, up to three targets for Minuteman; as many as fourteen for Poseidon. Yet this may be a dubious advantage. MIRV's deployed in order to penetrate an enemy ABM may be justified, but without this rationale they may be interpreted by the other side as preparation for a pre-emptive strike. In fact, former Defense Secretary Laird stated publicly that if the Soviets were to MIRV their large SS-9 ICBM, the United States could only conclude that they were going for a first-strike capability.

Given its destabilizing influence on the balance of terror, MIRV should have been at the top of the negotiating agenda for SALT I along with ABM's. Curiously, it was not. It was hardly discussed at all, and there are no limitations on MIRV in the Interim Agreement.

Both sides made proposals in SALT I to ban MIRV's, but neither side appeared interested in a frank discussion of the issue. The U.S. version called for a ban on research, development, testing, production, storage and deployment — and demanded on-site inspection as the means of verification. Even before tabling this proposal the U.S. negotiators were almost certain that the Soviet Union would reject any scheme involving on-site inspection. Since 1946 the USSR has rejected virtually every arms control proposal containing a requirement for "intrusive" inspection procedures.[7] Not only was the means of verification proposed by the United States non-negotiable, but studies within the U.S. government had also shown that on-site inspection was of little or no value as a means of monitoring a MIRV ban. The proposal was a classic example of arms control gamesmanship. Not to be outdone, the Soviets responded with a proposal of their own which they knew would be unacceptable to the Americans. It called for a ban on deployment — but not on development, testing and production of MIRV's — and no reliable means of verification. The ban would be self-monitored.

In exchanging these *pro forma* proposals, the two sides uncovered a feasible MIRV ban compromise almost midway between the plans they had put on the table. This would have banned the flight-testing as well as the deployment of MIRV's, but would not have required the on-site inspection the Soviets found unacceptable. Such a scheme would have overcome a major Soviet objection and still have provided for adequate verification. American intelligence analysts thought a flight-test ban was a much more effective method of verification than on-site inspection in any case.

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[7] The one exception was Khrushchev's apparent interest in on-site inspection as a means of verifying a nuclear test ban. However, each proposal he advanced contained other elements designed to ensure U.S. rejection. Even as a tactical ploy, the Soviets never again demonstrated a similar interest.

Although both sides were aware of this possible compromise, neither side proposed it. Perhaps the United States never tabled the proposal because by that time it was not seriously interested in a MIRV ban. The Pentagon had already begun deployment of MIRV's on land-based Minuteman III missiles and sea-based Poseidon missiles; to accept a MIRV ban at that point would have involved undoing much work that had already been done. Since no unitary warhead even existed for the Minuteman III and Poseidon, the Defense Department was not anxious to develop a new re-entry vehicle that would give it less rather than more targeting flexibility.

Why the Soviets did not propose a flight-test and deployment ban is unknown. They may have been put off by the asymmetries in technology and verification such a ban would have imposed. Since they had not at that time tested a MIRV, the United States could have been confident of Soviet compliance with a MIRV ban so long as it detected no flight tests. On the other hand, since the United States had already flight-tested a MIRV, Moscow would in effect be relying on Washington's good will (with a little help from the *New York Times* and other public watchdogs) to ensure U.S. compliance. Moreover, if the ban were ever abrogated, the Soviets would have found themselves some two or three years behind the Americans in MIRV technology.

Other explanations of Soviet reluctance are equally plausible. Perhaps they were determined to match the United States in MIRV technology before considering the idea of a ban; perhaps they had already determined to produce their own MIRV, regardless of the consequences for arms control; perhaps they were convinced that the Americans would never seriously consider such a proposal.

Whatever the reason, the opportunity for a complete MIRV ban — if it ever existed — has come and gone. The U.S. MIRV deployment begun in 1970 is now well on its way to completion. In the near future over half of our 1,000 Minuteman ICBM's will have MIRV warheads, and three-fourths of our deterrent submarines will be similarly equipped with multiwarhead Poseidon missiles. Still, the United States is known to be pressing the Soviet Union for some type of limit on MIRV's in SALT II. One of the

Nixon-Brezhnev "Basic Principles," signed in June 1973, declared that "the limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement," a laborious way of saying that a MIRV limitation is under consideration, or at least was when the "Basic Principles" were negotiated.

The successful test of a Soviet MIRV has dramatically altered the prospects for negotiating a meaningful limitation on MIRV in SALT II. It should not be seen as proof that the USSR has lost all interest in a MIRV restriction; the test program could conceivably be a Kremlin "bargaining chip." Whatever the motivation, the effect of the Soviet MIRV tests was to erase the prospect of a moratorium on future MIRV testing and to restrict severely the range of possible limitations on multiple warheads.

Two possible limitations are worth considering. The first is a ban on the flight-testing of all future generations of MIRV's. This would leave the United States with its existing force of Minuteman III and Poseidon warheads, and the Soviet Union with the first-generation multiple warheads it is now testing. Such a limitation would restrain both sides from developing more advanced, and hence more threatening, MIRV's, but at the same time it would be difficult to define and verify since divisions between MIRV "generations" are as ambiguous as the distinctions between human generations.

Another possibility, albeit a remote one, is a ban on all land-based MIRV's, including those currently deployed. Land-based missiles are the primary source of concern about MIRV; SLBM's lack the combination of accuracy and payload necessary to threaten hard targets, and they will not develop such a capability in the near future. A ban on land-based MIRV's would permit the USSR to develop sea-based multiple warheads, and permit Washington to continue plans for the new Trident missile and submarine. It would, however, require the United States to convert 550 Minuteman III missiles to single warheads — an expensive step backward which the Pentagon would strongly oppose.

Perhaps the most realistic hope for a MIRV limitation in SALT II lies not in the search for an explicit provision to include in a treaty, but in mutual realization of the instabilities that MIRV's portend. If each side acts with restraint — if, for example, the United States abjures development of more accurate MIRV's, or if the Soviet Union refrains from deploying the MIRV it has now tested — the horror of a first strike may become more remote for both countries, without their having to formalize and trade off a complex welter of technical and structural asymmetries.

ICBM's

The Interim Agreement is incorrectly thought to have established a freeze on ICBM's. Actually, ICBM's themselves are unlimited; the Agreement put a freeze only on *silos* for fixed land-based ICBM's. The missiles can be replaced, and the silos can be reinforced. Only the building of new ICBM silos and "significant" increases in the size of existing silos are specifically prohibited. This arrangement, with some minor language refinements, should provide a satisfactory basis for ICBM limitation in a follow-on offensive treaty. Neither side appears anxious to build additional fixed land-based ICBM silos. Qualitative improvements are a much more effective and cheaper means of improving an ICBM force than quantitative increases.

It is conceivable that a reduction in ICBM force levels could be negotiated at SALT II. The "Basic Principles" commit the two sides to "continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, *as well as their subsequent reduction*." The wording of this statement is probably an intentional attempt at ambiguity. It is not clear whether the negotiators will first work out an offensive treaty and then in a future round of SALT concern themselves with reductions, or whether the treaty as negotiated will provide for eventual reductions. At this point the negotiators themselves may not know. A reductions proposal was put forth by the U.S. delegation in SALT I, but at that time it met with little enthusiasm from the Soviets.

The phased reduction of ICBM's is an appealing but paradoxical proposition, and it must be approached with great care. The paradox is that if such reductions were ever agreed upon, the effect would be to place greater importance on each remaining ICBM. This no doubt would spur each side to maximize qualitative improvements. The net effect is that a limitation on MIRV's would increase the value of retaining relatively large numbers of ICBM's, thus making reductions less likely, and reductions in ICBM force levels would emphasize the qualitative importance of each remaining ICBM, making restrictions on MIRV less likely.

The reductions approach would apply to fixed land-based

ICBM's. The status of another type of ICBM — mobile instead of fixed — may present a difficult negotiating problem. At the present time neither side has operational mobile ICBM's, but a conflict developed in SALT I over how such missiles should be treated in an agreement on offensive forces. The United States declared its preference for a complete ban on mobile ICBM's, to be included in the Interim Agreement as well as in the follow-on treaty. The Soviets argued that such missiles should be exempt from the Agreement, and that specific limitations on strategic offensive forces should be discussed in SALT II. Presumably the Soviet position on mobile ICBM's is that such missiles should be permitted and subject to the same limitation as fixed ICBM's. The choice in SALT II therefore seems to be whether to ban mobile ICBM's altogether or to permit them and count them in an aggregate of strategic offensive forces.

Mobile ICBM's are one of the few issues in SALT in which the advantages and disadvantages are roughly equal for the two sides. Neither banning nor permitting such missiles would give either nation a particular unilateral advantage, and each alternative has its good and bad points. A ban on mobile ICBM's would simplify problems of verifying the number of existing missiles, but at the same time it would prohibit the development of an ICBM that would be much less vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack than its immobile brother. Allowing mobiles would complicate verification, but it would permit the option of constructing a more secure and stable strategic force.

To ban or not to ban is therefore a marginal decision, and it probably makes little strategic difference which way the final judgment goes. Opinion on this issue is divided within the U.S. government, and the same may well be true in the Soviet bureaucracy. For mobile ICBM's, the problem is not to find an acceptable solution but to settle on one. Either alternative should be acceptable to both sides.

Forward-Based Systems

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed early in SALT I that ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers were strategic forces and should be subject to limitation in a comprehensive treaty on offensive weapons. The Soviet Union also insisted that a limitation should be applied to any other systems capable, by virtue of their geographic deployment, of striking the territory of the opposing side with nuclear weapons. Although this definition of forward-based systems (FBS) suggested a broad category of weapons, in practical terms it applied only to U.S. tactical aircraft deployed in and around Europe.[8]

The issue of forward-based systems was by far the most difficult obstacle to agreement on offensive forces in SALT I. This, more than any other reason, is why there is an interim agreement rather than a permanent treaty on offensive forces. It is therefore surprising that the Nixon-Brezhnev "Basic Principles" made no reference to this major issue. One may reasonably assume that if some basic principle for dealing with FBS had been agreed upon, it would have been announced during Brezhnev's visit. The absence of any statement on FBS suggests that the subject is still a complex and troublesome issue in SALT II.

In the early days of SALT I the Soviets demanded that the United States withdraw all of its forward-based systems and destroy the bases they occupied as a precondition for reaching agreement on the central strategic forces. This was an absurd demand, as both sides knew. Eventually the Soviets modified their position, and tabled an offer permitting the United States to keep its forward-based systems but requiring "compensation" to the Soviet Union in the form of an additional number of ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers. The United States rejected this proposal, and maintained that FBS was completely beyond the scope of SALT. The U.S. delegation argued that such forces were not strategic but tactical in nature, and were based in Europe to deter an attack on NATO, not to prepare for a nuclear war with the USSR. The United States suggested that possible limitations on such forces would be more appropriate for consideration in a European forum. If such forces were raised in strategic arms negotiations, it threatened to bring up the issue of the hundreds of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MR/IRBM's) the USSR had targeted against Western Europe.

The Soviets, undeterred by this threat, persisted with their "compensation" proposal. After much deliberation, the Americans made a final compromise offer. The United States declared its willingness to sign, as part of a SALT accord, a provision stating that neither side would upset the effectiveness of an agreement on central forces through significant changes in the deployment of nonlimited systems such as U.S. FBS or Soviet MR/IRBM's. But while this was a major change in the U.S. position, it did not go far enough in meeting Soviet demands. Talks on offensive limitations were stalemated for several months. The impasse was resolved in May 1971 when President Nixon announced a "breakthrough" in the talks. Actually, however, there was no breakthrough as far as FBS was concerned, merely an agreement to defer that particular issue to follow-on negotiations.

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[8] In theory the definition of forward-based systems should include U.S. aircraft deployed in the Far East which are also capable of striking the Soviet Union. During SALT I, however, the Soviets focused their concern almost exclusively on FBS in Europe.

In SALT II the United States has apparently reverted to its hard-line position on FBS. During Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June 1973, Dr. Kissinger seemed to rule out any compromise by saying that the United States believed forward-based systems were not forces that should be included in the negotiations. Unless the Soviets have dropped their demands, it is safe to assume that the FBS issue still needs to be resolved before a treaty on offensive forces is concluded.

One enormous difficulty in working out an acceptable compromise will be the problem of specifying precise quantitative or qualitative limits. How much compensation do the Soviets want for American FBS? Surely it cannot be on a one-for-one basis: one ICBM or SLBM for each U.S. aircraft in Europe. The USSR could not seriously argue that an F-4 or F-105 fighter aircraft is as potent a weapon system as an SS-9 ICBM. Some types of U.S. tactical aircraft do not have the range to reach the Soviet Union from their bases in Western Europe; others are capable of doing so only by flying vulnerable high-altitude flight profiles that their pilots would never dream of flying under actual combat conditions. Furthermore, how would aircraft aboard carriers be figured into the equation?

Even if all these problems were somehow resolved, a host of corollary difficulties would rise to take their place. Would U.S. aircraft stationed in the Far East be subject to the same type of limitation? Once a compensation formula was agreed upon, could Washington increase the number of aircraft based in Europe in response to some crisis? Could the United States modernize its air forces in Europe if it did not increase the number?

Such questions would tax the wisdom of Solomon, who after all was only a mediator, not a negotiator. In SALT I the Soviets never made a specific proposal explaining how compensation should be determined. If they are serious about it, they will have to develop and present a detailed formula for computing compensation in SALT II. It may be, however, that they are not interested in a precise form of compensation and are simply pressing the FBS point for its negotiating advantage. They may reason that if the United States were forced to acknowledge that FBS indeed has a strategic capability, a much more stringent and precise pledge of noncircumvention could be extracted, and perhaps even an informal or implicit form of compensation.

The United States has three basic concerns in this debate: first, to ensure an American capability to respond to some possible future crisis in Europe by augmenting tactical air forces if necessary; second, to maintain the right to modernize American airpower in Europe; third and most important, to convince the NATO allies that Washington will not bargain away its commitment to the security of Western Europe in an effort to reach agreement with the USSR at SALT II. Underlying all of these concerns is the residual conviction of most American officials that FBS is *not* a strategic issue, and should never have been raised in SALT. Many are convinced that the Soviets have simply impaled the United States on a sharp debating point; for such officials it is a question of honor as much as military strategy not to concede too much on FBS.

Despite American skepticism, the issue does not appear to be irresolvable. There is no specific point on which the two sides have registered a fundamental disagreement, and with a modicum of good will on both sides some compromise solution should be possible. Whether or not this good will exists — on either side, much less on both — is a different question. The complexity of FBS is such that if either state wished deliberately to stall the talks, it could find plenty of opportunities in the intricacies of this issue for doing so.

Bombers

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed early in SALT I that heavy strategic bombers would be limited in a comprehensive agreement on offensive forces. They also agreed not to limit medium bombers, and decided which existing bombers would be considered "heavy" and which "medium." The two sides even agreed to determine the classification of future bombers on a case-by-case basis. In a reasonably painless procedure, all of the more important questions on bomber limitations were settled in SALT I. The only points left unresolved concerned such problems as how to count American bombers mothballed in the Arizona desert and what to do about the few Soviet tanker aircraft that are really converted bombers.

One new problem appears to have been raised in SALT II. The Soviet Union has brought up the subject of new types of armaments for airplanes, and the United States has reluctantly agreed to discuss the issue.[9] The source of Soviet concern is the new U.S. Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), a standoff nuclear missile for the bomber force which has a warhead equivalent in yield to a Minuteman III re-entry vehicle. It is too early to tell what sort of limitation the Soviets have in mind for such systems.

All of the currently operational heavy bombers of the United States and the Soviet Union are over ten years old, but both sides have new bombers under development. The USSR has a new swing-wing bomber named the Backfire already undergoing testing, and the first U.S. B-1 bomber is scheduled to come off the production line in 1975. There should be no question about classifying the B-1: it is an intercontinental strategic bomber by any sort of criteria, and should be limited by SALT. The Soviet Backfire, on the other hand, presents a more difficult problem.

U.S. intelligence experts estimate the unrefueled range of the Backfire to be about 3,000 miles – more than adequate for a peripheral attack role, yet not enough for an impressive intercontinental capability. Even if the Backfire is intended for peripheral attack against Europe and China, as now seems most likely, it possesses an undeniable capability to attack targets in the United States, particularly when aided by aerial refueling. How the SALT negotiators categorize the Backfire will not only be a test of the "case-by-case" basis of deciding future bomber types; it will also be a more general test of the viability of such *ad hoc* arrangements in arms control agreements.

Whether the Backfire is determined to be a heavy or medium bomber should not have a major impact on SALT. Neither side is likely to jeopardize SALT because an agreement could not be reached on the categorization of one bomber aircraft type. Airplanes are simply no longer that significant an element of strategic arms limitation. Whatever happens in other areas of arms competition, there will not be an arms race in heavy bombers. The B-1, for example, will be a replacement for the obsolescent B-52, not an addition to the bomber force. Almost 450 B-52's are still flying, and a gradual phase-down of the force is scheduled to occur over the next several years. Upward of 200 B-1's are now projected for operational service, but as costs rise the number ultimately built may be considerably lower. The Soviets currently maintain an aging fleet of less than 200 heavy bombers, with only the Backfire in sight as a possible replacement. For both sides, therefore, the total number of heavy bombers will almost certainly decline over the next several years. Cost will be a much more limiting factor than arms control.

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[9] See "Excerpts from Kissinger's Briefing on Arms Accord," *New York Times*, June 22, 1973, p. 12.

The tentative agreement reached at SALT I on heavy bombers – to count them in an aggregate of strategic offensive forces, giving each bomber a value equal to an ICBM or SLBM – appears irreversible. While for tactical reasons one side or the other may find advantage in unsettling the issue, such a move would clearly be a negotiating ploy rather than a sign of substantive dispute. Even if a proposal were discovered that both sides would prefer over the existing formula, the understandable reluctance of the two governments to reopen a closed issue might preclude its adoption.

OTHER SALT II ISSUES

Verification

Three other issues are of secondary importance in SALT II. The first is verification. In SALT I, the two sides agreed that verification would be accomplished by "national technical means." This arcane phrase refers primarily to photographic satellites, but also includes communications and electronic means of surveillance operating outside the country being inspected. There is no on-site inspection provided for in the ABM Treaty.

On the offensive side, on-site inspection is of virtually no use. As mentioned earlier, even its utility in verifying a MIRV ban is doubtful. One of the Nixon-Brezhnev "Basic Principles" states that limitations "must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means." This wording appears definitely to rule out any sort of on-site inspection in the treaty on offensive weapons.

Modernization

A second minor issue to be resolved in SALT II is the limitation to be placed on the modernization of strategic offensive forces. Here the "Basic Principles" are of little help. They declare that modernization and replacement will be permitted "under conditions which will be formulated in the agreements to be concluded." The key question is the extent to which one type of weapon can be substituted for another – whether an ICBM can be retired, for example, and a new SLBM constructed in its place.

Under the Interim Agreement, a limited right of "one-way" substitution is permitted: each side is permitted to trade in its obsolescent ICBM's for new SLBM's. However, the reverse procedure — exchanging old SLBM's for new ICBM's — is prohibited.

Of the three types of strategic offensive forces — ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers — fixed land-based ICBM's are potentially the most destabilizing. With satellite photography, each side knows the precise location of the other's ICBM's. This knowledge may under certain conditions provide the incentive for a preemptive strike to destroy the other side's missiles before they can be launched. In essence, this potential instability is the reason why a reduction of ICBM force levels may be an outcome of SALT II. It is also the reason why it would seem prudent to prohibit the substitution of new ICBM's for other strategic weapons, and even the substitution of new ICBM silos for older ones. Other types of force substitution — for example, SLBM's for heavy bombers, or heavy bombers for ICBM's — should as a general principle be permitted. The offensive treaty will have the greatest chance of enduring if it allows each side maximum flexibility to structure its strategic forces as it sees fit.

Nontransfer

The third issue concerns restrictions on the transfer of strategic weapons to third countries. The ABM Treaty contains a provision committing each party "not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components." This limitation was completely acceptable to the United States, which under no conceivable circumstances would want to build an ABM system in another country. Nor did any U.S. allies appear overly anxious to acquire an ABM capability of their own.

But while the two sides found it relatively easy to settle on an acceptable nontransfer provision relating to ABM's, the United States realized that such a provision might have serious implications if adapted for use in the offensive treaty. We have a nuclear-sharing arrangement with Great Britain which Washington presumably will want to continue for the foreseeable future, and the possibility of some future Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, however remote, further complicates the issue. Certainly if forward-based systems were in some manner limited in a follow-on agreement, the United States could not accept a nontransfer provision similar to the one contained in the ABM Treaty.

Obviously the United States does not want the ABM nontransfer provision to set a precedent for negotiations on offensive weapons. During SALT I the U.S. delegation prepared for this eventuality by stating:

> The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article [the ABM nontransfer provisions] do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.[10]

The fact that the United States felt obliged to issue such a statement suggests that at least an informal precedent has been established. The Soviets can be expected to argue long and hard for a ban on all transfers of strategic offensive weapons. It is doubtful, however, that they would insist on so sweeping a prohibition in the final offensive arms treaty. Moscow would delight in the discomfort such a prospect would cause the United States and its allies (particularly Britain and France), but it would probably not expect the United States to abandon existing transfer arrangements with its allies solely for the purpose of making progress with the Soviet Union in arms limitation.

The status of *future* transfer arrangements presents a more intractable problem. Presumably the United States would like to keep open the option of transferring nuclear materials to a joint Anglo-French force. This is not so much because Washington would like to see such a force come into being as because the decision to forgo it should be made — for obvious political reasons — by Britain and France, not by the SALT principals. For the same reasons, the USSR would undoubtedly prefer to see all future transfer arrangements prohibited.

The prospects for solving the nontransfer issue to U.S. satisfaction appear doubtful. The USSR has the advantage of a clear and consistent position; by contrast, the American position is ambiguous and complex. Time also seems to be working against the United States. Since the nontransfer provision will depend on which forces are covered by the offensive treaty, the hard bargaining on this clause cannot begin until the major elements of the treaty have been set in place. At that point, however, there may be little time or enthusiasm left for a vigorous and protracted defense of the U.S. position.

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[10] This was a unilateral statement that did not require (and did not receive) any response from the Soviets.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

One important subject that does not fall specifically under the SALT II charter is antisubmarine warfare (ASW). It was only indirectly considered at SALT I, and there are no limitations on ASW in the Interim Agreement. It was not mentioned in the Nixon-Brezhnev "Basic Principles," and a follow-on treaty could easily be concluded without making reference to it. Nonetheless, various limitations on ASW are worth considering as possible efforts at further strategic arms limitation.

The ABM Treaty, by limiting ABM's to strategically insignificant levels, has removed a potential threat to the penetrability of missile warheads. It seems only logical to consider ways of removing another potential threat – to the launching platform itself. Missile-carrying submarines have always been considered the least vulnerable of strategic forces, a distinction they will continue to enjoy for the foreseeable future. The two other elements of the strategic force triad are subject to unavoidable vulnerabilities: ICBM's and bombers can both be attacked by enemy missiles before they leave the ground; bombers also run the risk of being intercepted during flight to their targets. Submarines, on the other hand, have millions of square miles of ocean area in which to roam, and trying to find a submarine in an ocean is on a par with trying to find a needle in a haystack.

This invulnerability is a cornerstone of the assured destruction doctrine. Not only is it in the interest of each side to maintain an invulnerable sea-based deterrent; it is also in each side's interest to ensure that the other side's deterrent force is invulnerable. Despite this fact, the United States and the Soviet Union spend enormous sums of money each year trying to develop techniques for detecting each other's submarines.

In the United States two reasons are generally advanced to justify continued work on ASW:[11] the need to protect the surface navy and commercial shipping from attack submarines, and the need to guard against the possibility of a technological breakthrough in ASW by the Soviet Union. Perhaps an even more compelling reason is the solid support ASW has, not only in the Navy, but in influential sectors of industry as well.

The first reason advanced – protection of surface ships – is a legitimate naval objective. It would not interfere with a strategy of assured destruction provided there was some way to distinguish this type of ASW from that directed against ballistic-missile submarines. Analytically such a distinction is easy to make, since the ASW problem is different for the two cases. Strategic ASW involves tracking an SLBM submarine from its home port, usually through a detection barrier, and then maintaining continuous contact with it. Tactical ASW requires the establishment of a moving cordon around a convoy or naval task force and detecting enemy attack submarines that penetrate the cordon. The first technique calls for surveillance; the second, for protection.

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[11] Actual ASW techniques — those employed at present and those being developed for future use — are quite technical and need not concern us here. Those interested in a description of them should see Richard Garwin's article, "Antisubmarine Warfare and National Security," in *Scientific American*, July 1972, p. 14.

The need to guard against a technological breakthrough by the other side is also a legitimate strategic objective, and one which in practical terms is consistent with a strategy of assured destruction. By continuing research on ASW techniques, each side can increase confidence in the virtual invulnerability of its SLBM force. ASW research is in a sense an insurance premium paid to safeguard the invulnerability of the SLBM fleet. Theoretically the ideal solution would be to ban all research on strategic ASW, but such a ban could never be verified, and neither side would have confidence that the ban was being observed by the other party. Thus, there seems to be no realistic alternative to permitting unimpeded ASW research. The problem is that research of this sort tends to develop its own momentum, and the increasing pressure to proceed with deployment becomes difficult to resist. The erroneous notion of putting sunk costs to good use should not be used to justify deployment — as it so often has been in the past.

For arms control purposes an ideal curb on ASW would restrict the deployment of strategic ASW forces but not affect research, and at the same time leave tactical ASW completely unlimited. Unfortunately, such proposals are hard to come by in the real world. Only one proposal dealing with ASW has been advanced in SALT, and it was far from satisfactory. During SALT I, the Soviet Union proposed that each side keep its ballistic-missile submarines out of range of the other side, perhaps in specified "patrol zones." These zones would be clearly defined open-water sanctuaries where ballistic-missile submarines would be able to patrol without harassment by opposing ASW forces. The United States rejected the proposal, primarily because such zones were of doubtful value. In peacetime there would be no advantage in establishing safe havens for submarines; in fact, depending on the size of the zone, it could even simplify the opponent's ASW problem. In wartime the use of such zones by submarines and the avoidance of such zones by ASW forces would be equally improbable.

The patrol zone idea demonstrates a basic difficulty in trying to develop effective, meaningful and negotiable limitations on ASW. The goal is to get the two sides to stop chasing each other's ballistic-missile submarines, but since this is well-nigh impossible to do directly, most proposals take an indirect approach. Such indirect proposals would seem to work well in a period of peaceful relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, but during a crisis — and certainly during a war — neither side would be bound by an artificial restriction on its ability to wage antisubmarine warfare.

As one means of avoiding the destruction of ballistic-missile submarines during a conventional war, it has been proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union could provide safe-conduct routes through minefields or other ASW barriers for each other's nuclear deterrent submarines.[12] Nuclear submarines would be distinguished from attack submarines either by running on the surface where they could be identified, or by running submerged and towing a buoy emitting a distinctive radio signal. This is a commendable notion; unfortunately it strains credulity to imagine either side in a conventional war — which could escalate to a nuclear exchange — transmitting the precise location of its ballistic-missile submarines to the enemy. The difficulty of negotiating the relatively simple provisions of the SALT I accords suggests that the two superpowers are not yet ready to consider arms control proposals of this complexity and sophistication.

There are other difficulties in limiting ASW. The first is that this is not strictly a bilateral issue. Virtually every navy engages in some ASW, and the Soviet Union could insist with some justification that any limitation it observed should apply equally to all navies of NATO. Another difficulty is the great asymmetry that exists between the United States and the Soviet Union in their ability to wage ASW. Some elements of the asymmetry are manmade; for example, the United States' impressive technological lead in ASW may not last forever. But other elements are permanent. The geographic position of the United States will always make its ASW job easier than the Soviet Union's.

In short, antisubmarine warfare is not at an arms-controllable stage of development. Fortunately the need for limitations is not critical, since there is no imminent threat to the relative invulnerability of SLBM submarines.

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[12] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

OVERSEAS SUBMARINE BASES

Whether or not ASW is raised in SALT II, another submarine-related issue is bound to surface. The Soviets gave fair warning in SALT I that they would return to the question of overseas bases for SLBM submarines. The United States maintains two such bases outside U.S. territory, one at Holy Loch, Scotland, the other at Rota, Spain.[13]

At present the primary importance of these bases is in reducing travel time between home port and patrol area. The relatively short-range Polaris and Poseidon missiles currently deployed on U.S. submarines need to be fairly close to the Soviet Union to be within range of their targets, and without Rota and Holy Loch, submarines patrolling in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean would be forced to travel back to the United States simply to change crews or replenish supplies. If the Soviet Union chose to follow the same deployment practices its lack of forward bases would give it fewer submarine-days "on station"; or putting it another way, to schedule the same number of days on station as the United States, the USSR would have to maintain a larger number of submarines.

Yet there is no inherent reason for ballistic-missile submarines to be within range of their targets while on patrol. Presumably they would be almost as convincing a deterrent if they patrolled two or three days' travel time out of range. In a situation of strategic alert, the importance of such bases would undoubtedly diminish, as both sides would try to keep a maximum number of submarines out of port and on patrol. The real value of the bases is in the convenience they afford during normal peacetime operations. Their importance in a strategic sense is not remarkable.

In the future the value of Rota and Holy Loch as time-savers can be expected to decline. The United States is developing an SLBM with a significantly greater range, and when such missiles become operational they will expand the ocean area in which submarines will be on station. For submarines armed with missiles of that range, overseas bases are unnecessary.

No doubt the Soviet Union would like to speed the day when these American bases are closed down. For that matter many U.S.

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[13] A third base, on the Pacific island of Guam, is in U.S. territory and presumably not at issue in SALT.

officials probably would not object to pulling out of them immediately — whatever their military utility, the bases are a political headache to maintain. That Rota and Holy Loch give the Soviets any real strategic concern is questionable, but it is a wise negotiating ploy for them to appear concerned. The Soviet Union has more to gain by registering the existence of these bases as a strategic asymmetry in favor of the United States which requires some type of compensation than it does by forcing their closure.

ABM Deferral

SALT II is supposed to deal with offensive weapons only. The defensive side of the strategic weapons ledger is ostensibly closed until the principals conduct the joint review called for in the ABM Treaty five years hence. Nonetheless, another provision of the treaty permits the two signatories at any time to "consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments."

One amendment that has been widely discussed would defer construction of the second ABM site permitted by the treaty. The United States is now in the process of completing its first ABM site, located near Grand Forks, North Dakota, to protect the surrounding ICBM field. In the mid-1960's the Soviet Union constructed an ABM site around Moscow, which is currently being modernized. Neither side has begun building its second site, and the treaty could easily be amended to defer construction, either permanently or for some specified period of time.

For the United States the option to build an ABM site around Washington is almost certainly lost already. Congress has abandoned whatever interest it may have once had in the project, and even if some Congressional support were rekindled in the future, the cost of procuring such a system might be prohibitive. Under these circumstances the only event that could prompt the United States to proceed with an ABM defense for the national capital would be the construction by the Soviets of their second permitted ABM site.

This risk gives the Kremlin a forceful reason to think twice about constructing a site to defend ICBM's. Another reason is that reliance on one lone ABM site to defend ICBM's is strategic nonsense. The United States originally intended the Grand Forks site to be one of twelve around the country. It now stands in splendid isolation, 100 ABM interceptors defending 150 ICBM's.

Government studies have shown that if the Soviets ever launched a pre-emptive strike against the U.S. ICBM force, the Grand Forks site would save at most about twenty missiles that would have been destroyed had it not been there. Grand Forks would never have been built if American defense planners had known from the start that it would be the only U.S. ABM site to reach completion.

What would American defense planners think if the Soviet Union began building the equivalent of Grand Forks? Either that the Soviets were fools unable to learn from the American mistake, or worse, that they had found some way to make the project worth the cost. In SALT I the U.S. delegation manifested an almost paranoid fear that the Soviet Union might somehow upgrade its extensive air defense network and give it an ABM capability. It seems unlikely that the Soviets would want to add to that fear by constructing so expensive a system for so marginal an advantage.

Hence, deferral makes good strategic sense. Unfortunately it makes much less political sense. Both nations are extremely sensitive to the appearance of equality in the ABM Treaty: as now written, the treaty provides almost rigid equality, not only in numbers of systems, but in purpose as well. Each side has the right to build exactly what the other has. If they had not wanted to maintain this strict appearance of equality, they could easily have written the treaty in such a way as to permit each side the one ABM site it now has. It is therefore unlikely that some explicit declaration of deferral will be forthcoming from SALT II. But it seems equally improbable that either side will ever build its second ABM site.

TACTICS AND TIMING

The easiest prediction to make about SALT II concerns its duration. Barring some major new crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations, SALT negotiations should continue until the Interim Agreement is converted into a treaty, however long that process may take. Even if the two sides prove unable to make progress, they will both prefer a continuation of nonproductive talks to an outright admission of failure.

The United States and the Soviet Union have manifested considerable optimism about the prospects for concluding an early agreement. The June 1973 "Basic Principles" committed them to "make serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974."

Establishing a target date is a useful catalyst in forcing the negotiation to conclusion. For SALT I, the Moscow summit meeting served as such a deadline. Both Nixon and Brezhnev had communicated to their delegations an intention to sign the SALT accords during the summit, and this understanding put considerable pressure on the negotiators to tie up loose ends and prepare the agreements for signature. A number of issues that had divided the two sides for nearly three years were settled in literally the last few hours before the signing ceremony. Without this sort of externally imposed deadline the SALT I delegations might well be commuting between Helsinki and Vienna today, still trying to conclude the initial agreements.

The 1974 deadline for SALT II coincides nicely with the next Congressional elections. An agreement on offensive forces would undoubtedly work to the advantage of the Republicans, conferring a major diplomatic achievement on a party badly damaged by the Watergate affair. In fact, the Republicans should be able to put to good use even the prospect of an agreement, if one has not been concluded by the time of the November elections. The Democrats would find it difficult to criticize the negotiations at what would by then be a critical stage.

If the negotiators are unable to meet their 1974 target date, the next realistic deadline would be the end of Nixon's Presidency. A treaty on strategic offensive forces would be a welcome political present for the next Republican Presidential nominee, and even a bad treaty would take the wind out of the Democrats' arms control sails during the campaign. More than that, conclusion of a SALT II treaty would be a noble capstone to President Nixon's term of office, and would secure him a place of honor in the history of arms control.

It does not appear that pressure from Congress, the public or other nations will provide much incentive for the negotiators. In contrast to SALT I, which was widely reported by the press and followed by the public, SALT II has stirred little public enthusiasm. By the spring of 1972 SALT I had generated such great expectations that failure to reach some sort of agreement at the Moscow summit — or certainly before the November elections — was almost unthinkable politically. SALT II may over time produce similar expectations, but at present hardly anyone appears interested in it.

In SALT I there was also some moral pressure exerted by the nonnuclear states. As an inducement for these nations to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to try to negotiate "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race." In return for the nonnuclear states' help in preventing horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the two superpowers agreed to make some attempt to stop vertical proliferation. The SALT I agreements seem to have relieved the United States and the USSR of their obligation under the NPT, and there is now no real concern about SALT II in the nonnuclear world.

SALT has always been affected by other elements of the political relationship between the superpowers, although both sides have consistently denied any linkage between the arms talks and other issues, and indeed there has been none on a direct and visible level. SALT I was remarkably immune to the normal vicissitudes of diplomatic life. One exception occurred in what must have been a moment of Presidential pique: the members of the U.S. delegation were ordered to adopt a cold and reserved mien toward their Soviet counterparts in retaliation for Soviet support of India during its war with Pakistan. In contrast, the Soviet delegation never raised a diplomatic eyebrow during the U.S. invasion of Cambodia or the mining of Haiphong harbor.

SALT II may appear unlinked to other variables of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, but the general tenor of the negotiations cannot help but be affected by success or failure on other issues. For the Soviet Union the most important of these issues in 1974 may be securing most-favored-nation status and a major increase in trade with the United States. Thus far, most U.S. Senators have linked the granting of most-favored-nation status to a demand that the USSR permit its Jewish citizens the unrestricted right to emigrate. The Soviets could attempt to turn this issue around by tying progress in SALT to concessions in trade.

SALT II will also affect, and be affected by, the relationship of the negotiating states to the People's Republic of China. There is still no reason for China to take a seat at the SALT table, since the numerical limitations and qualitative restrictions under discussion have no relevance to the PRC at its current stage of nuclear development. But China's influence on the conduct of negotiations will clearly be felt by both sides.

Peking repeatedly condemned SALT I as a blatant demonstration of Soviet-American nuclear collusion. As usual, this Chinese hyberbole contained an element of truth, but by and large SALT I must be seen as an honest effort by two nations to avoid another round of strategic arms competition. In one sense the ABM Treaty actually helped the Chinese. By limiting ABM's to very low levels, it ensured the deterrent effect of a relatively small number of ICBM's.

SALT II may not change the strategic relationship of the nuclear superpowers to China, but the Chinese themselves may see the second round of talks as a decidedly different type of political endeavor. They may feel that they have more to fear from SALT II than they did from SALT I. It represents a formalization of the strategic dialogue begun in SALT I; it deals with strategic offensive force levels, technologies and policies; and it covers forces of destruction rather than defenses against such forces. Significantly, SALT II also continues to exclude the Chinese. The thaw in Sino-American relations could require the United States to make greater efforts to assuage such Chinese concerns, possibly at the expense of alienating the Soviets.

Another type of linkage to contend with in SALT II did not even exist during SALT I: that between SALT and the two other conferences on related issues – the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). Paradoxically, there appears to be an inverse relationship between the extent to which a conference deals with the issues of European security and the degree of actual European involvement in the negotiation. SALT II, which has no formal European representation, may have the most bearing on the real security issues; the CSCE, with the widest representation, may have little substantive effect on the military security of Europe. Which negotiation is the most comprehensive with respect to European security remains to be seen. Such a judgment is impossible until we know which issues will be negotiated in which forum. The United States and its NATO allies would prefer not to see the forward-based systems issue discussed at all, but if it is raised they would prefer it to be in MBFR. This would not only establish U.S. FBS as the military and political equivalent of Soviet aircraft based in Eastern Europe, it would also give America's European allies an opportunity to participate in negotiations that directly involve their own security. Other issues involving European security will necessarily be dealt with in SALT – nontransfer, for example. On such issues, and on the general course of SALT negotiations, the United States can be expected to continue its close consultation with NATO.

Jurisdictional disputes over which issues should be discussed in which forum can be used to camouflage a wide range of more substantive differences between East and West. It may be that SALT, as well as the other conferences involving issues of European security, will make little substantive progress until such disputes are resolved.

The Outcome of SALT II

Most of us have come to see arms control as an integral element of national security policy. We understand that national survival in the nuclear age depends not only on maintaining a strong deterrent posture but also on developing arms control agreements which reduce strategic uncertainties and the risk of nuclear war. By reducing ABM's to very low levels, SALT I made a major contribution to this end. The ABM Treaty had the dual effect of shutting off a new avenue of strategic arms competition and legitimizing the doctrine of assured destruction.

SALT II is unlikely to have such a profound political and military impact. For one thing, the ABM Treaty should reduce the pressure to expand strategic offensive forces even if an explicit limitation of offensive forces is not negotiated. In the United States the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will go down over the next few years – not up – whether or not a follow-on treaty is concluded. The real opportunity for achievement in SALT II, therefore, lies not so much in limiting the number of strategic offensive weapons as in restricting their quality. Specifically, the negotiation of a meaningful restriction on MIRV's would be a major accomplishment.

SALT II may ultimately manage to slow the arms race, but in the short run it may produce some unfavorable consequences. One already in evidence is the use of SALT as a justification for building new weapons as "bargaining chips." Before SALT the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine were both under attack in Congress; since the signing of the Interim Agreement these two systems have taken on new prestige as bargaining chips, and as a result their development has been accelerated. The Defense Department has also proposed the development of a multibillion-dollar submarine-launched cruise missile which, it argues, will make a good bargaining chip even if it is never built. Not only are such chips expensive to purchase, but when it comes time to cash them in, we may find they are no longer bargaining chips but the next generation of strategic weapons. If arms control cannot stop the development of new weapons, it at least should not accelerate the process.

SALT II could also be subverted if it confuses what the two sides should negotiate bilaterally with what each side should determine unilaterally. The military will always want new strategic weapons systems: longer-range submarines with quieter propulsion systems; faster and more sophisticated bombers; more accurate and more reliable ICBM's. This impulse is understandable — after all, most Americans buy a new car every three years. But in most cases, whether or not to proceed with new systems should be a unilateral judgment, not an outcome of negotiation with the other side. Whether the United States builds a new submarine, for example, should depend on the strategic need to correct existing deficiencies and the cost-effectiveness of the new model. It should not depend on whether the Soviets are building a new submarine of their own.

There are three possible forms the SALT II outcome could take. The first is an extension of the Interim Agreement. If a compromise on FBS is not attainable, the most likely course will be to continue the Interim Agreement indefinitely. The agreement is set to run for five years, and though several U.S. officials have indicated that five years is as long as the United States could live with such limitations, statements like this should be seen as negotiating bravado. There are no strategic programs under consideration that would force the United States to withdraw from the Interim Agreement, and learning to live with it should not present too great a problem.

A second possibility would be a series of partial measures. Such an outcome was presaged by the "Basic Principles," which stated that "pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing interim agreement of May 26, 1972." This process would allow the principals to formalize their agreement on various aspects of strategic arms limitation without having to resolve all the details associated with concluding a comprehensive treaty.

The third possible outcome, a comprehensive treaty on offensive arms, is contingent upon a settlement of the FBS issue. If a compromise on FBS is negotiated, almost certainly the United States and the Soviet Union will conclude a treaty that provides for equal aggregates of strategic offensive forces. The treaty will not be founded on a precise equality of forces, since that would be impossible to define — much less achieve — given the asymmetries in the strategic force deployments. Instead it will be based on a political manipulation of numbers designed to equalize the overall forces of the United States and the Soviet Union as nearly as possible.

Whatever the specific provisions of the treaty on offensive forces, if one is ever negotiated, the real value of SALT II will not be found in a formal document. The major benefits will be indirect and virtually impossible to measure. SALT II has the function of transforming a first step at strategic arms limitation into a continuing strategic dialogue between the two nuclear superpowers. This in turn will lead to a more direct awareness on both sides of strategic doctrine and the action-reaction element of such doctrine. Finally, SALT II will provide a forum for a serious and frank discussion of deterrent strategy in general. If the world ever shifts away from the evil paradox of mutual assured destruction to a saner basis for protecting mankind from nuclear annihilation, the move will have its roots in SALT II.

THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE: A CASE OF SOVIET LINKAGE

by Lothar Metzl

MORE than a year ago, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed formally to conduct their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. It may therefore be opportune to take another look at the Soviet interpretation of the concept and its impact on Soviet behavior.

For some time now, Soviet representatives have been emphasizing that peaceful coexistence does not mean ideological disarmament. What it does mean is typified in a recent Soviet textbook which declares, "Peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders does not preclude, but on the contrary, presumes a decisive struggle against imperialist ideology." This proposition is one of a series of doctrinal guidelines legitimizing the efforts of the Soviet regime to reap the benefits of détente and to act at the same time on the traditional assumption that a global "victory of communism" will bring even greater gains in the long run. As a Politbureau member of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (communist) Party put it in the *World Marxist Review* of November 1972, "The strategic purpose of peaceful coexistence is to assure favorable conditions for the worldwide victory of socialism."

LINKAGE PERPETUATES TENSIONS

Translated into Western political jargon, the linkage of peaceful coexistence with the ideological struggle reads like the cliché about keeping all one's options open. The evidence, however, shows that the Brezhnev regime not only keeps all its options open but exercises them simultaneously. It concludes a profitable wheat deal with the United States and launches a new anti-American propaganda campaign in its press. It meets Dr. Kissinger behind closed doors and whisks Angela Davis on a triumphal propaganda tour through the Soviet Union. It sends a goodwill exhibit of French paintings to Washington and opens in its own Museum of Religious History and Atheism a new exhibit on the revival of satanism in the West which includes the California murder case of Charles Manson. It promotes peaceful coexistence and continues to exploit and exacerbate disintegrative trends in the noncommunist world, either directly through its secret intelligence and political action service or indirectly through its support of Moscow-oriented communist and leftist parties as well as liberation movements. It combines its quest for the relaxation of international tensions with the intensification of ideological, social and police controls at home, and fortifies these through the extensive use of computer and other technologies. It couples its forward drive toward industrial and managerial modernization with the insistent demand that the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism remain intact. To bolster this demand, it magnifies the threat from Western propaganda and subversion to Soviet society so as to justify its efforts to impede the free flow of ideas, repress internal dissent and combat opposition in the international communist movement. Thus, the pursuance of contradictory policies by the Soviet regime continues to produce tensions internationally as well as within the USSR.

Brezhnev's Formula Reaffirms Long-Term Goals

The linkage of peaceful coexistence with the ideological struggle has been operative since Khrushchev's day. The Brezhnev regime, however, has been implementing the slogan more aggressively. It also seems more keenly concerned with the ideological erosion that may affect its power base in the wake of prolonged détente. In April 1968, for instance, a plenary session of the Soviet party's Central Committee cast a wary eye on the budding reform government in Czechoslovakia and called for an offensive against what it considered to be the villain in the affair: the subversive influence of bourgeois ideology. In 1969, the international Moscow conference of communist and workers parties made the ideological struggle into a global rallying cry for its anti-imperialist and anti-Maoist unity campaign. The Twenty-fourth Soviet Party Congress of 1971, whose "peace program" was correctly read in Washington as a go-ahead signal for the May 1972 summit meeting, considered it necessary to set in motion another "ideological offensive." In November 1971, a plenary session of the Central Committee resolved that the ideological struggle would become increasingly important in the international arena as a companion piece to Brezhnev's peace program. In March 1972, at the Soviet trade union congress, Brezhnev called President Nixon's impending visit "useful" but warned immediately that the USSR's foreign policy "combines implacability in the ideological struggle with a readiness to develop mutually advantageous relations with states of opposite systems."[1]

One month after the Moscow summit, Brezhnev toasted Fidel Castro at a Kremlin banquet and declared that peaceful coexistence would lead to an intensification of the ideological struggle. Emphasizing that Soviet leaders had "no illusions" about the "aggressive intentions" of their imperialist partners, he made it clear that the summit had not abrogated the fundamental conflict between the social systems of communism and capitalism, and that the ideological struggle would become an increasingly acute form of this conflict. In his report on the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR in December 1972, Brezhnev stated that the "outlooks and class objectives of socialism and capitalism are conflicting and irreconcilable." The class struggle between the two systems will therefore "continue in the realms of economics, politics and, naturally, ideology." He stressed that "*we* [emphasis added] will strive toward channeling such historically inevitable struggle into a channel which does not create the threat of new wars, dangerous conflicts, and [an] uncontrolled arms race."[2] Brezhnev pointedly omitted to state that the other side would reciprocate. The implications are obvious. Détente may possibly change the modalities of the conflict but must not be viewed as a true alternative to it.

Brezhnev's view permeates current Soviet doctrine. The Soviet propaganda apparatus rarely speaks of peaceful coexistence to Soviet audiences without playing up the irreconcilability of their social system with that of the capitalist-imperialist West. On March 12, 1973, a Radio Moscow broadcast rejected the notion of an "ideological truce" as subversive and said, "as long as opposing social systems exist, the ideological struggle between them . . . cannot be annulled or banned by intergovernmental agreements."[3] Soviet textbooks accept as a matter of course that "the Soviet Union links peaceful coexistence with ideological struggle for the simple reason that it is the only real approach to the matter."[4] Separating détente from the fundamental conflict situation, textbooks teach that peaceful coexistence may pertain only to intergovernmental relations but never to the opposing social systems to which states belong. The Soviet *Dictionary of Scientific Communism* defines the "struggle of the two systems" (socialism and capitalism) as "class struggle," a notion which, outworn though it may seem, is still maintained at the center of Soviet political thought. The dictionary lists the forms of this class struggle as economic, political and ideological struggle, the "battle of ideas" being the most complex and acute form at present.[5] A textbook of the Brezhnev era makes it impermissible to think that peaceful coexistence provides an alternative to "revolutionary class struggles." "One cannot pose the question either-or: either economic competition or revolution, either peaceful coexistence or class struggle. This is neither a Marxist nor a Leninist formulation of the question." According to the textbook, "capitalism can and must be destroyed only by means of revolution," which may be peaceful or violent, depending on the situation.[6] The cited dictionary defines "peaceful coexistence" as "the shortest and most rational path to a triumph of the cause of socialism throughout the world."[7]

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[1] *Pravda,* March 21, 1972.

[2] *Kommunist,* No. 18, December 1972.

[3] Talk by Professor Aleksandr Logachev, "The Soviet Peace Program and the Ideological Struggle of the Two Systems," Radio Moscow, March 12, 1973. English translation from U.S. Department of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS): 58561, March 26, 1973, pp. 27-31. (Hereafter, Department of Commerce translations of cited Soviet texts will be referred to as JPRS, identified by number and date of issue.)

[4] *Stroitel'stvo Kommunizma i Mirovoy Revolyutsionnyy Protsess* (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1966). JPRS: 41518, June 22, 1967, p. 468.

From these samples—and there are many more—it should be clear that the Soviet elite still sees itself as the representative of an exploited world working class with a revolutionary mission, even though, and perhaps *because*, its credibility and revolutionary legitimacy have been questioned. Brezhnev's emphasis on the ideological struggle is but another way of insisting that Soviet communists must remain true to their long-term objectives even when they do big business with their class enemy. It is therefore not surprising that on January 17, 1973, at a time when Washington was swarming with Soviet trade representatives, the Soviet party's chief ideologist, M. A. Suslov, declared that "together with the other fraternal parties, we must . . . exacerbate the conflicts of state monopoly capitalism." According to the next day's *Pravda,* Suslov made this statement in the context of a congratulatory address to the party's Marxism-Leninism Institute on which the Order of Lenin had been bestowed. He stressed the Soviet party's struggle "for the purity of revolutionary theory" and clearly had long-term objectives in mind when he called Marxism-Leninism "the great science of winning."

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[5] *Nauchnyy Kommunizm. Slovar',* edited by A. M. Rumyantsev (Moscow: Politizdat, 1969), p. 14.

[6] *Stroitel'stvo Kommunizma i Mirovoy Revolyutsionnyy Protsess, op. cit.,* p. 123.

[7] *Nauchnyy Kommunizm. Slovar', op. cit.,* p. 177.

PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE ADDS TO PRESSURE ON WEST

On the face of it, the priority placed on the ideological struggle could be read as an indication that the Soviet regime is stepping up its propaganda battle against the West at the expense of the other forms of "struggle," i.e., the economic and the political. Such an interpretation would be wrong. In Soviet literature, the political struggle — the struggle for power — is still considered the "highest form" of the class struggle. Moreover, there is no factual evidence showing that the strategic, tactical and organizational commitment of Soviet communism and Soviet-oriented communists toward the expansion of their power base has been diluted, adjustable to time and circumstance as it may be. A 1972 textbook for Soviet party schools clarifies the issue. It explicates current Soviet doctrine on the strategy and tactics of the international communist movement, declares that the Soviet party government considers itself to be a predominant part of it, and postulates that the full force of the international communist movement, "the main blow," is concentrated against its chief enemies. In the words of the textbook, "The chief enemy now is world imperialism, and especially the imperialism of the USA."[8] Propaganda is obviously only a component part of the main blow.

The upgrading of the ideological struggle reflects a judgment of Soviet leaders to the effect that there are now trends operating in the West which favor their short-term propaganda objectives and justify intensified exploitation. In their view, these trends are the climate of détente and socio-economic trouble. They are not unmindful that the climate of détente has brought about a relative decline of the levels of Western anti-communism and a corresponding increase in receptivity to communist ideas and ideology, whatever the denomination. Their conclusion that increased propaganda pressures now have better chances of succeeding is reinforced by their estimates of the economic-political situation of capitalist systems.

The Soviet party's estimates of the perennial "general crisis of capitalism" and specific "crises in the United States" were indeed sharpened at and after the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, especially in the wake of the monetary crisis of 1971 and President Nixon's introduction of price and wage controls in August 1971.

[8] V. V. Zagladin, editor, ***Mezhdunarodnoye Kommunisticheskoye Dvizheniye: Ocherki Strategii i Taktiki*** (The International Communist Movement: Outline of Strategy and Tactics) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972). JPRS: 57044-1, September 18, 1972, Part I, p. 21.

Following Brezhnev's lead at the congress, Petr Fedoseyev, Director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, posited the "beginning of a new phase in the general crisis of capitalism" for the late 1960's and early 1970's. Candidate Politbureau member and propaganda chief, Petr Demichev, predicted even stronger manifestations of the 1971 crisis in the United States for the future, and projected an ever deepening economic as well as political crisis of capitalism in general. Candidate Politbureau member Boris Ponomarev, the party secretary in charge of supervising communist parties abroad, went even further and projected the emergence of revolutionary situations in capitalist countries for the not too distant future.[9]

A book review of the third volume of Brezhnev's collected speeches and articles highlights Brezhnev's estimates as follows: "The general crisis of capitalism continues to intensify. . . . New prospects have opened up for the triumph of socialism throughout the world . . . the revolutionary forces of modern time . . . are merging into a single stream and pressing back imperialism step by step."[10]

In keeping with these estimates, Ponomarev considered the global situation ripe for an "even broader ideological offensive against imperialism." Demichev called for an increased ideological offensive that would bring to the "peoples of all continents the immortal revolutionary doctrine of Marx, Engels and Lenin. . . ." The November 1971 plenary session of the Central Committee placed high priority on the ideological struggle and instructed the party's "foreign political, ideological and propaganda organs" to energize their "struggle against imperialist propaganda and the opponents of Marxism-Leninism."[11] According to the Soviet *Dictionary of Scientific Communism,* the ideological struggle is synonymous with "the dissemination of communist ideas and ideology and has as its 'immediate goal' the ideological isolation of the most aggressive monopolistic leadership of the imperialist states."[12] Brezhnev's emphasis on the ideological struggle in international affairs may be fairly interpreted as a requirement on Soviet propaganda to exploit the climate of détente more intensively for several purposes: (1) to reduce the influence of anti-communist government and nongovernment leaders on public opinion at home and abroad; (2) to scale down official policy options that are unfavorable to the Soviet Union's interests, particularly in the military area; (3) to reinforce trends that serve Soviet state interests and keep Western governments détente-prone; and (4) to reinforce disintegrative processes operating in the West which may eventually lead to communist power seizures.

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[9] "24th Congress of the CPSU," *Information Bulletin* (Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers), Nos. 7-8 (Special Issue), 1971. See *Kommunist,* No. 15, October 1971, for articles by Fedoseyev, Demichev and Ponomarev.

[10] *Kommunist,* No. 16, November 1972. JPRS: 57871, December 29, 1972. p. 33.

[11] *Ibid.,* No. 17, November 1971. JPRS: 54945, January 14, 1972, p. 4.

[12] *Nauchnyy Kommunizm. Slovar', op. cit.,* p. 79.

As to the United States, Soviet calculations are that social, economic and political pressures are already isolating the government and restricting its options. The view that these "objective factors" are highly operative has been most clearly articulated by G. A. Arbatov, the influential Director of the Institute on the USA and author of a comprehensive 1970 study on *The Ideological Struggle in Current International Relations*. Arbatov has been crediting "objective" social and political pressures with forcing the U.S. government to disregard Cold War policies and embark on a "realistic approach to détente," that is, coming to the summit and getting out of Viet Nam. After the Moscow summit, he stressed that the forces compelling the United States to change its policies must nevertheless be reinforced by "struggle," particularly against anti-communist and anti-détente trends. In his latest review of Soviet-U.S. relations in *Kommunist*,[13] Arbatov still sees change-compelling pressures operating on the U.S. government but seems unusually concerned with the anti-détente "intrigues" of "the military-industrial complex, extreme right wing elements, Zionist circles and so forth" and with similar trends in Congress and even in the Administration. From this, one may conclude that Brezhnev's call for the intensification of the ideological struggle by means of Soviet propaganda remains operative. Indeed, the Central Committee session of April 26-27, 1973, which approved Brezhnev's forthcoming trips to West Germany and Washington, called again for "a consistent struggle against reactionary ideology and propaganda." It also stressed the need for a propaganda offensive as a means of "winning to our side the minds and hearts of millions of people."[14]

MAGNIFIED THREAT OF WESTERN PROPAGANDA JUSTIFIES OLD GUARD REGIME

The estimates underlying the external Soviet propaganda offensive may be unrealistic. Its effectiveness may be difficult to measure. Nevertheless, it is obvious that its implications for the internal affairs of the Soviet Union are significant. By involving the system in an intensified propaganda battle against the West, Soviet leaders keep alive the image of an external threat which they apparently still need as a justification for maintaining repressive policies, especially in the area of security and ideological-political control.

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[13] No. 3, February 1973.
[14] *Pravda,* April 29, 1973.

The need flows from a variety of sources. Not least important among them is the fact that present party and government structures remain largely staffed with functionaries who began their careers under Stalin, both before and after the Great Purges. Their tradition-bound perceptions and reaction patterns are not likely to change radically. The perception of the external threat derives from a long-standing Leninist-Stalinist assumption about the behavior of capitalist (imperialist) political systems in situations where the balance of power shifts in favor of communist systems. In its original form the assumption read: the stronger communist systems and movements become nationally and internationally, the more desperately capitalist/imperialist systems will try to stave off ultimate defeat and destruction. War against the Soviet Union and severe repression of domestic communism are therefore constant primary threats. Given the persistent tendency of the Soviet regime to read its undeniably increasing strength as a measure of its opponents' growing weakness, the old assumption prevails but is undergoing certain modifications today. War against the Soviet Union appears now to be considered a secondary threat. The threat from Western propaganda, however, has been moved close to first place. Needless to say, this rearrangement is not irreversible, nor is it always expressed in absolute terms.

In *The Ideological Struggle in Current International Relations* Arbatov argues that the United States and the West are being forced by the pressure of communist state power, by internal communist pressures, and by the high risk of nuclear war to adapt their ineluctably hostile response patterns to existing realities. Frontal attacks through domestic repression and military aggression against the Soviet Union, though not excludable as possible alternatives, are being gradually replaced by, or combined with, more flexible and sophisticated policies of maneuver, compromise, concessions and ostensible cooperation. Nevertheless, such policies are, as was the old "head-on anti-communism," "essentially anti-socialist in nature," aiming, he alleges, at the erosion of communist systems from within. In short, Arbatov assumes emphatically that the new, more flexible tactics require capitalist systems to maintain an ever rising level of "ideological struggle against socialism" to compensate for the fact that direct military aggression is becoming more difficult and risky.[15]

Brezhnev's views follow similar lines. The aforementioned review of the third volume of his collected speeches and articles[16] states, for instance, "The materials of the third volume stress the invariability of the reactionary, aggressive, anti-popular nature of imperialism." The review further summarizes Brezhnev:

> Imperialism, incapable of recovering its lost historical prospects, is now trying to adapt to the new situation in the world. Obliged to embark on peaceful coexistence with countries belonging to the opposing systems, it is counting increasingly on ideological diversions against the socialist states. . . . But the enemies of socialism must know that their hopes will never come true. We answer their intrigues with doubled and trebled vigilance.[17]

Vigilance was one of Brezhnev's themes at the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress which upgraded the ideological threat from abroad. In face "of the continuing subversive activity by imperialism," he instructed the secret police to maintain "unremitting vigilance" and emphasized the continuing importance of the state security organs, primarily the KGB (Committee of State Security) but also the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). The congress resolutions sharpened Brezhnev's guidelines and postulated the "need to enhance vigilance in face of the schemes of imperialism and its agents," and keep fighting ideological trends which seek "to destroy the revolutionary essence of Marxism-Leninism" and "pave the way for penetration of bourgeois ideology."[18] Conforming to these guidelines, the congress approved Brezhnev's plans for the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting and simultaneously raised the status of the KGB. Yuri V. Andropov, the KGB chairman, was confirmed as Politbureau candidate member. Two KGB deputy chairmen were elected as Central Committee candidate members, and one as member of the Central Auditing Commission. The KGB responded favorably. Andropov himself warned in December 1971 that the unchanged hostility of imperialist states made it imperative to conduct a "sharp, principled and ideological struggle against imperialism" and to combine peaceful coexistence with "high vigilance toward the enemies of peace and socialism."[19]

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[15] Georgiy Arkad'yevich Arbatov, *Ideologicheskaya Bor'ba Sovremenikh Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniakh* (Moscow, 1970). JPRS: 53365, June 15, 1971, especially pp. 161-183.

[16] Leonid Brezhnev, *By the Leninist Course* (Moscow, 1972).

[17] *Kommunist,* No. 16, November 1972. JPRS: 57871, December 29, 1972, p. 35.

[18] "24th Congress of the CPSU," *op. cit.*, p. 213.

The theme was further fleshed out by the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Semen Tsvigun, an old Brezhnev protégé. In a long article in *Kommunist,* Tsvigun warned in particular of the new and dangerous "soft sell" tactics employed by imperialist diversionists in the "ideological war against socialism."[20] After the May summit, on June 8, 1972, *Pravda* revalidated the assumption that "imperialists and their associates pin their hopes on ideological methods," increasingly so when the balance of power shifts in favor of socialism.

Suslov dramatized the threat of bourgeois propaganda again at a conference of ideological workers on June 26, 1972. Although Brezhnev's peace program had created a healthier world situation, he said, a long and stubborn struggle was still ahead because the "main forces of bourgeois propaganda are directed toward planting poisonous seeds of political indifference, an attitude of anarchistic self-assertion, petit bourgeois money grubbing, chauvinism, and nationalism in the ideological soil of socialist society."[21] Repeatedly stated since, the thesis is still operative. On the eve of Brezhnev's travels to West Germany and the United States, KGB chief Andropov was promoted once again. A Central Committee session of April 27, 1973 made him a full member of the Politbureau as if to indicate once more that the importance of the secret police rises in proportion to the rising levels of détente.

The manipulative purpose behind the thesis becomes clear from the way the external threat is magnified in Soviet publications. The hostile intent of imperialist propaganda is played up but the considerable capabilities of the regime for minimizing its effectiveness, through the secret police, border and media controls, jamming, and the like, are not. Western intentions are stigmatized as aiming at "the bourgeois degeneration of communism." Arbatov and others define the threat so broadly that the definition covers not only "subversive propaganda," i.e., covert and psychological warfare, but also the total overt communications output of noncommunist systems, such as books, films, radio, television, satellite broadcasts, newspapers and magazines. In short, the definition tends to become synonymous with the threat of "Western" or "United States" influence. Moreover, the "penetration of bourgeois ideology" is ominously portrayed as a major threat to internal security because it seeks "to complicate the internal situation, to disrupt the ideological unity of the people, to worsen ethnic relations, and to undermine the principal foundations of society."[22]

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[19] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Soviet Union,* January 17, 1972, p. J 2. (Murmansk broadcast.)

[20] No. 5, March 1972. JPRS: 55961, May 10, 1972, p. 152.

[21] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Soviet Union,* June 27, 1972, p. J 1. (Moscow broadcast.)

Obviously, though, there are tensions operating in the Soviet Union which have their sole origin in the internal situation and in relations with other communist parties. Their effect is seen in the continuing malfunction of the economy, including agriculture; a steady increase in consumer demands and a decrease of interest in politics and ideology; the gradual alienation of younger generations from the Marxist-Leninist value system; a certain trend of intellectual and nationalist fermentation, difficult to measure though it may be; and, last but not least, Chinese intransigence as well as other opposition in the international communist movement. By way of projecting the causes of internal difficulties onto a threat from imperialist subversion, the regime shows how little it has moved from traditional positions. Under Stalin ideological regimentation and repressive policies were justified by the theory of "capitalist encirclement" and the resulting threat of war against the Soviet Union. With their constant stress on the growing power of socialist states and on the success of their détente policies, today's Soviet leaders have found it convenient to relegate Stalin's thesis to the background and to replace it, however tentatively, with their new thesis of an increasingly dangerous threat from Western influence and propaganda. Though more sophisticated than Stalin's theory of capitalist encirclement, the postulated threat from Western propaganda and influence has similar functions.

IDEOLOGICAL MOBILIZATION CAMPAIGN REINFORCES FUNDAMENTALISM

In the period since the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, the dictum of the increasing ideological struggle has been cracked like a whip in a proliferating ideological mobilization campaign whose multiple purpose is to prevent "a softening of the socialist world outlook"; maintain severe limits on what the West calls "liberalization"; preserve a high level of hostility against the West; and brand "all opponents of Marxism-Leninism," dissenters and nonconformists as traitorous agents of bourgeois/imperialist ideology.

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[22] Arbatov, *The Ideological Struggle . . . , op. cit.,* p. 143.

The opening signal of the campaign was given by Brezhnev at the 1971 CPSU congress when he emphasized that the Soviet party was the party of scientific communism. As a relatively new and separate discipline of Marxist-Leninist teachings which enshrines the doctrines of world revolution, power seizure, and the Soviet model of building a communist society, scientific communism represents the essence of Soviet communism and its revolutionary goals. Brezhnev's signal clearly implied that the party desired increasingly strict adherence to the guidelines of scientific communism. They are to guarantee the combat-readiness of Soviet ideology and to deter undesirable evolutionary trends in Soviet thought, particularly during the détente period.

Most Soviet sub-institutions, with the notable exception of the armed forces, responded readily. In July 1971, for instance, the President of the Academy of Sciences exhorted the community of social sciences to participate aggressively in the "struggle for victory of the communist ideology all over the world, against the bourgeois ideology, harmful theories such as the theory of convergence, and against anti-communism and various tendencies of revisionism."[23]

Boris Mitin, Chairman of the Scientific Council on Foreign Ideological Trends under the Academy of Sciences, a holdover from the Stalin era, endorsed the slogan enthusiastically and was clearly delighted with the prospects opening up for the council and his staff of specialists.

The editors of the review, *Questions of Philosophy,* seemed to jump on the bandwagon somewhat reluctantly. Two lengthy pre-congress reports on the achievements of Soviet philosophers oddly omitted any reference to the accomplishments of scientific communism, the party's pet project. After the congress, however, *Questions of Philosophy* paid tribute to the usefulness of scientific communism as a policy-oriented science.[24]

The increasing threat from imperialist propaganda was an important point made at a joint conference of leading party and social science institutions, held in Moscow, September 29 to October 1, 1971. High-ranking ideological experts and exponents of scientific communism briefed the session on the requirements placed by the Twenty-fourth Congress on Marxist-Leninist theorists. They made it clear that the party's demands for less dogmatism and more "creative development" of theory were to be tempered by strict adherence to the fundamental principles of scientific Soviet communism. There was to be no tampering with the leading and expanding role of the Communist Party; the centralist form of political rule and economic management; or the denial of freedom of expression or organization for dissenters. No opposition, no pluralism, no multiparty system, no Western-type democracy, no national communism whatsoever would be tolerated. There would be no retreat from the irreconcilable struggle with capitalism and imperialism on all fronts of the class struggle, political, economic and ideological. Political and ideological deviations, notably right-wing revisionism, left radicalism, Maoism, and anti-Soviet nationalism, must be sharply attacked because their exponents are despicable allies of the adversary in the "ceaseless ideological war urged against our country and against the socialist world by imperialist propaganda."[25]

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[23] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSR,* Vol. 41, No. 7, July 1971. JPRS: 54142, September 28, 1971, p. 26.

[24] *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 7, 1971. JPRS: 55784, April 24, 1972.

Suspecting that the socialist world outlook of Soviet philosophers might have softened, the party created in December 1971 a new interdisciplinary Soviet Philosophical Society for them and browbeat them into making a more decisive contribution to the ideological struggle. Besides obediently pledging that the society would address itself to the solution of practical problems and keep the natural sciences on Marxist-Leninist tracks, the new charter promised "a wide involvement of Soviet philosophers in the propagation of the Marxist-Leninist world outlook." In the spirit of scientific communism and party-mindedness, philosophic science would also make "a decisive onslaught on ideologies that are inimical to communism and Leninism."[26]

In a December 1971 address to the directors of social science departments at higher educational institutions, the powerful Suslov used the dictum of the "inevitable" exacerbation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism to justify his instructions that teachers and scholars must intensify their study of Marxism-Leninism, especially the classics, and participate increasingly in "the struggle against bourgeois ideology, anti-communism and revisionism."[27] Intensification of ideological and political indoctrination "in the spirit of irreconcilable struggle

[25] *Kommunist,* No. 15, October 1971. JPRS: 54571, November 29, 1971, p. 112. This issue of *Kommunist* contains the most important reports made to the conference.

[26] *Voprosy Filosofii,* No. 1, 1972. JPRS: 55633, April 5, 1972, pp. 35, 37, 38.

[27] *Kommunist,* No. 1, January 1972. JPRS: 55329, March 2, 1972, p. 34.

against bourgeois ideology, anti-communism, and revisionism" was also requested of the party members in the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, which had been severely castigated by the Central Committee for its poor performance in practical research.[28]

The "sharpened ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena" slogan was brandished by the party immediately before and well after the May 1972 summit. In April 1972, *Kommunist,* the Central Committee's house organ, used it to insist again that "all party organizations" pay increased attention to "the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the political education of party members and non-party working people, and toward propaganda and agitation." At the end of June 1972, it was the keynote in an all-union conference of ideological workers convoked to discuss ways and means of modernizing techniques of party and mass indoctrination. The slogan was used to make it crystal clear that modernization of indoctrination techniques was not to lead to any softening of the Soviet world outlook. "The CPSU does not retreat one single step from the immovable principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." Ideological workers were instructed not to underestimate "bourgeois ideology and revisionism or the subversive activity of our enemies," and to wage the "most implacable and decisive struggle against imperialism." The meeting was further warned that ideological loyalty and activism would be a criterion in the impending and vitally important exchange of party cards, to take place in 1973-1974.[29]

Predictably, the campaign invaded not only the new reform program of higher educational institutions but also the party's ambitious training program for political, scientific and economic management cadre-specialists needed to implement the Ninth Five-Year Plan. In a severe shake-up of the higher party school of the Central Committee, practical leadership was stressed. A new course on the scientific management of the "socialist economy" was introduced, but, as *Kommunist*[30] pointed out, the training of future party and government leaders was to be improved principally by "focusing" on Marxist-Leninist theory through a "profound" study of Marx, Engels, Lenin and CPSU doctrine. In the educational process students must also learn to persist in an "implacable struggle against bourgeois ideology and revisionism." Intensified ideological indoctrination, the CPSU assumes, may offset not only the impact of détente but also the impact of its own priority concern with industrial-technological expansion and management efficiency.

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-4.
[29] *Partiynaya Zhizn,* No. 14, July 1972, pp. 3-11.
[30] No. 16, November 1972. JPRS: 57871, December 29, 1972, p. 1.

In the field of popular (mass) indoctrination, the campaign got a significant boost in June 1972 when the All-Union Knowledge Society was awarded the Order of Lenin for its twenty-five years of service in disseminating and popularizing party policies among the Soviet people. On the occasion Suslov again noted the external threat of "the most refined methods of ideological subversion," and instructed the society not to let up in the "struggle against reactionary bourgeois ideology," since the regime had "no illusions about imperialism" and its "ideology of anti-communism."[31]

The area of culture has been similarly affected. Early in 1972 the CPSU decree on "Literary-Artistic Criticism" instructed all media-related institutions to rear a new generation of critics who would display no conciliatory attitudes toward bourgeois, decadent and revisionist influences and who would serve as watchdogs over the party-mindedness and correct orientation of Soviet art and literature. The impact of the decree was reviewed by the *Literary Gazette* and found wanting in some respects.[32]

On August 22, 1972, the Chairman of the State Committee on Cinematography was fired, apparently for permitting too much Western influence in Soviet cinematography and for failing to live up to the standards of socialist realism. In October 1972, the theatrical profession came under increasing criticism for ideological failings. On October 31, *Pravda* was upset about the popularity of folksingers who follow "the Western style."

Soviet Latvia reported on September 15, 1972 that the newspaper *Soviet Culture* would be placed under direct Central Committee control as of January 1973. It would cover its field "from class positions . . . sharply criticize deviations from the principles of socialist realism . . . unmask the essence of bourgeois ideology and fight against various kinds of alien ideological influences in the cultural life of Soviet society."

The campaign themes were repeated insistently in special articles, books and anthologies on the importance of ideology as a motivating force and on the need to keep it "pure." Philosophers were reminded to guard their party-mindedness. The natural sciences were warned not to let themselves be de-ideologized. The journalistic profession was exhorted not to forget that it stands in the forefront of the ideological struggle. Historians were criticized for de-ideologizing and de-politicizing their research. A series of literary works came under heavy criticism for idealizing and romanticizing non-Bolshevik emancipation trends of the Russian past before 1917. The entire ideological apparatus was instructed to conduct its atheistic propaganda campaign more vigorously, and party members still attending religious ceremonies were criticized. The "contemporary ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism" prompted *Kommunist*[33] to request that the apparently still existing slack in the ideological re-education of the "scientific and technical intelligentsia" be taken up. An ideological watchdog even attacked the USSR Ministry of Culture for letting a book go to print in which somebody had a good word to say about Freud's views on esthetics. The potential threat implied in such attacks was illustrated in April 1973 when a book by the Politbureau member and former Ukrainian party boss, Petr Shelest, was severely criticized by the Ukrainian party press. Shelest was removed from the Politbureau shortly after the attack was published.[34]

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[31] Radio Moscow, TASS International Service in English, June 20, 1972. Cited from Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report, Soviet Union,* June 21, 1972, pp. J 4-6.

[32] No. 4, January 1973.

The campaign against ideological deviations—i.e., Trotskyism, right and left revisionism, and, of course, Maoism—was developed in a spirit of intolerance and vengefulness. In February 1972, the party decreed that preparations for the forthcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet Union must include an intensification of the campaign against anti-Soviet nationalism because nationalism is an area of contention in the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. In October 1972, the Central Committee's journal, *Party Life,* reminded all party units that the ideological war was still on and that Western propaganda was especially keen on subverting nationalism. Similarly, a review of a recent collection of Suslov's speeches and articles noted that "the works included in the collection repeatedly stress that peaceful coexistence does not extend to the sphere of ideology and that a particularly fierce exacerbation of contradictions between the capitalist and socialist systems is taking place in this sphere." The review provided a rare insight into the goal the party's chief ideologist attached to the role of ideology. It quoted Suslov as stressing "very forcibly that it is necessary to get back through our ideological work Bolshevist militancy and purposefulness . . . and subordinate it to the task of the struggle for the victory of communism."[35] The admission—even if only implied—that Bolshevist militancy has been lost and must be recovered may explain the persistence and urgency of the current ideological campaign.

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[33] No. 11, July 1972. JPRS: 56961, September 6, 1972, pp. 68-73.

[34] *Kommunist Ukrainy,* No. 4, April 1973, pp. 77-82. Editorial "On the Serious Shortcomings of a Certain Book" refers to a book by P. Ye. Shelest entitled *Our Soviet Ukraine.*

The pressure, however, was apparently resisted by the armed forces, for reasons still obscure. The military leadership may have objected to Brezhnev's détente policies or may simply have considered the ideological struggle theme insufficiently strong for the indoctrination of the troops. More than a year after the Twenty-fourth Congress, for instance, armed forces propaganda guidelines still did not refer to the priority threat of ideological subversion and played up the threat of war instead. The resistance seems to have been overcome at an unusual Kremlin conference of party secretaries within the armed forces, March 27-29, 1973. Chaired by eminent military and party leaders—including Andropov, who is responsible for the secret surveillance of all armed forces units—the meeting seems to have achieved some sort of compromise. According to *Red Star* of March 28, Marshal Grechko, the Defense Minister, declared in his speech that "of course, the imperialists are not now deciding to make a military attack," and merely noted "the intensification of the struggle on the ideological front." He maintained "we believe that in international relations imperialism is counting primarily on force," i.e., not on ideological subversion. Nevertheless, he paid tribute to the primacy of the party and its ideology. He agreed that it is required for "generals, admirals, officers, warrant officers, and ensigns persistently to study Marxism-Leninism." (Grechko may have been further pacified by his election to the Politbureau on April 27, 1973.)

The chief party representative in the armed forces, General Yepishev, stuck to the tenets of the ideological mobilization campaign but may have satisfied the military by putting teeth into the campaign. *Red Star* for March 27 and 28, 1973, reported that he agreed that the campaign should not only be built around the themes of "socialist internationalism" and "devotion to communist ideals" but also around "pan-national Soviet pride," "class hatred of the enemies of socialism," "class hatred toward imperialism" and "class hatred for all enemies of communism." Clearly, a class hatred campaign in the armed forces could be carried by the discharged soldier into the civilian sector to support the party's crusade at home.

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[35] *Questions of History, CPSU,* No. 2, February 1973. JPRS: 58561, March 26, 1973, p. 15.

From the domestic area, the ideological mobilization campaign spilled over into Moscow-oriented international communist movements and client states. Ponomarev's authoritative projection of revolutionary situations for capitalist countries and his highly optimistic views on the revolutionary process in Latin America were disseminated internationally. The Soviet leadership displayed a renewed interest in the "world revolutionary process." In September 1971, representatives of the Academies of Science from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, North Korea, Mongolia and Cuba placed research on "the working class and the world revolutionary process" first on the list of their joint research programs.[36] In May 1972, when Central Committee Secretary K. F. Katushev opened the inaugural Moscow meeting of a newly created "problem-oriented" commission of scientists from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, he put top priority on joint, operational research into the expanding role of the working class in the revolutionary process.[37]

In June 1972, a *Pravda* article surveyed the international communist movement since its 1969 Moscow meeting, and accented the continuing urgency of the need to fight anti-communism, left and right revisionism, and nationalism because of the West's increasing reliance on divisive propaganda. On July 20, 1972, *Pravda* urged the communist parties of Eastern Europe and Mongolia to conduct an "ever wider offensive against the ideology of imperialism and its nationalist, revisionist accomplices." In its comment on the July 31, 1972 Crimea meeting of socialist countries, it combined praise for the show of unity with the dire warning that détente in Europe does not abrogate the current "confrontation of the two social systems" and must be accompanied by an "implacable ideological struggle."

TASS reported from Moscow on November 17, 1972, that representatives of Soviet friendship societies from Eastern and Western Europe had met to prepare for the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR and agreed on the "importance of resolute struggle against the ideology of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism." Other indications show that East European regimes have been responding to the Soviet drive, e.g., in East Germany, Poland, even in Hungary. Hungarian Politbureau member Gyula Kallai related in the *World Marxist Review* that the Tenth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, quite aware of the intentions of anti-communist strategists, had decided "continuously to sharpen the vigilance of the peoples of the socialist countries against the hostile 'softening-up' policy in order to frustrate all overt and covert imperialist attempts at interfering in the life of socialist countries."[38]

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[36] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSR,* Vol. 42, No. 1, January 1972, p. 79.

[37] *Kommunist,* No. 13, September 1972. JPRS: 57306, October 20, 1972, p. 23; p. 24, note 1.

IDEOLOGY FEEDS REPRESSION

It is fairly evident that, from the summer of 1971 through 1972, and into 1973, the Brezhnev regime has been conducting an intensive fundamentalist indoctrination campaign on an international level as well as on all levels of Soviet society and institutions, in part to offset an anticipated erosive impact of its détente policies. Despite declarations that the campaign is free of "dogmatism" and promotes the "creative development" of ideology, its effects have been restrictive and repressive, calculated as it is to keep Soviet society insulated as much as possible. The feedback of the campaign on the Soviet scene has been lucidly described by the noted Soviet physicist and leading figure of the loyal opposition, Andrei S. Sakharov. In his memorandum to Brezhnev of March 1971, with an appended postscript of June 1972, Sakharov deplored the continuing repressive policies of the regime.

In this correspondence, never published in the Soviet Union but now available in the West, Sakharov writes *inter alia,* "It is with pain and alarm that I am compelled to note the renewed restrictions of ideological freedom in the wake of a most deceptive liberalism, the trend to control all information that is not government controlled, and deliberate aggravation of national problems." He establishes a precise correlation between the current ideological mobilization campaign and repression when he remonstrates, "The wave of political arrests during the first months of 1972 is cause for the gravest concern. Numerous arrests were made in the Ukraine; arrests took place likewise in Moscow, Leningrad, and in other parts of the country."[39] In March 1973, Sakharov co-signed an open letter to UNESCO which warned that the Soviet government may misuse its recently announced adherence to the International Geneva Copy Right Convention to limit or suppress the right of Soviet authors to publish abroad. "Our ideological and esthetic censorship," the letter states, "has always been extremely inflexible and in recent years is becoming more harsh and arbitrary."[40] Also in March 1973, Sakharov was called in, reportedly for the first time, for an "interview" with the KGB.

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[38] No. 11, November 1972.
[39] *New York Times,* August 18, 1972.

The feedback is visible in a variety of other situations. There continue to be about one thousand labor camps in the USSR, with an estimated population of one million. An additional ten thousand political prisoners are said to be in jail. On January 5, 1973, *Pravda* stated that the Soviet Union would not tolerate a free flow of people and ideas across its borders unless they were acceptable to party ideologists. In November 1972, the Soviets even prohibited the use of telephones for what was vaguely termed "purposes in conflict with the national interest and public order." The KGB drive to suppress underground publications and dissenters has not ceased. The political trials of alleged subversives in Czechoslovakia during the summer of 1972 may be fairly ascribed to the feedback effect, and so may the continuing presence of Soviet forces on the Chinese border. Ideological feedback is even reflected in the current Soviet admiration for ex-renegade Tito, who has retreated from liberalism and shifted over to centralism and orthodoxy.

Conclusions

In sum, the Brezhnev regime is pumping ideological fundamentalism into the Soviet system, the East European system and the international communist movement to keep anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism levels high at a time when the levels of anti-communism are low in the West and can be expected to drop even further with the end of the war in Viet Nam. The ideological factor is clearly in the ascendancy, whether propelled by a fear of détente or by internal difficulties. As a result, the Soviet regime will continue to combine contradictory policies. Internationally, it will link pragmatic and stabilizing policies with ideology-oriented policies promoting destabilization. Internally it will go on suppressing the rights of the individual in favor of such abstractions as the state and its world revolutionary mission. The proportions of the mix will obviously depend on

[40] *Russkaya Misl* (Paris), April 5, 1973.

concrete situational circumstances and on the advantages or disadvantages accruing from them to the Soviet side. Nevertheless, the behavior pattern of the Soviet regime which appears to the West as erratic, inconsistent and even paranoiac, is in the Soviet view perfectly normal: the linkage of peaceful coexistence with the ideological struggle is no contradiction at all.

A September 1972 *Kommunist* article, for instance, stated that the goals of Brezhnev's détente program are identical with the goals of the communist movement abroad which seeks to gain power under the flag of the "anti-imperialist struggle." Denying any incompatibility, the article declared, "In our international policy, which represents an indivisible whole, there are no contradictions." In the Soviet perspective it is normal to direct that the armed forces be indoctrinated in the spirit of class hatred for imperialism at a time when disarmament talks are continuing. It is normal for the regime to press its propaganda advantages during the détente, and to try to preserve and fortify its capabilities for reaching communism's long-term global objectives whenever this should become possible.

An authoritative preview of the second round of U.S.-Soviet talks in the United States in June 1973 left no doubt that détente and ideological struggle would remain linked beyond the summit period: "Of course, only naive people would expect that recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence by the leaders of the biggest capitalist power would eliminate or weaken the main contradiction of our epoch—the contradiction between capitalism and socialism—and that the ideological struggle between them in the international arena would lose its significance."[41]

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[41] *Pravda,* May 30, 1973.

BREAKING THE DEADLOCK ON UN PEACEKEEPING

by Seymour Maxwell Finger

THE framers of the United Nations Charter worked in an atmosphere strongly influenced by the 1930's and World War II, particularly in writing Chapter VII. It was natural, therefore, that the kind of action most precisely detailed in the Charter was enforcement action as set out in Article 42 and subsequent articles of Chapter VII. The threat then uppermost in the minds of the five major wartime allies constituting the five permanent members of the Security Council – China, France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States – was the resurgence of German or Japanese militarism. An indication of this frame of mind can be found in the "transitional articles," Numbers 106 and 107 of the Charter.

But the situation has changed radically since 1945. First of all, there was an open split in the allied coalition, thus removing a precondition of effective coercive action against outlaw nations. And the Germans and Japanese have directed their great energy and competence to economic growth, rather than militarism. Second, rapid decolonialization, desirable as it has been, has resulted in a proliferation of small new nations and has brought with it a degree of instability in what is loosely called the Third World. Third, both of these developments have taken place in the setting of nuclear stalemate, which has deterred big wars but has not prevented small wars. Thus, the threat of small wars getting out of hand became a major concern of the international community, particularly as represented at the United Nations.

With a few exceptions, notably Korea and Viet Nam on the one hand, and Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the other, the kind of peace-threatening situations the world has encountered and will continue to encounter are local conflicts, not directly involving the forces of major powers. UN peacekeeping actions in such situations have been of three types: (1) In quarrels and border disputes between small states, as in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a UN mission could supervise a cease-fire and serve as a buffer. (2) In situations like the Congo and Cyprus, where internal strife threatened to draw in outsiders, the UN has helped to restore order and stabilize the situation. (3) In situations such as in Greece at the end of the 1940's and Lebanon in 1958, the UN helped to spotlight subversion and infiltration.

In more than a dozen such situations since World War II, the United Nations has helped to prevent or end fighting and maintain a truce. But except for Korea, it has not undertaken the more ambitious task of stopping aggression or enforcing the peace. It was unable to take such action, for example, in Hungary, Viet Nam, Laos or Czechoslovakia. In no case has it ordered any forces into coercive action under Article 42, nor have any forces for this purpose been put at its disposal under Article 43 agreements.

This does not imply that UN peacekeeping in disputes involving the superpowers is out of the question. On the contrary, during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Secretary-General was prepared, if requested by the Soviet Union and the United States, to observe compliance with the agreement on missiles. This was an important matter to the United States, and Khrushchev indicated a willingness to agree. However, Cuba refused to go along, and other methods of verification were used.

The record of these UN actions over the past two decades shows that United Nations peacekeeping, as distinct from enforcement action, has been primarily an *auxiliary to political measures* — an extension of political action to contain conflict and set the stage for peaceful settlement. The purpose has not been to apply military force in the classic sense of coercing the parties to submit to the UN's will. It has rather been to install a political presence which carries out certain ancillary police duties. The late Adlai Stevenson put it in a nutshell in an article for *McCall's* in October 1964, entitled "No Mission But Peace; No Enemy But War."

The essential function of UN peacekeeping is far more political than military. From this fact, a number of consequences follow. First, the mandate of a peacekeeping force must be compatible with the national security interests of the countries concerned, including the troop-contributing countries. Second, the consent of the host government or governments, on whose soil the force is to be stationed, is deemed necessary for entry of the force. Third, the force should not resort to violence beyond what may be essential to defend itself and to carry out its primarily political mission. Finally, all principal parties to the conflict must be willing to cooperate with the force.

Peacekeeping operations cannot stop the parties from fighting if they are absolutely determined to fight, but where there is a willingness to observe a cease-fire, UN forces or observers can give each side reassurance that the other side is also being observed for honest performance.

Among the major powers, the United States has been the most consistent supporter of UN peacekeeping. But though U.S. support has usually been crucial, it is equally true that these operations were made possible only through the support of middle powers that were prepared to provide personnel and financing — such countries as Canada, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Yugoslavia, Ireland and the Scandinavian states, to name a few.

For more than twenty years the Soviet Union asserted that there was no such thing as voluntary peacekeeping. Its expressed doctrine held that the only legitimate role for UN forces under the Charter was the enforcement action governed by Article 42.[1] In practice, the Soviets have been more realistic. They have supported or acquiesced in virtually all peacekeeping operations, although they refused to pay the assessments for the Congo and UNEF — thus bringing on the Article 19 crisis of 1964-1965[2]— and have insisted, along with France, that the Cyprus operation be financed by voluntary contributions.

Soviet-U.S. Negotiations

In recent years there have been signs that the Soviets might be prepared to bring their position more into line with the realities of today's world. They have shown some willingness to negotiate guidelines for future peacekeeping operations. This has been the basis of negotiations in a Working Group of eight (now enlarged to thirteen)[3] at the United Nations as well as for informal discussions between Soviet and U.S. representatives. Since some question has been raised by other countries concerning American discussions with the Soviets, these should be seen in their proper context.

Our first efforts after the Article 19 crisis in 1964 and 1965 were to work with the smaller and medium-sized countries on behalf of peacekeeping principles supported by a majority of UN members but strongly opposed by the Soviets: for example, (1) that the financing of peacekeeping is a collective responsibility, with the costs to be apportioned among the members by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter; (2) that, while the Security Council has *primary* responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the General Assembly may initiate cooperative action if the Council is stymied by a veto; and (3) that, while authorization of peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of the Security Council or the General Assembly, the Secretary-General should — in the interest of efficiency — be responsible for day-to-day control of operations.

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[1] UN General Assembly, Statements by P. Morozov (USSR) to Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, March 6, 1968.

[2] Adlai E. Stevenson, "The UN Financial Crisis," *Department of State Bulletin*, November 9, 1964, pp. 681 ff.

[3] The original eight members of the Working Group were France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Mexico. In 1972 Argentina, Brazil, India, Japan, Nigeria and Pakistan were added, while Mexico withdrew.

However, the smaller and medium-sized countries displayed little will to bring the issue to a head against the strong opposition of the Soviets. More and more they signaled that the United States should attempt to work out some sort of understanding with the Soviet Union, without sacrificing the principles the majority considered essential. It was with this background and the hints of some flexibility in the Soviet attitude that we began, early in 1970, discussions aimed at breaking the deadlock.

Both in the Committee on Peacekeeping (the Committee of 33) and in informal discussions with the Soviets, we tried to set aside any disputes over Charter interpretation whose solution was not essential to progress. For example, although the United States continues to believe in the residual authority of the General Assembly to authorize voluntary peacekeeping operations in situations where the Security Council is unable to act, the USSR still does not accept this principle; so we agreed to begin discussions on guidelines for operations authorized by the Security Council. The United States has always held to the Charter principle (Article 24) that the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security. Moreover, it is obviously a less unwieldy body than the General Assembly of 132 members. Nevertheless, the United States would not foreclose completely a new resort to the General Assembly — as in the Middle East crisis in 1956 — if in a dangerous situation the Security Council were again stalemated by a veto.

The Soviet-U.S. discussions concentrated on three essential areas:

Financing. While the observers in Kashmir and the Middle East are financed on a basis of collective responsibility in the United Nations budget, the larger operation on Cyprus depends on voluntary contributions — a system which is inequitable and undependable. Although fifty-two countries, including two nonmembers of the United Nations, have contributed to UNFICYP since its inception, currently such contributions are being made by only nineteen countries out of a total membership of 132. Among the larger members, the most notable omissions are France and the Soviet Union. This is obviously not in accord with the principle of collective responsibility of members. Moreover, it is hardly dignified for the Secretary-General to have to go hat in hand to governments in order to carry out an operation to keep the peace.

Preparation. A second essential is to assure that personnel and facilities for any peacekeeping force are available and ready on short notice. To this end member countries should be encouraged to earmark in advance military personnel and facilities for use in United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Establishment, Command and Control. Third, there must be agreement on procedures which are both politically realistic and operationally practical for the establishment and direction of UN operations after they are authorized.

The first two of these three main problems presented no major persistent obstacles. On financing, the United States made it clear at the beginning of the bilateral talks that a *sine qua non* must be a commitment that, if guidelines were agreed, all permanent members of the Security Council must pay their fair share of all future peacekeeping operations carried out in accordance with those guidelines. The Soviets objected to specific emphasis on the permanent members but were willing to include a paragraph requiring *all* members to pay unless the Security Council decided on some other method of financing. There were other differences on the respective authority of the Security Council and the General Assembly in apportioning expenses, but these did not appear to constitute a major obstacle.

On preparations, agreement was reached on the desirability of having member states earmark in advance military personnel and units for potential UN service, and maintaining an up-to-date roster of available personnel and equipment. There was some disagreement on who would request the information from member states and who would maintain the roster, but these problems were largely overcome. It was tentatively agreed that the Security Council would request the Secretary-General to inquire of member states what personnel, supplies and equipment they might be prepared to make available for operations authorized by the Security Council, and that he would maintain the roster on behalf of the Council. During meetings in 1971 I urged that we recommend such a step in our report to the Twenty-sixth Session of the General Assembly, and most members of the Working Group agreed. But the Soviets strongly opposed the idea of moving ahead on one aspect of the guidelines until agreement was reached on all aspects. Since we were working by consensus, this step could not be taken.

The real stumbling block was the matter of setting guidelines on how peacekeeping operations, once authorized by the Security Council, would be established, commanded and controlled. Such procedures must be both politically realistic and operationally practical. They must take account of the interest of all parties concerned, must be impartial in both intent and application, and must be calculated to induce the cooperation of contending parties as well as those states on which the operation depends for manpower and funds.

This meant, in the U.S. view, an acceptable and workable balance of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The Security Council has ultimate authority over such operations. It should have the power to authorize the operation, determine the key provisions of its mandate, and exercise broad political supervision over it. The Soviets, however, have advocated extending the authority of the Security Council to encompass *operational* decisions — for example, regarding size and composition of the force and designation of the commander — as well as determination of the method of financing.

The discussions have thus focused on where to draw the line of operational responsibility so as to take account of both political and operational necessities. As the United States sees it, the Security Council has a legitimate interest in assuring political responsiveness, but effective management requires that the executive authority of the Secretary-General not be impaired. The Soviets, on the other hand, urged application of Articles 43-48 of the UN Charter, giving command and control to the Security Council and its Military Staff Committee or a special committee of the Council. Problems arose because the Charter provisions in Articles 43-48 were designed for enforcement action rather than peacekeeping.

Despite this fundamental difference in doctrine, bilateral negotiations were carried on intensively over many months, in a good working atmosphere with a minimum of doctrinaire statements and no bombast. Gradually differences were narrowed, and it began to appear that agreement might be reached on an acceptable delegation of operational responsibilities by the Security Council to a special committee and the Secretary-General.

The high point of the negotiations came in June 1970. Ambassador Lev Mendelevich, my Soviet counterpart, was then leaving New York for a new assignment in Moscow. To sum up the results of five months of intensive discussions the U.S. delegation drew up a Working Paper incorporating points of agreement as well as certain suggestions for resolving remaining issues. It was not an agreed paper; however, it represented a serious U.S. effort to meet Soviet concerns expressed during the negotiations. Mendelevich, while clearly unable to commit the USSR at that point, was sufficiently interested in our paper to request five separate meetings with me for clarification during his final week in New York.

We hoped then that a Soviet response would be forthcoming by August or September. Unfortunately it did not come for thirteen months, too late for progress at either the Twenty-fifth or the Twenty-sixth Session of the General Assembly. But the documents submitted in the spring of 1972 to the Secretary-General by the USSR and the United States[4] show some of the progress made during the first half of 1970. Though important and substantial differences remain, I believe a further effort to close the gap is in order.

The Soviet document, which is a response to the U.S. Working Paper and incorporates many parts of it, represents a step forward in the following ways:

(1) It acknowledges something the Soviets long denied, i.e., that *voluntary* UN peacekeeping operations are a legitimate enterprise under the Charter and are something quite different from the enforcement actions envisaged in Article 42 of the Charter.

(2) While urging prompt resumption of negotiations on agreements for the provision of military contingents under Article 43 of the Charter, the Soviet document would give signatory countries the right to decide on the occasion of each operation whether or not such contingents may be used, instead of being obliged to make contingents available to the Security Council "on its call," as provided in Article 43. Thus the agreements would not differ in essence from those made by the Secretary-General since 1956; the

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[4] UNGA Documents A/8669, March 30, 1972, and A/8676, April 3, 1972.

difference would be the participation of the Military Staff Committee in negotiating them. In Paragraph IV (4), the document stipulates that contingents may also come from member states of the UN that have *not* concluded Article 43 agreements.

(3) There is no rigid insistence on a "troika" composition of UN forces. Instead Paragraph IV (5) states,

> it is necessary to make all efforts to reach an equitable balance in the composition of the participants in the operation so that no State Member of the United Nations is excluded from participation because of its political, social and economic system or because of its belonging to a certain geographical region. At the same time, the following considerations should be taken into account: the necessity to receive the consent of the host-country, the state of readiness and fitness for the conditions of the situation of furnished contingents, military personnel and facilities, and the necessity to ensure good working relations of the participating personnel with other parties concerned and among themselves.

The acknowledgment that contingents and the commander must be acceptable to the host country – a major advance – resulted in part from the fact that the Special Committee has an Egyptian rapporteur who made this point emphatically during Working Group discussions.

In connection with this third point, the agreement concluded between North Viet Nam and the United States in January 1973 to end the war in Viet Nam is relevant. To date no UN peacekeeping operations have included troops from Warsaw Pact countries. In certain cases the United States would have made strong objection. On the other hand, when a UN peace observation group was being organized to observe the mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani forces after their conflict in 1965, the Secretary-General invited two Warsaw Pact countries to provide military observers, but after some hesitation they declined. The peacekeeping operation established in Viet Nam this year, however, includes Polish and Hungarian as well as Canadian and Indonesian components. Of course, it is not a UN operation (neither North nor South Viet Nam is a UN member, and North Viet Nam has rejected UN involvement); it is under the International Commission for Control and Supervision. Yet, if communist units are acceptable in this peacekeeping operation there may well be others – including UN operations – where they could be used.[5]

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[5] In July 1973 Canada withdrew its components, which will be replaced by Iranians. An important element in Canada's decision was frustration at the inability of the Viet Nam peacekeeping force to carry out investigations opposed by the Poles and Hungarians. This might give the Canadians second thoughts about

This may help to facilitate Soviet-U.S. negotiations. Also, the end of the fighting in Viet Nam and the very fact that a significant peacekeeping operation has been established there should serve as a stimulus toward agreement on UN peacekeeping guidelines.

The United States, on its side, took certain steps forward to meet the Soviets:

(1) As noted earlier, despite its position that the General Assembly has residual authority to recommend peacekeeping operations when the Security Council is blocked by a veto, the United States agreed to begin the search for guidelines by discussing operations authorized by the Council.

(2) The U.S. proposal[6] acknowledges the ultimate authority of the Security Council over all aspects of a peacekeeping operation, an important point for the Soviets. It also proposes the establishment, in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter, of a Council Committee to be consulted by the Secretary-General on important operational matters; e.g., the choice of a commander, the provision of military observers and contingents, and the preparation of directives for the operation. This would give member states, and notably the Soviet Union, a significantly greater involvement in the conduct of UN operations than in the past, and corresponds to an earlier Soviet proposal.

On many significant points the two documents are parallel; for instance, the establishment of a Special Committee, the establishment and maintenance of a roster of available military observers and contingents, the role of the host country, and the ultimate authority of the Security Council. These parallel points are, in substantial part, the product of the negotiations. Yet the remaining gaps will not be easy to close.

The most serious problem is Soviet insistence that decisions in the committee may be taken only if *all* permanent members of the Security Council agree to them. This extends the veto, which can now be applied to the Council's authorization of an operation, to "*all aspects*" of its establishment, direction and control. Indeed,

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that element of their proposal on UN peacekeeping (described below) which would extend the veto to the Military Staff Committee of the UN Security Council. The numerous violations of the cease-fire in Viet Nam also illustrate another characteristic of peacekeeping; i.e., that it will work only so long and to the extent that the parties are willing to stop fighting.

[6] Annex to UNGA Document A/8676, Part II, April 3, 1972. The Working Paper given to the Soviets in June 1970 contained everything in this document plus certain additional concessions offered on a *quid pro quo*, "package deal" basis. That Working Paper is still classified, as the Soviets have not yet accepted the package.

under Paragraph VI (3) of the Soviet document, if any member objects to any activity by the field commander, he must suspend such activity unless or until it is approved by the committee or by the Council — in both of which the veto would apply. Under such conditions one would have a peacekeeping vehicle with a weak motor, powerful brakes and many hands on the steering wheel, as in Viet Nam.

The U.S. proposal would allow any member who disagrees with the way the Secretary-General or the commander is carrying out an operation to raise the matter in the committee or in the Council. The obvious difference is that, under the U.S. proposal, a majority would be needed to *stop* the action, not to sustain it.

Thus, one side fears arbitrary or unjust action by the commander or the Secretary-General contrary to its interests; the other fears paralysis of an operation after its launch. Both fears can be supported by rational argument, but that leads nowhere. Can the differences be reconciled? Before discussing that question, it might be useful to examine the views of other states as expressed during the past year.

VIEWS OF OTHER STATES

Secretary-General U Thant, in September 1971, noting the progress made and the gaps remaining, appealed to member states to strive for "the required degree of political accommodation."[7] This sentiment was reflected in General Assembly Resolution 2835 (XXVI) which, *inter alia,* "stresses the importance of achieving agreed guidelines to enhance the effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations" and "requests Member States to make available to the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations before 15 March 1972 any views or suggestions which they may wish to submit to help the work of the Special Committee."

An examination of responses by member states[8] reveals several points of interest.

(1) There were relatively few replies from the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Outside Europe, substantive suggestions came only from Canada, Japan, Brazil, Upper Volta, Madagascar and the United States. This pattern of response appears to reflect a general tendency in the last five or six years for most countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to stand aside,

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[7] Introduction to the *Annual Report of the Secretary-General,* Document A/8401, Addenda 1-17, September 1971.

[8] UNGA Document A/AC121/L15, April 17, 1972, and Addenda 1, 2 and 3 thereto.

either in resignation or in the hope that the major powers will work out some sort of agreement.

(2) Most respondents echoed U Thant's call for "the required degree of political accommodation" and stressed the crucial importance of peacekeeping to the success of the UN.

(3) Only the Warsaw Pact countries and France upheld the view that peacekeeping operations should be carried out in conformity with Articles 42-48 of the Charter; i.e., that the Security Council should assume supervision over all the operations it orders. The French reply, however, calls for "a rapprochement of the various positions" and the Soviets, as I have indicated, do not appear impervious to negotiation and accommodation.

These general observations aside, we can examine certain individual member replies to see whether and where they might help toward accommodation.

Yugoslavia's reply is of interest not only because of its content but also because Yugoslavia is one of the more active leaders of the "nonaligned" and has participated substantially in past peacekeeping operations. Yugoslavia affirms that "peacekeeping operations should become an integral part of the over-all efforts aimed at strengthening the role and efficacy of the United Nations and at realizing its primary role in the area of preventing the threat to peace, eliminating actions of aggression and promoting peaceful solutions of conflicts." It calls attention to the Third Conference of Nonaligned Countries, held in Lusaka, Zambia, in September 1970, which reiterated "the interest and support of the nonaligned countries for the strengthening of peacekeeping machinery, and speedy solution of this problem."

Yugoslavia advocates that all thirty-three members of the Special Committee be enabled to contribute to the negotiations instead of leaving matters to the Working Group. Most nonaligned countries, however, have remained passive in face of the deadlock. Perhaps most significant in the Yugoslav submission is the statement that the "complex issue of peacekeeping operations . . . demands that all solutions be fully based upon the respect for the *principles* of the Charter and that they serve the realization of United Nations *purposes*." (Emphasis added.) This position, which appears to be supported by a majority of the members submitting replies, stresses that peacekeeping guidelines must be *consistent* with the Charter and need not in all instances be found specifically in Articles 42-48, which deal with *enforcement* operations (the latter a position taken by France).

The Nordic states — Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden — which have been outstandingly active participants in UN peacekeeping, also urge the need for political accommodation on guidelines consistent with the Charter. Further, they recall that each of them maintains standby forces available for UN peacekeeping, as set forth in GA Document A/AC 121 of March 29, 1968.

Only two countries make an issue of the 1950 "Uniting-for-Peace" resolution (GA Resolution 377 (v) of November 3, 1950), which outlines procedures for possible General Assembly action if the Security Council fails to take action to maintain international peace and security in a given situation. Upper Volta favors it, and Madagascar maintains "the greatest reservations."

Japan's reply shows an increased interest in UN peacekeeping and makes certain interesting proposals: (1) On questions where a consensus has not been achieved, the Committee of 33 should submit to the General Assembly "an interim report in which the major views expressed in the course of its deliberations" are set forth, along with a report on those matters on which consensus has been reached. (2) Peacekeeping operations should be defined by adding a new article to the Charter. (3) The People's Republic of China should be invited to participate in the committee's deliberations "at the earliest possible opportunity." These suggestions have borne little fruit. The first has not been acted upon; the second is unlikely, in view of the difficulties of amending the Charter; and China has shown no inclination to participate.

Japan also emphasizes the residual authority of the General Assembly to undertake peacekeeping operations if the Security Council fails to act. While stating that the power of command resides in the authorizing body — the Security Council or the General Assembly — it suggests that "in order to take prompt action to cope with fluid and changing situations and thus to achieve effective results for peacekeeping operations, *the Security Council should delegate limited power to the Secretary-General and/or some subsidiary organs to be appointed by the Security Council (or the General Assembly)*." (Emphasis added.)

One of the most interesting suggestions is made by the Netherlands. The Dutch, like most members, feel that there should be a delegation of authority from the Security Council to a subsidiary organ or committee and to the Secretary-General. Their new idea would be to delegate to the chairman of the subsidiary organ some aspects of the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations because "experience . . . has shown how important it is that advice, approval and decision should be available to the UN field commander within 24 hours." The Secretary-General, in the Netherlands view, should have the responsibility for administrative and logistic support and should have at his disposal a complete and up-to-date roster of military personnel, contingents, facilities and services which members of the United Nations are willing to provide for peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council.

This proposal might be regarded as a compromise between those who, like the Americans, consider that the Secretary-General — as an individual — can provide faster and more efficient management than a committee, and the Soviets and French, who want the Council or its committee to run operations. Also, it would protect the Secretary-General from political repercussions if certain members are dissatisfied with the management of a particular operation. The Netherlands does not specify whether the proposed chairman would rotate monthly, as in the case of the Military Staff Committee, or serve for a year or for the duration of the mandate of a particular peacekeeping operation, as is true of most UN committees. From the standpoint of efficient operation, the latter would clearly be preferable; however, this is a negotiable point.

Canada did not reply last spring but in October submitted a memorandum which was obviously the product of extensive thought and labor.[9] It has two principal new ideas:

(1) It proposes that the Security Council "delegate its responsibilities for operational direction and control to the Military Staff Committee" (MSC). This would be a major departure from current and past practice, under which the Secretary-General has performed such functions. It should not be seen simply as a concession to the French and Soviet view, although it happens to correspond with it. Canada has consistently given generous support to UN peacekeeping, having provided components for all major operations. Canadians I have known have expressed annoyance that previous Secretaries-General have taken important decisions without consulting principal troop contributors; the change of the UNFICYP (Cyprus) commander in 1970 is an example. They have also expressed concern at the lack of military expertise at UN headquarters.

(2) A Headquarters Staff, which would include "a substantial

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[9] UNGA Document A/S PC/152, October 4, 1972.

element of professional military expertise," would supply expert advice and information to the MSC and would issue specific orders and instructions to the commander of a mission in implementation of the Security Council mandate and for the conduct of the operation, subject to periodic review by the committee.

The Canadian proposal would retain for the Secretary-General responsibility to conclude, "with the authority of the Security Council," agreements with contributors for the provision of troops, equipment or services as well as Status of Forces agreements with host countries. Also, the Secretary-General would, if so requested by the Security Council, compile a list of potential commanders for United Nations peacekeeping missions and lists of types of units, equipment and services which member states might make available for peacekeeping operations.

Thus, the Canadian proposal offers a number of ideas for bettering the preparations for peacekeeping and for delegating operational responsibility from the Security Council to a somewhat less unwieldly body. In my view, however, it has two serious defects.

First, the MSC, being composed of military men, may not have the political sensitivity required for directing peacekeeping operations. These are not combat operations, and much of the day-to-day guidance required by a field commander involves political judgment. From that standpoint a subordinate body of the Council established under Article 29 of the Charter — as proposed by the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, the United States and others — would be a more appropriate vehicle. The MSC would still be available for advice on military matters, as would the Headquarters Staff proposed by Canada.

Second — and more crucial — the Canadians propose that the MSC, "with membership augmented by the addition of States contributing to the peacekeeping force," would proceed by majority vote, "*including the concurring vote of its permanent members.*" The phrase I have emphasized would extend the veto by any single permanent member to all operational decisions — in the same way as the Soviet proposal. The prospects for stalemate are only too obvious.

An excellent review of the range of proposals was made by the United Kingdom representative to the Special Political Committee in his statement of November 24, 1972.[10] He listed the types of decisions that must be made — authorization, aim, duration, strength and composition of the force, selection of the commander, the directives to be given him, financing, and management. He then recommended that a large chart be drawn up showing the various suggestions on how decisions would be made with respect to each of these questions, and that the Committee of 33 and its Working Group examine each in turn, rather than argue general doctrine.

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[10] UNGA Document A/SPC/SR 844, November 24, 1972.

> It should become much easier to continue the discussion if it could only be recognized that inflexibility or cumbersome procedures are certain to hamper the effectiveness of any operation; that a range of options exists for methods of decision-taking; and that the choice of method may vary according to the nature of the decision to be taken—whether it concerns, for example, policy control or day to day management. There is clearly more than one way in which progress can be made; but would it not help efforts to achieve what might be called institutional compromise if the Special Committee and its Working Group could investigate the possibility of applying to each point in the range of questions for decision—the upper scale of the slide-rule, so to speak—a suitable prescription from the lower scale, the range of options?

The range of options, referred to as the "lower scale," would include the Security Council, the MSC, an Article 29 committee, the Secretary-General, the commander, and various combinations thereof.

With reference to how a subordinate organ (committee) of the Council would function, the British posed the following questions:

(1) Should the organ be
  (a) executive, that is a decision-taking body in its own right, or
  (b) consultative, giving advice to the Secretary-General, or
  (c) on some points one, on others the second?
(2) Should actions or proposals in connection with a peacekeeping operation
  (a) be made subject to the express approval of the organ, or
  (b) be only subject to disapproval, or
  (c) be a mixture of the two according to circumstances?
(3) Should the decision or advice of the organ be expressed
  (a) by voting of some sort, or
  (b) by the chairman, acting at his discretion but in its name?
(4) If voting of some sort is required, should the organ operate
  (a) on a basis of unanimity, or
  (b) only with the agreement or absence of objection from the 5 Permanent Members, or
  (c) by simple majority, or
  (d) by majority, but with the view of the Permanent Members being given some special consideration?
(5) If the agreement of the 5 Permanent Members is required, is it

(a) agreement on a *challenge* to an act or proposal that is involved, or

(b) agreement on the act or proposal itself; in other words, should any one Permanent Member by the mere challenging of an act, however arbitrarily, be able to frustrate it—a sort of reverse veto?

RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS?

These views and analyses expressed by various states during 1972 represent a significant contribution to the understanding of the key problems. Along with the chart to be prepared by the Secretariat, they should help the Committee of 33 and its Working Group in their 1973 deliberations. Yet I remain convinced that a breakthrough leading toward agreed guidelines can only be achieved through preliminary Soviet-U.S. negotiations. If these two powers can agree, there should be little difficulty in achieving general agreement; if not, experience has shown that all efforts will be stymied.

In such bilateral Soviet-U.S. negotiations, the British analysis should be most helpful in dividing the problems into negotiable components, and the Netherlands suggestion of delegating authority for day-to-day operations to the chairman of a committee established under Article 29 might provide an avenue of compromise – given the fact that both the USSR and the United States, along with most members, accept the concept of such a committee. Certain ideas might also be drawn from the Canadian proposal.

The bilateral discussions should include the negotiation of a list of decisions, distinguishing between those that would require consultation and those that could be left to the field commander, the Secretary-General, the chairman of the committee, or some combination of these. Surely the Soviets, with their advanced and complex economy, realize that day-to-day management decisions can be made more rapidly, flexibly and efficiently by a single executive than by a committee.

Perhaps agreement would be facilitated if the aim were for a given *trial period* – say, the present term of Secretary-General Waldheim. The Soviets have repeatedly expressed their great confidence in him. Could they not agree to leave certain executive functions to him, subject to consultation with the committee but not to veto? They could always have recourse to the Security Council in the event that he unjustly ignored the strongly-expressed views of an important permanent member – a most unlikely event in view of Waldheim's background and temperament and his indelible memory of the Article 19 crisis which plagues the financial health of the UN to this day.

Among those decisions requiring consultation by the Secretary-General with the committee might be the following: composition of the force; choice of a commander; agreements with the host country and with countries providing contingents; periodic review of the operation. Until the contingents are chosen, the committee — like the Military Staff Committee — would consist of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Then representatives of states providing major parts of the force would be added to the committee to fulfill its role during the balance of the operation.

A critical problem would still be the prospect of a veto blocking necessary action in the committee, as in the Canadian proposal. In order to avoid such a stalemate, the guidelines should provide for a majority vote to sustain a proposed action by the commander or the Secretary-General, *with no veto.* In the absence of a favorable majority, the action could not go forward. (In the Council, of course, the veto would remain, as provided in the UN Charter.) This is not to imply that voting would be customary; on the contrary, I would expect that virtually all questions could be resolved by the commander, the Secretary-General, or by committee agreement rather than voting. The provision for majority voting would be there as a safety valve, to be used when urgent and necessary action would otherwise be blocked or too long delayed.

There is a Soviet precedent for this distinction between voting in the Security Council and an operating body. In connection with the proposed establishment of an International Disarmament Organization, which would report to the Security Council and make recommendations for action, the Soviets accepted the principle of majority voting in the two inspection and control commissions of the IDO. Speaking in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on December 4, 1946, Foreign Minister Molotov stated:

> It should be quite obvious that the question of the well-known principle of unanimity operating in the Security Council has no relation at all to the work of the commissions themselves. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to consider the matter in the light that any government possessing the "right to veto" will be in a position to hinder the fulfillment of the control and inspections. The control commissions are not the Security Council, and therefore, there are no grounds whatsoever for saying that

any power making use of the "right to veto" will be in a position to obstruct the course of control.

Unfortunately, there has been no agreement on establishing the International Disarmament Organization. Nevertheless, Molotov's statement suggests that the Soviet position on the veto in operating organs reporting to the Security Council may not be graven in stone.[11]

Such majority voting involves a risk for the United States and other permanent members as well as the Soviets. With the changing pattern of representation in the Security Council, the United States might well find itself in a minority on certain decisions of the committee. Indeed, on the last four votes of the Security Council on major controversial resolutions, the United States has been in the minority. It vetoed resolutions on the Panama Canal Zone, the Middle East (July 1973) and Rhodesia and abstained on the resolution adopted by the Council in April 1973 condemning Israeli attacks on Lebanon. But to my mind the risk of paralysis by extension of the veto to the committee is graver than the risk that the United States might be outvoted. Furthermore, both the Soviet Union and the United States, as permanent members of the Security Council, would have a veto over the *authorization* of any operation or its *extension.*

The United States should also reconsider its opposition to any use of the Military Staff Committee in voluntary peacekeeping. It is true that the Charter concept of the MSC envisaged enforcement action rather than peacekeeping, but the Charter does not forbid such use either. For more than two decades the MSC's work has been limited to one *pro forma* meeting of about five minutes every two weeks. Yet the MSC includes many experienced military men whose advice to the Security Council on military matters might occasionally be useful. As the Soviet document now reads, it appears likely that the USSR would rely principally on a committee set up under Article 29 to assist in the establishment and conduct of peacekeeping, leaving relatively little for the MSC to do. Still, if acceptance of Paragraph II (2) of the Soviet document, with its reference to the MSC, would bring agreement, and if the Soviets would on their part forgo the veto in the committee, I do not see that any harm would be done. The MSC might turn out to be quite useful on certain military aspects of peacekeeping; e.g., cooperating with the Secretary-General on arrangements for standby forces, including any training that might be required. Many officers I have known who served on the MSC during the last seven years have been men of unusual ability.

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[11] It should also be noted that, in Security Council elections for judges of the International Court of Justice, there is no veto (Statute of the ICJ, Article 10).

All of the foregoing steps toward reaching agreement would be conditioned on a firm understanding that all members of the UN, and especially the principal contributors, would commit themselves to pay their fair share of future peacekeeping operations.

There are numerous arguments made for not bothering to close the gap. In the State Department many experienced officials have felt that the *ad hoc* procedures used in the past have been reasonably effective; they fear that changes made to accommodate the Soviets are bound to impair flexibility and efficiency. They believe that, when the need arises — perhaps in connection with an Arab-Israeli settlement — guidelines will be worked out. Their argument implies that the Soviets will be less rigid in the face of an actual situation than in the establishment of general guidelines. They may be right. However, the guidelines the Soviets submitted to the Big Four discussions on the Middle East were no more flexible than those they set forth in the UN document cited above.

It is also argued that the will to use UN peacekeeping is more important than procedures. I would agree, if it is a case of either/or. I suspect, however, that the absence of agreed guidelines, the crippling deficit from past operations, the lack of any assured financing for future operations, and the absence of any systematic preparation for peacekeeping have had a demoralizing effect which in itself affects the willingness of countries to rely on UN peacekeeping. Consequently, I feel that every effort should be made to restore the momentum of negotiations on guidelines, using the Netherlands, Canadian, Soviet and American documents along with other proposals.

A Soviet-U.S. agreement, of course, would not guarantee acceptance by the entire membership of the UN. Action would then have to be taken by the Working Group of the Committee of 33, the Committee itself, the General Assembly, and the Security Council. As in the case of the various arms control agreements negotiated in Geneva, some modifications may be brought in by other members and accepted. But these arms control agreements have also demonstrated how prior U.S.-Soviet accord gives tremendous impetus toward general acceptance on peace and security issues.

Based on both formal and informal statements I heard from representatives of many states during the years I represented the United States in the Committee of 33 (1966-1971), I am convinced that a Soviet-U.S. agreement, if it can be achieved, would be widely welcomed by other members and would pave the way toward generally agreed guidelines, thus providing a firm foundation for launching and financing future UN peacekeeping operations. A review of the written statements submitted in the spring of 1972 and the oral statements in the General Assembly last fall, with their constant emphasis on the need for a political accommodation, strengthens this conviction.

The People's Republic of China has thus far declined to participate in the work of the Committee of 33 and has submitted no written statement in response to the request in General Assembly Resolution 2835 (XXVI). Its eventual position must, therefore, be a matter for conjecture. Yet the PRC has paid its share of the cost of the UN observer missions in Kashmir and the Middle East, both established before it took its seat at the UN. If, as appears likely, a Soviet-U.S. agreement obtains general support among the nonaligned countries — perhaps with minor modifications — there is nothing in the record of the PRC to date to indicate that it could sabotage such a general accord.

It is, therefore, my conviction that Moscow and Washington should get serious about peacekeeping negotiations — serious enough to challenge their own doctrines, to involve the highest officials in both capitals, and to make a strenuous, sustained effort to close the gap. Otherwise, an opportunity to strengthen the UN in one of its crucially important functions may be lost.

THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE: PARTNERS OR RIVALS?*

by Kurt Birrenbach

SINCE the idea of Atlantic partnership was first proclaimed by President John F. Kennedy on July 4, 1962, there has been a growing gap in communication between the United States and Western Europe. Understanding for each other's interests has waned and the first symptoms of estrangement have become apparent.

The relationship between the members of the European Community and the United States has undergone a change, which urgently calls for a thorough reappraisal. That change has been economic, military and political, but its primary cause has been the change in the relative position of the United States in the world: economically in relation to its NATO partners in the European Community and Japan, militarily and politically in relation to the Soviet Union, and politically in relation to China.

This shift in the overall power relationship has altered the constellation of the international system. It has placed the Atlantic Alliance and the Japanese-American Security Treaty into a new frame of reference. The European Community has been enlarged by the accession of Britain, Denmark and Ireland. The economic consolidation of Europe has so far not been followed by the political and military reinforcement hoped for, but has produced tensions within the alliance in the form of an emerging rivalry in trade and monetary policy. This development, in conjunction with the policy of East-West détente, has diluted appreciation of the need for political and military interdependence, and hence for an Atlantic community of NATO partners.

At the same time, the United States, in further developing the bilateral course it has followed since the Cuba crisis, has under President Nixon entered an era of arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union instead of continuing the confrontation of the past. The rapprochement between the United States and China, coming as it did when the Viet Nam war was being wound down,

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has eased the strategic burden on the United States in East Asia, while the tension along the Soviet Union's eastern frontier has increased. The American policy of containment of the Soviet Union has been replaced by a policy of universal equilibrium. It is against this background that the shift of power of recent years in the trilateral United States-Europe-Soviet Union relationship must be seen.

SHIFT IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC POWER

The economic position of the United States in relation to the European Community has been weakened since the EEC's enlargement. The Community has superseded the United States as the world's leading trading power. In 1950 the gross national product of the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community together amounted to only $78 billion compared with the $285 billion achieved by the United States. (The ECSC GNP was about 27 per cent of the American.) But within two decades the GNP of the six EEC countries had risen to $540 billion, thus doubling the 1950 U.S. GNP and equaling that registered by the Soviet Union in 1970. In 1971 the GNP of the nine members of the enlarged Community totaled $690 billion as against $1,050 billion for the United States. Thus the European Community GNP had increased from about 27 per cent that of the United States in 1950 to 70 per cent by 1970. During the same two decades the American share of world GNP fell from 40 to 30 per cent.

The gold and foreign exchange reserves of the enlarged Community now approximate three-and-a-half times those of the United States, which, in contrast, suffers from a chronic balance-of-payments deficit that assumed alarming proportions in 1971. Indeed, even the American trade balance since 1971 has shown a deficit for the first time since 1896. This critical situation led the United States in August 1971 to take drastic steps, including suspension of dollar convertibility. The realignment of currencies under the Smithsonian agreements of December 1972, combined with the devaluation of the dollar, represented only the first step toward normalizing the international monetary situation.[1]

The United States based its foreign trade policy on the fundamental principle of GATT, i.e., the most-favored-nation clause. In recent years, on the basis of Article 24 of GATT, the European Community has created preferential arrangements which today link Western Europe's most important industrial nations in a customs union. Several other European countries enjoy special access to the Community by free trade agreements. In addition, the European Community has concluded association and preferential trade accords with countries ranging from the Mediterranean area through large parts of Africa to the equator and, following the admission of Britain, also to some parts of the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean.

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[1] Only one year later, on February 13, 1973, a further devaluation of the U.S. dollar, this time by 10 per cent, became necessary. In another month's time six European nations felt obliged on account of the enormous speculative inflow of U.S. dollars to float their currencies en bloc vis-à-vis the dollar. Italy and Japan had had to float individually in the months previously; Great Britain and Ireland earlier in 1972. This development is not only the result of the deficitary evolution of American trade. Much more complex factors are involved.

The United States regards the emergence of this huge European preferential trade bloc as a potential threat, in spite of the fact that the U.S. export surplus in trade with the European Community ranged between one and two billion dollars a year for a whole decade up to 1971. In 1972 the balance appears to have been slightly in deficit for the first time since World War II.[2] At the same time, the net aggregate American trade deficit, taking into account U.S. trade with all regions of the world, has trebled since 1971.

The main reasons for this deterioration in the U.S. trade balance are the decline of American industrial competitiveness after years of inflation – which the Nixon Administration is still struggling to control – and the fact that the technological lead the United States held over other major industrial countries has been reduced. What is more, the rate of productivity has slowed down relative to that of many other industrialized countries, and wages in the United States continue to run at a higher level than in Europe and Japan. In this connection, however, it must be pointed out that the United States obtains substantial returns (at present about $10 billion a year) on its huge direct investments abroad,[3] which substantially reduces the balance of payments deficit. It is still uncertain whether the revaluation upward of the European currencies and the Japanese yen since the Smithsonian agreements, together with the devaluation of the dollar, will sufficiently alter existing trends in the flow of trade and help substantially to restore the American competitive position.[4]

[2] The overall trade deficit amounted to $140 million, including the re-export and export of military equipment.

[3] In 1970 these amounted to $86 billion throughout the world, including $22.5 billion in the EEC and Britain.

[4] The changes of parity vis-à-vis the dollar which have taken place in the course of the first half of 1973 may be able to restore the equilibrium of the American trade balance within a foreseeable period.

In any case the United States, as a world power with widespread military commitments, has become economically vulnerable — at least in terms of its balance of payments. The dominant economic power in the 1950's and 1960's, it now looks upon the European Community as a potential commercial rival. In past decades it tolerated the weakening of the GATT most-favored-nation principle by the Europeans, in accordance with Article 24. The United States did so because it expected a European customs union to be the first step toward a European political union, which it hoped would alleviate America's defense burden around the world and support its strategic posture on the Eurasian continent. That hope remains unfulfilled. Europe has not yet achieved political union.

True, at their summit conference in Paris in October 1972 the European heads of state or of government stressed the need for Europe "to establish its position in world affairs as a distinct entity" and accordingly affirmed their intention "to transform before the end of the present decade the whole complex of their relations into a European union." But the goal of political union is still a long way off. It is not even possible at the moment to tell when the obstacles to the creation of an economic and monetary union may be removed. The current system of foreign policy consultation lingers in the initial phase. At the present time the only tangible basis for the development of a European defense community is the Eurogroup, which France has declined to join.

On the whole, therefore, it must be said that the ultimate goal of political union has yet to be given concrete definition; the Community has not even agreed on a phased plan for its attainment. Moreover, the world at the beginning of the 1970's is still not pentagonal. In international politics there are only two real centers of power: the United States and the Soviet Union. A third focal point, China, is beginning to emerge, but Europe and Japan at present rank only as industrial world powers. The need for Europe to evolve a form of political union that encompasses defense is apparent, and its eventual development is perhaps inevitable.

Shift of Power in Favor of the Soviet Union

The shift in the global distribution of economic power has led the United States to view its contribution to the defense of the Western world in a different light. Its responsibility for the security of the European continent, the main area of confrontation between the Eastern bloc and the West, is still decisive. The United States provides 10 per cent of the ground forces, 20 per cent of the naval forces, and 25 per cent of NATO's air forces in Europe. But what counts most is the American strategic nuclear capability. The nuclear forces of Britain and France would, even if pooled (which is not feasible at present), fail to constitute a genuine and reliable alternative deterrent in view of the overwhelming Soviet superiority. Restrictions placed upon the European nuclear option by the Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as geographical and political constraints, make a European nuclear alternative to the U.S. strategic guarantee almost an impossibility in the foreseeable future. The American forces in Europe underpin the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent and to that extent cannot be replaced by European formations.

Moreover, the U.S. Seventh Army, because of its considerable firepower, is hardly replaceable as an element of conventional defense in Europe. As regards American complaints that Europe's contribution to Western defense is inadequate, it should be remembered that in 1971 the Europeans provided some $30 billion for NATO's defense budget, calculated on the basis of the new currency parities under the Smithsonian agreements. By comparison, the American share of European defense in that year, including home-based forces in reserve for NATO, came to $16 billion. To be sure, this figure does not include the cost of U.S. strategic weapons located outside Europe. Yet, the United States is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power, and the American strategic umbrella protects the American continent as well as its allies in Asia and in Europe. Even if that proportion of the American strategic forces assigned to the protection of Europe were included among America's "Europe" expenditures, those expenditures would still be smaller than the total defense outlays of the European members of NATO.

In the meantime there has developed in the United States, particularly in consequence of its traumatic experience in Viet Nam, a body of opinion which finds expression in the Nixon Doctrine and aims to reduce overseas military commitments. This applies not only to Asia but, as tendencies within the Senate have shown for a number of years, to Europe also. Although the American administration has so far managed to ward off resolutions initiated by Senator Mansfield, its success during the last two years is attributable almost entirely to the fact that future MBFR negotiations with the Soviet Union hold out the possibility of achieving mutual balanced force reductions. But the Europeans cannot ensure a substantial, long-term American military presence on the continent unless they at least improve the quality of their armed forces rather than reduce them, as some NATO members have already done or threaten to do. Further burden-sharing agreements along the lines of the European Defense Improvement Program are required to ease the financial strain on the United States. In any event the U.S. nuclear deterrent will remain the decisive element of the military balance in Europe.

But here there has been a second shift, in favor not of Western Europe but of the Soviet Union. In recent years the Soviet Union has overtaken the United States in land-based strategic missiles, and will soon have gained the lead in missile-launching nuclear submarines. The present U.S. nuclear sufficiency has been codified by the first SALT agreement, for during the first round of SALT the Americans managed to place limitations on the weapon systems of both sides. But although the United States still has a qualitative lead, especially in the field of multiple warheads (MIRV), it has experienced a weakening of its military position in relation to the Soviet Union — not unlike the weakening of its economic position vis-à-vis Europe.

This is all the more serious because the superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in terms of conventional forces in Europe has, if anything, increased.[5] It is calculated that they have a ground force superiority on the central front of 1.6:1 with France discounted, and 2:1 thirty days after mobilization, including France in the Western totals. In the North the ratio is 5:1; in the South it is 4:5 if the Greek and Turkish forces are included. The Soviet bloc possesses much greater armored strength than NATO — 21,200 heavy tanks confront 8,100 under NATO command. This superiority is only partly offset by Western antitank weapons. A similar Pact supremacy obtains in artillery. In the air, Eastern Europe has 4,700 fighter aircraft compared with 750 in the West, and 750 reconnaissance aircraft to NATO's 450; the numbers of fighter bombers are about the same.

On the other hand, the conventional supremacy of the Soviet bloc is offset by the forward-based systems of tactical nuclear

[5] For military strength ratios, see *The Military Balance 1972/73* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Annual Defence Department Report, FY 1973); John Newhouse with Melvin Croan, Edward R. Fried and Timothy W. Stanley, *U.S. Troops in Europe: Issues, Costs and Choices* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971); and William P. Rogers, *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970* (Washington: GPO, 1971).

weapons stationed in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. Here NATO has 7,000 nuclear warheads as opposed to 3,500 for the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, two other factors have to be taken into account: (1) the explosive power of the Soviet warheads is in some cases greater than that of the American; (2) the Soviet Union has 700 MRBM's in western Russia pointed at Europe. The military position of the Eastern bloc is also strengthened by the huge reserves that can be quickly mobilized, the vast room for maneuver behind the western borders of the Warsaw Pact, much shorter supply routes, the advantages of interior lines of supply, and a higher degree of standardization of weapons and equipment.

In view of Soviet-bloc superiority in conventional forces, the changing world constellation poses for the United States, and the West Europeans in particular, a major challenge. Is the defense of the West still adequate? Is deterrence in the era of parity still credible? As far as conventional defense is concerned, the first question can be answered positively, though with a host of qualifications. In the nuclear field, neither of the superpowers has a first-strike capability, but both can deliver a second strike. The risk of a nuclear counterblow is therefore still a reality and compels both powers to exercise self-restraint in pursuit of their objectives insofar as these affect each other's vital interests. More and more, Europeans feel that the existence of such a nuclear stalemate means that any future military conflict would be confined to Europe and strategic weapons would be excluded. Thus European-American relations face a twofold predicament: rivalry in the commercial and monetary field, and a shifting balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.

THE DANGER OF SOVIET HEGEMONY IN EUROPE

This shift in the balance of power is apt to speed up the process of détente with far-reaching and as yet unforeseeable consequences. The opening of the Free World toward the East has attained a momentum that may even increase the present military superiority of the Soviet Union. Some Western states — not least because of the German *Ostpolitik* as they understand it — are inclined to think that the causes of tension between East and West in Europe have now been removed and the defense effort can consequently be reduced. But it should be pointed out that the Soviet Union has meanwhile become a global military power and does not appear to regard détente as an inducement to ease its strategic buildup; on the contrary, it has stepped up its armament effort in recent years. The ideological conflict between East and West has not by any means been terminated, only diluted. This conflict, together with the Soviet-bloc policy of "delimitation," leaves little scope for the peaceful permeation of East and West — at least in the West-East direction. At the moment détente means to Eastern Europe no more than a general improvement in the political climate.

It is not yet possible to say whether the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the MBFR negotiations will bring any substantial change in this respect, but some European states might be tempted to make concessions in the form of an all-European peace system of the kind the East European people's democracies may have in mind, in order to offset what they see as deterioration of the overall security situation in Europe and a change in the military constellation. Such a development could slow down the process of West European unification and reduce American influence in Europe — all the more so if the American military presence were substantially diminished.

Irrespective of this, the Soviet-American rapprochement resulting in part from the changed military balance of power in the world is seen by some European countries to incline the United States to attach as much importance to relations with the Soviet Union as to consolidating the Atlantic Alliance. Such conflicting priorities could further strain the relationship between Europe and the United States and weaken the cohesion of the alliance.[6] This would lead to the hegemony of the Soviet Union in Europe — achieved by means of military superiority rather than aggression — and thus end the military balance of power.

The Need for European-American Negotiations

If the United States and Europe wish to prevent Soviet hegemony in Europe and a further deterioration of their relations — and the warnings to this effect delivered by the American Secretaries of State and Defense at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in December 1972 were unmistakable — then the United States and Europe must negotiate the entire complex of these burning issues, especially now that the war in Viet Nam has virtually ended. However, as Henry Kissinger said on September

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[6] Rightly or wrongly, this impression seems to the Europeans confirmed by the last American-Soviet summit in Washington and particularly by the Soviet-American nuclear accord of June 22, 1973.

16, 1972,[7] European-American relations can no longer be seen merely from the aspect of security. Today, a new Atlantic partnership can only be defined in a global context embracing commercial, monetary and economic interests. According to the Treaty of Rome, the European Community cannot initiate talks on the global questions that have assumed such critical proportions in relations between the two continents. Thus future negotiations will have to be in the hands of different institutions depending on their functions — NATO and the Eurogroup for problems of defense, offsetting foreign exchange costs and burden-sharing; a GATT conference for the further reduction of tariffs, the removal of nontariff barriers to trade, the creation of generalized preferences for the Third World, and reciprocal preferences, as well as remedies for agricultural problems; and the Group of Twenty in the International Monetary Fund for the organization of a new world monetary system.

It would seem desirable for the Europeans, in view of the vital interests at stake, to take the initiative in finding solutions to such acute problems. But can a community of sovereign states that still have widely diverging interests genuinely be expected to come forward with a convincing initiative?[8] If it cannot, the United States, as the leading power within the Atlantic Alliance, should make the move and submit proposals to its partners in accordance with these global perspectives. The most expedient forum for this could be an Atlantic summit conference with the NATO Council and the European Commission participating. The signals the new American administration gave at the NATO ministerial meeting in December, the successful outcome of the Kennedy Round, and the Washington monetary agreement of 1971 show that constructive solutions are possible if both sides are willing.

The economic and monetary problems cannot be resolved, however, without Japan. Japan must be involved in the negotiations. But even if an Atlantic summit conference provided the decisive stimulus for global solutions of these urgent problems — which would then have to be negotiated on the three levels mentioned above (NATO-Eurogroup, GATT, and IMF Group of Twenty) — it would still not be enough. Such issues will continue to affect relations between the two continents; therefore, a permanent dialogue is called for. For this purpose a joint institution is needed, of a higher level than hitherto conceived (Dahrendorf, Samuels/Eberle), especially since the European Commission is not empowered to cope with such global problems. Europe currently has no suitable institution. European summit meetings are inadequate in this respect. Even the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, assisted by the President of the European Commission, could not fill this gap. If summit conferences are not considered suitable for this purpose, there ought to be periodic meetings between these two representatives of the European Community on the one hand and representatives of appropriate rank from the U.S. government on the other – as well as the Secretary-General of NATO as a link between the political and the defense sectors – to deal with serious problems arising in U.S.-European relations.

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[7] And particularly in his important speech in New York on April 23, 1973.

[8] The different reactions of the European states to Dr. Kissinger's April 23, 1973 speech, whatever motives they may have had, have sustained the impression that the initiative is not likely to come from Western Europe.

Only a true partnership between the United States and a uniting Europe which transcends a classical alliance, and the settlement of American-Japanese trade and monetary differences, can strengthen the position of the West in the world and improve conditions for the kind of détente that will not jeopardize Europe's stability.

CAN NATO FASHION A NEW STRATEGY?

by R. C. Richardson

SOME U.S. force reductions in the NATO area seem likely within the next few years. This is not to argue that they are desirable, only to recognize that the signs point in this direction. The shift in priorities from defense to domestic programs, the unfavorable U.S. trade balance, the détente environment and related force reduction conferences, and a growing public feeling that by now Europe should be able to defend itself will continue to build up pressures for a U.S. withdrawal. The question is less "if" than "when."

The present NATO strategy is one of conventional, flexible response. The force levels required to carry it out are at, or below, the level of credibility for this particular strategy. Some claim that so long as these levels are maintained, our NATO commands could do a credible job of defending against most plausible threats. No one claims this to be possible with even less force than is now available. To do so would be to admit that NATO had too many troops for its present strategy — and all responsible NATO leaders argue the contrary.

If a force reduction is inevitable, for whatever reason, what happens to the security of Europe? No one proposes to dismantle NATO or abandon any pretense at maintaining as effective defenses as practical, at whatever force levels the member nations agree to support. This being the case, the problem is to devise and "sell" a new NATO strategy that can be credible and effective at a lower level of force and cost. Is this feasible?

Some may argue that were it possible to provide an adequate defense for Europe with fewer forces, and at less cost, this would have been done long ago. This is not necessarily so. Different strategies carry different price tags and force levels. In the strategic arena, massive retaliation is cheaper than counterforce. It requires far less sophisticated weapon systems to carry it out. In the early 1950's NATO turned to a strategy emphasizing tactical nuclear weapons when it became apparent that the force requirements for a purely conventional defense of Europe could not be met.

The choice of strategy can affect both cost and force requirements in any plan or area, but these are not the only considerations in determining what the strategy should be. Political acceptability, past military experience, arms control considerations — such as peaceful space or nonprovocation — and vested interests, all have an impact on the selection process. Technology also plays a key role, for new weapons are what really make new strategies possible.

There was a time when soldiers decided the strategy required to accomplish the goals set by political leaders and the nation provided the means — or if it was unable to do so, the goals were changed. Since the advent of nuclear arms, however, everyone "gets into the act." Disarmers, amateurs, politicians, social scientists and public relations "buffs" all want a voice in devising our military strategy. Whether or not this is justified, it certainly complicates the selection process.

Any change in strategy is a traumatic experience. This is particularly so in peacetime when we must overcome the old adage that "the military start each war with the strategies found successful in the last one." The "system" inherently resists change, and the more interests there are involved, the harder it is to reach agreement. The easiest solution is to rationalize the status quo, which is what we have been doing in NATO for some years. The question today — when change is sorely needed — is: Are there any alternatives a majority could rally around?

In this article we are concerned only with NATO strategy. The problem is to determine if a new and acceptable strategy can be introduced, taking into account real-world trends in: (1) new weapons, (2) manpower and weapon costs, (3) economic and political pressures to reduce U.S. forces overseas, (4) détente and related, current or planned, East-West negotiations, (5) the implications of the Nixon Doctrine, and (6) the multilateral power balance evolving from the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, the expansion of the European Community, and the growth of Japanese power and self-sufficiency.

A change in NATO strategy is dictated by one or more of the above trends, and it must come to pass in the 1970's; it is already overdue. Unfortunately, the strategic alternatives theoretically available far exceed those that could be implemented in practice. The difference between what might be done and what can be done results from the real world of politics, public attitudes, inertia and other factors severely limiting the extent to which a new strategy can be "sold" to NATO governments — particularly in the near term.

By first establishing the boundaries of probable acceptability, we can prevent wasted effort and make the acceptance of proposals more likely. These boundaries are not fixed except at a specific time. They widen as time passes because the farther one goes into the future, the greater the options become; time is a key factor in creating conditions favorable to change.

For the next few years, boundary conditions for planning the initial proposal definition, feasibility and acceptability of a new strategy might realistically conform to the following timetable:[1]

Boundaries to military acceptability	1975 era
Boundaries to political acceptability	1976 era
Boundaries to availability of the means	1977-1978 era

This timing means that our new strategy can be built around 1977 technology, must be politically acceptable in the anticipated 1976 environment, and will be neither developed nor proposed unless, as a minimum, it can be militarily acceptable and "sold" to the NATO military authorities in the 1975 environment. These are the target dates we can retain for boundary planning, and around which acceptability must be predicted.

The boundaries to feasibility and acceptability of any NATO strategy option we might consider are both physical (as with technological or financial capabilities) and conceptual (as with political or public acceptability in the assumed atmosphere of the agreed time frame). The principal areas for which we need to establish limits (boundaries) to feasibility or acceptability so that we can narrow down our strategy options are:

(1) Weapons technology and hardware availability (1977)
(2) Public attitudes on nuclear matters (1976)
(3) NATO security goals and objectives (1976)
    —for deterrence purposes
    —for defense purposes
(4) Collateral damage and other effects (1977)
(5) Military acceptability (1974-1975)
(6) Degree and rate of change and the transition factors (1976-1977)
(7) Cost (1976-1977)
    —to the United States
    —to the interested NATO nations
(8) Escalation and conflict controllability factors (1977)
(9) Political trends and developments

If we can establish boundaries for these nine areas of concern and then define one or more new strategies that fit within those boundaries, it may be possible to find a new approach to NATO's defense which is both feasible and acceptable. If no alternatives can be found that satisfy both the current pressures for cost and U.S. force reductions and our criteria of feasibility and acceptability, we will know that prospects for the survival of an effective NATO alliance during the next decade are poor to nil. We should then consider unilateral U.S. alternatives.

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[1] Historically, military definition and acceptance of a significant change in NATO strategy has taken an average of two years. Political approval has taken an additional one to two years.

Technology and Hardware Boundaries

These physical boundaries are relatively easy to define within the time frame that concerns us (1977-1978). We know what we have today in items such as weapons, vehicles and support systems; we know what is programmed for procurement within the next year or two; given the authority and funds, we know what we could build and field by 1977. Our nuclear-weapons options have been defined, as well as the earliest availability dates of the various systems and the rough cost estimates per unit. This same type of information has been developed for major new support systems, such as surveillance, control, communications and transport systems.

Any NATO (or U.S.) strategy that is to be effective in 1977 must be based on some combination of existing systems and systems which can be fielded by 1977. There can be no others if our availability dates are valid. These are hard boundaries and generally represent the outside limits, because the assumed availability dates may depend on early procurement decisions that do not materialize. In this study, we will assume that if an item can be made available in time, it is within our technology and hardware boundaries.

A summary analysis of weapons availability can be readily made. It should lead to conclusions along the following lines, though these are only illustrative:

(1) Real-time, space-based observation and reporting of exposed items, including men, can be envisioned under clear-weather daylight conditions.

(2) Tactical nuclear weapons with negligible fallout or contamination side effects and with yields of from 50 tons to 55 kilotons can be envisioned.

(3) Precision guided missiles and rockets, now available, will be improved in reliability, accuracy and diversity of types.

(4) Laser-kill weapon systems will not be sufficiently developed

to have a major impact on strategy or force requirements within this time frame.

These forecasts may be considered quite accurate due to the long lead time in new weapon developments.

ECONOMIC AND COST BOUNDARIES

Next to technology and hardware, budget considerations establish the most rigid boundaries. If we assume that no dramatic international events, such as a Sino-Soviet war, will occur unexpectedly, the limits on defense spending by NATO governments for the next few years can be fairly accurately forecast.

Except as required by inflation, NATO nations will probably budget no more annually for defense throughout the 1970's than they did in 1972. Thus, we can reasonably assume that they will not increase the percentage of GNP spent on defense beyond that spent in 1972.

All NATO nations suffer from inflation and feel steadily rising pressures for increased domestic spending. Most are at or near peacetime limits of taxation. The international atmosphere, exemplified by SALT, MBFR, CSCE and expanding East-West trade, is one of détente. When we add to this the rationale that the China threat limits the Soviet Union's flexibility to deploy its full potential against NATO, we must conclude that the foreseeable NATO environment is more conducive to decreased than to increased defense spending.

The only indicators that may potentially argue for significant increases in NATO defense budgets are a growth of Soviet strategic power and a concurrent waning in reliability of U.S. strategic forces in emergencies limited to Europe. A major U.S. force reduction would also argue for a European increase.

The factors arguing for spending, however, are far less tangible than those arguing against it. For this reason, our planned economic boundaries can hardly allow for larger defense allocations than those that would be realized if all NATO nations were to budget annually the same percentage of their GNP for defense as they did in 1972. Accordingly, we can conclude that any new strategy calling for spending in excess of these totals will be politically unacceptable. We can eventually refine our economic boundaries by breaking down NATO budgets among manpower, operations and maintenance, and procurement. Minimum levels of flexibility to shift funding among these accounts on a nation-by-nation basis could be readily identified. Such boundaries could further restrict the scope and nature of proposed strategy changes, but this degree of detail is not considered necessary in a first effort. If we accept the overall boundaries established by using a percentage of GNP, we can conclude:

(1) The forces and major weapon systems now deployed in NATO are not likely to be increased significantly.

(2) Because the current rate of rise in manpower costs and replacement systems (aircraft, ships, tanks) exceeds the average nation's GNP growth rate, present levels of manpower and major weapon systems in NATO cannot be maintained indefinitely within our assumed budget boundary.

(3) Any introduction of new weapons will require offsetting quantitative reductions in force requirements or in existing systems, and the higher the unit cost of new weapons, the greater the offsetting reductions. The same will be true in modernizing the existing force with more costly equipment.

These conclusions suggest that any new strategy whose cost is to be acceptable must do the job credibly with fewer forces or weapon systems, or both.

In addition to overall NATO cost boundaries, other cost boundaries can be based roughly on U.S. force and weapon contributions during the 1970's. Specific conclusions would require a detailed analysis, but the following general considerations suggest the trend:

(1) Our loss of strategic superiority indicates that priorities on available U.S. defense funds will go to the Trident missile, the B-1 bomber, ABM, and other strategic systems.

(2) Recent studies of the defense budget by specialists indicate that domestic and political considerations will keep our defense budgets near current levels, except for increases to offset inflation – up to a ceiling of $100 billion regardless of GNP.

(3) Adoption of the volunteer-army concept, associated pay scales, and rising retirement-pay demands will increasingly require us to choose between force reductions and new weapons. In any U.S. force reduction, our NATO contingents are prime targets.

(4) Because of fleet obsolescence from neglect during the Viet Nam era and increased U.S. dependence on oil imports, naval forces will probably be given priority over NATO deployment when such a choice has to be made.

(5) We must always take into account how our defense spending will affect gold flow, foreign exchange, and the balance of payments.

Spending cutbacks seem to be in store for the U.S. contribution to NATO forces in the 1970's. No increases are foreseen even if the overall U.S. budget should increase. This situation suggests that our cost boundary for U.S. NATO forces should be expressed in 1971-1972 costs and 1972 dollars — if not in even less favorable terms.

POLITICAL BOUNDARIES

This section deals with purely political limits to acceptable strategies, as differentiated from those reflecting public attitudes, economics, collateral effects or escalation. These latter boundaries, though in essence political, are treated later. The principal U.S. political boundaries relate to:

(1) The extent to which the Nixon Doctrine can countenance U.S. assumption of responsibility for overall, initial, partial, nuclear or other defenses for other nations. The boundary here could well be that no increased American responsibilities could be realistically proposed. The goal is to decrease U.S. responsibilities while still honoring past commitments. Thus, no new strategy will be politically acceptable if it calls for additional U.S. commitments.

(2) The priority currently given to détente and related SALT, MBFR and other arms control efforts. The boundary here appears to be that no strategy requiring a major trimming of these efforts will be politically acceptable.

(3) Political unacceptability of any substantial increases in U.S. peacetime overseas bases or forces, regardless of economic acceptability. Another boundary should probably be set on any plan calling for a significant U.S. presence in areas where it does not now exist.

The above three boundaries will probably remain fixed at least until 1976, the minimum period over which the present Republican administration will confront a Democratic Congress. Until then, the known views of such men as Senators Fulbright, Mansfield and Kennedy cannot be ignored.

The European political boundaries for the acceptability of new NATO strategies are more diverse and less clear.

(1) France now has little say at the military level, so her political views are pertinent only if the strategy demands her collaboration. France's attitude could affect ultimate political acceptability, however, through North Atlantic Council deliberations and her European Community ties. This boundary may best

be described as a need to avoid antagonizing the French politically, and thus appears to be more a criterion for selecting options than a boundary on options.

(2) There are clear boundaries for what is politically acceptable to Germany today, but the situation in 1977 is hard to forecast. The most likely development is that Germany will move farther to the left, increase her East-West ties, adopt a more nationalistic foreign policy, and voice stronger demands for defense funds. If this trend materializes, any NATO strategy that is judged to be more "provocative" or to impede *Ostpolitik* will be politically unacceptable. The political boundary could be any new posture deemed more "overtly aggressive" than the present one.

(3) Boundaries to political acceptability in Great Britain appear to be less restrictive. Those in Scandinavia relate mainly to the presence of nuclear weapons and the participation of Spain, and these are treated later under public attitude boundaries. No political constraints on the acceptability of otherwise sound plans supported by a NATO majority seem to exist in the southern flank countries. The boundaries there will be more logistical and economic than political.

SECURITY GOALS

Security goals fall into two categories according to their association with deterrence or with defense. Since the requirements for effective deterrence are not necessarily the same as those for effective defense, they must be dealt with separately.

There is a great deal of confusion over the contribution of deterrence and its association with "war-fighting capability." Let us consider for a moment that deterrence is a function of how an adversary assesses the military potential of your force and your willingness to use that force.[2] It is not difficult to apply this definition to a conventional or a tactical nuclear force. For either force, one links military potential with war-fighting capability. If you assume that one is willing to commit his tactical nuclear force, the close association of deterrence with war-fighting capability is understandable. At present, the American President would have great difficulty in releasing the NATO tactical nuclear force; hence, it serves little use, i.e., it has little or no deterrent value.

The situation is less clear with regard to strategic forces. The military potential of the U.S. or Soviet strategic force can be placed near infinity on any scale. Even as willingness to use the force approaches zero, its deterrent effect can be great, or at least undetermined. Not only is its military potential enormous, but it has an impersonal and unreal character — vastly removed from the concrete features that define a conventional or tactical nuclear force. For these reasons, one hardly associates war-fighting capability with strategic forces.

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[2] This discussion is based directly on the article by W. S. Bennett, R. R. Sandoval and R. G. Shreffler, "A Credible Nuclear-Emphasis Defense for NATO" (p. 470), which appears in this issue of ORBIS.

Since arguments on deterrence versus war-fighting capability in NATO are almost always confused by definitions of theater, strategic and tactical forces, it is understandable why a close association was seldom made and, indeed, why the two subjects were treated separately. They also need to be treated separately from the viewpoint of boundary definition.

The primary NATO political objective is to deter aggression. Any NATO strategy that is to be acceptable must contribute to, or independently satisfy, this goal.

A strategy and force posture that can clearly defeat any attempt at aggression is a deterrent. However, a strategy and force posture that cannot possibly contain aggression, and yet promises inevitable retribution to an extent making the overall cost of aggression unacceptable, is also a deterrent. We thus start with two extremes: (1) a perfect defense and (2) unacceptable retaliation in lieu of any defense. Both will deter. In theory, if deterrence is the only goal, either extreme should be acceptable.

A perfect defense is impossible. Though cost and other factors may be under our control, we can never be certain of the scope and nature of the threat. However, retaliatory capabilities that are unacceptable to the enemy are possible. The problem is that use of such capabilities in other than extreme situations is not credible. Any strategy and associated force posture will thus be a compromise.

Are there identifiable boundaries based on defense policy and conceptual (not economic or technological) grounds that should limit the extent to which we (1) seek a perfect defense or (2) rely on retaliation (punitive offensive capacity) to deter?

If an effective forward defense cannot be provided and enemy military superiority is inevitable under some conditions of aggression in certain areas, there is no deterrent to such aggression except the promise of retaliation. To date, the principal retaliatory deterrents have been the U.S. strategic forces and, to a lesser degree, French and British strategic forces and SHAPE tactical nuclear forces. As stated before, low credibility reduces the value of retaliatory deterrents. Growth of Soviet retaliatory capability has steadily diminished the credible-use scenarios for allied strategic forces. At present, strategic retaliation (as opposed to possible defensive assistance) for anything short of an overall attack on Western Europe is just not credible.

Under the above reasoning, U.S. strategic forces would be used only in extremes and, thus, would no longer be a deterrent to local aggression in Europe. The deterrence we provide must come from a combination of local defense capabilities and the aggressor's concern that, should these prove inadequate, we would resort to tactical nuclear firepower that could lead to escalation levels beyond those he could accept.

A seldom-mentioned key consideration is that no aggressor wants to provoke escalation beyond his pre-planned limits, for under this circumstance the initiative is surrendered to the defender, who chooses the time, place and weapons.

If strategic retaliation is not available to respond to local aggression in Europe and any tactical weapons used are limited to military targets in combat zones, there is no rational nuclear deterrent to local aggression so far as fear of unacceptable losses is concerned; instead, we return to relative defense effectiveness and war-fighting capabilities. Retaliatory deterrence is not a factor in this situation; it can only be a factor when losses to the aggressor — not directly related to battlefield successes — are unacceptable.

This rationale needs to be developed further, but it strongly suggests that there is no purely deterrent role for theater tactical weapons, only a backup war-fighting role. Their deterrent value would lie in either (1) the combined conventional and tactical nuclear capacity to defeat aggression, as assessed by the aggressor, or (2) the aggressor's conviction that, rather than accept local defeat, we would use our tactical nuclear weapons and the conflict would reach levels unacceptably out of proportion to his local objectives.

One point that should be emphasized is that conventional and nuclear wars differ with regard to the acceptability of escalation. In conventional wars, escalation relates primarily to force buildups, deployment capabilities, and industrial and manpower mobilization. It is a form of wartime arms race that is normal to attrition-type conflict. In nuclear wars, the maximum means of destruction are on hand from the onset. There is no race to build, deploy and commit these means, only a decision to use them. Logic thus dictates that an aggressor start at the maximum level of intensity he considers allowable by both sides for the particular situation. To do less would be foolhardy, as it would invite the defense to pre-empt escalation without exceeding the allowable limits.

To give a simple example, a potential aggressor who believes we will go to total war rather than permit him to achieve a limited objective should start at the total-war level. If he believes we would use tactical nuclear weapons, he should start out by using them. The threat of escalation could be a deterrent only if the aggressor had misjudged our willingness to escalate in the given situation.

Tactical nuclear capabilities thus deter only to the extent that they actually improve war-fighting capabilities. The only way they might deter when ineffective for defense would be if they were targeted on countervalue targets whose loss could not be justified by the aggressor's success in achieving his local objectives. This form of retaliation is essentially the rationale for the French *force de frappe* and operates on the assumption that the Soviets would not trade Moscow and Leningrad, for example, to achieve the conquest of Paris, while the United States stood by uninvolved and undamaged.

The boundary condition that develops from this rationale is that, if war-fighting defense is inferior, nuclear attack can be deterred only if we manifest the will and capability to commit theater nuclear forces to countervalue targets. If we do this, we should be prepared to start with strategic forces for maximum effect, so as not to surrender the strategic initiative; or else we should be sufficiently decoupled from participation in the war to feel secure that subsequent Soviet retaliation would be limited to theater forces and targets.

Since both the above assumptions are unrealistic, as long as the United States is directly involved in European defense from the onset, a tactical nuclear countervalue strategy would seem politically unacceptable even as a deterrent. This is a boundary that limits our tactical nuclear strategies to those that can make an active defense truly effective and thus provide deterrence.

A strategy is designed to achieve some given objective. Suppose we rule out the possibility of a local deterrent to local aggression in Europe because it would unrealistically require an attack on Soviet countervalue targets without triggering Soviet strategic retaliation. NATO strategy would then have to provide for deterrence through obviously effective local defenses, whether conventional or nuclear. Our weapons and forces would have to be designed for war-fighting, with deterrence a by-product, not a separate or "sizing" objective. This is a boundary.

Any concept of theater weapons or forces designed solely to deter aggression against NATO Europe can make sense only if the European Community's defense and war-fighting posture is totally separate from that of the United States. This is a third-power concept wherein the United States is sufficiently decoupled, both politically and militarily, to be isolated from unwilling involvement regardless of targets selected or weapons used by either side.

To summarize: (1) A tactical nuclear strategy that fails to provide an effective defense is not a credible deterrent to either local aggression or subsequent escalation.

(2) A strategy that surrenders a large chunk of the territory of any member nation as a prerequisite to implementation will not be politically acceptable to the nation concerned. A strategy that accepts destruction of most of the values in a member nation as the price of its success is also unacceptable.

(3) A strategy that relies solely on European strategic or tactical retaliation either to deter or defeat aggression will be unacceptable to the United States as long as U.S. forces are directly involved in any conflict in Europe.

(4) The goal of any new strategy must be to provide (a) a truly effective and reasonably forward European defense against local aggression, as well as (b) a capability to defend against worldwide aggression and to launch a counteroffensive.

RATE- AND DEGREE-OF-CHANGE BOUNDARIES

The extent of change that can be introduced in large organizations is limited. Changes in concepts, strategies and doctrines are more difficult to achieve than changes in hardware.

Individuals and organizations tend to welcome changes in hardware which improve capabilities, but they tend to resist major changes in the way they learned to use their hardware (changes that affect such areas as doctrines, force deployments, employments, tactics and strategies) for the following reasons:

Experience of Leadership. Most leaders exploit the methods and techniques that earned them their leadership roles. New ways of doing things often destroy the advantage they have held over subordinates, because their expertise acquired through experience no longer counts.

Efficiency and Economy. In large organizations like national defense establishments or alliances, efficiency and economy depend heavily on pre-planning and on everyone adhering to established rules, regulations and procedures, all of which have to be revised when major changes in methodology occur. Changes that threaten the routine, day-to-day operations are resisted by those who champion, and are responsible for, efficiency and economy.

Management by Committee. Neither Free World alliances nor national defense establishments are ruled by dictators. Matters such as roles, missions, forces and distribution of service and national responsibilities are decided mostly by compromises and joint agreements arrived at within committees, councils and similar bodies. All these bodies will resist changes that tend to upset past agreements. Resistance will be particularly strong from those members who will lose out in the process of change.

Absence of Battle Testing. The military resists changes that have not been proved in war. Historically, most changes involving doctrine or tactics have been introduced and tested in conflict. If they led to success, they were adopted, taught as the new and approved methods, and used at the start of the next war. Changes that have not been war-tested are inherently resisted, particularly those that cannot be realistically war-gamed in peacetime (e.g., tactical-nuclear-weapon-related changes). At best, the changes are accepted on the condition that the capability to fall back on tested methods be retained. This last requirement results in dual capabilities and defeats the potential benefits to be gained from introducing changes.

Fixed Political and International Commitments. International and national commitments often involve treaties, executive agreements, congressional approval and other formal procedures that, once put into effect, tend to be self-perpetuating. The U.S. commitment of force levels to NATO in the early 1950's has remained relatively constant despite later changes in weapon systems that improved their effectiveness and, theoretically, should have affected force requirements.

Conceptual Lead Time. Training people to use new hardware is a relatively short and painless operation compared with training them to restructure their thinking with regard to new ideas. Concepts, tactics and doctrines are taught in schools or in training exercises held over many years. The lead time required to retrain in these areas will vary with the degree of change introduced, but it is inherently long.

The introduction during peacetime of changes involving new ideas usually must await a new generation of participants. Otherwise, peacetime changes will generally occur only when (1) agonizing reappraisals reveal that the political, military or economic alternatives are worse than making the effort to overcome resistance to change, or (2) the selfish interest in preserving organizations forces the reluctant acceptance of change. An example of the first case occurred in the early 1950's when the military accepted the "new look" at home and in NATO as being preferable to admitting the inadequacy of our defense posture with available resources. Examples of the second case occurred when the U.S. Air Force accepted ICBM's and the Navy accepted the Polaris system at the expense of the primary strategic roles of bombers and carriers. These actions were taken reluctantly, but they were preferable to letting their roles go to other services. None of these acceptances are ever wholehearted, and reversal pressures continue for years.

The extent of change that the U.S. and NATO systems can absorb at any time is a major boundary conditioning the acceptability of new strategies. Though conditions are ripe today for acceptance of a new NATO strategy, any proposal will be resisted for one or more of the above reasons. Any new strategy proposed should thus permit as gradual a changeover as possible from current concepts. Radical changes are not likely to be accepted, no matter how sound they are in theory. The digestive capability of the "system" is a boundary condition in itself.

Public-Attitude Boundaries

Public attitudes determine public policies. For example, the exploitation of nuclear systems, whether for war or peace, has suffered from the "Hiroshima complex" prevalent since World War II. This attitude has been effectively exploited by elements at home and abroad who sought to weaken U.S. nuclear capabilities or merely to reduce reliance on these weapons.

Public attitudes can be molded by persistent vocal elements in our society, but changing something that is taboo into something that is acceptable takes time, even many years. Leaders can no longer decide what is good for the nation and, by simple pronouncement, make their views acceptable. If their views run counter to public opinion, they will not prevail until a preconditioning effort has altered public opinion.

U.S. and European public attitudes will establish some well-defined limits as to what new NATO strategies can be accepted. These attitudes can be changed when the reasons are sufficiently compelling, but time will be required. This is a further boundary condition. Also, we cannot know what attitudes have to be changed until we know what changes we want. Once we know what we want, we have only a limited period of time to change attitudes before we lose the momentum needed to bring about the desired change.

Public attitudes certainly rule out any strategy that would require the use of biological weapons. In the United States they also limit the level and type of forces the government can station overseas in peacetime. Most U.S. citizens believe that, twenty-five years after World War II, America should not have to furnish the bulk of manpower required to defend Europe. Current overseas force levels are a boundary here; any major increase beyond current levels would violate both the Nixon Doctrine and public opinion.

Military planners become particularly concerned with public attitudes in the nuclear weapons field. Misconceptions and inhibitions have to be taken into account in the following areas:

Anti-proliferation. Argument: "No one can be trusted with the control of nuclear weapons but the United States, and maybe Great Britain." Any strategy that calls for relinquishing the control of nuclear weapons or for development of such weapons by any currently nonnuclear country will be unacceptable regardless of arguments in its favor.

Escalation. Argument: "Any use of nuclear weapons will escalate to total nuclear war and thus the end of the world. Therefore, use nuclear weapons only as a last resort. Even surrender (particularly of allied territory) might be preferable. Nuclear weapons are good only for deterrence; they have no place in war-fighting." This ignores the aggressor's objectives discussed above.

The Fire-Gap Concept. Argument: "A gap in destructive capability must be maintained between conventional and nuclear systems so that military or political leaders cannot easily escalate from one to the other. The development of nuclear weapons that close this gap by approximating the effects of conventional weapons should not be permitted." This has always been a nonprovable assertion by anti-nuclear spokesmen.

Effects. Argument: "All nuclear weapons are at least as destructive as the Hiroshima bomb. All nuclear weapons produce fallout and contamination in one form or another. No nuclear weapon can be used without massive collateral damage." This, of course, is no longer true, but the public does not realize it.

Safety. Argument: "Nuclear weapons are inherently unsafe. They should not be kept in, transported through, or flown over populated or civilized areas, nor should they be transported in vessels or planes that also carry passengers." This argument stems from the pervasive Hiroshima image of the effects of nuclear weapons.

Most of these views are either incorrect or only partly correct, but they are held by enough of the public to influence the acceptability of policies and plans. The people who expound them have so thoroughly influenced public attitudes that anyone airing contradictory opinions appears to be a "warmonger," an "enemy of the people," a "dangerous hawk." Thus, we not only face erroneous public attitudes about the weapons themselves, but erroneous attitudes about those who would correct the mistaken views. This situation has been created by opponents of our use of nuclear weapons to obtain cost-effective security.

These public attitudes can be changed under the following conditions:

(1) We must demonstrate that some (so far undefined) degree of reliance on nuclear systems is the only alternative to risking military defeat or economic bankruptcy.

(2) We must conduct a widespread educational program to disseminate the facts in the above areas of public concern.

(3) We must produce and stockpile new weapons that alleviate the conditions causing greatest public concern; e.g., fallout, unnecessary collateral damage and contamination. We must correct the prevalent view that the outstanding characteristic of any nuclear weapon is its nonselectivity.

(4) We must point out that the choice is between (a) ever-increasing U.S. responsibility for the security of all allies and (b) trusting our allies with the means necessary to defend themselves. There is an inherent contradiction here between the Nixon Doctrine and nonproliferation.

(5) We must point out that we are rapidly approaching a choice between (a) some reliance on a nuclear NATO strategy

and (b) no credible NATO defense strategy, with the attendant drift of European countries toward accommodation or nuclear self-sufficiency.

Even if we assume a successful effort in these five areas, the following boundaries for a nuclear-weapon strategy would probably remain valid in our time frame:

(1) No requirement for physical release of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear allied forces in peacetime.
(2) Wide distribution of nuclear weapons among U.S. troops in peacetime only if we can satisfy all concerned that they cannot be subverted or that they cannot be used without proper authority.
(3) Use of nuclear weapons from the onset or soon after, subject to some credible and widely publicized rationale that this use will not result in instant escalation.
(4) Commitment to use strategic systems against targets in the USSR only in retaliation for an attack against the United States.
(5) Alternatives to peacetime deployment in countries whose people object to the presence of nuclear weapons, e.g., Norway and Denmark —at least until their authorities can change these attitudes.
(6) No indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons on the territory of allied nations, even when they are overrun. Selective targeting only. (Area-contamination-barrier tactics would be out of bounds, for instance.)
(7) No positioning (overtly at least) of nuclear weapons in congested urban areas of allied nations.

Having listed some of the boundary conditions that seem to limit planning for the use of nuclear weapons in any new NATO strategy, we should also point out that certain public attitude conditions tend to support their introduction:

(1) Antipathy to local wars of attrition in the future.

(2) Increased feeling in America that Europe and Japan should go it alone.

(3) Increasing acceptance of the inevitability of some proliferation as a result of technology such as that associated with breeder power plants and centrifuge techniques.

(4) Greater concern over the high cost of domestic programs than over the cost of assuring nonproliferation (in terms of overseas commitments and deployments).

(5) The high cost of manpower, i.e., increasing recognition that any future strategy must be automated to increase productivity, as in any industry.

(6) Acceptance of détente and coexistence, because if war seems less likely there will be less concern over military measures taken to deal with it should it occur.

(7) Concern over the growing Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear capabilities, and the feeling that "If they have it, we must, whether we like it or not."

A new strategy that contemplates the use of tactical nuclear weapons should be built around these favorable factors. To the maximum extent possible, it should also satisfy the negative factors. If a proper balance can be struck in satisfying the pro and con factors, the public-attitude boundary should be reduced to one of little consequence in the final decision. This balance should be a goal in any strategy.

Collateral-Damage and Other Effects Boundaries

Collateral damage has always been a major inhibiting factor in the acceptance and use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW's) in the NATO area. The problem stems partly from the heavy population of prospective battlefields in Europe and the historic and social value of urban areas close to the most likely targets. The solution lies in selecting weapons whose characteristics minimize undesirable collateral damage.

There is a slight conflict of requirements in seeking minimum collateral damage while at the same time ensuring the benefits of economy of force and the advantages for defense inherent in a TNW strategy. The TNW's characteristics that contribute most to eliminating relative mass as a key factor are their potential for wide-area destruction or kill. This capability allows a trade-off between accurate knowledge of target location and the weapon size required for effective destruction with a single sortie.

As capabilities for battlefield surveillance and for target location and identification increase, the exploitation of the TNW's area effects along with the associated collateral damage can be decreased. Thus, the collateral-damage problem need not be solved by new weapon technology alone.

The potential for collateral damage with current stockpile characteristics appears to far exceed the area effects needed for a successful TNW strategy. A first step should be to correct these characteristics, but there are limits on how far the area kill capabilities of TNW's can be reduced without defeating their very purpose.

If all targets could always be pinpointed and hit directly with conventional weapons, the only need for TNW's would be to destroy those targets that could not be destroyed with a direct hit by the largest nonnuclear weapons. Under these conditions, the cost-effectiveness of conventional firepower would be so great that an effective defense with minimum manpower could almost be realized without TNW's.

The relationship between target identification, delivery accuracy and the need for TNW's, with associated collateral-damage probabilities, is crucial in development planning. The relationship suggests that, as battlefield surveillance techniques and delivery accuracies improve, the absolute requirement for TNW's should decrease, and so should the need for area-effect (hence, essentially "dirty") characteristics in those TNW's that are still required.

In an extreme and purely theoretical situation, defensive forces could be reduced to near zero if aggression on land were to be prevented by interposing a scorched-earth, total-destruction, near-impassable radiation belt or barrier. Collateral damage would be total within and adjacent to the barrier area. In a situation closer to the other extreme, where defensive firepower is selective and is no more effective than that of the aggressor, relative force levels will determine the outcome.

The major goal in developing a new NATO strategy is to provide a credible defense and a deterrent to aggression at a force and weapon level the NATO countries are willing to provide today. Since the acceptable level appears to be well below that needed to meet the threat, our firepower effectiveness must compensate for the lower force level. Until we can devise better target identification and delivery systems, however, this effectiveness can be provided only at the expense of some collateral damage.

Boundaries on collateral damage should have both upper and lower limits. The lower one should not constrain our ability to substitute area effects for accurate knowledge of target location in the case of mobile forces. The upper one should not allow destruction of areas beyond the limits of known, fixed types of TNW targets, such as airfields and buildings.

Our weapon characteristics and acceptable-use doctrines should permit us to attack and destroy fixed, known targets effectively with a minimum of sorties or missiles and with little or no collateral damage outside the desired area of destruction. They should also permit us to exploit the area effects of TNW systems to pin down and destroy mobile military forces with a minimum of sorties or missiles, even though we only know the general target locations. These requirements should establish the use and characteristic goals of TNW's and the boundaries for control of collateral damage.

MILITARY-ACCEPTABILITY BOUNDARY

Military acceptability of any strategy depends on several considerations, principal among which, in probable order of priority, are:

(1) Impact on service roles, missions and budgets
(2) Extent of "changes" involved
(3) General opinion as to potential effectiveness
(4) Extent of testing in war or ability to be simulated realistically in exercises

Few changes will satisfy all these considerations, and any major violation will normally generate sufficient military resistance to prevent the change from being introduced.

Service roles and missions have been argued since before World War II, and present assignments are the result of years of debate, competition and compromise. Since strategy can seldom be changed without some impact on one or more of the services, each change will be opposed by those who consider it detrimental to their future budgets, force levels or responsibilities. Conversely, those who benefit from the change will support it. This unfortunate situation suggests that changes in strategy must not drastically alter the responsibilities of more than one of the three military services.

Within certain limits, military views on a new strategy can be overruled by political considerations. The military as a whole never considered the NATO strategy of flexible conventional response to be adequate or effective at the force levels provided in the 1960's. This opinion was made evident by extensive allied resistance and some U.S. resistance to its adoption between 1961 and 1966, and by constant military demands for more forces to make the strategy credible and effective once it had been imposed by U.S. political pressures.

However, while a low military opinion of strategies imposed by political considerations may not guarantee their rejection, a strategy that is clearly militarily unsound has little chance of prevailing even with political support. A recent example was the U.S.-proposed multilateral force concept in 1962. The lesson is that boundaries to acceptability are established by war-fighting usefulness. A new strategy cannot be sold purely on political merit.

Boundaries imposed by lack of wartime experience can be quite restrictive. Changes based on new approaches applied successfully in wars fought by others are often hard to accept, and those based on theoretical or "ivory-tower" studies are invariably resisted.

The net effect of resisting strategy and doctrinal change while accepting new and improved weapon systems is that a new war will commence with a period of confusion while everyone improvises to bring old tactics and doctrines into phase with the new weapons. This circumstance in itself is a major contributor to deterrence.

Boundaries to military acceptability are reasonably clear in the case of strategies whose success depends on weapons untested in past wars, such as TNW's. They occur at the point where it is proposed to introduce these weapons and to rely on them, as contrasted with merely adding them to an existing and proven capability.

ESCALATION AND CONTROL BOUNDARY CONSIDERATIONS

The possibility of escalation in any limited conflict has been a concern to NATO governments ever since the advent of nuclear weapons. The escalation potential of any NATO strategy can thus affect its acceptability.

The optimum strategy for avoiding escalation would be for each side to allow maximum time and warning between each major increase in commitment of forces or new weapons. The least acceptable strategy would be one that automatically expands the scope and nature of the conflict with no advance warning and no opportunity to consult at the political level.

Increased force and weapon commitments can best contribute to military success when they exploit the advantage of surprise and occur as soon as possible after local commanders recognize the need. This military fact conflicts with the political desire to defer action and consult before authorizing increased commitments. A compromise is clearly required between military requirements and political considerations.

A general misconception exists as to what factors control escalation in limited-war situations. A superficial view acquired by some during the Viet Nam war is that, if defensive military action threatens not only to contain but to defeat a communist aggressor, he will never accept that defeat and will inevitably escalate, even to general war. An example of that attitude was the often-stated view that, if the North Vietnamese had been faced with a decisive military defeat, the Chinese, and then the Soviets, would have come into the conflict.

This view is not logical, nor can it be tolerated as a boundary to defensive and counteroffensive military operations. To do so would be to admit the ineffectiveness of any deterrent to aggression, because it would leave the aggressor in an assured "no-loss" situation. It would inevitably lead to losses by the defender, since successful containment, even where possible, would invariably be at the expense of some loss of territory or sovereignty. Also, it usually results in a breakdown of morale and loss of the "will" to win on the part of the defenders. Such results have been well documented during the Viet Nam experience; one hopes that some lessons were learned.

The truth is that neither side in a conflict will escalate above the level where the consequences of escalation are likely to exceed the potential gains. This level establishes a relatively automatic ceiling on the extremes either side will go to before seeking victory or accepting defeat.

Escalation ceilings are normally established by the evaluation by both sides of the aggressor's original objective. The assumption, for instance, that the Soviet Union, having tried militarily for control of Berlin access routes, would risk the destruction of Moscow rather than back down is ridiculous; yet such beliefs are seriously argued in some circles. That assumption is no more credible than one that would have the United States launch a strategic retaliatory attack on the USSR in response to any minor border incursion in the NATO area. Yet the same voices that discredit such a massive retaliation strategy on our part support the notion that our enemies will initiate massive escalation rather than accept defeat of their incursions.

A strategy that allows no possibility of either containing or defeating, and hence punishing, the aggressor has little military and no deterrent value. This strategy is not an acceptable boundary even though some advocate it.

A strategy that permits automatic escalation of any conflict and accepts failure only after total defeat in global war is equally unacceptable. Aggression that is less than total from the onset implies an objective short of total world domination. The relative worth of the objective must be the factor that establishes the ceiling on force commitments. The problem is to ensure that our strategy and the procedures for implementing it will not permit this ceiling to be inadvertently or automatically violated. This is the point at which there must be provisions for deliberate decision-making.

The boundaries for acceptability of a new strategy in the NATO area, based solely on escalation and control considerations, should thus be: (1) No higher level of response to aggression than is commensurate with the worth of the aggressor's and defender's objectives. (2) No constraints on escalation to defeat the aggression until the levels set by (1) above are reached; prior political decisions are required to escalate beyond this point — even if this delay handicaps military operations.

These guidelines are harder to apply in practice than to define in theory, but if knowledgeable men will approach the problem objectively and bring their collective wisdom to bear, we should be able to fashion a credible NATO defense strategy that better serves the primary objective of deterrence.

CONCLUSIONS

Theoreticians, planners and politicians with differing views on what should be done about NATO are plentiful. Library shelves are filled with books on NATO strategy and the U.S. role. Hardly a week goes by without an editorial advocating some change in American force levels in Europe or in other transatlantic politico-military relationships.

This is not to belittle the value of studies and analyses of NATO. Taken as a whole, they help to shape public and official opinion, to define the options, both theoretical and real, and to tabulate the advantages and disadvantages of each option. They highlight the fallacies in the existing order of things. But rarely can substantive change be traced to any single study or analysis.

Major change is brought about only by deliberate and concerted decisions on the part of responsible national authorities. In accordance with a natural law of bureaucracy, authorities resist the solutions offered by outsiders. They are the ones most directly constrained by the boundary conditions discussed above.

If we consider the recent official pronouncements of the Nixon Administration with regard to NATO, and the boundary conditions that have been outlined, we can safely draw the following salient conclusions:

There will be no major change in NATO strategy in the near term. Our leaders have made clear that they are opposed to a force reduction in Europe except in the context of mutually agreed reductions. A principal argument for changing strategy is to accommodate such a force reduction. Therefore, to propose such a change officially at this time would be to anticipate, or admit to, the desirability of a reduction, and this will not be done unless Congress translates the Mansfield Resolution into force cutbacks.

The loss of U.S. strategic superiority in recent years has led some observers to advocate formally decoupling U.S. strategic forces from the defense of NATO Europe. To divorce the NATO sword from the shield, on the grounds that the use of U.S. strategic force to succor Europe is no longer credible, might sound logical in theory, but it is not logical in the real world. There can be no realistic defense or deterrence in Europe without balanced sword and shield components. Western Europe is not yet ready to fashion, let alone to wield, its own sword of strategic nuclear forces. Until such time as it may acquire these capabilities, the United States has no alternative, in its own self-interest, to maintaining its nuclear deterrent over Europe. Therefore, it does no good, and probably considerable harm, to say we cannot continue to provide the shield, and to advocate decoupling. Inasmuch as deterrent credibility is in good measure a function of demonstrated faith, such advocacy can become self-fulfilling.

Finally, the "system" can only absorb change slowly, even when change is sought by governments and responsible NATO leaders. It must come about through evolution and osmosis. The "system" will resist any revolution in NATO strategy or force posture, particularly when proposed unilaterally. If one adds to this the new element of mutual change in force levels inherent in present U.S.-Soviet disarmament discussions, and the primacy of domestic problems in most NATO member countries, one can surely forget about drastic alterations in the near term. Nothing short of full-blown crisis or war will bring these about.

The purpose of this writer is not to be either cynical or negative with respect to NATO strategy. It is only to point out from long years of experience with politico-military planning that more progress can be made in the right direction by advocating small evolutionary steps — so as over time to bring about necessary changes in the existing system — than by arguing for drastic, immediate changes. Today's strategy is far from the optimum, as are the force levels, but these have deterred aggression for over twenty years. This is the reason for NATO. If these force levels can be maintained and progressively improved, it is hard to see how we can do much better. It will be interesting to see whether the alliance review, now formally taking place under the auspices of NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, will challenge this conclusion.

THE REALITIES OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARFARE

by James H. Polk

IT is an almost universally accepted fact that any use of tactical nuclear weapons will lead inevitably up the destructive escalation ladder to large-scale thermonuclear war. Alain Enthoven can take credit for this distortion of reality, for it was in his carefully prepared speech of February 1963, delivered at Seattle University, that the notion of the "nuclear fire break" was first advanced. The talk was planned to explain the official military and intellectual basis of the Kennedy defense policy for the decade of the 1960's. It was a well reasoned and important speech and the "fire break" portion was limited to one small paragraph, yet this notion persists some ten years later. Whatever one's personal views of the matter, there is no question but that the inevitable escalation theory, like the "Guns of August" syndrome, has had a disproportionate effect on intellectual thought and national policy. It has somehow become an article of faith that once general mobilization begins, or once the nuclear threshold is crossed in any degree, the march of events must move irreversibly toward Armageddon and total disaster.

The Soviet Union has adopted this same idea, endorsed it on numerous occasions, and even made it a primary declaratory policy for the 1970's. This is not surprising, since the obvious conventional force superiority the Soviet bloc enjoys in Central Europe contrasts with NATO's distinct advantage in small-yield battlefield warheads; such a declaratory policy has the clear aim of deterring the Western allies' first use of low-yield nuclear artillery or demolition munitions. Thus, in the one area of nuclear technology where we have a clear-cut advantage — the one, incidentally, that in no way threatens Soviet Russia — we are largely deterred from recourse to the lower end of the nuclear spectrum. This mental block, which is so evident in current literature on the subject, is also displayed in the high councils of NATO, to such an extent that rational discussion of possible employment options is impeded.

Practically all of the academicians and most of the governmental hierarchy who address the problem of tactical nuclear war think almost exclusively in terms of deterrence and thrust aside the war-fighting role as distasteful or unthinkable. The usual American design for the future is to place reliance in a Europe-based, strong but somehow nonthreatening countervalue force that deters tactical nuclear war on NATO's part, just as our triad of strategic forces deters thermonuclear war. On the other hand, the European view, not often openly expressed but nonetheless widely believed and supported, is that the linkage between the smallest front-line weapon and our total strategic strike force must remain firm and unbroken, so that the ultimate deterrence resides in the escalative spectrum leading to cataclysmic thermonuclear war. In a sense, therefore, and generally without realizing it, our allies have fostered a declaratory policy of escalation to the ultimate holocaust and we come back to the "fire break" notion once again. Surely we must disavow this erroneous strategic theory and adopt a more viable and less dangerous scenario.

Unfortunately, there are several other proposals that habitually make the rounds, suggesting how to manage the 7,000 warheads that we acknowledge are based in allied European countries. The propositions vary all the way from total withdrawal to large reductions, and even to a trade-off for Warsaw Pact conventional forces, while most of the proponents neither know nor care about these weapons' proposed use in a war-fighting role or their contribution to deterrence by their very presence. Actually, it might make better sense to put some upper limit on megatons of yield available to NATO than to concentrate on warhead numbers, knowing that we can build a "clean" artillery shell of fractional kiloton yield, suitable for targeting against a platoon of enemy infantry and guaranteed to be free of residual contamination or nuclear debris. Obviously we might need a large number of such small-yield weapons, but ever since Robert McNamara told the NATO Council that 7,000 was the correct number, this has remained the magic figure. The essential fact, however, is the composition and characteristics of the stockpile and not the numerical warhead count.

Another proposal fashionable during the recent past has to do with somehow divorcing the United States from NATO and assisting the major European NATO powers to build a tactical nuclear force of their own. This is an appealing proposition to Americans, as it serves to break the Atlantic link that binds our strategic triad of forces to the less stable balance of tactical nuclear forces facing each other in Central Europe. It assists the West Europeans to become a third nuclear power, while cutting our weapons deployments and costs. Most important, it reduces our risks of involvement in European quarrels and the "inevitable" escalation such linkage is thought to entail. The suggestion usually calls for a coordinated British-French nuclear custodial force under the policy direction of a revised and Europeanized NATO which is supposed to satisfy the Federal Republic by giving it a finger on both the trigger and the safety to the trigger. But this proposal would never satisfy the West Germans. Moreover, if they were admitted to full alliance membership with nuclear development and custodial rights, this might well be enough to trigger a Warsaw Pact nuclear castration attack, to use Joseph Alsop's phrase. It is certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility for the Soviets to tell the other Europeans to stand aside while they solve the German problem once and for all time, for their fear of the Germans is quite real even now and an independent nuclear-armed FRG would terrify them.

From another angle, our own military services, and particularly the U.S. Army, have been attempting for years to provide guidance to their leaders on the conduct of the limited nuclear battle, and to this end they have sponsored a series of studies, war games and exercises. In August 1971 the Army published an unclassified field manual entitled *F.M 100-30* (*Test*) *Tactical Nuclear Operations* that provides tentative doctrine for senior military commanders. It is a good general distillation of what the Army knows or thinks it knows about limited nuclear warfare and it has a conservative and cautious approach, just as one would expect. The manual is devoted almost totally to nuclear warfighting, including the roles of combat arms and combat support, but generally excluding consideration of the roles of the other services. Any deterrent value, either real or implied, of Army dual-capable or single-purpose nuclear delivery systems or forces is not mentioned, but at least the requirement for and importance of mutual restraint and observed limits on actions of the belligerents is stressed. Two primary restraints are recognized: (1) the requirement for limiting the employment of nuclear weapons to military targets while minimizing civilian casualties, and (2) the need to restrict yields, numbers of weapons and types of burst in any operation that one hopes to keep limited. Unfortunately, neither the Army's nor the other services' weapons are optimized for these highly commendable aims.

It appears that all these tentative proposals and doctrines for guidance of both high governmental authorities and senior military leaders manage to miss the mark in some respect. Certainly there is a "nuclear fire break," but with the many yields and options available this benchmark is far more psychological than actual. Deterrence and war-fighting are the dual and equally critical elements required to maintain NATO as a viable entity in the decade ahead, and most of the well-informed scientists and leaders agree that the NATO warhead stockpile needs refinement and updating. Moreover, perhaps we should plan for an independent West European stockpile and delivery force to be active, possibly in the next decade. But first, as we look ahead, we should understand how deterrence and war-fighting operate together, how deterrence is possible at any point in the spectrum of nuclear combat, and in what areas both our policies and our capabilities needed to support these critical concepts are to some extent deficient.

II

Before examining the main problem, several assumptions need clarification. First we must agree that we are dealing with a rational and hard-minded group of experienced adversaries in the Soviet Presidium who will invariably act in their own self-interest and that of the USSR and degrade the role of the Warsaw Pact or other parties to second place. This seems plainly evident from the lessons of recent history as witnessed by the Soviet withdrawals from Cuba and Egypt and the brutal suppression of the Czechoslovakian bid for greater freedom. Also, the struggle for power within the Presidium and the ousting of Khrushchev indicate that the ruling peer group does not want an emotional and to some extent unpredictable leader at the helm. Surely this rules out the ready acceptance of any declaratory policy as an immutable fact under all circumstances. Rather, it suggests that events and actions, not always under Soviet control, will dictate the responses of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, probably after sober thought and careful analysis at the highest levels. Were we dealing with emotional and excitable leaders whose actions were unpredictable, we would have a quite different and totally precarious situation. From the evidence we have, furthermore, declaratory statements or policies are viewed as tactical ploys by most communists and are in no sense considered binding on future actions.

Another element in the essentials of assured or almost-assured deterrence must be that the allied response to aggressive acts or provocations remains ambiguous as well as realistic. Our aim is to influence the attitudes and perceptions of the prudent Soviet planner and his decision-level superior in such a way that they are unsure of the future course of events and their ability to manage them. Thus, the more complicating yet credible are the variables available to the alliance, the more difficult it becomes for the Kremlin to predict the counterstroke and the more likely that the Kremlin's provocative acts will be delayed or deterred. When the prudent war planner cannot give his commander positive assurance that a particular plan will achieve a quick and painless objective, it is usually discarded or at least deferred until conditions appear more favorable.

It is ambiguity that makes the NATO strategy of "flexible response" effective, not only as a viable and reasonable strategy to espouse but because of its impact on the prudent Soviet planner. In discussing this strategy, the allies have never said, nor should they say, that they will adopt a "no first use" policy or that the alliance will respond exactly in kind to Warsaw Pact incidents or attacks. Unlike the "massive retaliation" era, when our declaratory policy threatened an irrational overkill and actually deterred nothing, the current policy says that NATO forces of unspecified nature and undetermined strength will be used in a manner calculated to best solve the military problem. This position should and apparently does cause the Soviet staff some unease and uncertainty, and can be particularly valuable if a wide range of alliance capabilities are made known and demonstrated as possible options for use when and if needed.

That Warsaw Pact strategic policy, dictated largely by the Soviet Union, does not reflect publicly this uncertainty or wariness in regard to NATO's "flexible response" position is hardly surprising. The Pact's proclaimed policy is a variant of our old "massive retaliation" gambit, in their case applied to Western Europe and threatening a massive countervalue strike against the cities, ports and airfields of European NATO once the nuclear fire break is crossed in any degree. The military instrument for this supposed "limited war" response to any first use by the NATO powers is the 600-plus force of IR/MRBM's based in the western USSR, which has no exact counterpart in the West. It is obviously a declaratory policy, based on the supposition that, in the event some allied military unit or units dare to cross the nuclear threshold, the U.S.

strategic strike force will stand idly by while Western Europe — and our armed forces and citizens in residence there — are dealt a brutally destructive blow from strike bases within the Soviet Union. Surely such a questionable assumption gives a pause to the prudent Soviet planner, for to be wrong in this decision and bring on a strategic exchange is more than serious; it is catastrophic. Moreover, Soviet forecasts of probable American reactions have been notoriously poor in the past, wrong often enough to cause the high command to avoid hasty decisions and move with extreme caution.

To preserve a viable alliance in the face of all the negotiations and changes in prospect, therefore, the West should avoid accepting any sort of declaratory policy or threat made by the Soviets at face value and should not permit it to have a strong influence on our own policy determinations. As we have noted, such tactical Soviet moves are intended to influence our national decisions within the NATO arena but are in no sense considered binding by their authors. Instead, we should maintain the ambiguous policy of "flexible response" and never permit our nuclear planners or high governmental authorities to predetermine a specific response to an assumed set of circumstances. Given the breaches of security within NATO, any agreed decision to employ a specific course of action or adopt a single tactical nuclear war plan will quickly reach Soviet ears. The requirement thus is for numerous options and multiple plans, none keyed to a particular Pact move, so that the Soviet planner is faced with a serious dilemma in forecasting events and is thereby deterred. Forcing him to dance to our tune — or more correctly our multiple capabilities — is much better than our responding or reacting to his declaratory policy of localized but massive retaliation or the blackmail associated with such a declaration.

III

In order to make the foregoing really effective, however, we need to get over the "fire break" mentality and initiate a vigorous program to modernize our Europe-based stockpile — despite the objections of some highly influential Senators. Most current warheads are products of 1950's technology, are "dirty" as well as wasteful of enriched uranium, and fail to provide the range of low yields that may be desirable in certain situations. As reported in the open press, we can produce and should have available suppressed radiation weapons of varying yields to fit special situations as well as to increase the options available to us. Moreover, the cost of an updated and more flexible stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons is in reality cheap, probably requiring not more than a small fraction of the total defense budget to effect a rapid modernization of our European inventory.

On the presumption that sufficient numbers and types of tactical nuclear systems are available, what becomes critically important are the constraints imposed by either political or military authorities on their use in a particular war-fighting situation. All sorts of limitations can be applied to fit or influence an individual case, related to geography, systems, yields, numbers, immediate and residual effects, or any combination thereof. Therefore, it is possible to solve the immediate military problem in a number of ways, some of which may be escalatory and frightening to our enemies while others will be seen by them as a controlled application of nuclear firepower, not immediately threatening to their vital interests. In destroying a dangerous penetration of NATO forward defensive positions, for instance, if warhead delivery systems were limited to accurate tube artillery, geography held to the actual area of penetration, weapon effects limited to clean air burst types, yields specified at below two kilotons, and targets limited to enemy formations and units only, this solution clearly could save the immediate military situation while at the same time not posing a threat to the vital national interests of the USSR. Unless the situation is badly misread by the highest Soviet authorities, there appears to be no logical reason for a spasm reaction on the part of the Pact leadership to such a controlled and localized application of nuclear firepower.

It is, of course, critically important that the situation not be misunderstood or misinterpreted by the opponents, and in these days of increasing proliferation it is almost equally important to keep current information flowing to non-engaged friends and enemies and even to neutrals. This suggests that a NATO-Pact hot line would be a valuable communication link in such circumstances. By this means and all other media available, NATO could explain its intent to solve the local military problem by a severely constrained use of tactical nuclear weapons and back up these signals by proceeding to use the weapons in exactly that careful, surgical fashion. By word and deed, used together to give a clear signal of limited purpose, we might thus be able to save a deteriorating military situation without forcing the senior Soviet decision-makers to an immediate and desperate riposte. The

Soviets, understanding that their vital interests were not under immediate threat, could afford the time to assess carefully all aspects of the new situation so as to facilitate a decision satisfying Soviet self-interest. Unquestionably the non-engaged nations would find the situation alarming in the extreme, but not to the extent that they, either as individual countries or as a bloc, would take action to exacerbate it. Quite the contrary. They would probably use their good offices to achieve a cease-fire or halt-in-place with every means at their disposal.

The third element in this delicately balanced equation of limited defense in response to local aggression is to prevent or seriously inhibit escalation up the nuclear scale in the tactical battle. It is not sufficient for the military commander to concentrate on solving his immediate military problem through the constrained use of nuclear firepower. Beyond this, it is even more important for him to prevent any sort of enlargement in the scope or scale of a nuclear counterstroke. To do this, it is essential to convince the conventional aggressor who has now become the victim of a limited but nonetheless locally effective first strike, that he has little to gain and much to lose by raising the level of violence. The enemy has three options: to escalate, to reply roughly in kind, or to halt his attack and reassess the situation. The defender's aim is to make the first choice a risky and dangerous action and the latter one desirable, or at least possible. Moreover, by targeting and inflicting heavy casualties on the maneuver elements of the attacking first echelon, the defense can actually cause an enforced pause of about twenty-four hours before the reserves of the second echelon have moved to contact and are in position to resume the attack. Under this kind of precise targeting, the enemy commander is not in position to exploit some form of escalation immediately or even to maintain the momentum of his attack with a quick nuclear reply in kind. By the same token, we should avoid counterattacking during this period, as our aim is to bring operations to a temporary halt rather than to take advantage of our success and further complicate the situation.

The NATO commander can support this aim of limiting or deterring escalation by the dispositions and missions he orders for his own forces. Assuredly, on launching the first tactical strike, he would disperse his forces in both width and depth to protect against a counterstroke, thus denying the enemy the advantage of hitting concentrated targets with maximum effectiveness. Further, our allied commander might forgo almost all close air support and deploy his airpower in a dispersed quick-reaction strike role, responsive and ready to prosecute operations as needed and far less vulnerable than when deployed for conventional air support missions. Similarly, the missile force would be deployed and dispersed, so that the picture presented to both the prudent Soviet planner and his commander in the field is one of poor opportunities and deadly risk. Under such conditions, it appears logical that, acting from clear signals and understandable self-interest, the Soviet commander would be deterred from nuclear escalation and could well elect to cease and desist.

IV

The scenario above and others like it should be studied in detail by the responsible civilian and military directorates. Unfortunately, like hardware development or the lack thereof, our tactical procedures belong to the 1950's and consist primarily of some variant of a spasm reaction. Our conceptual beliefs are equally outdated and in some cases dangerously impractical.

Given an updated stockpile, the collective will to use it selectively, and a determination to avoid collateral casualties and damage, however, a somewhat new view of tactical nuclear war begins to emerge. The central factor is the realization that constrained use of our nuclear arsenal need not lead to escalation, because our on-call reserves of far greater destructive power are deliberately deployed and readied in such a fashion as to seriously inhibit our enemies from raising the nuclear level. While until recently we could afford a detached and somewhat academic view of the actions and options available in this area, all this is changing rapidly. Just as the SALT talks demand that we push ahead with MIRV and Trident, so the MBFR talks require that we modernize our hardware, our thinking, and the tactical options available and required at the lower end of the nuclear spectrum. To do otherwise is to continue drifting, aided and abetted by the euphoria of détente and the false hopes that may be generated by East-West negotiations on European security and cooperation.

A STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE*

by Wynfred Joshua

THE key problem of the 1970's for America's policy toward Western Europe remains the same as that of the 1960's: how to ensure a credible deterrence and defense posture for the Western alliance. But the strategic and political context has changed and the answer in this decade is likely to differ considerably from the one attempted some ten or twelve years ago.

The 1960's brought to Washington a group of policymakers determined to reduce NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons and emphasize instead the conventional dimension of the Western posture. As a result of the search for a more credible defense against a limited attack than the massive retaliation strategy provided, the strategic concept of the 1960's called for a largely conventional defense and for postponing resort to the use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, as long as possible. A consequence of the high nuclear threshold was the need to keep the nuclear weapons available to the alliance under central American control. Carried to its logical conclusion, the flexible response concept of the 1960's also required the United States to oppose the development of national nuclear forces by its allies.

American efforts to put the nuclear genie back into the bottle reflected an understandable concern over Soviet progress in nuclear weapons. The prospects of a Soviet strategic nuclear capability meant that the United States would be vulnerable to a nuclear strike in the event of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. In the eyes of West Europeans, however, the changing U.S. strategy seemed to place increasing stress on containing a conflict in Europe, if deterrence should fail. The Kennedy-Johnson approach eventually resulted in 1967 in NATO's reluctant endorsement of the flexible response concept, but it precipitated

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France's withdrawal from the integrated NATO commands and left the alliance in a protracted crisis that has weakened the sinews of transatlantic cohesion.

CHALLENGE OF THE 1970'S

Although there are indications that the U.S. version of flexible response has been modified, no clear new concept has been promulgated in Washington. The interpretation of flexible response — loosely worded as it is — remains ambiguous and dependent on the political bias of the interpreter. Yet because of a number of factors, the need for confidence and cohesion in the alliance and for a generally accepted strategy is today more compelling than ever.

First, the détente climate notwithstanding, there is no evidence of change in fundamental Soviet objectives in Europe. Soviet long-range goals continue to be (1) the fractionalization of the Western alliance; (2) the removal of the U.S. strategic umbrella from Europe; (3) the elimination of the U.S. military and political presence; and (4) eventually the creation of such a change in the political climate that the Kremlin can accomplish the Finlandization of the continent. Nor has Moscow relaxed its efforts to strengthen the military means to achieve these objectives. Particularly during the last few years the Soviets have steadily improved the quality of their war-fighting potential in Central Europe and substantially expanded their naval power on Europe's flanks. Their massive manpower, armor and tactical airpower, combined with a doctrine which emphasizes blitzkrieg tactics, give them the edge in a conventional conflict on the continent. Moreover, Soviet attainment of strategic parity with the United States has evoked widespread concern in Washington as well as in European capitals that the threat of U.S. strategic nuclear forces has been neutralized for anything but a direct attack on the U.S. homeland. The USSR has consistently tried to deepen the West Europeans' anxiety over this issue and to impress them with the futility of their defense efforts. In a highly sophisticated manner Moscow is exploiting the utility of its preponderant conventional forces in Europe for political ends.

Second, the United States is subject to increasing domestic pressures to reduce defense spending and force levels abroad, as reflected in the Mansfield Amendment to recall U.S. troops from Europe. The last Mansfield Amendment, rather than being introduced on the Senate floor, was reported out of the Senate Appropriations Committee — an action that carries more weight and might swing some marginal votes the next time. Pressures for troop reductions emanate in part from those political circles advocating a retreat from America's involvement abroad; they also reflect an effort to alleviate U.S. balance of payments difficulties;[1] and finally, they are inspired by considerations of manpower and budgetary constraints. In short, trends in the United States for the rest of the decade strongly point toward a reduction of U.S. troops in Europe. Precipitate withdrawals, however, would seriously erode the credibility of the U.S. commitment and would render the European allies vulnerable to Soviet political coercion.

A third factor affecting the alliance is the effort in Washington to move from the era of confrontation to that of negotiation. Round II of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) is in progress; preparatory phases of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and talks on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) have begun. The bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the USSR underscore the urgency of restoring political cohesion in the alliance, for without it establishment of a coordinated approach between the United States and its allies toward SALT II, CSCE and MBFR will be difficult. So will joint development of a credible strategy based on an agreed set of objectives enabling the West to meet the changed strategic equation. Failure to define our strategy clearly would make it well-nigh impossible to gauge the political and military utility of the various American and allied force components needed to support it. There would be no strategic and political framework for determining which elements of the forces can be selected as bargaining chips in the negotiations. Nor would it be possible to define the type of posture the Western allies need to undergird their security in the era of negotiation. The Western alliance finds itself in a profound dilemma at a time when its objectives of deterrence and defense remain as valid as ever.

Thus, the issue for the West centers on the need to restore confidence and cohesion in the alliance. In order to ensure West European resilience against Soviet political coercion in the shadow of Moscow's steadily improving military capability, the West must formulate a common strategic concept and supporting force posture that can deter Soviet aggression at any level. In addition to being militarily supportable and effective, this strategy has to be politically acceptable to the United States as well as to its allies. In spite of NATO's official embrace of flexible response, the allies have never fully accepted the original American version stressing conventional defense. Flexible response is still in force today, but there continues to be a wide divergence in its interpretation. At the core of the controversy are differing perceptions of the role of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons. .President Nixon highlighted this point when he raised the question: "Beyond their value as a deterrent to war, how should our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe be used to counter specific Warsaw Pact military threats?"[2]

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[1] One estimate of the actual cost of U.S. forces in Europe and their U.S.-based support is approximately $7 billion per year; direct costs of U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe are about $4 billion. Of the $4 billion spent in Europe, approximately $1 billion represents a deficit in the U.S. balance of payments. (See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on North Atlantic Treaty Organization Commitments, *The American Commitment to NATO,* H.A.S.C., No. 92-641 [Washington: GPO, August 17, 1972], p. 14978 ff.) There are, however, lower as well as higher estimates to be found in the literature.

The purpose of this article is to outline a strategic concept responsive to these military challenges and political constraints. It takes into account European sensitivities and fears, yet pays heed to the demands voiced in Washington to bring at least some of the American troops home.

THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND UNCERTAINTY

Central to the West's strategic predilections is the desire for deterrence. The specter of another devastating conflict sweeping across the continent continues to haunt our European allies. They have no desire to fight a war, long or short. Their concern is to make deterrence as strong as possible, and, if deterrence should fail, to force the USSR to terminate its aggression on acceptable terms in the shortest time and with as little damage to Western Europe as possible.

Deterrence brackets political and military dimensions. The goal is to convince the opponent that the United States and its allies have the military capability, the will to use this capability, and an effective strategy which, if deterrence broke down, would make it impossible for him to calculate in advance how the West would respond to his contemplated aggression. The objective would be to convince the Soviet Union that any attack would entail unacceptable risk. This means that the Western allies should have available a wide array of options permitting them to respond at any level to a Soviet attack and thus induce Moscow to halt its aggression and withdraw. It also means that the *specific* option to be used by the Western allies should not be determined in advance, but should remain uncertain. The desideratum is flexibility for the allies and uncertainty for their Warsaw Pact opponents. A viable strategic concept should be based on these fundamental principles of flexibility and uncertainty.

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[2] *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's. A New Strategy for Peace.* A Report to the Congress by Richard M. Nixon, February 18, 1970 (Washington: GPO, 1970), p. 33.

THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES

The U.S. nuclear umbrella constitutes a critical element in deterring Soviet aggression. As long as American troops and nuclear forces remain in Europe, the USSR is likely to perceive a continued coupling between the defense of Western Europe and American strategic nuclear power. Yet Soviet perceptions notwithstanding, the United States finds it increasingly difficult to persuade its allies that its strategic nuclear guarantee still blankets Western Europe in the era of superpower parity. It is, in part, this skepticism that has eroded mutual confidence between the United States and its allies. This confidence must be restored. The existence of parity makes it imperative for Western Europe to enhance its linkage with U.S. retaliatory forces; the coupling requirement is central to European strategic conceptions.

In light of these considerations, the United States should strengthen that part of its military panoply that can convey the perception of coupling. This implies the need for some counterforce capability in the strategic forces, so that the threat of using them remains credible. The May 1972 SALT Interim Agreement on Offensive Missiles does not prevent the United States from adding necessary refinements to its strategic forces, such as improving its MIRV (multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicle) capability with accurate warheads. This does not mean that it should try to endow its entire strategic offensive force with accurate MIRV's; nor that it should build a counterforce capability that can cover all Soviet strategic missiles targeted on Western Europe. After all, the British and French strategic nuclear forces also contribute to strategic deterrence requirements. But the existence of such a U.S. counterforce capability should be made obvious to the allies as well as the Soviet Union.

Beyond military improvements to retaliatory forces looms their political credibility. In the final analysis the linkage of U.S. strategic forces to Western Europe's defense rests on a political commitment. For this reason the United States should once more make clear — in open foreign policy declarations and more private consultations — that its nuclear shield remains pledged to the security of its Atlantic partners. In the case of West Germany, a major target of Soviet pressures, such an effort may even have to take the form of a bilateral U.S. commitment to Bonn.

The Role of French and British Nuclear Capabilities

The question of West European strategic nuclear capabilities and their relation to the American strategic deterrent is complex and fraught with political risk, whether viewed from Washington or West European capitals. But given the trend of events, it can no longer be skirted, lying as it does at the core of the transatlantic relationship.

The British and French have long argued that national control lends credibility to nuclear forces. Even a modest nuclear force in the hands of a potential victim is taken to be more credible than the nuclear panoply of the most powerful ally, no matter how close that ally. Perhaps more persuasive is the argument that Moscow, in contemplating aggression or extreme pressure against a smaller nuclear power, would have to consider whether its objective was worth the risk of incurring a nuclear response. The existence of national nuclear forces under separate national commands seriously compounds the uncertainties for the potential aggressor. Effective British and French nuclear forces would help to deter theater-level nuclear war and would, thereby, contribute to the overall deterrence posture of the West.

For Washington the choice is no longer that which dominated policy councils in the early 1960's and led to the MLF (multilateral force) debacle, i.e., the choice between exclusive or modified American control of the alliance's strategic nuclear capabilities. French and British strategic nuclear forces are in being, and are being improved despite considerable cost in economic and manpower resources. The choice for the United States now is between *laisser faire* and active assistance — within the bounds of domestic constraints and international treaty obligations — to Britain and France in their efforts to create viable nuclear capabilities.

Yet choice seems to have been pre-empted by the need to strengthen the overall Western posture in Europe and restore the bonds of trust and confidence between the United States and its major allies. The global considerations of unfolding American long-range policy are another factor in this. The Nixon Doctrine envisages American-West European partnership in a multipolar world. Partnership, along with Washington's recognition that it has reduced means to support its strategy, calls for greater West European self-reliance. Given the weight of nuclear weapons in the scales of power, self-reliance means that Western Europe must obtain and control a credible measure of that power. In light of abiding nationalist tendencies in Western Europe, the most realistic possibility appears to be a strengthening of British and French nuclear capabilities. In light of strategic nuclear parity, it would also be to our advantage to have some hedge against a decline in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The existence of meaningful nuclear capabilities in West European hands would help to offset the loss of confidence were a perception of decoupling to prevail in European capitals. If truly effective nuclear forces were to be fashioned gradually and with American help, they could go far toward neutralizing the effects of that perception and rendering the process less dangerous.

To demonstrate allied cohesion and resolve vis-à-vis the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, the British and French strategic nuclear forces would eventually have to be coordinated within a wider European framework — if not in NATO, then in some type of revived Western European Union structure or within the European Community context. This coordination is also essential to allay West Germany's fears of losing American protection and being relegated to second-rate power status as against Britain and France. But there is no reason to insist that France and Britain surrender ultimate national control over their nuclear forces or jettison their own national targeting plans. Before the dawn of nuclear parity the American strategic deterrent ably protected the West European allies, yet it always remained under undiluted U.S. control. Britain's insistence on such autonomy has similarly been accepted.

A host of factors makes the outlook for a workable Anglo-French nuclear entente far from bright. Without examining in depth the considerations that argue for or against a concerted nuclear effort between the French and British, we can acknowledge that the difference in strategic concepts in London and Paris, the asymmetrical levels in their nuclear technology, the absence of compelling economic motives, and severe political constraints render the prospects for effective cooperation remote.

A more realistic solution for strengthening the British and French nuclear forces can probably be found in American support of their nuclear efforts. Washington may wish to consider expanding the long-standing American-British cooperation in the nuclear field. This would meet with fewer obstacles in the United States than a rapprochement with France would; the latter's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure remains a sensitive issue in Washington. But France's insistence on retaining full control over her own forces and avoiding arrangements that would commit her to participate automatically in military operations augurs ill for the possibility of her return to the NATO fold. An American nuclear arrangement with France would, therefore, have to be in a bilateral context outside the NATO framework.

The sense of malaise that pervaded French-American relations in the 1960's stemmed from the incompatibility between France's nuclear aspirations and America's determination to arrest nuclear proliferation. President Nixon's call for a closer partnership with France, however, goes beyond more equitable burden-sharing; it is a crucial step toward accepting France as a nuclear power. If the Nixon Administration provides effective leadership in arguing for U.S. nuclear support to France, it should be able to sway domestic critics, including those in Congress, in this direction.

At the least, Washington can convey its readiness to explore the road to cooperation with France. Two tactical considerations should govern the effort: (1) the dialogue should be staged and phased so as to avoid any impression that American willingness to contemplate cooperation is part of a plan to sever U.S. strategic nuclear forces from the defense of Western Europe; (2) the U.S. approach should be low-key, and actual assistance should be gradual.

In lieu of assistance to the French nuclear program, the United States should ask France to cooperate increasingly in the planning of European defense. As U.S. aid grows, our price tag should go up. To be sure, conditions obviously unacceptable to the French should be avoided. France's sovereignty and control over her own forces are not negotiable; her leaders continue to believe that she cannot entrust her ultimate defense to any foreign ally. But the United States can expect an improvement in U.S.-French political relations, which in the long run will enhance the overall Western defense posture. This would be a rich reward. By strengthening France's nuclear program and expertise, moreover, the United States would create the conditions in which Anglo-French nuclear cooperation would be possible.

Shaken by NATO's expulsion from French soil and by France's torpedoing of NATO military integration and European political union, the United States is understandably reluctant to engage in a nuclear dialogue. Nevertheless, the problem faces the United States now, and the swiftly changing strategic scene makes an early solution imperative. If France is no longer an integrated ally, it can be a true partner, whose determination to assist in defending the West should be harnessed to a Western solution.

THE ROLE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES

The threat posed by the U.S. strategic forces and the French and British nuclear forces serves to deter Soviet aggression, and, if deterrence fails, to preclude escalation to nuclear war on the theater level. Contributing to deterrence requirements are the American nuclear systems located in Europe that can reach the Soviet homeland. Currently, U.S. forward based systems (FBS), notably long-range nuclear-armed aircraft, fulfill this role in the chain of deterrence. For the European allies, these aircraft present visible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe. They are the only U.S. nuclear systems in the European theater that can hit Soviet targets. This does not necessarily mean that, if deterrence failed, the European allies would wish to strike the Soviet Union immediately; rather, it means that they value the political utility of having a visible system with this capability. For these reasons the quick-reaction alert (QRA) aircraft contribute to the cohesion of the alliance. The widely reported Soviet efforts to include the U.S. forward based systems in SALT I agreements were viewed with great apprehension in allied capitals as another attempt to remove the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the continent.

These aircraft are, however, vulnerable to Soviet pre-emptive attack; their ability to break through Warsaw Pact air defenses is limited; and the cost of the planes and their maintenance is relatively high. If some of the current aircraft were one day replaced by more suitable systems, such as missiles, the allies would have to be carefully prepared for this step and convinced that it would not presage a U.S. strategic decoupling from Europe. Any substitute systems, moreover, should meet allied demands by being visible on the continent and having a range sufficient to cover targets in the USSR, if necessary. Still, the FBS and the U.S. and allied strategic forces alone would not suffice to deter either a limited or a massive conventional aggression.

If the Soviets were to believe that, despite the presence of American forces, the United States no longer had the will to defend Europe and, if necessary, resort to the use of nuclear weapons, or that the will of America's allies had been seriously weakened, they might be tempted to adopt an increasingly belligerent policy. Such a policy could eventually lead, either deliberately or through accident or miscalculation, to armed aggression against Western Europe. Under such circumstances, the most likely Soviet thrust would be conventional rather than nuclear, to avoid unnecessary collateral damage and to capture Europe as intact as possible. To avoid providing the United States with targets suitable for nuclear counterattack, the Soviet Union would probably attack in relatively dispersed formations.

In order to halt an armed Soviet probe or a limited conventional thrust, it is imperative that the United States and its allies maintain adequate conventional forces. If the Soviet Union persisted in its aggression, the Western allies would need their conventional troops to force enemy formations into areas more favorable for counterattack and into nuclear targets. If the Soviets still sought to press on, the Western allies would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW's) to liquidate these penetrations. An early recourse to TNW's would be necessary in light of Soviet superiority in conventional forces, for a significant increase in Western conventional power is clearly not possible. The United States, already struggling to contain domestic pressures for reducing overseas manpower commitments, cannot augment its forces abroad, and the European allies are unlikely to increase their armed forces. Besides, the allies want to avoid a protracted conventional war on their continent.

Consistent with the requirement for uncertainty, the stage at which TNW's are to be introduced should not be fixed in advance, but should be determined by the developing military situation. Tactical nuclear firepower should be introduced as a supplement to conventional firepower, to stop penetrations before breakthroughs are achieved. The nuclear strikes should be selective and directed against only military targets, but executed in such a way as to keep collateral damage to a minimum.

In response, the Soviet Union could, of course, consider escalation, but in view of the demonstrated resolve of the Western allies to use nuclear weapons, this would be tantamount to risking a nuclear strike on its homeland. Unless the USSR had determined to complete the capture of Europe regardless of consequences, the calculated use of tactical nuclear weapons by the allies would induce it to halt its aggression and withdraw.

To provide for a credible tactical nuclear defense, however, these components of the force need to be improved. According to recent analyses,[3] the current U.S. tactical nuclear stockpile is ill-suited to meet European political demands for limiting collateral damage, because the fission content of the weapons is high, their yields are too big, and their accuracy is not satisfactory. The technology for cleaner and more accurate tactical nuclear weapons is available, and they could help to make the Western defense posture on the continent politically more acceptable to the allies and militarily more viable.

Advanced concepts for tactical nuclear weapons include suppressed radiation weapons which can considerably limit fallout but increase blast effect. These weapons could be used to strike relatively hard targets, such as storage sites. Enhanced radiation weapons, on the other hand, limit blast and heat effects, but increase prompt radiation without producing long-lasting radioactive damage. They could be employed as anti-personnel weapons. Another concept calls for induced radioactivity in TNW's to restrict or deny the use of an area to enemy forces for a given time. These weapons produce relatively short-lived radioactivity while reducing problems of long-term contamination. They could be effective in denying key transit areas to the enemy. In short, there is an array of small nuclear weapons that can produce varying effects.

Given the high degree of accuracy in delivery of nuclear weapons that can now be provided through television, laser and other guidance systems, the yields of advanced weapons can be greatly reduced. The ability to deliver accurate, concentrated firepower in small units allows for maximum maneuver, decentralization and dispersal, and concealment. As a result, the West would possess an enhanced surprise capability which would profoundly compound problems for the opponent, thereby strengthening the Western deterrence and defense posture. If introduced in the stockpile, these weapons would support a strategy seeking to offset the Soviet capacity for mass and blitzkrieg tactics.

All this does not imply a strategy depending to a large extent on tactical nuclear defense. This would clearly be as unpalatable to

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[3] For a detailed analysis of the current state of the art for tactical nuclear weapons, see Robert M. Lawrence, "On Tactical Nuclear War: I and II," *Revue Militaire Générale,* January 1971, pp. 46-59, and February 1971, pp. 237-261; and William Beecher, "Over the Threshold," *Army,* July 1972, pp. 17-20.

America's European allies as the conventional emphasis strategy of the 1960's. Nor would it, in all likelihood, be acceptable to the majority of U.S. policymakers. But the development of a discriminate and highly accurate tactical nuclear component, balanced with a similarly improved conventional capability, would go far toward meeting the political requirement of limiting collateral damage, yet give the Western posture necessary flexibility and effectiveness at the battlefield level.

The fact that the conventional allied forces in Europe can stand upgrading has been repeatedly documented. The study by the NATO Defense Planning Committee on "Alliance Defence for the Seventies" ("AD70") reportedly listed a series of deficiencies in the allied forces.[4] Here again, the so-called smart weapons technology for highly mobile weapons systems with highly accurate target acquisition, notably in the area of artillery and anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, would greatly strengthen the quality of Western conventional forces.[5] Terminal homing systems, fitted to missiles, artillery or other weapons, would permit a weapon to strike a target with surgical precision. The impact on cost-effective combat power becomes evident if we remember that it took between 200 and 300 rounds of fire to cause a casualty in World War II and the Korean War.[6] The TOW (tube-launched, optically-guided, wire-tracked) missile is a major advance in anti-tank systems; but since it is not fitted with a terminal homing device, it still depends on launcher-to-target operator guidance. It is not difficult to envisage how the refinement of terminal guidance would improve such a weapon.

To assess the political and military utility of "smart weapons" and their implications for manpower and expenditures as well as for doctrine and strategy requires a great deal of study. At this stage, however, four tentative conclusions may be drawn. First, because terminal homing permits a weapon to be placed in the general area above the target, whence it will find its own way, launchers and the missile's initial guidance can be relatively simple and inexpensive. Second, as has been mentioned, the sure-hit capability of smart weapons permits savings in manpower and weapons, and hence also in expenditures. Third, the new technology promises to offset the Soviet advantage of massive quantities with quality. Fourth, precision-guided conventional weapons permit small units, dispersion, mobility and flexibility. These characteristics suggest a force structure and posture similar to the one that would be feasible for advanced accurate tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, smart conventional weapons and small, accurate tactical nuclear weapons appear to be able to cover complementary targets: the former would effectively cover many point targets; the latter, hard fixed targets and many area targets. For these reasons the dual-capability problem that has bedeviled the military planner since the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons now seems to be on the road to a solution.

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[4] Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey,* 1970 (London: ISS, 1971), p. 19.

[5] For a discussion of new developments in military technology, including terminal homing systems and laser-guided and television-guided anti-tank and anti-air missiles, see Trevor Cliffe, *Military Technology and the European Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), and John T. Burke, "Smart Weapons: A Coming Revolution in Tactics," *Army,* February 1973, p. 15 ff.

[6] Burke, *op. cit.,* p. 16.

The introduction of precision-guided conventional and nuclear weapons in Europe would provide an effective capability against Soviet armor and tactical air elements, which form a major part of the Soviet offensive threat. By emphasizing anti-tank and anti-air systems, the West would maintain a truly defensive posture. Precise and clean tactical nuclear weapons would help to deter the Soviet Union from attacking with massed formations and serve to cover the larger targets. Conventional forces, equipped with weapons of improved accuracy, would help to deter the USSR from attacking with more dispersed formations, and would cover smaller targets and participate in nuclear defense. Together these two components of the Western posture, if protected by the umbrella of U.S. and European strategic forces, would seriously vitiate the Soviet Union's tactics and its war-fighting capability as an instrument of military conquest and political coercion.

Although deployment of the full array of advanced systems is not expected until the late 1970's,[7] some systems, such as the Maverick and Walleye air-to-surface missiles with television homing, have already been used. An increased emphasis on developing smart weapons — conventional and nuclear — will offer a much more viable defense for Western Europe. Implications for manpower and military budgets can then be evaluated. The development of smart weapons could also strengthen the West's bargaining position in negotiating troop reductions with the Soviet Union without degrading its deterrence and defense posture.

So far, our focus has been on the problems of Western Europe, but the need to retain an effective posture on Europe's northern and southern flanks should not be forgotten. Geographic circumstances and the terrain inhibit an effective local defense of the northern periphery. So do the political factors. Neither Norway nor Denmark permits the stationing of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on its territory, although the Danish army has Honest John surface-to-surface missile systems in its weapons inventory.[8] Denmark, however, is planning to reduce its military forces and defense spending substantially. Probably more than any other front, the northern flank derives its security from the strength of the alliance as a whole.

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[7] Cliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

On the southern flank the Sixth Fleet is a major U.S. instrument underwriting the Western position. Withdrawal of the U.S. naval presence would seriously undermine defense of the entire southern flank and leave the region's allies in the shadow of overwhelming Soviet land and airpower without the reassurance of any countervailing local deterrent. For Greece and Turkey, NATO has always been identified with its most powerful member. From their vantage point, Soviet naval intrusion in the Mediterranean underscores the continued need for the American military forces. The tangible evidence of U.S. concern, reflected in the visibility of the Sixth Fleet, assures the southern NATO members that an alternative to a neutralist or pro-Soviet orientation remains. Despite the political coloring of the current Greek regime, the U.S. homeporting agreement with Greece also strengthens the earnest of the American commitment. For the 1970's, there is no substitute for the U.S. fleet in plans to secure the southern flank.

Prospects for the 1970's

Although the Atlantic Alliance is beset with diminishing cohesion as well as with growing Soviet military capabilities and political initiatives, a viable strategy for the alliance can be found. This strategy must provide a coherent structure for the roles of the American strategic nuclear forces, the British and French nuclear deterrents, and the tactical nuclear and conventional forces within the theater as well as the naval elements at the flanks. To strengthen the perception of coupling, the U.S. strategic forces need to maintain some measure of counterforce capability. To enhance the overall posture, the British and French nuclear capabilities should be strengthened — an effort that may have to occur outside the NATO framework. To strengthen the credibility of defense further, improvements and modifications in the tactical nuclear and conventional components would have to be made.

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[8] The nuclear warheads for Denmark's missiles are not stored on Danish soil. See *ibid.*, p. 35.

The combination of these modifications could permit the United States to cut back its forces in Europe. Particularly, the introduction of precision-guided weapons could eventually permit troop reductions. The actual level of U.S. troop strength and any contemplated changes in the type of forces, however, are clearly issues that should be negotiated in an American-Allied forum before they can be discussed with the Soviet Union.

The possibility of making large-scale U.S. troop withdrawals without seriously compromising the Western deterrence and defense posture is remote. If Western Europe is to be preserved as the frontier of Western, including American, security, there is no alternative to continued U.S. military involvement across the Atlantic. Shaped by wise and farsighted American leaders, the U.S. commitment to Western Europe reflects an abiding U.S. interest in maintaining a reasonable balance of political-military power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union on the European continent. The perceived climate of détente does not invalidate this commitment.

A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR-EMPHASIS DEFENSE FOR NATO*

by W. S. Bennett, R. R. Sandoval and R. G. Shreffler

THIS is a proposal of long-term goals toward which changes in NATO's defense posture should be directed. Its primary aim is to increase the effectiveness of NATO defense against Warsaw Pact aggression and to make that increase manifest and credible to both NATO and Warsaw Pact decision-makers. Negotiation of the issues dividing East and West in Europe could then be approached by the NATO governments, secure in the knowledge that the West's military posture was adequate to repel any invasion.

An effective defense threatens nothing but the ambitions of an adventurous aggressor. If a similar posture were acquired by the Warsaw Pact, no harm would be done to NATO's defense. Instead, the parties would enjoy a mutual state of confident deterrence, or stalemate — a situation even more stable than that now existing between the U.S. and USSR strategic forces.

The primary aim of making NATO's defense effective, and therefore credible, cannot be achieved without careful consideration of the prevailing political, military, economic and technical conditions affecting both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The necessary changes must be planned and accomplished deliberately to avoid disturbing the foundations on which the North Atlantic alliance is built. In particular, positive attitudes toward the existing NATO political and military posture must not be weakened during the conversion to an effective defensive posture. Finally, it is assumed that the configuration of a credible NATO defense must result in a decreased economic burden.

APPROACH

NATO's military posture has always been regarded as a counter to a formidable Warsaw Pact threat — a threat inferred as much from Soviet ambitions as from pure military capability. In the mid-1950's, our NATO allies concurred in U.S. plans to deploy nuclear weapons in Europe to offset the disparity between conventional forces on the two sides. Since then, the Soviet Union has acquired intercontinental nuclear capabilities that have changed the strategic context in which the United States views its worldwide relationships. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has acquired and fielded nuclear weapons in the Warsaw Pact framework that more than suffice to deter any attack by forces based in Western Europe. These weapons also provide a *de facto* capability to destroy most of Europe should the Soviet Union choose to do so, for whatever reason. Meanwhile, the conventional forces of the Pact, characterized by large numbers of armored and mechanized units, provide a disturbingly credible instrument for Soviet adventurism ranging from political pressure to massive invasion.

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*This article was written by three members of the staff of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory of the University of California. It reflects their own studies and discussions as well as exchanges with experts who have participated in seminars held at the Los Alamos Laboratory, but they accept sole responsibility for the opinions expressed.

Flexible response, NATO's declared strategy for coping with these various contingencies, attempts to combine military and political measures to contain the more limited forms of aggression and to deter the wider forms by threatening to inflict damage that the Soviets would find either unacceptable or out of proportion to any prospective gains. To many analysts, including the present authors, there is something illusory about this strategy. First, the ability of the NATO force to defend effectively against a massive attack is seriously questioned. Second, actual use of the nuclear deterrent component of the force would result in unacceptable damage to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The result is NATO's reliance on a military instrument inadequate for effective defense and unusable if it fails to deter. Faced with this dilemma, how do our allies hope to prevent a war in Europe from proceeding beyond a defensive engagement on the battlefield to an exchange of high-yield nuclear weapons on a theater-wide scale? They see no alternative but to rely on the mutual restraint imposed by the possible involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union in a war of mutual destruction. So far, Washington appears to have resigned itself to this formulation, which it actually helped to devise.

Several factors currently tend to deny stability to the situation just described. Political discussions that may result in a reduced NATO military structure have already begun. All alliance members are feeling economic pressures to reduce forces. Another factor, inherent in NATO's nuclear weapons and in the procedures prescribed for their use, is the enormous potential for collateral or unintended damage even if NATO fights only a defensive war. All these factors suggest the need for a detailed examination of the NATO military posture.

The most obvious deficiency of the NATO posture is the limited ability of present defenses to deny territory to a determined Warsaw Pact attacking force. To stop an invasion and retake lost territory, NATO would be forced to depend on mobilization and reinforcement. This buildup would take time, during which an invading force could be expected to have penetrated deep into the Federal Republic of Germany. West Germans thus face the prospect, if the Pact attacks in force, of a prolonged war fought over their territory, quite possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons by both sides. Our other NATO allies, fearful of their fate in such a conflict, join the FRG in the hope that the Pact will be deterred from attacking by the threat of our use of nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons. There is, however, little hope among our allies that defensive action against a massive ground attack would be effective enough to forestall escalation to theater-wide use of nuclear weapons. Understandably, then, they would want the destruction of the United States and the USSR indissolubly linked to their own demise through our commitment of intercontinental strategic nuclear capabilities.

Discriminate use of nuclear weapons from the outset would enable NATO to conduct a successful defense. Western policymakers should aim to replace, in Pact calculations, the uncertainty of an irrational NATO response with the certainty of an immediate, effective response to attempts to take NATO territory. Dealing with threats of irrational attacks to destroy all or part of NATO is a problem for our European allies to face without counting on U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. It is their survival that such attacks threaten. However, they should recognize that the existence of European retaliatory forces cannot be ignored by the Pact, and might provide an otherwise absent incentive for a pre-emptive disarming attack. It is true, after all, that retaliatory forces can also be used pre-emptively.

The strategy proposed in this article departs radically from present plans to try first to defend conventionally in Europe: It calls for immediately engaging an attacker with low-yield nuclear weapons for all but the most trivial incursions. Yet this concept would require no change in NATO's accepted strategy of forward defense, only in its interpretation. We admit there is no place in our proposal for any U.S. forces whose useful purpose in a defensive role on the battlefield cannot be defined. We acknowledge the utility of an undeclared reliance on the U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for an indeterminate contribution to the deterrence of high-intensity theater war in Europe. We hold that a NATO force optimally configured to employ nuclear weapons defensively would require a smaller U.S. investment and would accommodate the many constraints that now prevent NATO from mounting a realistic deterrent to Warsaw Pact pressures.

First, we will address the political, military, economic and technical factors bearing on this proposed solution to NATO's defense under the following headings:

(1) Our perspective of nuclear weapons.
(2) U.S. courses of action with respect to NATO.
(3) Defensive capability and deterrence.
(4) Escalation of a nuclear war in Europe.
(5) The NATO force and its interactions with the threat.

Then we will identify the general characteristics of a future NATO force posture consistent with our analysis of these factors. Finally, we will indicate some directions that development of the future NATO force structure should take to reflect the recommended posture, and suggest ways to adapt the alliance's present force.

Some aspects of our proposal are extremely controversial. A number of strategic analysts have warned that our suggestions could undermine NATO. In particular, some critics feel strongly that Europeans do not want a defense of any kind, that they rely on the fact that any conflict on their territory would rapidly involve a U.S.-USSR intercontinental exchange, and that this fact is the only deterrent that protects NATO. Whatever the merits of that position, it strikes us as a holdover from the days of unquestioned faith in U.S. strategic superiority. This argument has been overtaken by the conditions of strategic parity, so we believe NATO must take a new look at its own defenses. If it can find a credible defense posture for its European members, military aggression will be deterred. And if the Europeans gain confidence in this posture, it will give them the courage to resist the more likely threat of political coercion. Conjecture of this kind is clearly subjective, but our aim is to strengthen NATO and to make the U.S. contribution meaningful rather than illusory.

FACTORS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

In some instances, the following factors are little more than definitions; in others, they are matters of substance that can severely restrict our choice of realistic solutions to the problem. All must be understood, however, if a dialogue on this complex subject is to be intelligent.

Our Perspective of Nuclear Weapons

The numerous complex parameters required to define nuclear weapons and the infinite set of political-military situations their existence influences make them difficult to classify. Are they defensive, retaliatory, or both? Confusion is especially evident in this period when the United States is obliged to formulate its world position accurately.

For example, the 7,000 U.S. weapons in Europe would be regarded by many as a stockpile of defensive nuclear weapons. One would do better, however, to take the opposite view and acknowledge that, although the NATO General Strike Plan (GSP) is directed against military targets, its execution with NATO's present high-yield weapons would cause widespread collateral damage in Warsaw Pact homelands. This situation arises because we usually consider the GSP in the same context as the U.S. SIOP – i.e., as a deterrent only. But because the Warsaw Pact perceives the GSP to be coercive (or even pre-emptive) in intent, weapons assigned to the plan cannot be regarded as relating solely to the defense of NATO. Only those weapons put to use directly on the battlefield can be properly described as defensive.

One reason for the present confusion (and we must recognize that some of it flows from deliberate decisions) is our past practice of designing weapons systems and forcing them into the existing military structure. A more rational approach is to decide what political and military needs exist, develop an accommodating force structure, and then call on the technical community to build weapons that support that force structure. Each theater has different demands. The political-military confrontation between the USSR and the United States varies from one part of the world to another; for example, the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation differs from the situation confronting the United States in Asia. When we evaluate a nuclear weapon or a nuclear arsenal, weapon characteristics should be chosen to ensure that they best meet the demands of a particular theater, or even a particular area within a theater.

Let us consider how some of these characteristics relate to our assessment of political acceptability and military utility. The first essential is what might be called weapon controllability. To be politically acceptable as an instrument of national policy, a nuclear weapon must be capable of manufacture, deployment and use under conditions that make unauthorized detonation virtually impossible. Deployment and use, in particular, must unquestionably support the achievement of a clearly defined objective, and, in the case of defensive weapons, must be carefully limited. On the other hand, if a weapon is to be militarily useful, the control apparatus must be responsive to military exigencies and must not impose an inordinate security, storage and maintenance burden on the force.

Another important characteristic is the destructiveness of the weapon. NATO's political leadership wants no weapon explosion to expose people or their cultural heritage to indiscriminate destruction. This collateral damage can be largely controlled by the choice of target area and target damage criteria. The military commander, however, should have weapons whose use can effectively attain military objectives. Delivery accuracy, range and responsiveness of the delivery system, weapon yield and fuzing, target acquisition, damage assessment, and battlefield survivability of the system all play an obvious role in assuring effectiveness.

Economic considerations involved in developing a new stockpile which can best meet these effectiveness criteria include (1) the transition from a present force representing sunk costs; (2) the resources already committed to, and the costs still to be paid for, weapons in development; and (3) the relationship of these factors to other costs of fielding and maintaining forces, all of which have a profound influence on the defense decisions of NATO leaders. Ultimately, as experience has shown us, military planners will probably have to settle for less than they feel is enough; but they will still want to make sure that the force structure we can afford has military utility.

Other weapon characteristics affecting political acceptability are the image the weapon projects into the minds of our allies and adversaries and the weapon's ability to conform to constraints explicit in policy or implicit in the doctrine of use.

U.S. Courses of Action with Respect to NATO

Before addressing the NATO defense problem, it is appropriate to consider a range of future U.S. military linkages with Western Europe. At the risk of oversimplification, one might consider four courses of action: (1) Complete removal of U.S. military forces from Europe as quickly as possible. (2) Complete removal of U.S. military forces from Europe according to a schedule set by the U.S. government. (3) Retention of present U.S. military forces in Europe indefinitely into the future. (4) Retention of a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe indefinitely into the future.

If any of the first three courses is pursued, there is no need to develop a rationale to support refurbishing stockpiles of nuclear weapons or redesigning the U.S. contribution to the military force. The action required to follow the fourth course is less clear. U.S. international responsibilities and domestic considerations should induce us to choose the fourth course, but drastic revisions of the U.S. force will be necessary to make this a feasible course to follow. Associated revisions of the NATO force as a whole would likewise be mandatory to ensure the military compatibility of its components. Our proposal addresses this problem.

U.S. political decision-makers can hardly choose intelligently unless they are given carefully evaluated military options from which to select. In February 1971, President Nixon documented his frustration in developing these options:

> The basic problem was not technical or esoteric. It was an absolute necessity to devise a sensible posture of defense we can plausibly ask our peoples to support. Many voters, legislators, and officials in Western countries have raised questions about the continuing burden of defense budgets—not because they did not see the need for security, but because they did not see a clear rationale for the forces proposed. Our armies are not ends in themselves, or merely tokens of a commitment. They have a function to perform: to aid in deterrence and to defend if deterrence fails.[1]

As the leader of the NATO alliance and the Free World, the United States should play a leading role in developing the required military solutions. In addition, Washington has by far the greatest potential for resolving these issues, particularly when the options may depend on the essential defensive use of tactical nuclear weapons — weapons over which the U.S. government may feel obligated to retain control.

Whatever military solution is selected, the obvious principal goal is to create a deterrent force posture that minimizes the possibility of war. The issue is how to develop such a deterrent force consistent with the other constraints previously identified.

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[1] *United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace.* A Report by President Nixon to the Congress, February 25, 1971 (Washington: GPO, 1971), p. 33.

Defensive Capability and Deterrence

There is a great deal of discussion and confusion over whether and how deterrence is associated with a war-fighting capability, which we prefer to call a defensive capability. The following argument is presented for consideration: First, we hypothesize that deterrence is a function – possibly some product – of how an adversary views the military potential of your force and your willingness to use that force. It is not hard to associate this definition of deterrence with a conventional or a defensive nuclear force. For either force, one associates military potential with defensive capability, and the close connection is understandable if you assume willingness to commit the nuclear force. We maintain that the U.S. President would encounter great reluctance, and therefore great difficulty, in releasing defensive nuclear forces in NATO as long as the NATO stockpile contains so many high-yield, indiscriminate weapons. The present NATO force accordingly has little or no real deterrent value beyond that attributed to the uncertainty of its use.

The situation is not so clear with respect to strategic forces. The military potential of the U.S. or the Soviet strategic force can be placed near infinity on any scale. Even as willingness to use the force approaches zero, deterrence can be large, or at least indeterminate. Not only is the military potential enormous, but it has an impersonal and unreal character – a far cry from the concrete features that define a conventional or defensive nuclear force. U.S. strategic forces, however, constitute the only significant deterrent we have in Europe – a deterrent conceived before the advent of strategic parity.

Escalation of a Nuclear War in Europe

There is a puzzling ambivalence in current attitudes toward escalation. On the one hand, it has been contended that any use of nuclear weapons introduces a qualitative change in the nature of the battlefield. Allegedly, one side or the other will find this change intolerable and attempt to redress it by widening the conflict in some fashion that will initiate an irreversible escalatory process ending inevitably in the intercontinental strategic exchange, an unthinkable denouement. On the other hand, once the introduction of nuclear weapons is postulated, escalation is viewed by the same people as the only credible threat one can hold over an adversary to restrain him from taking escalating steps himself. The positive feedback potential of this scheme is self-evident. If war should occur while we possess our present strategy and military force, the intercontinental strategic exchange may well come to pass. But if our security needs are to be truly met, it is essential that a war fought with nuclear weapons should not escalate out of hand. Any employment doctrine must be fashioned to this end.

Escalation is defined as an extension or amplification of a war in one or more of the following directions: (1) The war might become intense. More yield would be delivered in a given engagement area. (2) The area over which the war is fought might be expanded. (3) The distance from which weapons are launched might be increased.

To minimize the possibility of a nuclear war escalating out of hand, the following steps must be taken:

(1) We must construct a defensive force that can use low-yield nuclear weapons to stop the enemy before he becomes irreversibly committed through seizing a significant part of NATO territory, or through suffering nuclear retaliation that forces him to escalate.

(2) In conducting and terminating a conflict, the NATO objective must be to preserve or re-establish the pre-conflict border. Insistence on wider goals in an engagement supported by the USSR and the United States can lead to escalation involving a release of their strategic forces.

(3) We must exclude the planning option of using U.S. nuclear forces in Europe — primarily our Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) aircraft — which are capable of striking the territory of the USSR. To this end, such forces now in Europe should be removed. The United States should dissociate itself from allied forces possessing a comparable capability, and discontinue its declared policy of promising to defend NATO with U.S. CONUS-based and otherwise strategically-oriented nuclear forces. The importance of an undeclared policy in this regard is vital. Under these conditions, the President's options for defending NATO can be weighed separately from the problem of releasing forces meant only for deterrence, not for defense.

(4) Other steps doubtless need to be taken to relieve the President's concern over escalation, but they are more tenuous. For example, we should consider advertising the ground rules by which NATO would fight a war. These rules could cover such matters as number and yield of nuclear weapons in stockpile. In

this regard, NATO could consider a low maximum yield (in the neighborhood of a kiloton). The rules could also specify the policies under points (1), (2) and (3) above. In short, NATO could advertise its constraint policy.

By taking the foregoing steps, we would avoid the enormous risks of depending on a controlled, but possibly uncontrollable, escalation to halt a Pact invasion and then retrieve lost ground. With the suggested approach, planning for NATO's defense becomes a much simpler problem: We would be able to meet aggression at the border with only the requisite nuclear force to bring it under control. This concept is compatible with accepted NATO strategy, except that current interpretations stress a conventional-emphasis phase while ours relies on immediate nuclear emphasis. Current fears about escalation are warranted, but they result from the commingling of defensive and offensive (even if called counteroffensive) nuclear forces in Europe. Removing U.S. offensive forces allows us to rely on the defensive forces.

We see no possibility of effective military action in defense against an irrational attack on Europe: for example, Soviet release of IRBM/MRBM weapons to destroy all or part of it. There can only be suicidal retaliation for such an act, authority for which is present in the President's ability to release the SIOP. This capability provides strategic deterrence based on the balance of terror. It is more a political counter than a military one. The danger is that political adventurism by the Soviets, combined with military thrusts for limited objectives, could escalate uncontrollably. Nothing can guarantee that this will not happen, but we believe the purely defensive force we propose will minimize the risk. If, in addition, the NATO force lacked offensive capability, the chances would be minimized that the Soviets would fear the force to the point where they felt they had to strike first to blunt our threat to them.

The NATO Force and Its Interactions with the Threat

The character of the NATO force has varied little since shortly after its origin. Briefly, NATO relies on a large conventional army, air force and navy; the protection of the U.S. SIOP, if necessary; and nuclear weapons deployed in the European theater, both as an ill-defined backstop of the conventional force and as a coercive deterrent, deliberately implying a trigger to the SIOP.

This combination of forces would seem unrealistic in light of the previous discussion and the following points in particular:

(1) The inflexibility the current NATO force causes in addressing problems that arise in debates on SALT, MBFR and other security matters.

(2) The lucrative targets offered to Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons by a conventionally deployed NATO force.

(3) The consideration of nuclear weapon use *in extremis*, particularly if the conventional force has insufficient time to mobilize.

(4) The difficulty concerning Presidential release of nuclear weapons in the theater, where the stockpile and delivery systems include threats to the territory of the Soviet Union.

(5) The absence of suitable military doctrine for using nuclear weapons in a purely defensive war.

(6) The fundamental difficulty of warping a conventional-force structure to meet the demands of nuclear war and the associated difficulty of structuring a sensible stockpile of defensive nuclear weapons.

(7) The probable Soviet intention to expand Moscow's influence without a major war – certainly without a strategic nuclear exchange.

It is frequently asserted that the Soviets still view our NATO force with considerable apprehension and respect. Quite the reverse may actually be true. They may dismiss our NATO deterrent force as a noncredible planning option. They may well attempt to extend their influence into Western Europe against a defensive force they consider a façade – a military force in which NATO pretends confidence but which the Soviets fear very little. Given time, and merely flexing the muscles of their massive force, they might expect to accomplish their goals with little risk of reaction.

A decision to retain the present NATO force has the attractive feature of requiring no change in current political or military posture. This factor alone is probably sufficient to argue for continued endorsement. The additional fact that there has been no conflict in Europe in over two decades of East-West antagonism encourages some to extrapolate the present state of affairs into the indefinite future. Also, recent negotiating efforts to resolve East-West differences at the diplomatic level are used as a basis to argue in favor of maintaining the present posture, i.e., "don't rock the boat." We can only reply that, should the Warsaw Pact countries, particularly the Soviet Union, choose to invade Western Europe either with or without nuclear weapons, the political leadership of our alliance would have distressingly few choices of response, with widespread destruction almost certainly the only alternative to humiliation. Moreover, the present force provides a poor bargaining position from which to resist Soviet political pressures.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF A FUTURE NATO FORCE POSTURE

NATO should be extremely cautious in considering any change in its military force without first giving careful consideration to its long-term goals. Although the present force posture is not altogether rational and cries out for revision, it still has some value. We contend, however, that if Warsaw Pact forces were to attempt to seize Western Europe, as opposed to an attack intended to devastate it, our force could be decimated. If NATO's purpose is to be fulfilled in the future, it follows that the present conventional-emphasis force posture should be changed drastically over the long term. Because of the early decisions to be made at SALT, MBFR and CSCE, and because of possible force reductions, it is essential that NATO adopt a military design which gives direction to the necessary changes in force posture.

The foregoing leads us to visualize the desirable characteristics of a future military posture predicated on the following considerations:

(1) The U.S. SIOP has some indeterminate residual value in deterring irrational forms of Warsaw Pact aggression or escalation, but this role should not be articulated in declared policy.

(2) No U.S. capability for other than defensive war should be retained on European soil.

(3) Any NATO forces deployed in Europe that are solely deterrent (i.e., punitive or retaliatory) should be provided and controlled by Europeans.

(4) The defensive capabilities of the NATO force should be tailored to the characteristics of each prospective battle area in which these capabilities may be exercised. The force should be constructed in each case around U.S.-supplied and U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons and should be designed to defend NATO at its borders.

(5) The design of the force should accommodate to economic pressures to reduce the cost of acquiring and maintaining forces.

In particular, the size of the U.S. manpower commitment in Europe should be reduced. Since the NATO force will depend largely on nuclear weapons to defeat massed attacks by Warsaw Pact armor, our goal should be eventually to restrict the U.S. role to command and control of these weapons. The Europeans should be left to provide those elements of the force that would cope with other than massed armor attacks. This goal seems to be a clear application of the Nixon Doctrine to the defense of Europe. Also, emphasis should be placed on procuring weapons that minimize acquisition and maintenance costs.

(6) The force must be usable and effective without exceeding collateral-damage constraints. We offer two thoughts on the control of collateral damage, defined as unintended destruction which should be minimized or avoided if possible: (a) To make a nuclear-emphasis defense acceptable to our allies, the goals for minimizing expected collateral damage must be set at levels at least equal to and preferably even lower than would be associated with a conventional defense. (b) Concern about collateral damage stems largely from the presence of high-yield weapons (greater than a few kilotons) in our NATO stockpile and from vivid memories of wars as long engagements that ravaged the continent. We contend that a nuclear-defensive war by NATO, fought in proximity to the border with low-yield weapons and discriminating delivery systems, would result in a short conflict. Under such conditions, collateral damage is far less an issue, and the criteria set forth in (a) are reasonable.

(7) We are fated to pursue the brinkmanship game of strategic deterrence (assured destruction) in the NATO theater until NATO adopts this new defensive stance. The problem is far more one of policy and doctrine — and U.S. leadership — than it is one of technology. There are advantageous changes possible in both weaponry and forces, but the first step is a recognition that a new approach is necessary. As NATO comes to this realization, there is much to trade the Warsaw Pact in MBFR negotiations: our theater-range weapons for theirs, for example. We need not develop expensive new "bargaining chips"; both sides have many of them already. Because Europe is the issue, this is a problem for the multilateral MBFR talks, not for bilateral SALT II negotiations. In any case, our negotiating position does not become worse by NATO's acquiring an effective defense.

If plans for the force proposed here were generated by the

United States and clear steps were taken toward ultimate implementation, a number of benefits would result:

(1) The inevitable changes to be made in the present force could be planned to advantage for political bargaining power in such matters as SALT and MBFR talks.

(2) Internal pressures to reduce the U.S. contribution to NATO forces could be accommodated.

(3) The deterrent value of NATO's defensive force would be enhanced if the President were confident that release of weapons for defensive purposes would not inevitably be followed by execution of the SIOP. He would also be far more likely to establish peacetime consultation procedures with our NATO allies for the release and employment of defensive nuclear weapons.

(4) The United States and its NATO allies could possess a truly effective defensive force and supporting arsenal that would take maximum advantage of nuclear weapons as the dominating presence on the battlefield. Planning for the use of this force would be uninhibited by the dogma associated with the present force and the deployment of U.S. strategic capabilities in the theater.

(5) The United States could initiate the creative development and implementation of the political, military and technical elements of command and control systems required for nuclear defense. These difficult tasks become more tractable when divorced from their strategic counterparts.

(6) The Soviets would be far more cautious in dealing with an alliance whose deterrent would be a credible nuclear defensive force marked by high confidence and resolve. At the same time, the stage would be set for détente through military stalemate, and ultimately for further, major mutual force reductions.

Several problems are doubtless associated with proposing such a force: (1) The force has yet to be defined in detail. (2) The existing force structure would certainly have to be reoriented and, possibly, drastically changed. (3) Definition of the force and transition from the present force to the new one would take a number of years.

The United States should — and apparently intends to — remain in Europe indefinitely, though at lower force levels. This necessitates that serious consideration be given to adopting a NATO military posture having the characteristics identified above. If we can configure a force clearly capable of conducting a nuclear defense of NATO's borders for as long as the Warsaw Pact forces can mount an invasion attempt, we will have removed the one Warsaw Pact option most dangerous to Europe's future, namely, the extension of Soviet hegemony over the entire continent. Of course, it must be reiterated that the Soviet Union can maintain indefinitely the capability to destroy Europe.

We recognize that the task is most difficult. It prompts a quotation from *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783*, by Alfred Thayer Mahan:

> The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the methods of using it to the qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage—a lesson in itself of no mean value.

Future Courses of Action

We have searched for a new configuration for a NATO defensive force. This force, hypothetical at present, would derive its credibility from a manifest capability (lacking in the present force) to deny success to any Warsaw Pact attempt to seize NATO territory. In the preceding sections, we identified what might be regarded as a set of conditions to be satisfied by such a force. We then derived the general characteristics of the military posture NATO should assume in preserving its territorial integrity. What remains to be done to lend form and substance to this concept is outlined as follows:

(1) Development of alternative force structures, each conforming to the new posture. These will be designed specifically to engage in defensive nuclear operations. They will include an evident capability for accurate, responsive, low-yield nuclear weapon delivery. Battlefield survivability will also be a prominent characteristic. The design of such forces is an appropriate task for military agencies already engaged in configuring force structures

to support national objectives. It can also be addressed usefully by others having a special interest and knowledge.

(2) Extension of the methodology for evaluating force structures to permit the selection of optimal forces for the nuclear battlefield, subject to appropriate constraints. Provisions for objective testing would include: (a) Scrutiny equaling that accorded in the cost-effectiveness analyses to which force proposals are now subjected. Among the tests to be applied should be one for compatibility with the factors we have set forth, arranged in some order of priority. In this way, appropriate trade-offs can be identified. (b) Field exercises to evaluate organizations, doctrine and tactics successively in the U.S. military CONUS base, in the U.S. NATO component, and in NATO as a whole.

(3) Review of the present force to identify elements that could be used in configuring the kind of defensive capability we are seeking. Those weapons and delivery systems capable of engaging battlefield targets with appropriate (no larger than necessary) yields and at appropriate distances would have obvious utility. Similarly, some conventional elements of the force would have relevant tasks in the nuclear environment. The review should assess realistically the capability of the present force to conduct nuclear defense. In particular, the analysis should proceed without the complications arising from consideration of an initial conventional phase of battle and the attendant difficulties of a transition to the nuclear phase.

The essence of our proposal is the substitution of an effective forward defense for a NATO force which, if attacked, would today pin all its hopes on a questionable ability to counterattack after trading space for time until mobilization could be realized. Hovering in the background in this unlikely scenario are panoplies of nuclear power possessed by both sides. For too long we have depended on U.S. strategic power based in this country and around the world to frustrate Soviet expansionism. It is increasingly evident that those forces are mutually deterred by similar Soviet capabilities, so that neither can be used in times of crisis. For either nation to seek the attainment of any political objective at the risk of destroying both is nearly inconceivable. For either to declare that it would do so seems naive.

The matter of greatest priority to the U.S. national security interest, short of survival itself, is the preservation of a healthy NATO Europe sharing its essential goals with America. We urgently need decisions at the highest political level to direct the configuration of a military force which can indefinitely maintain an effective defense against encroachments of NATO territory. Further, that force must be releasable by an American President, mindful of the risks of escalation. If those decisions are not forthcoming, present pressures to reduce forces will lead to further diminution of an already inadequate defensive strength. Should the decisions we advocate be made soon, however, U.S. force reductions can be implemented without disturbing the present shaky military equilibrium in Europe. Most important, our NATO allies will acquire a renewed confidence in the efficacy of NATO's defenses.

SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

by Ian Clark

IT required no special insight to predict that the Soviet Union would find the Sino-U.S. rapprochement disturbing: happy is the state whose rivals are beset by formidable antagonisms of their own. However, in attempting to assess the rationale behind Soviet apprehensions, we would do Secretary Brezhnev and his colleagues less than justice if we attributed their uneasiness to a simple capacity for deducing that, in any threesome, it is folly to constitute the minority. Soviet irritation goes deeper than this: it derives from a perception of developments which presage a profound change in the structure of the international system and which signify a calculated breach by the United States of some of the superpower codes that have emerged from the experiences of the Cold War.

The immediate significance of the Nixon pilgrimage to Peking, as far as Moscow is concerned, is that the United States has decided to bring China more directly into the play of a global balance beginning to swing in favor of the USSR. This is undoubtedly the basic Soviet perception of the calculations behind the new diplomatic status that the United States has accorded to China by way of the People's Republic's admission to the United Nations and the touch down of the *Spirit of '76* at Peking airport. Moreover, as regards Soviet interests, accordance of this new status to China has been totally gratuitous.

Such an interpretation is borne out by the nature of Soviet objections to the normalization of Sino-American relations. Ostensibly at least, the Soviets view the Sino-U.S. rapprochement within the context of the domestic and foreign policy crisis currently believed to be occurring in the United States. As a discussion on Moscow Radio put it on August 1, 1971,

> this stage is characterized by a further weakening of the USA's position and prestige in international affairs. In the confrontation with the Soviet Union, and this is the central aim of American policy, US imperialism now seeks new partners; and Washington is trying to find such a partner in China. . . . What depths of crisis has American policy reached?

Seen in this light, Washington's courtship of China can only be interpreted as a move designed to bolster the U.S. position in the international arena. An interesting analogy has been drawn by one Soviet commentator. Citing the decreasing stature of the U.S. economy within the capitalist camp and the prescriptions of the American "economic Kissinger" (Peter G. Peterson, Presidential Adviser on International Economic Affairs) for dealing with a situation in which "special measures are necessary," L. Stepanov draws the conclusion that the politico-strategic doctrines of the Nixon Administration arise from a similar set of circumstances requiring the shoring up of a rapidly crumbling world position.[1] Thus the basic contention of the USSR is that the timing of the American move necessarily casts doubts on the motives that have inspired it. As G. Arbatov, Director of the Institute on the USA of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, expressed the point, "it must be regretted that the USA has been holding back for such a long time from recognition of realities and has only now, *in circumstances which make its position rather ambiguous,* begun taking the first steps along the path of renouncing its 'cold war' policy towards the PRC."[2]

This, in simplest outline, is the raw material of the Soviet position. It now remains to amplify and refine this interpretation. Above all it must be appreciated that, in the Soviet perception, the international structure which is emerging is still fluid and its full implications have not been worked out. As Leonid Brezhnev pointed out in his address to the Fifteenth Congress of Soviet Trade Unions, regarding the Sino-U.S. rapprochement "we are in no hurry with final assessments. The future, perhaps the near future, will show how matters stand and we will then draw the appropriate practical conclusions."[3] Since the Soviet leadership has not yet provided us with a definitive assessment of its interpretation of the events surrounding China's admission to the UN and the Nixon visits to Peking and Moscow, the best means of drawing out the likely elements is to analyze the objections the Soviet Union has raised to the exploits of its American and Chinese rivals. These objections can, for convenience, be grouped into three categories: (1) immediate fear of Sino-U.S. collusion in Asia; (2) the feeling that the United States has unilaterally violated the rules of the game; (3) concern that the global structure has been complicated to the disadvantage of the USSR.

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[1] L. Stepanov, "Nasha Epokha i Manevry Ideologov Imperialisma," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya,* April 1972, p. 85.

[2] TASS report of *Pravda* article, August 9, 1971.

[3] Speech reported in *The Times* (London), March 21, 1972.

SINO-AMERICAN COLLUSION IN ASIA

The specter of Sino-U.S. collusion in Asia, which has long been a prominent theme of Soviet propaganda, has now taken on an air of unpleasant reality for Moscow. We can be fairly certain that the attention Moscow has lavished on the Asian implications of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations reflects an understanding that it is in Asia that the United States has tampered with the existing state of the superpower balance. The manner in which the Soviets have discussed those implications also provides us with a reasonably coherent view of what they believe to be the significance of the Peking talks. On the one hand they insist that the collusion implicit in the Sino-U.S. rapprochement presents a threat to the independence of the Asian states; on the other, they describe the accommodation of U.S. and Chinese interests in Asia as part of a wider scheme directed against the USSR. The structure of the argument is revealing; in essence, the Kremlin believes that Asia is being used as a pawn in the design by which the United States calls China into a new configuration "to redress the balance of the old."

The threat to Asia is, perhaps, the Soviets' most favored image. In support of it they argue that the independence struggle of Bangladesh and the heroic efforts of the Vietnamese people were both sacrificed on the altar of Sino-U.S. accommodation. Moreover, these are but the two most overt symptoms of a pervasive and nefarious campaign against the peoples of Asia. Soviet media have therefore constantly returned to the theme of a "joint division of Asia into spheres of influence," of "secret agreements" and of collusion "spearheaded against the independent and peaceloving states."

The concrete form this collusion will take has been a matter of debate, but it is possible to distinguish two recurring versions of the scenario. One is that in return for a recognition of China's position within Asia, China has facilitated the U.S. withdrawal from the Viet Nam war. A Soviet article tracing the evolution of Sino-American relations within the context of the Viet Nam war cited both "disengagement" by America and "Vietnamization" as based on the recognition of a Chinese sphere of influence and as "necessary preconditions for the normalization of American-Chinese relations."[4] Disengagement would produce a situation in which the two powers could encircle the Soviet Union from "positions of strength," the basic rationale of the strategy being that the Chinese leaders "offer peaceful coexistence with the USA in return for a switch in the center of gravity in US aggressive policy from Asia to Europe."[5]

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[4] Yu. Yukhananov, "Voyna vo V'etname i Evolutsiya Amerikano-Kitayskikh otnosheniy," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodniye Otnosheniya,* January 1972, p. 50.

The central theme of the second version is that an American and a Chinese presence in Asia need not be mutually exclusive. On this count much publicity is given to statements in both countries that "American and Chinese influence in Asia complement each other."[6] As in the above account, the American withdrawal from Viet Nam was part of the deal but in this case there will be no total U.S. withdrawal from the continent, for it is in Asia that the United States and China most feel the need for a joint counterpoise to Soviet influence; therefore, whereas "China used to demand United States withdrawal from Asia, now it wants the United States to play a role in the area."[7] In this connection much mileage has been derived from the reported conversation between Chou and Congressmen Boggs and Ford in which the Chinese Premier is alleged to have intimated that China "did not desire the USA to leave the Pacific and considered such a withdrawal premature."[8]

Whichever theory has substance in Soviet thinking, the net outcome is the same: both are directed against the present position of the Soviet Union in the international arena. This is clearly brought out by another constant theme in Soviet comment on the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. Moscow is anxious that it should not be interpreted as a sudden or unexpected development but rather as the culmination of a process of evolution which had its real beginnings with the Sino-Soviet rift and, hence, in the splitting tactics of the Peking leadership. The process was later given a boost by the border fighting between the USSR and China in 1969. These open hostilities acted as a signal to the United States that China was "on the market" at a mutually agreeable price. "When the Washington strategists received sufficient proof that the Maoists had departed from the common political line of the socialist states," Moscow Radio observed on November 30, 1971, "only then did the White House decide to review its doctrine with relation to Peking."

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[5] V. Pavlov, "Europe in Peking's Plans," *International Affairs* (Moscow), March 1972, p. 17.

[6] Moscow Radio. February 24, 1972.

[7] *Ibid.*, February 28, 1972.

[8] E.g., V. Rybakov, "Behind the Scenes of Peking's Peace Strategy," *International Affairs*, November 1972, p. 21.

UNILATERAL VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF THE GAME BY THE UNITED STATES

For the purposes of this section an episode that casts interesting light on Soviet perceptions of the significance of changing great-power relationships is analyzed at a fairly high level of abstraction. The episode in question is the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, the first international event of any consequence to reflect the complex transmutations the global system was experiencing. We may take as our starting point an observation made in an article published in an American journal in the middle of 1971: "the Soviet-American side of the triangle, unlike the other two sides, already rests upon firm foundations of mutual understanding. . . . They have developed a habit of tacit cooperation in relation to China on the Indian subcontinent."[9] This observation was perfectly correct at the time. If we look back at the military aid that flowed from both the United States and the USSR to India in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian war, we can see the real beginnings of this process.[10] The classic demonstration of the tacit understanding was provided in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when both powers acted conjointly through the UN to obtain a cease-fire before China should have an opportunity to exploit the situation. Both states were full of praise for the "constructive" role played by the other during the crisis.

Why was this scene not re-enacted during the Indo-Pakistan confrontation of 1971? According to the Soviet Union, there can be no dispute about the answer. As one commentator remarked, "the U.S. acted at the time of the Hindustan conflict guided above all by a striving not to frighten off its future partners in the Peking negotiations."[11] In practice, this signified that Washington had taken it upon itself to violate unilaterally the "tacit understanding" that had underwritten Soviet and U.S. policies in the area over the last few years.

[9] Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1971, p. 670.

[10] The Soviet Union was not averse to the United States sending arms to India. It feared only that publicizing of the fact might make it difficult to go ahead with the MIG deal recently concluded between the USSR and India. Both India and the United States were apparently sympathetic to Soviet embarrassment. See J. K. Galbraith, *Ambassador's Journal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), entry for November 5, 1962: "Under instructions from the Ministry of Defence, the papers are playing down the news of the arms lift. This, I believe, is in response to a Russian request."

[11] Stepanov, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

We are, thus, faced with a central paradox: what the Soviet Union considered to be an adverse change in the rules of the game was immediately followed by a dramatic shift in the balance of influence in South Asia in favor of the USSR. Moreover, this windfall came about not only in spite of, but also because of, the breach of existing codes. The incipient Sino-American rapprochement, and the violation of the rules this implied, resulted in a situation in which both the United States and the Soviet Union were free to adopt a virtually "no holds barred" policy. Strangely, the U.S. decision that greater constraints should be placed on the Soviet Union in Asia by co-opting China into the system brought about a state of affairs permitting the USSR a freer hand in 1971 than she had in 1965 when she cooperated with the United States within the framework of an established code of conduct.

This writer, therefore, strongly inclines to the view that if Washington had acted more "correctly" in 1971 – if it had adopted a quasi-neutral role as in 1965 and if Dr. Kissinger had not chosen this moment to visit Peking from Pakistan – the Soviet Union might have been constrained to pressure India into accepting a somewhat lesser victory than the total one actually achieved. Looked at in this perspective, the Indo-Soviet treaty and the Soviet vetoes in the UN, whatever else they signified, were in part a gesture to the United States indicating that superpower codes are not to be tampered with lightly.

COMPLICATION OF THE GLOBAL STRUCTURE TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE USSR

Article 11 of the document on the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reads as follows: "The USSR and the U.S.A. make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs." When Secretary Brezhnev signed this in May 1972 on behalf of the Soviet Union, he was being less than completely honest. (So, of course, was President Nixon.) It is precisely because the Nixon-Kissinger doctrine presents a challenge to the essential bipolarity of the global balance that Soviet leaders have taken such offense at American maneuvers. This clearly emerges from Soviet writings in the last year or so. Following the announcement of President Nixon's proposed visit to Peking, for example, Arbatov's *Pravda* article, which was given great prominence by Soviet radio stations, carried the insistent reminder that "there are quite a few people in the USA who understand very well that much depends on the direction and course of the development of relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, both for the peoples of the two countries and for the entire international situation." In this connection, Arbatov continues, many Americans are asking "the price which might have to be paid for an understanding with China. They are asking how this understanding will influence Soviet-U.S. relations, and the prospects for a limitation of the arms race and a general détente in the world."[12] The line that the fundamental basis of world order should still be described in terms of the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the United States was given an even more forthright expression in a Soviet journal issued at the time of the Nixon visit to Peking:

> The implementation of men's desire for peace and progress is a truly noble task and is naturally dependent on the joint efforts of all peoples, of all states whether big or small. However, one must not fail to reckon with the importance for the international situation of the state of the relations between the Soviet Union and the US, the two states with the greatest economic and military might, particularly since the various aspects of relations between the USSR and the USA are closely interwoven with international issues which affect the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples but also of other nations.[13]

For the Soviets, it is a challenge to this simple picture that some new stage of the international system is in the process of emergence. And because the United States bears the major responsibility for ushering in this "brave new world" they are especially bitter. Soviet leaders are heavily conscious of the danger this new scheme presents to the mainstream process of détente, and of the essentially anti-Soviet reasons that have inspired the United States to "complicate" the structure by giving China an increased role in the system. Thus, on learning of Nixon's proposed visit to China, the main thrust of Soviet media appeared to be a frantic search for reassurance from Washington that the "complication" would not be taken to the point where the essential primacy of the Soviet-U.S. dialogue would be lost sight of. It is from this perspective that we are to understand *Pravda's* admonition, via Arbatov:

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[12] See note 2, *supra.*

[13] B. Svetlov, "USSR-USA: Possibilities and Realities," *International Affairs,* February 1972, p. 15.

> A dialogue on a broad range of problems has long been under way between the USA and the USSR. This dialogue is very important, but not easy, both because of the complexity of the problems and because, above all, confidence is needed for their successful solution. There can be no stronger blow at confidence than unscrupulous diplomatic maneuvers, backstage intrigues and ambiguities.[14]

Given the Soviets' strong preference for the kind of system that characterized international life in the 1960's, the vehemence of their attack on the Chinese doctrine of the dominance of the two superpowers becomes readily comprehensible. There can be no doubt that in a period when Moscow is trying to realize major political programs in Europe and Asia, it is sensitive to charges that in these settlements only superpower interests will be respected. At the same time, as a result of the long conditioning of the bipolar Cold War, the Kremlin feels unable to discard the notion that there are some decisions so vital that they must remain in the hands of the two dominant states.

As a consequence of these antagonistic principles, Soviet theoreticians have found themselves in an unenviable position. At the purely doctrinal level their arguments are compatible. Thus, when they attack the concept of a multipolar international system, they do so with regard to the fundamental ideological bipolarity — the struggle between two different socio-economic systems — which is supposedly inherent in the present world situation. Likewise, when they abuse the Chinese doctrine of the two superpowers, they base their recriminations on the essentially non-class basis of the Chinese position. As one ideologue maintained,

> the logical nature of the struggle of the "small and medium-sized countries" against the "super-powers" as preached by the Peking leaders proceeds from the anti-Marxist propositions of Mao Tse-tung concerning the primacy of national contradictions over class contradictions. It follows from this assertion that in today's world the motive force of social development is allegedly not the class struggle but the international struggle.[15]

At this level, the two positions may be reconciled. However, at the level of practical policy there is more than a trace of suspicion that the bipolar "superpower" doctrine Moscow attacks in theory forms, in practice, the basis of Soviet misgivings about the emerging multipolar system.

Perhaps the most revealing Soviet statement on multipolarity was provided by L. Stepanov in his article in *Mirovaya Ekonomika*

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[14] Arbatov, *op. cit.*

[15] G. Kadymov, *Krasnaya Zvezda,* December 14, 1971.

i Mezhdunarodnŭye Otnosheniya.[16] He sees the socio-economic crisis in the United States and the political decline of America as "the main motive force of the aspiration for such a reconstruction of the world, in which the competition of two social systems gives way to the polycentric or multipolar combination of state forces." Is it only because recent developments indicate a tampering with the ideological bipolarity of the world that Soviet commentators have displayed such open antagonism to the idea of multipolarity? Probably not. The Stepanov article goes on to describe as utopian any attempt to reconstruct the world while ignoring the basic laws of the epoch. If this is the case, there would be little cause for Soviet concern. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that when the Soviets denounce any attempt to modify the bipolar ideological confrontation they are in fact attacking a much more insidious development — a multipolar configuration of state entities, each impinging to an increasing degree on the bipolar global balance.

There are two reasons for my conclusion. It is not immediately obvious why a "multipolar combination of state forces" should in any way obscure the dichotomy between the socialist and the imperialist systems. I would have thought this fundamental contradiction was as valid in the context of the multipolar interwar (1919-1939) system as in the context of the bipolar Cold War structure. If this is the case, and if the events to which the Soviet Union takes exception represent no more than a partial reversion to this kind of system, we are left with the conclusion that it is this kind of system, rather than its doctrinal implications, to which the USSR objects.

Again, looking at a particular aspect of the question, we find Stepanov telling us that "the rapprochement between Washington and Peking breathed new life into the doctrines of multipolarity and evoked a new flood of enthusiasm in their adherents."[17] As a statement of fact this is unexceptional, but as an implicit complaint it is somewhat wide of the mark. If the USSR's objection is to the blurring of the divisions between the two social systems, how could it object to the Sino-U.S. rapprochement? Since Peking had previously all but gone over to the imperialist camp in any case (so the Soviets maintain), the rapprochement should be viewed as no more than a formalization of an existing situation and hence as a clarification rather than a blurring of the ideological demarcations. However, as a complaint against increasing international political pluralism, both symbolized and precipitated by the rapprochement, Stepanov's observation becomes quite intelligible: China may be the thin end of the Japanese and West European wedges.

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[16] Stepanov, *op. cit.*
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

Soviet suspicion of the multipolar world has not abated in the past year. One of its many recent expressions is found in the February 1973 issue of the journal *International Affairs*:

> . . . traditional views on the alignment of forces in the world arena are undergoing changes. "Multipolar" models are being substituted for "bipolar" ones. Various geometrical figures are being constructed: the USA-USSR-PRC triangle, the USA-USSR-PRC-Japan quadrangle and the USA-USSR-PRC-Japan-Western Europe pentagon. These and similar constructions divorced from the actual struggle between the two social systems in the world arena are meant by bourgeois theorists to provide the USA with new opportunities to influence the "interaction of many independent power fields."[18]

This leads us to one final point in this section. The reluctance with which the Soviet Union views the prospect of China playing a wider role in world affairs has found consistent expression in attacks on the PRC's great-power ambitions, on its attempts to become the "world's third superpower." One Soviet writer charged that

> Peking's key strategic concept is based on the idea of using all kinds of political combinations and bloc arrangements, above all with the imperialist circles, to convert China into a special and independent center of power and pole of attraction capable of exerting a considerable, if not a decisive, influence on the development of the international situation.[19]

Amid the name-calling surrounding the Nixon visit to Peking, China came in for a large measure of abuse for that very reason.

And yet, looking at the matter more closely, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the main thrust of Moscow's irritation has been directed against Washington rather than Peking. We can even deduce why this should have been so, for while Peking's ambitions and anti-Soviet animus have been to a large extent taken for granted in the USSR, the U.S. infringement of the bipolar rules is the novel element in the present situation. From the Soviet angle, Peking had no choice but to move toward Washington; Washington had two strings to its bow and seemingly preferred the Chinese option to the furtherance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. That Washington might have had sensible reasons for doing so is not considered to be a redeeming feature in Soviet eyes.

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[18] A. Kunina, "A Critique of Bourgeois Theories of the Development of International Relations," p. 66.

[19] N. Kapchenko, "Maoism's Foreign Policy Platform," *International Affairs*, February 1972, p. 37.

CONCLUSION

Powerful states seldom base their national policies on pique, and the Soviet Union is unlikely to prove an exception to this rule. When the dust has fully settled in the three capitals the USSR, although it may be no more enamored of the new system than before, will almost certainly appreciate the necessity of responding in a positive manner. One consideration is likely to remain supreme: by remaining obdurate and refusing to adapt to the new rules, Moscow can only aggravate those elements in the *new situation it likes least and drive the United States and China* into even more far-reaching commitments.

Thus if any inflexible two-against-one alignment is to be avoided, an almost prima facie case argues that developments to date must issue in some sort of normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China, however implausible this seems at the moment. If the Soviet Union must play the game of tripolarity (in preparation for the future game of multipolarity), it cannot afford to do so with one hand tied behind its back. Both China and the USSR have a mutual interest in maintaining their doctrinal diatribes at a pitch sufficiently low to permit the emergence of a working relationship with each other that would reduce the current asymmetry in relations among the three powers.

In light of grudging Soviet acceptance of an emerging tripolar system and of the importance this lends to Sino-Soviet relations, it is possible to understand Brezhnev's reference to China in his Trade Union speech of March 1972: "Official Chinese representatives tell us that relations between the USSR and the PRC should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Well, if the people in Peking are not prepared for more in relations with a socialist state, we are ready to develop Soviet-Chinese relations on this basis too."[20] We can draw two conclusions from these remarks. The first is that the superficially idyllic days of Sino-Soviet "fraternal cooperation" have passed forever into history. Secondly, however, we may expect that in their relations with each other, China and the Soviet Union will develop the technique of differentiating between their global postures and their subsystemic disputes which is a salient characteristic of current superpower relations. The fundamental weakness of Sino-Soviet relations has been that both states have constantly transformed their subsystemic disputes into global issues: in this sense Soviet leaders appreciate that the border fighting with China in 1969 was the immediate catalyst of the present Sino-American dialogue.

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[20] Reported in *The Times* (London), March 21, 1972.

Paradoxically, therefore, a possible outcome of America's infringement of some of the conventions she shared with the Soviet Union may be the recognition of a new set of conventions within the context of Sino-Soviet relations. As Arbatov pointed out in the *Pravda* article cited above, "the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union also include some whose examination demands the participation of all the Big Powers, including the PRC. The PRC's positive participation in discussing and solving these international problems would be of serious importance."

Nevertheless, it still remains true that the Soviet Union would like to retain a special bilateral relationship with the United States. Certainly this was indicated in the fact that the Nixon visit to Moscow in May 1972 went ahead as scheduled and the SALT agreement was signed despite the U.S. mining of Haiphong harbor. That this course of action was not achieved without some conflict in the ranks of the Soviet leadership, however, is revealed in an article in *New Times*, reporting on the May 19, 1972 Plenum of the Central Committee, which attacked those who favored the adoption of a hard line toward America in response to the Peking talks and the mining of Haiphong. The writer, Vadim Zaglyadin, maintained that while it was difficult to find anyone who openly opposed the principle of peaceful coexistence,

> there are nonetheless people who, though declaring themselves favorable to its application, put the principle in question by some means or another. Thus it is sometimes claimed that, in reply to such or such an imperialist move, socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, should have one unique reaction: to harden their attitude.

Zaglyadin dismisses this point of view on grounds that

> the experience of past years has shown beyond a shadow of doubt that any tendency to be guided by considerations of the moment (for emotional or other reasons), to confine oneself only to the interests of the present day while ignoring the long-term perspectives, has never led to anything good.[21]

At least one Western commentator has seen in this public castigation of those who opposed the Nixon visit a partial explanation for the removal of Pyotr Shelest from his position as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee.[22]

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[21] *New Times*, No. 22, May 1972, p. 5.

Relations among the three powers are still in uneasy equilibrium. The smoothness of the Kissinger talks in Peking in February 1973 and the exchange of quasi-diplomatic missions between Washington and Peking suggest that the process of normalization between these two countries will continue to make headway. Meanwhile, the next round of SALT talks, the prospect of a European security conference and developments in Soviet-U.S. trade have served to reinforce the prominence of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Perhaps the Soviet Union need not be unduly distressed by the course of events. It would appear that a U.S. recognition of the special status of bilateral U.S.-USSR dialogues on certain mainstream issues is the promise Moscow has evoked from Washington in return for Soviet compliance in the Kissinger system. And this suggests that on such issues as European security and Soviet-U.S. trade, the Soviet Union will be looking for a "constructive" attitude on the part of the United States. Soviet responsiveness to the U.S. vision of the future international system will hinge, in large measure, on how cooperative the U.S. attitude is on such important issues.

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[22] Alain Jacob, *The Times* (London), June 15, 1972.

CHANGING SOVIET POLICIES AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

by Robert C. Horn

DURING the late 1950's and the early 1960's Southeast Asia was the scene of a rivalry of considerable importance between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. Their striving for influence in the area may well have begun as early as the Asian-African conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, when uninvited Moscow had to watch helplessly from the sidelines as Peking's Chou En-lai seemed to score great successes. Thereafter, into the 1960's, the two communist competitors focused their attention primarily on Indonesia as the most significant (considering strategic location and potential power) and most anti-colonial state in the region, and to a lesser extent on Burma and the states of Indochina.

This direct competition endured until the anti-communist, anti-Chinese aftermath of Indonesia's *Gestapu* of October 1, 1965. Destruction of the powerful, CPR-aligned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the political demise of President Sukarno meant a radical alteration of the country's foreign policy and, particularly, an abrogation of the "Djakarta-Peking axis." Moscow's response to this Chinese setback was a more active and diversified Southeast Asian policy. No longer were relations with Malaysia and Singapore precluded because of Soviet identification (however reluctant and equivocal) with Sukarno's *konfrontasi.* Thailand and the Philippines would also come to receive increased Soviet attention, although the post-Khrushchev leadership took initiatives with greater caution and lessened optimism than its predecessor.[1] Meanwhile, Peking began to turn away from regional and other foreign policy concerns in favor of the inward focus of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Until approximately 1969, competition between the USSR and the CPR slackened as the latter fixed its international attention more narrowly on communist-led insurrections and the spread of Mao Tsetung Thought. Since early 1969, however, with China's gradual reemergence in world politics accompanied by more traditional forms of behavior, it has been renewed.

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*This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual conference of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, held in Monterey, California, June 15-17, 1972.

The study's focus is on Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. The complexity and relatively distinct character of the situation in Indochina makes that area and Sino-Soviet policies there deserving of separate and expanded treatment. Also largely ignored in the interest of space and clarity are the actions of the United States and Japan. The author is not implying, by this exclusion, that great-power competition in Southeast Asia is limited to the USSR and the CPR.

[1] R. A. Yellon provides an excellent discussion of changing Soviet policies in the Third World in his paper, "Shifts in Soviet Policies Toward Developing Areas 1964-1968," in W. Raymond Duncan, editor, *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries* (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), pp. 225-286.

This study's primary purpose is to analyze these changing Soviet and Chinese policies and the resurgent competition between the two powers in Southeast Asia from 1965 through mid-1972, basing the analysis on a prior consideration of Moscow's goals in the area and the intertwining of national and regional (endogenous) and international (exogenous) determinants that have led to the changes. The major theme is that Moscow's policies, successes and failures from the late 1950's through 1965 were determined largely by the role of China, and that this has continued to be the case, if less directly, since 1965. Moreover, since 1969 the Soviet-Chinese competition has intensified, and "escalation" appears to be the likely prognosis.

SOVIET GOALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Given the aggregate of Soviet goals in world politics, Southeast Asia looms as a significant if not "vital" arena for Soviet foreign policy. Since the USSR considers itself a major world power as well as an Asian one, at minimum the Soviets expect other Asian powers to recognize those facts and grant them a substantial voice in the region's affairs. More specifically, it would seem that Moscow seeks the "containment" of China. From the Soviet perspective, China aspires to political and ideological leadership in Southeast Asia (and elsewhere). Checking her in this area where the Chinese influence is historic as well as potential is seen by Moscow as a crucial effort. The Soviets also seek to reduce the American influence, for as part of the global struggle against capitalism the anti-American effort must be continued everywhere, including Southeast Asia — although in this case the United States is probably viewed as much less of a threat than the CPR. Another goal is most likely the limitation of growing Japanese influence; Soviet concern has mounted with respect to Japanese economic involvement in Southeast Asia. The rapidly expanded Soviet navy, built up in the first place because of broadening Soviet interests, has given Moscow further incentive to obtain bases, or at least docking and repair facilities in the region, as well as free access through such bodies of water as the Straits of Malacca. Finally, the Soviets have economic interests in Southeast Asia and seek increased opportunities for trade and markets. Along with the basic effort to expand the Soviet "presence" regionally as befits a superpower and an Asian power, it is some "mix" of these five goals that has conditioned Soviet behavior in Southeast Asia since 1965.

New Incentives for Soviet and Chinese Policy

A large number of far-reaching developments have combined to produce the vastly changed and still changing picture of Soviet and Chinese involvement in Southeast Asia. The Soviet leadership change in 1964 and the substantial expansion of the Soviet navy during the 1960's are conspicuous on the Soviet "level," but shifts have also occurred on other levels: within the Southeast Asian states, regionally, and in international politics. Taken together, these interrelated modifications have created a radically new environment for Southeast Asians and for the Soviet Union and other powers.

Among the changes *within* the states of the region, the abrupt turn in Indonesia in 1965-1966 was undoubtedly the most significant, standing as a benchmark in virtually any study of Southeast Asia. *Gestapu* and its aftermath drastically transformed the international relations of the area. While it hardly led to a warm embrace between Moscow and Djakarta, it allowed the Soviets to restore relations with Indonesia somewhat and it destroyed what had been thought to be a brilliant success of Chinese foreign policy. Furthermore, it facilitated a renewed role in Indonesia for the United States and led to the end of Sukarno's "confrontation" against Malaysia, thus removing a destabilizing factor and encouraging the Southeast Asian countries to investigate regional cooperation again.

The new atmosphere of decreased tension also afforded the countries in the area the opportunity to consider greater independence from outside powers and this became, in varying degrees, a noticeable aspect of their internal and foreign politics. A parallel development was the increasing assertion of nationalism in many of the region's states. While fueled by changing U.S. policies, this trend had significant "indigenous" and "natural" roots as well. Additionally, in some quarters there was a renewed awareness that the Peking regime was a constant and real factor with which a *modus vivendi* had to be reached.

On the *regional* level, perhaps the most significant shift was the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine by the U.S. President while in Guam in mid-1969. No matter how unclear its precise meaning, the Nixon Doctrine, when coupled with the beginnings of American withdrawal from Indochina, has seemed to augur a greatly reduced American presence in the region. This has had an impact on all area states, not only those closely allied to the United States. In addition, the rapidly expanding Japanese economic footholds have fostered changes, particularly in trade, aid and investment patterns. While the declining American role is in the interests of the Soviet Union and China, neither country's leaders wish to see the resulting "vacuum" filled by Japan.

There have also been external changes of such overwhelming significance in *world* politics that Southeast Asia could hardly escape their impact. The CPR's withdrawal inward and initial isolation after the Indonesian debacle left the USSR with an open field and greater opportunities to advance its interests. Subsequently, the turmoil and excesses of the Cultural Revolution in China between 1966 and 1968 increased the insecurity of many of Peking's neighbors and inclined them to search more actively for security-granting relationships with outside powers. Beginning in 1969, however, this picture began to change. In March of that year, the Soviets and Chinese engaged in a bloody clash along their border. Tensions between the two escalated to a dangerous high, triggering fear of a full-scale war and/or a Soviet pre-emptive nuclear strike. Moreover, Chinese apprehensions were heightened not only by the threatening Soviet buildup along their mutual border during 1968 but by the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, which was quickly justified by the menacing Brezhnev Doctrine of "limited sovereignty" with its potentially broad application to *any* socialist state.

All of this provided a substantial impetus to China's reappearance in international politics. What seemed gradually to materialize was a more moderate and more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy, somewhat less identified with militant ideology and the spread of violent revolution and more interested in traditional state-to-state relations.[2] The anti-Soviet emotionalism of the

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[2] For a stimulating discussion of "China's New Diplomacy" by a number of experts, see ***Problems of Communism***, November-December 1971, pp. 1-32 (Part I) and January-February 1972, pp. 48-70 (Part II).

Cultural Revolution and the border clashes encouraged the Soviets at the same time to step up efforts to "contain" China. Peking's emergence from isolation in 1969 seemed only to give Moscow added incentive to try to limit the CPR's influence. Indications of a transformation in Sino-American relations, which gained plausibility when Richard Nixon came to office in the United States in early 1969, further convinced the Soviets of the necessity of consolidating their position vis-à-vis both Peking and Washington and of seeking strenuously to limit the influence of both powers. This accelerated Soviet involvement was to find fruition dramatically in South Asia (India), but Southeast Asia was also to be an important arena for new Soviet initiatives.

Soviet and Chinese Policies Since 1965

The Southeast Asian states exhibit great diversity in their political and economic systems, levels of economic development, relations with each other and relations with external powers. For this reason, the most promising analytical path would seem to be to examine each "target" country individually in light of the themes we are exploring: changing Soviet policies, the nature of Sino-Soviet competition, and the factors that have caused these policy changes and made for different Soviet approaches to different countries. A certain pattern emerges in dealing separately with each state. Indonesia and Burma stand out as the parameters of Soviet and Chinese policies and accomplishments: they are the respective arenas in which Moscow and Peking have been investing perhaps their most significant efforts while confronted with relatively little competition from the other. Malaysia and Singapore (treated together since they share so many of the aspects under consideration) rank lower than Indonesia and Burma in emphasis given by the two powers, but both Moscow and Peking are actively involved. These two states can be analyzed as the arenas of the most direct competition. Lastly, the Philippines and Thailand will be seen as arenas of the least competition and movement.

Indonesia[3]

Indonesia was the Southeast Asian state in which Moscow had invested most heavily prior to 1965. By the time of the *Gestapu* in the fall of that year, however, the Soviet role was slight. The bloody aftermath of the abortive coup in many ways was beneficial to the USSR: during 1966 the pro-Chinese Sukarno and PKI lost power and the new military regime ended Djakarta's close relationship with Peking, rejoined the United Nations, and stopped the costly "confrontation" with Malaysia. Nevertheless, the encouragement afforded the Soviets was greatly tempered by the excesses against the PKI — the arrest, imprisonment and execution of its members and the efforts to extirpate communism and Marxism-Leninism as a whole from Indonesia — and by the increasingly close relations between Indonesia and the West, particularly the United States.

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[3] Soviet policy toward Indonesia between 1965 and late 1970 is covered in detail in Robert C. Horn, "Soviet-Indonesian Relations Since 1965," *Survey*, Winter 1971, pp. 216-232.

Consequently, Moscow's relations with Djakarta in the immediate post-*Gestapu* years were correct but somewhat cool, especially in contrast to the enthusiasm of the Khrushchev period. Soviet protestations about the treatment of Indonesian "progressives" (communists) were issued as one would expect of a claimant to leadership of the international communist movement. Yet these contained little conviction, were not directed against the new military regime, and were accompanied by no warnings or threats. A goodly amount of Moscow's commentary was even devoted to criticism of the PKI's role in the *Gestapu* and of Chinese influence on the party.[4] On the whole, the Soviets kept their attention on Indonesia's changing foreign policy, extending praise for the break with Peking and Chinese policy but warning against it losing its independence again to Western "neo-colonialism." Moscow's statements illustrated concern about Djakarta's economic relations with the West, its membership in ASEAN and that organization's possible military role, and the possibility of Indonesia changing its position and supporting the United States in Viet Nam.

In short, although not allowing the anti-PKI "terror" in Indonesia to torpedo relations, the Kremlin's new leaders approached Indonesia cautiously, hardly anxious to be effusive toward the country while it seemed to be exchanging a pro-Peking stance for a pro-Washington one. As Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik charged quite accurately, the Soviets adopted a "hesitant wait-and-see attitude toward Indonesia."[5] It was only after a number of delays and protracted bargaining, for example — in a most un-Khrushchev-like manner — that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime agreed to reschedule Indonesia's substantial debt (some $785 million) in November 1966. Most of the economic projects under Soviet auspices were halted shortly after the *Gestapu,* some only postponed but others canceled. New economic credits were not forthcoming, and for spare parts for previously delivered military matériel the Soviets required cash.

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[4] For example, *Pravda*, October 26, 1965, blamed the PKI and Peking for the consequences by reminding them that "political adventurism, putschism, and sectarianism are alien to Marxism-Leninism." Radio Moscow, in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, August 6, 1967, was more explicit: "Mao Tse-tung's band" had "made the Indonesian Communist Party victim of its adventurist policy."

In mid-1968 relations between the USSR and Indonesia took a turn for the worse. Apparently regarding as a failure their "compromise" attempt to foster closer relations while slowing down Djakarta's internal anti-communism and external pro-West sentiments, Soviet leaders adopted a harder line. The Indonesian regime was for the first time referred to as "fascist" and its "unbridled terror" was denounced in harsh and threatening terms.[6]

Moscow's approach changed not only because of the lack of success of previous policies, but also because of Soviet hopes for the revival of a Moscow-oriented Communist Party in Indonesia. It had been Peking, especially after CPR-Indonesian relations were "frozen" in 1967, that had been the PKI's main defender and supporter of its renewed underground efforts. Enthusiastic reports of revolutionary struggle emanated from China through 1967 and 1968, and there were stories of Chinese-trained PKI refugees being returned to work with local guerrillas. Then, amid a series of armed clashes that took place between communist terrorists and government security forces in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan, a large-scale army offensive in East Java in late summer 1968 smashed the PKI's base there and its Politburo. At this point, while castigating Peking's "Maoist adventurism" for leading Indonesian communists into "another disaster,"[7] Moscow became active in supporting a new PKI. Violent and bitter exchanges between Moscow and Peking and pro-Moscow and pro-Peking PKI groups continued for approximately a year, and the attacks by all on the Suharto Government in Djakarta were uncompromising. On May 17, 1969, Radio Moscow broadcast — to Indonesia in the Indonesian language — the harshly-worded "program" of the "Marxist-Leninist group of the PKI." On other occasions, Moscow promised the PKI "the support of their colleagues in the Soviet Union. . . ."[8]

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[5] Radio Djakarta, October 22, 1966.

[6] See, for example, the CPSU Central Committee Statement in *New Times,* October 23, 1968, pp. 2-3.

[7] *Pravda,* September 14, 1968.

In mid-1969, however, when it appeared that Moscow had strained relations with Djakarta to no gain, Soviet policy began to shift once more, this time back in the pre-1968 direction. As long as the Soviets were not faced with Chinese competition in post-coup Indonesia, they felt they could be more detached and "cooler" with regard to the new Indonesian government and meanwhile try to gain control over what was left of the Indonesian communist movement. There was little risk that Peking would try to undercut the Kremlin by halting its denunciation of the Suharto regime and improving relations with it. But by mid-1969, the Soviets realized that the hard line toward Djakarta was not working. Their attempt to gain control over Indonesian communism had come to nothing; the Moscow-oriented PKI remained small and ineffectual. Further, the Sino-Soviet border clashes had occurred and a more pragmatic China had begun to emerge from its previous isolation to assume a more active international role. Although there were no dramatic Chinese overtures toward Djakarta, Chinese enthusiasm for the Indonesian communists had noticeably cooled by late 1968. Moscow sensed that Peking's new moderation might soon alter the equation.

Symbolic of this change in Soviet policy in 1969 was the dispatch of a new ambassador to Djakarta in August accompanied by assurances that the Soviet Union stood for noninterference in the internal affairs of other states (an obvious swipe at Peking)[9]— and in corroboration of which Moscow's idea of a new PKI was muted, although not totally ignored.[10] Also signaling changing Soviet policies was the arrival in Djakarta in September of a fifteen-man delegation to discuss another rescheduling of Indonesia's debt. Even though no agreement was signed after a month of talks — indicating that there still would be no return to the Khrushchev era of "give-aways"— Moscow's willingness to discuss the issue Indonesia had been trying to raise virtually since signing the last agreement showed that the USSR's shifting attitude might be reflected in material changes as well. Indeed, after a fruitless visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Malik in February 1970, the Soviets finally agreed in August of that year to another rescheduling with terms comparing closely to those granted by Indonesia's Western creditors.

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[8] For example, via Radio Moscow in English to South Asia, May 23, 1969. In addition, there were PKI émigrés in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during this period, leading to accusations that the Soviets were seeking to revive and control the PKI.

[9] Khrushchev had repeatedly hammered on this theme on his visit to Indonesia in 1960, at a time of strained Sino-Indonesian relations over the Overseas Chinese issue, when Peking was accused of interfering in Indonesia's domestic affairs.

[10] Indonesian accusations that the Soviets were engaged in subversion and attempts to revive the PKI continued into 1972. See, for example, A.U., "Indonesia: Reactionary Propaganda Figments," *World Marxist Review*, June 1970, pp. 91-93; *Nusantara*, June 14, 1971; *Angkatan Baru*, October 18, 1971; and *Chas*, 5th week of January, 2nd week of April, and 1st week of May, 1972.

Moscow has followed these gestures of 1969 and 1970 with gradual moves toward a resumption of economic aid and cooperation. Malik returned from Moscow in August 1970 saying that the Soviets had agreed "in principle" to extend economic aid to Indonesia — which may be the USSR's way of signifying explicit interest in a *quid pro quo,* an interest that has been characteristic of the current leadership's view of the Third World. In July 1971, Moscow and Djakarta signed an agreement to study the feasibility of resuming work on two major Soviet aid projects, the steel mill at Tjilegon (West Java) and the superphosphate plant at Tjilatjap (Central Java). In August a large technical team from the USSR arrived in Indonesia to undertake the study. Moscow was also partly responsible for the increase in trade between the two countries. Total volume was higher in 1969 and 1970 than in 1968 and Soviet imports of Indonesian rubber increased in 1970 amid claims that Soviet purchases in 1971 would be three times greater than those of 1970.[11] In May 1972 the two sides exchanged a list of export goods in an effort to increase trade.

Moscow's gradual and cautious approach has been matched by the Suharto regime's own hesitation in its dealings with the Soviet Union. Djakarta has not yet decided whether the USSR will take part in finishing the Tjilegon and/or Tjilatjap plants. In connection with military aid, Indonesian commentary has criticized Soviet training programs, spare parts supplies, and financial terms. The Chief of the Air Force Operations Command asserted in late 1970 that Indonesia would buy no more military hardware of any kind from the USSR.[12] In April 1971, when the Soviets offered Djakarta four to five million dollars worth of spare parts on credit — rather than cash only — the Chief of Staff of the Indonesian

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[11] See O. G. Roeder, "Opposites in Need," *Far Eastern Economic Review,* March 20, 1971; *New York Times,* August 25, 1971; *Asia Research Bulletin,* February 1972, p. 680.

[12] *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter cited as *FEER*), September 19, 1970, p. 4. Estimates at that time claimed that two-thirds of Indonesia's naval vessels from the USSR and 90 per cent of its aircraft were not in operation due to lack of spare parts; see *The Sun* (Singapore), August 6, 1970, and *The Sunday Times* (London), December 6, 1970.

Navy, Admiral Sudomo, rejected the offer. Shortly thereafter, General Panggabean, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, also revealed a Soviet offer of military aid, on which thus far no action has been taken.

Moscow's analyses of Indonesia's internal and external affairs after mid-1969 provided further indication of a conciliatory if still qualified Soviet "line" toward the country. Although skeptical of the July 1971 general elections and critical of the ban on communist participation in them, for example, the Kremlin's tone was moderate. Moreover, contrasting sharply with the Chinese press, which allowed the Peking-resident PKI leader, Jusuf Adjitorop, a regular forum in which he attacked the "general election farce" of the "fascist military rulers" and their "imperialist masters,"[13] Soviet commentators warmed considerably after the election, and the Soviet ambassador congratulated Golkar (the government's electoral apparatus) on its victory as a triumph for democracy and the people of Indonesia.[14] The USSR's view of Djakarta's foreign policy also softened during 1970 and 1971, the tone and content marking a return to the pre-1968 position. For example, only "certain political quarters," rather than the Suharto regime itself, were accused of "trying" to get the country "to renounce the traditional policy of non-alignment" and to avoid "normalization" with socialist countries.[15]

What heartened Moscow was the increasing discussion of the country's foreign policies within Indonesia in the latter half of 1971, spawned by changes in American economic policies in August, by the U.S. Senate's attempt to curtail foreign aid in October, and by Indonesia's positions (affirmative on the defeated U.S. resolution and an abstention on the successful Albanian one) on the votes concerning Communist China's admission to the United Nations. Indonesian complaints of subordination to the United States were enthusiastically highlighted by Moscow. The "panic" in Indonesia caused by the U.S. policy changes was "graphic evidence of Indonesia's dependence on the United States and the West in general," wrote A. Yuriev in *New Times* in December 1971:

> These developments showed that those quarters in Indonesia are right who see a serious danger in one-sided orientation of the country's foreign

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[13] A typical example is found in the NCNA (New China News Agency) release of July 4, 1971.

[14] Antara (Djakarta), July 14, 1971.

[15] I. Antonov, "Against Indonesia's National Interests," *New Times*, October 7, 1970, pp. 25-26.

> ties, in its renunciation of an independent line in foreign relations. . . .
>
> Indonesians with their deep-seated traditions of struggle for national sovereignty and dignity are naturally annoyed and embittered by the fact that the West treats the republic as a second- or third-rate country. These moods tend to erode the positions of the rather influential pro-Western group in Djakarta which is doing its utmost to prevent Indonesia from pursuing an independent policy in its economic and political relations with other countries.

Yuriev concluded:

> There is a growing awareness in Indonesian political circles that having weakened its links with the socialist and Third World countries in recent years, the republic is in danger of finding itself isolated on the world arena. . . .

Two months later, Moscow must have been pleased when the influential Djakarta daily, *Pedoman* (thought to be closely associated with Adam Malik and the Foreign Ministry), advocated "raising relations" with the USSR, especially in light of U.S. President Nixon's visit to China.[16]

A disquieting aspect of the Indonesian foreign policy discussion for the Soviets, however, was that it broached the idea of restoring relations with Peking. Although it was the CPR's entry into the UN that accelerated the discussion in the Indonesian press and softened anti-Chinese positions perceptibly, there had been signs in 1969 and 1970 of Indonesian initiatives toward Peking.[17] During 1971 Malik dealt with the Rumanians and Yugoslavs as intermediaries and talked with representatives of both countries in Indonesia and during a visit to Eastern Europe. In July, however, he revealed that the CPR had not shown the "good will" he had been anticipating and that Peking would have to stop trying to subvert the Suharto Government through support for guerrillas (especially in Kalimantan), support for Indonesian émigrés in China, and Radio Peking's daily beaming of propaganda into Indonesia.[18] Despite some increase in trade, following its suspension in 1967-1968, Indonesian Trade Minister Sumitro has continued to oppose any trade normalization with China. In Indonesian political circles and the press, calls for the restoration of relations have been mixed with criticisms of Chinese policy and questioning of the economic value of ties with China.

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[16] *Pedoman*, February 29, 1972. Perhaps in line with this, the March 9 issue of the paper revealed that President Suharto had recently formed a Technical Team for the Promotion of Bilateral Economic Relations with East European Countries. The team was to have "the task of surveying all related matters and of studying the possibility of elevating trade relations and cooperation with East European countries. . . ."

[17] See *New York Times*, May 18, 1971.

[18] Antara, July 16, 1971.

Responsibility for the non-movement in relations seems also to rest with Peking. The Chinese leadership, although less enthusiastic about the PKI and while dropping occasional hints favoring trade normalization, has been unresponsive to reported Indonesian overtures.[19] Still, enough potential exists for a Sino-Indonesian rapprochement to make Moscow wary. Behind-the-scenes Soviet diplomatic efforts to keep Indonesia from "the consequences of a return of the Chinese to Indonesia" have been reported. Undoubtedly, the Soviets have tried to use the resumption of aid as a bargaining lever in this regard. They have also sought to link the American and Chinese threats to Indonesia; Yuriev described the "developing rapprochement between Washington and Peking" as being carried out "behind the backs of the Southeast Asian countries."[20] Finally, Moscow has attempted to prevent any improvement in Sino-Indonesian relations by "exposing" the "adventurism" that Peking advocates for Indonesian communism.

While the Chinese government itself says little about the PKI, it gives implicit support to the aforementioned Adjitorop. A recent example was the publication in *Peking Review* of a statement by Adjitorop as "Chairman of the Delegation" of the "Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia" on the fifty-second anniversary of the founding of the PKI. In it Adjitorop called for the application of the Chinese revolutionary model of violent revolution to Indonesia in order to overthrow "the Suharto military-fascist regime. . . ."[21] Moscow, while still backing its own group[22] (although with far less enthusiasm than in 1968-1969), has put its greatest emphasis on the dangers inherent in Maoist prescriptions of armed struggle. The contrast between Peking-based Adjitorop's repetition of the Maoist dictum that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun" and pro-Soviet calls for the PKI to seek to build a United Front can hardly escape officials in Djakarta.

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[19] See O. G. Roeder, "Still on Ice," *FEER*, October 30, 1971. However, Golkar raised the ante when, in January 1972, it called for the return of all Indonesian communists in Peking as a condition for normalizing relations. (*Ibid.*, January 22, 1972, p. 4.) There have also been reports that Indonesia rejected a Chinese invitation to the Indonesian table tennis team. *New York Times*, August 13, 1972.

[20] A. Yuriev, "Political Trends in Indonesia," *New Times*, December 1971, p. 23.

[21] *Peking Review*, June 2, 1972, pp. 7-8. See the July 30, 1971 issue, pp. 15-16, for similar statements by Adjitorop.

[22] For Soviet and pro-Soviet positions, refer to Radio Moscow, July 9, August 24 and October 4, 1971.

Burma

In stark contrast to the Indonesian picture, the situation in Burma is one of significantly changing Chinese policies and improving Sino-Burmese relations. While it is true that Moscow's relations with Rangoon are far more positive than Peking's with Djakarta, Soviet efforts in Burma's direction have been minimal. This arena has been left primarily to the CPR and the Chinese seem to have restored a close relationship with Prime Minister Ne Win.

During China's Cultural Revolution Sino-Burmese relations plummeted. The Rangoon riots of June 1967, sparked by "Maoist provocations" charged to CPR Embassy personnel and Overseas Chinese, climaxed a growing discontent in the relationship which prior to 1965 had been extremely positive.[23] In the wake of the riots, the two countries withdrew ambassadors and in October Burma abrogated China's economic aid program and sent some 400 Chinese "technical assistants" home. Peking attacked the "fascists" running Burma for the "terror" they perpetrated and demanded repayment of "blood debts."[24] Illustrating that it was by no means allowing China an *entirely* free hand in Burma, the Soviet Union seized on the crisis to blame the "Mao Tse-tung group" for its provocation and to commend the Burmese government's "energetic measures" in restoring normal conditions.[25] Premier Kosygin is reported to have sent Ne Win a message pledging "full support and sympathy for Burma in its troubles with China" and to have sought to step into the "void" by offering the Burmese military and economic support.[26]

Peking's focus promptly turned to the Burmese Communist Party (White Flags) which had been pro-Chinese and the recipient of some Chinese assistance for most of its twenty years. In August, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a strong statement of support for

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[23] A major element in the Chinese discontent seems to have been Rangoon's silence on the American role in Viet Nam. For a detailed analysis of the 1967 events in the context of Sino-Burmese relations since the 1950's, see Melvin Gurtov, *China and Southeast Asia — The Politics of Survival* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1971), especially pp. 105-111, and Robert A. Holmes, "The Sino-Burmese Rift: A Failure for China," ORBIS, Spring 1972, pp. 211-236.

[24] See Frank N. Trager, "Burma: 1967 — A Better Ending Than Beginning," *Asian Survey*, February 1968, p. 113.

[25] *Pravda*, July 7, 1967; cited in *ibid.*, p. 113n.

[26] Peter Boog, "The People's War," *FEER*, November 16, 1967, p. 323; cited in Gurtov, *op. cit.*, p. 206n. According to Boog, "a top-level seven-man economic mission" arrived in Rangoon shortly after Kosygin's message and spent over a month there discussing "the possibility of Soviet aid to help stabilize the Burmese economy. . . ."

> the people's revolutionary armed struggle led by the BCP. We regard such support as our bounden proletarian duty. . . . It is our firm conviction that the BCP headed by Comrade Thakin Than Tun, which persists in the revolutionary line of "to win the war and seize political power," will assuredly . . . *overthrow the reactionary Ne Win Government* and win complete victory in the revolutionary war in Burma.[27]

Until October 1970, Chinese emphasis would be on the Burmese communist movement, on aiding and sheltering armed guerrillas and BCP leaders who wished to take up residence in Peking, on the China-based "Voice of the People of Burma" radio, and on attacking the "Ne Win fascist clique" – toned down to "Burmese reactionaires" after early 1969 – for policies against the CPR and against resident Chinese.[28]

In face of what the Burmese saw as an increased threat, Ne Win stepped up his security-seeking travels, especially to India and Southeast Asian states. He also visited Czechoslovakia and Rumania and concluded a trade agreement with the latter in 1969. In late 1969, when it appeared that the CPR's approach to Burma was becoming somewhat less hostile, he made a plea to Peking to restore the "cordial and friendly" relations that "formerly prevailed" between the two neighbors. In October 1970 the Chinese responded concretely to Ne Win's plea and agreed to exchange ambassadors again.

There would seem to have been several reasons for the gradual shift in Peking's policy which culminated in the diplomatic agreement. Basically, the whole nature of Chinese foreign policy was changing as the Cultural Revolution receded and as the shock of the clashes with and threats from the Soviets set in. The CPR had few friends in Southeast Asia, and Burma undoubtedly presented the least obstacles to, and was most anxious for, a normalization of relations. Moreover, the BCP had been beset by splits and may well have appeared to Peking as an increasingly less viable force.

In November 1970 the new Burmese ambassador arrived in Peking, and in March of the next year the new Chinese representative was posted to Rangoon. Then came the crowning step in the two countries' rapprochement, General Ne Win's visit to the CPR in August 1971, marked by one of the most significant commitments China has made in Southeast Asia since its involvement in Sukarno's Indonesia prior to October 1965. Ne Win and his wife were given a flattering welcome, he met with Mao and Chou En-lai, and the latter accompanied him on his trip out of Peking. Chou hailed Burma's "policy of peace and neutrality," talked of China's "good neighbor policy" toward Burma,[29] and took concrete steps to give substance to the new relationship.

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[27] Cited in Trager, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[28] See Charles Snyder, "Friends of Convenience," *FEER*, October 31, 1970, p. 7, and the *New York Times*, November 8 and 22, 1969, August 23 and 24, 1970. See also the February 1969 and February 1970 articles reviewing Burmese developments in *Asian Survey.*

According to Ne Win,[30] Chou forcefully reaffirmed China's attitude toward the Overseas Chinese community in Burma (and, by implication, throughout Southeast Asia): that Overseas Chinese "should obey the laws of the countries in which they reside" and that Peking opposed the concept of dual nationality and exploitation by Overseas Chinese capitalists and moneylenders. In light of the 1967 events, the import of this restating of Peking's policy could not go unnoticed. Chou also dropped the CPR's claims to losses suffered by Chinese nationals in the 1967 riots and offered to restore approximately $50-60 million of the Chinese economic aid program (which represented the unused portion of the original $84 million, interest-free loan). Moreover, Peking wasted little time in carrying out its pledges; a nine-man mission was in Rangoon in August and September to help to reopen the aid program.

There has still been some degree of ambivalence in Peking's policy — or perhaps it is intentionally "dual." The pro-rebel radio station has continued to operate from Chinese territory and speculation persists that Burmese communists still receive assistance in arms and training from, and in, China. Moscow has not missed the opportunity to call the Rangoon government's attention to this. On June 3, 1971, for example, Radio Moscow issued *in Burmese* a strong denunciation of the clandestine radio broadcasts from within China, which, it pointed out, call for the overthrow of Ne Win's Revolutionary Council and defame the social and economic reforms carried out by the Council. The Moscow broadcast went on to say that China had trained insurgents in Burma and to conclude that there could be no genuine normalization of relations between China and Burma because of Peking's policies.

The Soviets have also attempted to increase their stock with

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[29] See Associated Press, August 7, and Agence France Press, August 8, 1971.
[30] See Leo Goodstadt, "When in Rome," *FEER*, October 9, 1971, p. 8.

Rangoon through attacks on U Nu's campaign against Ne Win and by dispatching high-level leaders to Burma: President Podgorny visited in October 1971 and Culture Minister Furtseva in February 1972. Further, Moscow has praised Burma's draft constitution and the country's internal "progress" and foreign policy stance of "peaceful coexistence."[31] Nevertheless, the USSR's aid program seems to have dried up with the failure of the farm mechanization project it sponsored. Desperately in need of foreign loans if the "Burmese road to socialism" is to be salvaged, Rangoon still is only seeking £100,000 sterling from the Soviet Union as compared with £2.5 million and £9.4 million from the United States and Japan, respectively.[32]

As 1971 drew to a close Chinese-Burmese relations seemed to be warming even more, despite some continued Chinese commentary on the BCP.[33] In October Burma supported the CPR's admission to the United Nations, voting against the U.S. resolution to make this an "important question" and for the Albanian one to seat Peking and expel Taipei. By an agreement in early December, it opened its borders to China and resumed large-scale overland trade. At about the same time, the Burmese government announced the abolishing of the KMT (Kuomintang) force in northern Burma. For its part, Peking sent "large numbers" of civilian and military experts to Burma, including engineers to survey the possibility of building a road from northern Burma to China. Military and economic assistance was reported flowing from China by the beginning of 1972. Perhaps symbolizing this new relationship, it was Burma that Peking chose to look after the CPR's affairs in Bangladesh beginning in January.

Malaysia and Singapore

Moscow had equivocated in its support for Sukarno's anti-Malaysia campaign, so it was not surprising that the Soviets were quick to applaud the end to *konfrontasi* in 1966 and the restoration of Indonesian relations with both Malaysia and Singapore. Peking, which had enthusiastically endorsed the Indonesian effort to "crush" the Malaysian Federation beginning in 1963, had by early 1966 lost its special influence in Indonesia with the eclipse of the PKI and Sukarno, and soon withdrew into its Cultural Revolution. Thus at least until 1969, when China resumed a more active role in international politics, the USSR faced little competition from its rival in Malaysia and Singapore (as had also been the case in Indonesia and Burma). Moscow sought to take advantage of this situation with a more energetic effort than it displayed in the other two cases. But since the end of 1970 the attention paid to Malaysia and Singapore by the CPR has increased and its focus is no longer exclusively on insurgent or guerrilla efforts. The result has been direct Sino-Soviet competition in the political and economic arenas. Although this competition is still on a fairly restricted scale, it seems likely to expand substantially in the near future.

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[31] *Izvestia*, May 12, 1972.

[32] Radio Rangoon, September 24, 1971. But Ne Win continues to look to the Eastern bloc for "models," as seen in his mid-July 1972 visit to Hungary. *FEER*, July 29, 1972.

[33] See, for example, the *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), quoting Hsinhua, June 3, 1971. See also the greetings sent from the BCP to the CPC on the latter's fiftieth anniversary. (*Peking Review*, July 23, 1971, pp. 15-16.) Nevertheless, the earlier-cited Soviet radio broadcast in Burmese mentioned a softened tone in the broadcasts from China (contending that this was only "temporary" and meant to conceal China's real designs).

Singapore's expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965 enabled Moscow to initiate changes in relations with Singapore more rapidly than with Malaysia. In November 1965, in fact, the Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore led a delegation to the USSR and an agreement in principle was later reached to establish a Soviet trade mission and a TASS office in the city-state. The visit of a Soviet delegation in April 1966 resulted in a trade agreement and the establishment of the permanent Soviet mission. In the case of Malaysia, the USSR, which even during the "confrontation" had bought more natural rubber from Malaysia than from Indonesia, emerged in 1965 and 1966 as the single largest buyer of this commodity from Kuala Lumpur. In September 1966, with *konfrontasi* formally ended, the Rahman Government sent its first trade delegation to the Soviet Union.

Soviet relations with these two countries thus received their first boost when Soviet policy in the region was "freed" by Sukarno's fall and the end to the Indonesian-Malaysian clash. They gained their second major impetus in 1967 from gradually changing policies in Malaysia and Singapore, by virtue of which both states — Singapore perhaps less explicitly — indicated their desire to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The primary reasons for this evolution were that London had announced its intention of withdrawing British military forces from the area and the expanionist threat from a chaotic and "revolutionary" China seemed to be increasing. The search for security dictated new arrangements, guarantees or balances, and both governments began actively to seek them.

In April 1967 Malaysia and the USSR announced a trade agreement and an accord (in principle) to exchange diplomatic missions. Later that year the two agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level; the first Soviet ambassador arrived in Kuala Lumpur in March 1968 and Malaysia's envoy was posted to Moscow the following November. Meanwhile, trade talks accelerated in 1968 and the May visit of Deputy Prime Minister Razak, the first Malaysian government member to make an official visit to Moscow, marked a warmer relationship.[34] In the case of Singapore, trade delegations were exchanged and in August 1967 the Soviets signed a technical assistance agreement that led to work on a number of industrial enterprises. In June 1968 Lee Kuan Yew's government agreed to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR and to exchange ambassadors. Also in 1968 the two countries took the important step of forming the Soviet-Singapore Shipping Agency, which Moscow was to hail as having weakened "the control of the monopolist organization over freight transportation in this region."[35] Because of this agreement, some fifty Soviet ships were soon operating in the region, carrying Southeast Asian goods at rates substantially below those of the major trading powers.

During 1970, Malaysia and Singapore appeared to adjust their foreign policies to take account of a lessening involvement in Southeast Asia on the part of the major Western powers. The British withdrawal had been accelerated and Washington was determined to lower the U.S. posture in Asia substantially, particularly in light of President Nixon's "Guam Doctrine" of mid-1969. Moscow, on the other hand, judging by its continued efforts in Malaysia and Singapore, changing approach to Indonesia, naval expansion, and Leonid Brezhnev's June 1969 call for an Asian collective security system, intended to play a significant role in the region for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, China had emerged from its isolation, was generally toning down its revolutionary line in Asia, and was increasingly seeking to extend diplomatic contacts and its role in world politics.

Confronted with this dynamic situation when he took over for Tunku Rahman as Prime Minister in mid-1970, Tun Razak initiated some changes going beyond the Tunku's efforts to deal with these new factors. For one, he sought increased contacts and strengthened ties with the "Eastern bloc." In an effort to establish Kuala Lumpur's credentials of nonalignment, he attended the Lusaka, Zambia, nonaligned meeting and visited Rumania and Yugoslavia on the trip. He solicited a greater British and Australian commitment to Malaysia's defense. He also reversed Malaysia's policy of support for the U.S. involvement in Viet Nam and called for the withdrawal of American forces. Lastly, Razak announced Kuala Lumpur's willingness to enter into a dialogue with the Chinese People's Republic. Singapore's concern for its security and survival and about its "vulnerability" heightened throughout 1970 and 1971 as it too sought to adjust, if somewhat more slowly, to the changing power balance in Asia.

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[34] See the interview of Tun Razak in *New Times,* June 12, 1968, pp. 14-15.

[35] *Izvestia,* March 13, 1971. The reference was to the Far Eastern Freight Conference.

Improving relations with Peking, however, was a complex task. For Malaysia, there were, first of all, memories of the communist "Emergency" which was identified in the minds of many with Communist China.[36] In addition, both Malaysia and Singapore have a large Chinese population — 40 per cent in the former and a large majority in the latter — and any warming toward the CPR would have to be gradually implemented so as not to aggravate ethnic tensions in Malaysia or upset Lee Kuan Yew's striving for a separate identity from China in Singapore.[37] The scars of the racially-related, tragic May 13, 1969 riots in Malaysia contributed to making a rapid rapprochement quite difficult for the Kuala Lumpur government. Moreover, China's reputed support for the Malaysian Communist Party, a largely Chinese organization, and for communist insurgents along Malaysia's borders with Thailand and Indonesia has been a stumbling block. These insurgencies seemed to grow in 1970, the one along the Thai border proving particularly serious.[38] Nor could it be overlooked that the radio station *Suara Revolusi Malaya* ("Voice of the Malayan Revolu-

[36] See Robert O. Tilman's chapter on "Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines," in Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose and Gavin Boyd, *Asia and the International System* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1972), and Anthony Short, "Communism, Race and Politics in Malaysia," *Asian Survey*, December 1970, p. 1081.

[37] See, for example, Marvin L. Rogers, "Malaysia and Singapore: 1971 Developments," *Asian Survey*, February 1972, p. 176.

[38] Cf. Lau Teik Soon, "The Security Situation on the Malaysia-Thailand Border," *Asia Research Bulletin*, July 1971, pp. 85-87; James Morgan, "Delicate Adjustment," *FEER*, July 3, 1971, p. 16, and "Malaysia: Bracing for the Long Haul," *ibid.*, October 9, 1971, p. 18; also *Asia Research Bulletin*, October 1971, pp. 324-326. The Malaysian government's White Paper on communism in Sarawak was discussed in the March 1972 *Asia Research Bulletin*. Discussing an earlier White Paper on the situation in West Malaysia, *The Asian*, October 10-16, 1971, reported that one of its conclusions had been that *Malay* support for the illegal MCP had increased significantly.

tion") continued to broadcast from China, as stations supporting the Thai and Burmese rebels did also.

Nevertheless, Kuala Lumpur took the first substantive step toward China when it announced in the fall of 1970 that it favored the seating of the CPR in the United Nations. Although Razak continued to assert that Malaysia would not vote to oust Taiwan, the country's delegation was instructed for the first time to abstain rather than support the U.S. position on the "important question" issue. In response, the Chinese offered Malaysia $200,000 in February 1971 for aid to Malaysian flood victims, and then invited a Malaysian trade delegation to the CPR. When this group was received by Chou En-lai in May 1971, the Chinese Premier gave an unmistakable indication of Peking's rekindled interest in Southeast Asia by urging Malaysia to open diplomatic relations. Other Chinese overtures followed: lesser officials were reported to have told visiting Malaysians that the outlawed Malaysian Communist Party (MCP) and other communist rebels were not supported by China and must be "brigands,"[39] and in August the trade mission Peking sent to Kuala Lumpur signed a trade agreement beneficial to Malaysia. Although it was an "unofficial delegation," it met with Razak and delivered greetings from Chou. Moreover, the August pledge by Chou En-lai to Burma's Ne Win about Overseas Chinese was in all likelihood intended to be applicable to Malaysia and Singapore as well.

Malaysia's response has been the cautious one of seeking expanded trade relations[40] while delaying consideration of diplomatic ties. It did officially announce a "one China" position, however, and proceeded to implement this at the UN in 1971 by voting against the U.S. resolution and for the Albanian resolution — in both cases along with Singapore and Burma. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry in Kuala Lumpur issued a rather strong statement in September 1971 on the question of diplomatic relations: the obstacle to formal bilateral relations was Chinese support for the armed insurrection by the MCP. The statement went on to emphasize that relations with any country were based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, and reciprocation of good will.

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[39] *New York Times*, May 26, 1971.

[40] For figures on Malaysia's trade with the Soviet Union and the CPR (among other countries) between 1960 and 1970, see *Asia Research Bulletin*, September 1971, p. 306. A further breakdown of Malaysia-CPR trade can be found in the October 1971 issue, pp. 330-331.

Despite Peking's denials of support and Malaysian reluctance to push the issue, the "Voice of the Malayan Revolution" has continued broadcasting from within China. The CPR publishes MCP and "Voice" documents and editorials as well as commentary on "people's armed forces" along the Indonesian and Thai borders.[41] Moreover, the "Voice" plays on racial themes, accusing "the Razak clique" of "national oppression" of the Chinese in Malaysia.[42] That, of course, is a highly emotional subject, and no matter how often Peking dissociates itself from such sentiments, these activities continue to exacerbate Kuala Lumpur-Peking relations. Perhaps epitomizing the improved but still difficult relationship, Tun Razak in early May 1972 rejected a request to send an all-party delegation to China on a good will visit; nothing would be gained *at present* by such a journey, Razak said.[43]

Singapore, as mentioned, has responded more slowly to the changing CPR approach. While Lee Kuan Yew recognizes that China will become a modern, powerful and wealthy state which will pose no threat to Southeast Asia, he also argues that while Peking is still aspiring to such power, it *will* be a threat.[44] Lee was blunt in criticizing the way President Nixon changed U.S. policy and approached China. "The manner in which it [was] done," he said, "has made a lot of people question the reliability of an American guarantee."[45] Manifestly, Singapore, owing to its smaller size and greater vulnerability as well as to its predominantly Chinese population, has felt more strain than Malaysia in the face of China's re-emergence, the Sino-American rapprochement and the U.S. withdrawal, and is acutely concerned for its own security. It is Lee's view that:

> The first thing the Chinese in China want to do is to establish themselves once again as the Central Kingdom accepted by the rest of the world and especially by those who live on her periphery. Then of course she would like to have friendly fraternal satellite parties in charge in all the neighboring territories who would do what fraternal parties ought to do.

Yet, he hastens to add, China's policy is a "many-faceted policy which we can live with. There is going to be no direct armed intervention."[46]

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[41] For examples, see the following issues of *Peking Review*: June 4, 1971, pp. 16-17; June 18, 1971, pp. 12-13; July 23, 1971, pp. 17-18; March 17, 1972, pp. 17-18; May 26, 1972, p. 17.

[42] One instance was on January 5, 1972. *Peking Review's* reports of the two most recent "Voice" statements have not included comments of this type on the racial issue.

[43] *FEER*, May 20, 1972, p. 3.

[44] See Tilman, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

[45] *The Mirror* (Singapore), November 8, 1971.

In the economic sphere, there is truth in Lee's contention that Singapore's policy toward the CPR has changed only slightly compared with the change evinced by Malaysia in sending a trade delegation to China in early 1971, because Singapore's "trade missions have regularly been going to Peking."[47] Singapore-CPR trade ties were already extensive; indeed, in the late 1960's the CPR ranked in approximately sixth place as a trading partner for Singapore.[48] (The USSR has not ranked in the top twelve.) Singapore's position in supporting the admission of the CPR to the UN was perhaps best stated by the *Straits Times* on August 6, 1971: Any change in relations with the CPR depended on China's recognition or nonrecognition of Singapore. As long as China was "intractable" and committed to "inspiring and supporting political activism in the region," Singapore would not establish ties. In any event, the paper concluded, Singapore's support for China in the United Nations and commercial dealings between the two would continue.

Moscow, too, has intensified its activity in Malaysia and Singapore during the period since 1970. On the most sensitive issues, communist insurgency and racialism, the Soviets have indicated their nonsupport and nonsympathy for the MCP and toward Chinese efforts "to stir up trouble . . . by encouraging pro-Peking elements to drive a wedge between the Overseas Chinese and the Malays."[49] Perhaps the greatest Soviet emphasis is on trade and aid. Not only does Moscow have a trade agreement with both Malaysia and Singapore, but so do a number of its East European allies. It has made strenuous efforts to convince the two states of the advantages of doing more business with the USSR. The Soviets held a large-scale trade fair in Kuala Lumpur in late 1970 and a substantial machine tools exhibition in Singapore in early 1971. *Pravda* (April 13, 1971) hailed the latter as "the first opportunity . . . representatives of business circles and industrial enterprises in this part of Asia have had to become broadly familiar with products of the Soviet machine tool industry." The Soviet paper went on to applaud the growth of Soviet-Singapore trade, the increasing diversity of items besides rubber on the trading list, and the fact that it was Soviet ships that did the carrying. An agreement for ship repair and servicing facilities has also led to an increasing number of Soviet ships calling at Singapore.

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[46] From a BBC interview in London on November 2 and 5, 1971, published in *Asia Research Bulletin*, December 1971, pp. 493-494.

[47] Lee Kuan Yew, quoted in the *New York Times*, May 30, 1971.

[48] *Asia Research Bulletin*, September 1971, p. 306. Singapore also is the location for the only Bank of China in Southeast Asia. Economics has provided a concrete reason for Singapore's skepticism toward Malaysian policy changes vis-à-vis China: the agreement calling for direct trade between Kuala Lumpur and Peking cuts out Singapore as the middleman and thus costs the city-state some U.S. $33.3 million annually in lost services. See James Morgan, "Odd Man Out," *FEER*, October 30, 1971.

[49] For example, refer to Radio Moscow, March 3, and *FEER*, March 20, 1971.

On the subject of aid, Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov stated in a speech over Radio Kuala Lumpur that the USSR was ready to cooperate with Malaysia in technical projects, industrial ventures and the training of scientific and technical personnel, and was prepared to supply the country with nuclear power stations, cement factories and many other enterprises.[50]

But trade climbed slowly and Malaysia especially was unresponsive to Soviet offers of technical assistance.[51] The USSR's balance of trade with both states was heavily unfavorable. Thus, the Soviets' main efforts were to improve their own exports and develop the Southeast Asian countries as markets for Soviet goods rather than merely suppliers of raw materials. In this connection, Peking's efforts to increase its trade with Malaysia and Singapore compounded Moscow's problems. To diplomats and traders in the area it appeared that one of the main incentives for the Chinese trade mission to Malaysia in August 1971 was to deprive the USSR of a potential market.[52] Peking is at an advantage in that its trade balance with Malaysia and Singapore is favorable and thus it can appear eager to buy more goods from these two states which already afford substantial markets for Chinese exports.

Perhaps the most direct challenge the Chinese have issued to the Soviets, in the interest of better relations with Malaysia and Singapore, was their offer of ships to ply routes between Singapore/Malaysia and Europe and the Middle East. This was in response to pleas from the Southeast Asian states concerning the unfair rates and regulations imposed by the Far Eastern Freight Conference, and enabled the Chinese to catch up to the Soviets, who had made a similar offer in 1968. China first extended the offer in October 1971 and made final arrangements in the following December and January to assist local shippers to break the "monopolistic contract system" of the FEFC. The Chinese stressed that their ships did not represent an attempt to break into the local shipping market but would provide a service to Singapore and Malaysia to help them meet their external trade requirements. The material and symbolic value of this act was apparent. It remains to be seen how Peking will follow it up and how Moscow will respond to it.

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[50] Radio Kuala Lumpur, November 7, 1970. Another broadcast to the same effect took place on December 19, 1971.

[51] It is perhaps indicative of Tun Razak's desire not to offend China that he has spurned Soviet aid offers but has signed a technical assistance agreement with Rumania, the current communist "maverick." For a recent examination of Soviet failures in trade and technical assistance, see *FEER*, July 8, 1972. The Malaysians have also expressed dissatisfaction with China in the trade area, according to United Press International, May 2, 1972.

[52] See *Asia Research Bulletin*, September 1971, pp. 251-252.

The Philippines

The Philippines and Thailand have been less significant arenas of competitive Soviet and Chinese efforts. Not only does Manila not have diplomatic ties with Peking (only Rangoon has diplomatic relations with Peking; Djakarta's are in "suspension"), but it is the only Southeast Asian capital in our survey without Soviet diplomatic representation. Recent developments indicate that this may not long be the case, however. Soviet-Philippine relations have progressed some distance, and there has also been considerable movement between the CPR and the Philippines. It is likely, therefore, that competition between Moscow and Peking vis-à-vis Manila will increase.

The keynote of Philippine foreign policy, of course, has been the country's relationship with the United States. The close ties between the two, which Moscow and Peking see symbolized in Manila's membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (or Manila Pact) and assistance to the American effort in Viet Nam, have until recently prevented any forward motion in relations with the communist world. Since the beginning of the period under consideration, however, Filipino nationalism has become stronger and the effort to establish a distinct national identity more pervasive and articulated. Much of this new nationalism has been reflected in an increasing assertion of independence from the United States. The added factor of an American withdrawal from Asia, as foreshadowed in the Nixon Doctrine, has accelerated processes of self-examination and self-assertion that were already under way. As early as his State of the Nation message in January 1967, President Marcos was predicting a reduction of the U.S. military commitment in Asia. Philippine defense and foreign policy would have to "undergo a complete change," he said, particularly with regard to a "more flexible approach vis-à-vis the main powers" in Asia and "consideration of regional defense arrangements. . . ." Significantly, he also pointed to the need to view the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with an "open mind" and "the urgent need to strive toward a *modus vivendi*" with Communist China.

Further American steps toward disengagement confirmed the accuracy of Marcos' perception. While China during its Cultural Revolution largely ignored such signs of change in the Philippines' foreign policy, the Soviet Union was far more responsive. In late 1966, the first Soviet journalist had visited the Philippines and, in reporting the desire of Filipinos for closer ties and cultural and trade relations, seemed clearly to be indicating *Moscow's* hope for these developments.[53] Thereafter, Soviet-Philippine cultural exchanges increased. In April 1968, Manila went a step farther when it approved a project for establishing trade relations with the socialist countries. Nevertheless, the Philippines leadership was so cautious in its response to various Soviet gestures, which were in themselves still far from effusive, that little progress was made until the end of 1970. In November of that year, faced with an increasingly critical decline of the American financial commitment to his country, Marcos sent a three-man inspection team to the Soviet Union.[54] The purpose of the mission was "to explore Moscow's willingness to put up long-term development aid." Stories in the Philippine press quoted the Soviets as being ready to undertake loans to Manila. The head of the Southeast Asian Department of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, visiting in the Philippines at the time, asserted that the USSR was "ready to give economic assistance to the Philippines if necessary, but the issue must first be negotiated." According to one report, this official said that Moscow was fully prepared to exchange ambassadors and was merely waiting for the Philippines "to make up its mind on the question."

Obviously Philippine caution and reticence toward the socialist countries — fostered by a still-strong domestic anti-communism, international uncertainties about the communist "threat," and perhaps U.S. pressure as well — was the crucial stumbling block. Moscow's "wooing" has been evident. The Soviets have been careful to assure Manila of their noninterference in Philippine affairs and thus have been critical of the "leftist" and "adventurist" tendencies in Philippine communism and the Maoist New People's Army.[55] They have warmly received such Philippine emissaries as Alejandro Melchor, the cabinet's executive secretary, and have sent them home generally enthusiastic about Soviet sincerity, Soviet offers, and the benefits of ties with Moscow. Melchor, for example, returned strongly recommending the establishment of diplomatic as well as trade relations.

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[53] *Izvestia*, November 20 and December 22, 1966, and January 29, 1967, cited in Yellon, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

[54] See Bernardino Ronquillo, "Star in the East," *FEER*, December 26, 1970, p. 38.

As Marcos began to acknowledge that ties with the Soviet Union were "only a matter of time" and in the "national interests" (especially in order to diversify trade), and that, as an "independent country," the Philippines could not ignore "the sixth of the world which is Socialist," Soviet emissaries to Manila reiterated that development loans to the Philippines would be forthcoming as soon as Marcos would request them.[56] Moscow continued to advertise that trade ties with the USSR would enable the Philippines to loosen the "iron grip of the foreign monopolies." Unless Manila sought economic cooperation with the USSR so as to promote its national independence and economic development, wrote a Soviet official from the Philippine capital, it might only exchange U.S. economic (and therefore political) domination for that of the Japanese.[57] Yet, strong arguments persisted concerning the doubtful economic benefits of trade with the Soviet bloc, warning that the Philippines could not afford to give "communism an entering wedge" and hope to avoid Soviet pressures.[58]

China's "approach" to the Philippines presents a complex picture. The initial area of Chinese interest, and this was not until mid-1970, was the Maoist-style New People's Army (NPA). This guerrilla organization, the military arm of the re-established and pro-Peking Communist Party (CPP), was founded in March 1969. It has since become an object of both Philippine and Chinese attention. Peking has not only given a forum to the CPP and the NPA, but has endorsed the efforts of both organizations amid assertions that "the present situation in the Philippine revolutionary armed struggle is excellent."[59] Thus, it is surprising that the Philippines has followed up President Marcos' call for an understanding with China by taking a few steps toward trade and diplomatic ties, however minor and nongovernmental. Philippine business groups sent an exploratory trade mission to Canton and Peking in May and June 1971. Chou En-lai reportedly told them that China was eager to promote good relations with the Philippines.[60] A fruitful result of the mission seemed to come with the announcement in August of the first direct commercial transaction between the two countries, whereby the CPR would help in a small way to alleviate the rice shortage in the Philippines in return for Philippine coconut oil. Cultural exchanges also increased during 1971. Moreover, although the Philippines stuck to its "two-China" policy and supported the United States on both UN votes in October (the only Southeast Asian country under consideration to do so), Marcos has indicated that his government favored the admission of the CPR into the world organization.

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[55] See *World Marxist Review,* December 1970. Moscow did react positively, however, to reports in 1969 that Marcos was considering legalizing the Communist Party. Radio Moscow, in English to South Asia, December 3, 1969.

[56] *Los Angeles Times,* January 25, 1971, and Bernardino Ronquillo, "Shy but Greedy," *FEER,* March 20, 1971, p. 28.

[57] *Izvestia,* May 26, 1971.

[58] At least one of the few "trial transactions" — one with Bulgaria — had failed and benefited Philippine trade not in the slightest. Ronquillo, "Shy but Greedy," *op. cit.* Also see Tilman, *op. cit.,* p. 222n.

The beginning of 1972 brought an acceleration of activity both between Manila and Moscow (and Eastern Europe) and between Manila and Peking. In early January Marcos announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania. Defending himself against charges by the *Manila Times* of this being too cautious a move, since it did not involve the USSR or the CPR and only called for nonresidential ambassadors, he asserted that this was but the first step in the improvement of relations with all communist countries. He went on to say that he hoped full diplomatic relations would be established with the Soviet Union before his term of office ended in December 1973. In March Marcos' wife journeyed to the USSR, where she was most warmly received by the Soviet leaders. On her return, she reported that Premier Kosygin had promised "any and all forms of assistance" to the Philippines and that diplomatic ties had been a subject of discussion.[61]

Just as closer Soviet-Philippine ties seemed to be nearing realization, China appeared to indicate its own interest more strongly. Although *Peking Review* hailed the "advancing . . . armed struggle" in the Philippines as late as January 14, 1972,[62] Chou En-lai was reported to have told a secret emissary from President Marcos in February that China would not support, financially or morally, any group, Chinese or native, which would try to subvert the Philippines.[63] Another prominent Philippine political figure went to Peking in March. There were also reports of Chinese-Philippine meetings in New York through representatives in the UN. Nevertheless, the obstacles to diplomatic ties with China seemed even greater than those impeding relations with the Soviet Union. In addition to the question of Chinese support for insurgency movements, critical problems concerned Philippine ties with Taiwan and the effect any changes in relations with Taipei and Peking might have on the close to one million Overseas Chinese in the country. Chou En-lai appeared to be sensitive to these issues, for he repeated to a Philippine journalist the CPR's position, earlier expressed to Burma's Ne Win, that Overseas Chinese ought to be citizens of and loyal to the country of their residence.[64] Meanwhile, Marcos had announced that he agreed in principle to trade relations with the CPR, and had set up a special cabinet-level committee to examine the question.

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[59] Cf. Party Central Committee Statement, *Peking Review*, January 26, 1971, pp. 13-14, and NPA Statement in the same periodical, April 23, 1971, pp. 14-15.

[60] Bernardino Ronquillo, "Spreading Chinese Goodwill," *FEER*, October 30, 1971, p. 21. Chou's "friendly conversation" with the group is reported in *Peking Review*, May 14, 1971.

[61] *FEER*, March 25, 1972, p. 4.

In sum, as affirmed in his State of the Nation address in January 1972, Marcos intends to make every effort to establish closer relations with both the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic.[65] Given the long-term Soviet and the more recent and mixed but still obvious Chinese efforts at opening and strengthening relations with Manila,[66] the immediate future will probably witness an increase in Sino-Soviet competition in this target area. Much, of course, will depend on developments in Philippine-American relations (even Marcos has criticized the presence of U.S. bases in the Philippines) and on how the recently instituted system of martial law has affected the internal situation in the island nation.

Thailand

Thailand has been the least significant arena of Sino-Soviet competition. Like the Philippines, it is a member of SEATO and has been deeply involved in the American war effort in Indochina. In addition, it has been faced with its own serious insurgency problem supported and supplied by China and North Viet Nam. Basically for these reasons, it has been the slowest of all the countries in our survey to adjust to the changing power configuration in Southeast Asia and the world. Despite changes in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy, as then Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman stated in 1969, Thailand does not want to "live with the crocodile" (the Soviet Union) just to "avoid a tiger" (China).[67] Since the Thais have given little intimation of seeking new and/or stronger relationships with the two communist powers, neither Moscow nor Peking seems to have invested substantial efforts in this country. Nevertheless, there has been some movement since 1965 and it seems likely to continue in the 1970's.

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[62] The May 26, 1972 issue, pp. 18-19, carried a report of an article commemorating the NPA's third anniversary.

[63] *Manila Times*, February 20, 1972.

[64] *Manila Daily Bulletin*, March 29, 1972.

[65] *Manila Times*, January 12, 1972. Still, one of the justifications for an increase in military expenditures has been the "continuing threat to national security from China." See Bruce Nussbaum, "Defending Malacanang," *FEER*, May 13, 1972, p. 26.

[66] In early August 1972, the CPR took the symbolic step of sending a relief ship laden with food supplies to victims of the Philippine flood.

Thailand's historic role of "bending with the wind" is best served by keeping options open. This has been the case respecting the USSR, with which Bangkok has had diplomatic relations since 1947. A modest cultural exchange program has continued and grown slightly since 1965. Talks held with Moscow about a trade agreement over the decade of the 1960's were renewed in 1969, and in December 1970 an agreement was finally signed. Trade agreements with Bulgaria and Rumania were signed in early 1969. However, in the words of one analyst:

> Thai trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has in the past been quite small (representing less than 1% of total Thai exports), and the potential for expansion is limited. Such trade will not significantly promote the major economic policy objective of diversifying trade and reducing Thai dependence on Japan.[68]

Peking's involvement with Thailand has been more extensive than Moscow's but it has been almost entirely in the direction of support for the communist struggle fomented by the Thai United Patriotic Front. A considerable amount of evidence has been gathered indicating Chinese assistance to the guerrillas: weapons from the CPR, information on a Chinese-run training center near Hanoi for Thai insurgent leaders, and daily broadcasts attacking the Bangkok government from Peking and from the China-based "Voice of the People of Thailand" radio. During 1968 the CPR was calling for renewed efforts against the imperialists and — apropos of the Sino-Soviet rivalry — accused the Soviets of seeking to "sabotage" the communist struggle in Thailand.[69] Following something of a lull in 1969, it again stepped up its support for the insurgents. The widely-spread Thai insurgencies continued into 1972, as did at least verbal Chinese support for them.[70]

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[67] Quoted in Astri Suhrke, "Smaller-Nation Diplomacy: Thailand's Current Dilemmas," *Asian Survey*, May 1971, p. 438. For an overview of relations between the USSR and Thailand, see Paul R. Shirk, "Thai-Soviet Relations," *ibid.*, September 1969, pp. 682-693.

[68] Suhrke, *op. cit.*, p. 437.

But despite continued Chinese intransigence, there were some gestures toward détente from Bangkok. Foreign Minister Thanat asserted in early 1971 that Thailand had been seeking for three years to improve relations with China. He contended that the CPR seemed to be responding favorably as Chinese radio broadcasts were softening in tone and some reduction was noted in Chinese-sponsored insurgent activities.[71] Efforts at a dialogue gathered some momentum throughout 1971 as a task force of China-watchers was created to study the question of relations, and a growing debate considered the benefits and disadvantages of trade with China. In October the Thais made the mixed gesture of supporting the United States on its resolution and then abstaining on the Albanian resolution which led to the seating of the CPR in the UN. In early November the Thai National Security Council decided to reduce the barriers to friendlier relations with China by removing the ban on trade, relaxing existing anti-communist laws, and allowing visits to China by invited sports and non-political groups. Although the Council added that there would be no diplomatic relations in the near future and that no individual or political figures would go to Peking at present, this was a highly significant act. According to a Foreign Ministry spokesman less than two weeks later, Peking indicated through an unidentified "third party" its intention to enter into an official dialogue with Thailand.[72]

The November 17, 1971 Thai coup interrupted these foreign policy processes. Although due primarily to internal political developments, it seems that relations with the CPR were a factor in the coup. In the words of one analyst, China's admission into the United Nations, coupled with efforts by some Thai Parliament members to deal with Peking individually (three sent a congratulatory telegram to Chou En-lai in October), served as the catalyst.[73] In any event, among the justifications for the coup given by its leader, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, were the prevention of renewed insurgency following China's admission to the UN and uncertainty regarding the effect of the admission on the country's three million Chinese.[74] Despite reports that a Thai government spokesman had been quickly dispatched to Peking to begin negotiations, there were signs of new friction in Sino-Thai relations, including increasing accusations respecting Chinese aid to Thai insurgents. In April 1972 Chairman Thanom declared that Thailand would "wait and see" rather than rush into "contacts" (not even "relations") with China.[75] Radio Peking initially analyzed the coup as an effort "to strengthen fascist dictatorship" in Thailand, and the Chinese have since continued to denounce the "frantic reactionary policies" of the "Thanom-Praphas clique" which has "strengthened fascist rule at home and intensified the suppression of the people, while externally actively serving as a U.S. accomplice in invading Indochina."[76] It is thus not surprising that Thanat says the question of relations with China has been put in "deep freeze."[77]

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[69] See Frank C. Darling, "Thailand: Stability and Escalation," *Asian Survey*, February 1968, p. 124, and "Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty," *ibid.*, February 1969, p. 116. For a discussion of Chinese-Thai relations, see Gurtov, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-48.

[70] For a recent discussion of the insurgencies, see "Fragmented Guerrillas," *FEER*, May 13, 1972, p. 18. For Chinese commentary, *Peking Review*, January 22, 1971, p. 18; April 16, 1971, p. 22; March 17, 1972, pp. 16-17; March 24, 1972, p. 21. Peking's publication of "Voice of the People of Thailand" radio editorials, Communist Party Central Committee statements, and commentary on the Thai insurgency has been far more substantial than that accorded to any other communist effort in the countries under consideration.

[71] *New York Times*, May 16, 1971. Thai sources said that of the unnamed third parties through which feelers were extended, France was probably the principal one.

[72] *FEER*, November 20, 1971, p. 4.

Although one might expect Thailand to move cautiously toward a *modus vivendi* with Peking — or toward Moscow so as better to resist the CPR — and though there have been a few straws in the wind in both directions, Thai foreign policy as a whole seems rather dormant. At the moment, in the words of Frances Starner, "Thailand has no foreign minister and foreign policy initiatives in any direction seem non-existent." However, the recent acceptance of a Chinese invitation to its table tennis team, and the revelation that a high-ranking Thai official would accompany the team, may well indicate the beginning of movement in Bangkok's foreign policy once more.

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[73] David Morell, "Thailand: Military Checkmate," *Asian Survey*, February 1972, p. 156.

[74] See *Asia Research Bulletin*, December 1971, p. 492; also, "Familiar Themes," *FEER*, November 27, 1971, pp. 6-8.

[75] *FEER*, May 6, 1972, p. 4.

[76] *Peking Review*, March 24, 1972, p. 21.

[77] Quoted in Frances Starner, "Uneasy Future," *FEER*, May 6, 1972, p. 18.

CONCLUSION

In an attempt to construct a pattern from this variegated record, it would seem that much of the motivation for Soviet efforts in Southeast Asia since 1965 has been provided by Moscow's rivalry with China, especially in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Moreover, changes in Soviet policy toward Indonesia since 1969 indicate a reaction to the new Chinese posture. Yet, China's role as an integral part of Asia has in many ways made it easier for her to affect Southeast Asian policies even while doing little of a concrete nature. As a prime example, even though China's "reappearance" in 1969 resulted in no new initiatives in Southeast Asia until late 1970 (and none of any significance until 1971), there was an immediate effort in most Southeast Asian capitals to deal in some way with the changed "China factor." Despite the USSR's insistent claims to be an Asian power, Southeast Asians have remained unconvinced, and thus Moscow has never had the benefit of the "automatic" influence belonging to China. As a result, the Soviets' strenuous efforts since 1965 have left them only marginally "ahead" of the Chinese, who did not enter the "competition" seriously until late 1970. In the face of this frustration, the Soviets remain convinced that they can do more for the countries of Southeast Asia economically, by way of technical and financial assistance and in offering security to offset the United States, than China can. Nevertheless, the technical and economic assistance that Indonesia, Burma and Singapore have taken from Moscow has been slight, and military assistance has been next to nothing. Also, China is a more important trading partner for at least Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. Peking seems to have made significant progress in the region through small-scale shipping and trade deals and, moreover, may have successfully defused the Overseas Chinese issue since Chou En-lai's statement to Ne Win in August 1971.

Perhaps the best Moscow can hope for is to be considered a main guarantor of the region's neutralization, security and economic development. Toward this end the Soviet Union has been playing an increasingly active role in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East[78] and has suggested the creation of an Asian collective security system in an effort "to make Asia a continent of peace and co-operation."[79] Although this collective security approach would seem to fit in well with the Malaysian and Association of Southeast Asian Nations' calls for the neutralization of the region, to be guaranteed by the major powers, Moscow has been unresponsive to and generally skeptical of the latter idea. The ASEAN declaration for neutralization and noninterference by foreign powers, in November 1971, was greeted by *Pravda* as denoting a "far from easy" task. The CPSU daily went on to assert that several steps had to be taken to clear the atmosphere first: the ending of U.S. "aggression" in Indochina, of China's "hegemonic aspirations" and contradictions among Southeast Asian countries, and the removal of foreign military bases and foreign troops from the area.[80]

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[78] See, for example, Frances Starner, "Selling Security Soviet-Style," *ibid.*, April 8, 1972, pp. 73-74. The Soviets have been far more interested in the UN-related ECAFE, where their vote is equal to any other, than in the Asian Development Bank (which they have not joined), where voting weight is based on financial contributions. See M. Lavrichenko, "Colonialist Plans and the Asian Development Bank," *International Affairs* (Moscow), February 1972.

An earlier Indonesian response to Brezhnev's call for collective security pointed to the difference between such a system and neutralization and perhaps explains Moscow's coolness toward the latter: "We in Indonesia believe that regional cooperation for prosperity is better than a defense system. We think that no Southeast Asian country is eager to join the Soviet defense system. The invitation is unwelcome."[81] By coupling the idea of a defense system with the need to eliminate China's "hegemonic aspirations," as mentioned by *Pravda*, one comes close to Moscow's perception of collective security for Asia. Efforts to sponsor such a system spring from Moscow's primary concern with Communist China, with its more active posture internationally, and with its desire to be the champion of the medium and small countries of the Third World — all of which is repeatedly expressed in Soviet statements and the Soviet press.[82]

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[79] O. Vladimirov, "The Way to Lasting Peace in Asia," *New Times*, April 1972, p. 8. The idea was first put forth by Leonid Brezhnev at the meeting of communist parties in Moscow in June 1969. (For text see *International Affairs*, July 1969, pp. 3-21.) It has since been mentioned infrequently and only barely elaborated upon. Cf. Peter Howard, "A System of Collective Security," *Mizan*, July-August 1969, pp. 199-210.

[80] Cited in *Asia Research Bulletin*, January 1972, p. 566. The contradictions among Southeast Asian countries were evident in the neutralization discussions. Manila was most skeptical, and Thailand and Singapore moderately so. On the other hand, the tone of recent Soviet commentary indicates a slight softening in Moscow's view of both ASEAN and its neutralization theme — e.g., V. Pavlovsky, "Collective Security: The Way to Peace in Asia," *International Affairs*, July 1972, pp. 23-27, 69.

[81] *Angkatan Bersendjata*, October 14, 1969. This daily is affiliated with the ruling military regime.

[82] For a semi-official Soviet assessment along these lines, see N. Kapchenko, "Maoism's Foreign Policy Platform," *International Affairs*, February 1972, pp. 35-41. That this has been the CPR's reaction to Brezhnev's proposal was borne out by NCNA, June 19 and 28, 1969.

Despite Moscow's denials,[83] Soviet actions thus imply that the Asian collective security idea as well as Soviet efforts in the individual countries of the area are primarily directed against the Chinese. Moscow is certainly not interested in an ASEAN-sponsored neutralization that could well be either a smokescreen for continued U.S. control and influence (Soviet doubts about ASEAN have been especially related to supposed U.S. influence in the organization) or a vacuum from which the USSR is excluded but the CPR, because of its location and ambitions, is not. The crucial problem for the Soviets has been indicated throughout this study: while certain countries seek protection against the Chinese "threat," even more are groping for some way to establish a *modus vivendi* with their powerful neighbor. But, granting that all are seeking to widen their options, none of the countries considered is interested in becoming a battleground for Sino-Soviet competition. The headline of a dispatch from Rangoon could be applied equally well to all countries of the region: "Big-Power Duel Worries Burma: Rangoon Fears Involvement in Soviet-Chinese Rivalry."[84] Nevertheless, the next few years seem likely to witness an increase in Sino-Soviet competition in Southeast Asia as the United States withdraws its presence at least partially and as the Soviet Union seeks to fill that "vacuum" and contain an increasingly assertive China.[85]

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[83] A recent one is found in Vladimirov, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[84] Tillman Durdin in the *New York Times*, February 9, 1972.

[85] A current development that reflects on a number of Soviet goals in the region has been the Indonesian and Malaysian claim that the Straits of Malacca is not an international waterway. The Soviets have argued against this and even circulated a roving ambassador through the area in March 1972 to get support for internationalizing the Straits. For commentary, see *Asia Research Bulletin*, December 1971, p. 523, and *FEER*, April 15, 1972, pp. 18-19.

UNCTAD III – INSIGHTS INTO DEVELOPMENT POLICIES*

by Amos Yoder

THE primary task of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is to reach agreement on trade and development policy resolutions, which act as guides for action by governments and UN organs. Major UNCTAD conferences take place every four years, with meetings of subsidiary bodies held more often.[1] The latest conference was UNCTAD III at Santiago, Chile, in April-May 1972. Chile's new conference center, constructed for the six-week meeting, provided a plenary hall seating 1,600 persons, 12 conference rooms seating 20 to 500, and a 23-story office building. Representatives of 140 nations and many international organizations attended.

The conference revealed economic demands and needs of developing countries and corresponding positions of developed nations. These warrant careful study because they represent years of struggling with complex development problems, and they can help to correct any simplistic views we may have about the felt needs of the developing world. Thus, the conference gives the United States a chance to measure its policies against demands of the developing world, and to compare U.S. trade and aid policies with those of other developed nations.

On the whole, the spirit of the conference was businesslike. There were a few political speeches by Cuba, the People's Republic of China and certain other countries criticizing the United States, a debate on the Suez Canal issue with political comments, and an attempt to discuss Viet Nam and the U.S. "blockade." However, by a vote of 50 to 26 with 17 abstentions, the conference supported a motion by the United States declaring that the Viet Nam issue was not within UNCTAD's competence. Following the vote the conference returned to trade and development issues.

During the meeting two large political demonstrations were staged near the UNCTAD conference hall — one against and one for the Allende Government — and there were many small demonstrations as well. Major themes of the pro-Allende demonstration included the alleged interference in Chile by the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) and the Central Intelligence Agency; smaller demonstrations protested against United States action in Viet Nam. Chilean police protection was restrained and efficient, and the delegates were not distracted from their work. They carried on the main business of the conference in six major committees and three working groups, and worked long hours, including two or more weekends. The last two sessions of the plenary conference continued through the night until six o'clock Saturday morning and after 9:00 a.m. on Sunday. About fifty resolutions were passed.

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*The views expressed in this article are the author's, and not necessarily those of the Department of State.

[1] For a detailed history of UNCTAD see Diego Cordovez, "The Making of UNCTAD," *Journal of World Trade Law*, May/June 1967, pp. 243-328.

THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The fifty major draft resolutions put forward by developing countries had a history of many months of discussion and negotiation among those states. Their initial positions were approved by representatives of 96 nations who convened at Lima, Peru, in November 1971 and continued to call themselves the "Group of 77," the original number of developing nations that had met to concert their positions for UNCTAD. Some of the results of the meeting were reflected in UN General Assembly resolutions on the world monetary situation and on other issues passed soon after the close of the Lima conference. Many of the participants at Lima were from delegations to the UN in New York and to UN bodies in Geneva, where UNCTAD's permanent headquarters is located. This facilitated their meeting together to prepare resolutions for UNCTAD III.

UNCTAD operates on the group system in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1995 of 1964, which established it as one of the General Assembly's subsidiary organs. There are four groups: A, the Asian and African developing nations; B, the developed market economy countries; C, the Latin American nations; and D, the communist nations of Eastern Europe. Groups A and C have joined in the informal "Group of 77," with a few exceptions such as China and Israel. The Group of 77 caucus has enough votes for a substantial majority, but the major "game" in UNCTAD is to negotiate agreements with developed countries possessed of the material and political resources to implement important resolutions. The Group of 77 normally works out agreed draft resolutions in advance of UNCTAD conferences. During the first three weeks of the Santiago meeting it resolved remaining controversial issues and thus did not present most of its draft resolutions formally until midway in the conference. In general the draft resolutions put into "marketable" form the positions hammered out at Lima, refining them into serious bargaining positions backed by the prestige of their governments. On almost all final draft resolutions the Group of 77 voted as a bloc, which hindered compromise on some of the more controversial issues.

Table I presents a summary of Group of 77 proposals classified according to the committees of the conference. It is a long list reflecting the hard fact that development involves many facets of economic policy. The abbreviation of items of necessity omits definitions and qualifications that appear in the resolutions. An X in the fourth column indicates an issue included in a resolution passed with developed-country support; the lack of an X indicates failure to reach agreement, and no resolution. In a few cases resolutions were passed, as noted with an X in the third column, even though no developed-country support is shown in the fourth column. Often failure to obtain developed-country support for an item occurred because the developed-country delegations could not commit themselves to legislative action — for example, that necessary to reduce taxes and tariffs or allocate funds for research and other purposes.

In columns 1 and 2, developed country demands were analyzed by examining points of emphasis in the official statements made during the plenary sessions of the first two weeks of the conference. These statements often are made by officials of ministerial rank, and are designed to show what the given country considers most important and most relevant to the conference.[2]

The most common theme of the plenary speeches was trade policy: the developing countries demanded that the industrialized countries take action to lower trade barriers and give preferences to their imports. This had also been the major demand at UNCTAD II. Trade policy issues are considered mainly by Committee 2 on Manufactures. Speakers of developing country delegations emphasized the desire for preferences for their imports, elimination of quota restrictions and nontariff barriers, and a "standstill" against new trade restrictions; a few speakers pro-

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[2] There is no verbatim published record of the plenary sessions, for budgetary reasons, but the texts of important speeches were distributed by the delegations concerned. Where these were not available, I obtained highlights from personal notes and from summaries prepared by others.

TABLE I

UNCTAD III POSITIONS AND RESOLUTIONS

Proposals and Recommendations	*Developed-Country Support in Plenary Speeches*		*Resolutions Passed*	
	U.S.	*Other*[1]	*By Group of 77*	*With Developed-Country Support*
I. GROUP OF 77 PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN LIMA DECLARATION AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS THAT RECOMMEND ACTION BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES				
A. Committee 1—Commodities	G.S.	G.S.		
Greater efforts to conclude commodity agreements	X	X	X	X
In particular, efforts to conclude cocoa agreement	X	X	X	X
Conclude general agreement on commodities	—	—	—	—
Not encourage production of substitutes	—	—	—	—
Assist research on natural products	—	—	X	X
Assist diversification efforts	—	—	X	X
UNCTAD consultations on agreed commodities	—	—	X	X
Not make harmful disposals of stockpiles	—	—	—	—
Abolish tariffs on primary products from LDC's	—	—	—	—
Reduce taxes, quota restrictions and other barriers	—	—	—	—
Eliminate tariff differentials favoring raw materials	—	—	—	—
Impose standstill on any new trade barriers	—	—	—	—
Reserve definite percentage of market to LDC's	—	—	—	—
World Bank Group should assist conclusion of commodity agreements[2]	—	—	X	—
B. Committee 2—Manufactures (Trade Policy)	G.S.	G.S.		
Preferential tariff rates to LDC's	—	X	X	X
Eliminate quota restrictions and nontariff barriers	—	—	X[3]	X[3]
Standstill on new tariffs and trade barriers against LDC's	—	—	—	—
Adjustment assistance to permit more imports	—	—	X	X
Expedite analysis of restrictive business practices	—	—	X	X
Action against restrictive business practices	—	—	X	X
Encourage trade fairs	—	—	X	X
Encourage subcontracting in LDC's	—	—	X	X
Set up import centers in developed countries	—	—	X	X
Support export promotion programs of LDC's	—	—	X	X
Establish comprehensive International Trade Organization	—	—	X	—

TABLE I (continued)

C. Committee 3—Finance				
Establish link between SDR's[4] and development financing	—	X	X[5]	X[5]
Full participation of LDC's in monetary reform	X	X	X	X
Provide increased aid	X	X	X	X
Bring public aid to 1% of GNP—minimum of .7 of 1%	—	X	X	—
Reschedule LDC debts so as not to affect development	—	—	X	—
Increase money to UNDP[6]	—	—	X	X
Untie aid	—	X	X	X
Increase LDC voting power in IMF	—	—	—	—
Soften terms of loans—not over 2%	—	—	X	X
Establish fund to lessen interest costs on loans	—	—	X[7]	X[7]
Increase aid to IDA[8] and other multilateral agencies	—	—	X	X
Support supplementary financing by IMF to offset drop in exports	—	—	X	X
Work out arrangement to compensate for losses from realignment of currencies	—	—	X	—
D. Committee 4—Invisibles				
Help expand LDC merchant marines	—	—	X	X
Admit LDC's to shipping conferences so LDC ships can obtain larger share of cargo	—	—	X	X
Urge shipping lines to consider reducing freight rates	—	—	X	X
Establish code of conduct for liner conferences	—	—	X	X
Give easier commercial credits for sale of ships	—	—	X	X
Liner conferences should admit LDC ships	—	—	X	X
Preference to tankers and bulk carriers of LDC's	—	—	X	X
Assistance to LDC shipbuilding	—	—	X	X
Adequate notice and rationale for freight rate increase	—	—	X	X
Help develop ports	—	—	X	X

G.S. = General Support; LDC's = Developing Countries.

[1] Marked if six or more developed countries supported the idea in plenary addresses.

[2] Not in Lima Declaration.

[3] Decision made to study question.

[4] Special Drawing Rights—paper reserves for international financial transactions.

[5] Decision made to study question.

[6] United Nations Development Program.

[7] Decision made to study question.

[8] International Development Association.

Table I (continued)

Proposals and Recommendations	Developed-Country Support in Plenary Speeches		Resolutions Passed	
	U.S.	Other[1]	By Group of 77	With Developed-Country Support
Assist maritime training	—	—	X	X
Urge investors to use more LDC insurance	—	—	X	X
Urge investors to retain substantial share of insurance technical reserves in LDC's	—	—	X	X
Provide technical assistance for insurance	—	—	X	X
Provide aid to tourist industry and hotels	—	—	X	X
Reduce air rates	—	—	X	X
Help train personnel	—	—	X	X
Developed countries eliminate foreign exchange restrictions on travel	—	—	X	X
Developed countries provide duty free entry on tourist items	—	—	X	X
Provide aid to LDC airlines	—	—	—	—
E. Committee 5—Trade between LDC's and Communist Countries				
Grant preferences to LDC's	—[9]			
Disseminate information on LDC products	—		X	X
Take account of increased LDC imports in plans	—		X	X
Intensify economic and other cooperation with LDC's	X		X	X
Stimulate transfer of technology	—		X	X
Extend industrial cooperation	X		X	X
Accept manufactured goods from LDC's to repay credits	—		X	X
Extend multilateral payments arrangements to LDC's	—		X	X
Do not re-export products without LDC agreement	—		X	X
F. Committee 6—Least Developed	G.S.	G.S.		
Increased technical assistance and aid	X	X	X	X
Special consideration in operation of commodity agreements	—	—	X	X
Exempt from contributing to buffer stocks	—	—	X	X
Aid to diversification	—	—	X	X
Special preferences on trade barriers	—	—	X	X
Reduce or eliminate duties on tropical goods	—	—	X	X
Eliminate restrictive business practices against least developed	—	—	X	X
No counterpart requirements for aid	—	—	X	X

TABLE I (continued)

Untie aid	—	—	X	X
Special fund by General Assembly for industrialization	—	—	—	—
Establish applied technology institutes	—	—	X	X
Financial assistance to shipping	—	—	X	X
Import promotion measures	—	—	X	X
Promote research on primary products	—	—	X	X
G. *Working Group I—Institutions of UNCTAD*				
Strengthen UNCTAD's negotiating role	—	—	X	X
Increase size of Trade and Development Board (TDB)	—	—	X	X
Increase size of committees	—	—	X	X
Hold TDB meetings at ministerial level	—	—	X	X
Transform intergovernmental group on transfer of technology to a permanent committee	—	—	—	—
Form intergovernmental group to negotiate on tariff and nontariff barriers	—	—	X	—
Establish organ to promote agreements on trade and development	—	—	—	—
Special body to find solutions on debt servicing problems	—	—	X	—
Intergovernmental group on least developed countries	—	—	X	—
Special committee on preferences	—	—	X	X
Ad hoc group of experts to report on restrictive business practices	—	—	X	X
H. *Working Group II—Regional Trade Among LDC's*				
Provide assistance for regional integration	—	—	X	X
Aid to build infrastructure for such trade	—	—	X	X
Eliminate restrictive business practices that affect this trade	—	—	X	X
I. *Working Group III—Transfer of Technology*	—	G.S.		
Designate institutions for transfer	—	—	X	X
Encourage enterprises to give favorable terms for transfer	—	—	X	X
Promote elimination of restrictive business practices	—	—	X[10]	X[10]
Encourage transfer of research results	—	—	X	X
Encourage enterprises to allow use of their patents	—	—	X	X
Encourage enterprises to use local labor and materials	—	—	X	X
Establish international technology transfer centers	—	—	X[11]	X[11]

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[9] Notations under Committee 5 apply to communist countries.

[10] Decision made to study question.

[11] Decision made to study question.

Table I (continued)

Proposals and Recommendations	Developed-Country Support in Plenary Speeches		Resolutions Passed	
	U.S.	Other[1]	By Group of 77	With Developed-Country Support
Study bases for international legislation on transfer	—	—	X	X
Provide technical assistance	—	—	X	X
Draw up program to adapt technology to needs of LDC's	—	—	—	—
Devote .05% of GNP to technological problems of LDC's	—	—	—	—
Allocate 10% of research and development to these problems	—	—	—	—
Provide fiscal and other incentives to transfer	—	—	X	X
UNCTAD should provide technical assistance	—	—	X	X
J. Other Proposals				
Endorse Security Council action on Suez Canal problem	—	—	X	—
Draw up charter on international economic relations	—	—	X	—
Use resources released from disarmament for development	—	—	X	X
Recommend General Assembly establish world development day	—	—	X	X
Facilitate development of cooperatives	—	—	X	X
Adopt principles to govern international trade relations and trade policies for development	—	—	X	—
Cease exploitation of seabed resources before international regime is established	—	—	X	—
Study adverse economic effect on developing countries of exploitation of minerals and fisheries of seabed	—	—	X	—
Special study of problems of developing island countries	—	—	X	X
Affirm right of LDC's to limit repatriation of profits on investment and express concern at such outflow	—	—	X	—
Provide special aid and assistance to landlocked countries	—	—	X	X
Aid transport infrastructure for these countries	—	—	X	X
Draft convention to simplify transit documents	—	—	X	X
II. Proposals by the Developed Countries				
Comprehensive trade negotiations in 1973 in GATT with special provisions for needs of developing countries	X	X	X	X
GATT and UNDP to give special assistance in these negotiations	—	—	X	X

posed the initiation of adjustment assistance so that the developed countries could make fundamental adjustments of their economies to accept more imports from the developing world. (See Table.)

African speakers particularly stressed the importance of improving the opportunities and terms of trade for their exports of commodities. In addition to requesting developed countries to remove tariffs and other trade restrictions, they proposed support for commodity agreements that would increase prices and control the marked fluctuations that occur in some commodity markets. A number of delegations supported the UNCTAD Secretary-General's demand for speedy conclusion of an international agreement on cocoa. Negotiations on this commodity agreement had been resumed under UNCTAD auspices in Geneva in the months before UNCTAD III.

The second topic accorded major attention in plenary speeches was international finance, the responsibility of Committee 3. The Lima Declaration, which had been drawn up in the middle of the 1971 monetary crisis, expressed "dismay" about the "breakdown of the international monetary system and the resurgence of protectionist policies."[3] By the time UNCTAD III met in April/May 1972, however, the nations of the world had adjusted their exchange rates to the new dollar position, and the United States had removed its 10 per cent surtax on imports. Thus, criticisms on these points were relatively muted.

In the plenary the Group of 77 emphasized their desire for full participation, along with the developed countries, in the reform of the world monetary system, though resolutions on this matter were not introduced to the conference until the fourth week.

The Spokesman of the Group of 77 also demanded a "link" between the allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's), the new paper reserves for international monetary transactions, and the developing countries' requirements for financing development. The two previous allocations of SDR's carried out by the International Monetary Fund had been based on country quotas in the IMF, determined on the basis of national income and trade — this, on the rationale that the new international reserves are needed to finance trade. The developing countries at UNCTAD III, however, pressed for a link between SDR allocations and their requirements to finance imports for development.

Another major demand of the Group of 77 was that developed countries at a minimum should meet the International Development Strategy (IDS) target of providing 1 per cent of their gross national product in net public and private transfers to the developing world.[4] The Group's maximum demand was that all of this be public aid, although the IDS had specified that only 70 per cent of transfers be public. A number of plenary speakers referred to the International Development Strategy, and it was an important point of reference in conference discussions. The IDS, it should be noted, provides for a biennial appraisal in the UN system of progress in the developing countries. It sets targets for aid and other policies of assistance for the developed world, but in Paragraph 11 it states that primary responsibility for development rests with the developing countries themselves. Biennial appraisals beginning in 1973 will make it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. The UNCTAD conference process tends to focus on the other side of the equation, the contributions of the developed world, by affording the developing countries opportunities to make requests of and demands on the developed countries.

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[3] UNCTAD Document TD. 143, "The Declaration and Principles of the Action Program of Lima," November 12, 1971, p. 3.

Other financial points advocated by the developing nations at UNCTAD III were rescheduling debts to lessen the burden of debt repayments, untying aid, and softening the terms of loans for development.

As was to be expected, delegates of the twenty-five countries officially designated as "least developed"[5] emphasized requests for special trade and other concessions. Some of the other developing countries also called for special assistance for the least developed, thus helping to build Group of 77 solidarity, but developed countries' speakers provided even more support for such aid. Proposals for the least developed countries included reducing trade restrictions and providing preferences, special aid programs, exemption from contributions to buffer stocks in commodity agreements, and many other measures.

Many plenary speakers referred to the need to increase the rate of "transferring technology" to the developing countries. This was considered by a special Working Group III at the conference. Some speakers asked that the transfer of technology by private investment be regulated by licensing and government controls to improve the bargaining position of the developing countries and lessen their dependence on the industrial nations of the world. One resolution proposed creating institutions on the national, regional and international levels to offer advice and coordinate the policies of the developing countries. Others called for new "international legislation," and aid to research that is most relevant to developing countries' needs.

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[4] The IDS was approved by General Assembly acclamation in October 1970 for the "Second Development Decade." It calls for progressive policies in many fields, including trade, investment, aid, education and science, recognizing that progress toward achieving a 6 per cent annual growth in GNP during the 1970's will require action in many areas. The Strategy is well known in UN circles but it has received little attention in the United States.

[5] The list of countries selected by the Committee for Development Planning under the UN Economic and Social Council, and confirmed by other UN bodies, includes Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sikkim, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Western Samoa and Yemen.

Some speakers concerned themselves with shipping services and freight rates, debt servicing burdens, the closure of the Suez Canal (this of special interest to Arab delegates), the high cost of armaments, and occasionally the other issues catalogued in Table I.

Although delegates of some developing countries urged radical changes in the world's trade and payments system, Group of 77 resolutions overwhelmingly called for action within the present framework. Some communist delegates pointed to private trade and investment as instruments of exploitation and neocolonialism, but the Group's resolutions did not support such criticism. Instead they asked for trade preferences, participation in planning world monetary reform, more favorable terms of aid, and similar policies attainable without destroying the present system.

Group of 77 spokesmen noticeably ignored population and environmental problems, which evoke so much attention from the developed world. Several indicated that development issues are more critical to them than the pollution troubling the wealthier countries. They point out that developing countries' problems of pollution and sanitation arise primarily from poverty, and define their environmental problems in these terms. One minor UNCTAD resolution nevertheless recommended that the upcoming Stockholm Conference on the Environment take note of an UNCTAD Secretariat study on the impact of environment policies on trade and development.

THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The developed countries[6] meet in the Development Assistance

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[6] Those of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Turkey, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.

Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris to coordinate development policies, including positions for UNCTAD meetings. Within the U.S. government a series of intensive meetings in the year preceding UNCTAD III had the task of defining positions and policies for the conference.

The developed countries' positions in a sense are defensive, because the Group of 77 usually tables resolutions asking far more of them than they consider economically or politically practical. On the other hand, they are committed to the principle of helping the developing world, and they wish to present constructive and practical alternatives. Generally, the final resolutions reflect a compromise, although on occasion and for various political reasons the Group of 77 uses its voting power to pass resolutions without the support of the developed countries. Such resolutions, of course, cannot commit the developed countries to a course of action and their value is questionable.

Developed countries' delegates in their plenary speeches for UNCTAD III stressed five major themes: trade preferences for the developing countries, increased aid, greater participation by developing countries in world monetary reform, designing special programs for the least developed countries, and support for commodity agreements, particularly for cocoa.

The Group of 77 had made demands for trade preferences at UNCTAD I and UNCTAD II against varying degrees of opposition from the developed countries, which resisted weakening the most-favored-nation principle. By the time of UNCTAD III, preferences for the developing countries had been implemented by almost all of the developed countries except the United States, and at the conference U.S. spokesmen indicated an intention to introduce preference legislation as soon as prospects for its passage appear favorable. On aid targets, the major developed countries except the United States were close to providing the 1 per cent of GNP in financial transfers for development that had been set at UNCTAD I and II. The United States was at a level of about two-thirds of 1 per cent of GNP. It was pointed out, however, that the United States still provides more than half of the total aid furnished by developed countries, which is defined as both public and private grants and loans.

The interest expressed in speeches regarding special help to the least developed countries reflected intensive efforts in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and other organizations to design practical assistance programs to fill this need, though only a few developing countries, aside from the twenty-five least developed, dwelt on this theme. Many developed countries indicated a willingness to examine and support international commodity agreements — for which UNCTAD has a special responsibility as set forth in the General Assembly's establishing Resolution 1995 — and took note that the one on cocoa was of particular interest to the organization and its Secretary-General.

Finally, many of the developed countries supported the idea of developing countries participating in world monetary reform, since this could be done within the framework adopted by the International Monetary Fund's leadership in planning the reform. They did not, however, agree to one of the major demands of the developing countries, that there should be a link between the allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) and development requirements. This decision is considered to be within IMF's sphere of competence.

Speakers for the developed countries supported the above five themes in general terms. In contrast, the developing countries proposed specifics, by way of resolutions. This points to a major function of UNCTAD, which is to define general proposals drafted by the developing countries in more concrete terms.

CONFERENCE ACTION

The conference passed almost all the resolutions in the final three days, which stretched into two all-night sessions. The climax was reached toward morning of the last night on May 21, when an adjournment of about two hours was called while delegates struggled for agreement on the important financial resolution. This resolution, passed in plenary shortly after 6:00 a.m., with 67 affirmative votes and only one abstention — that of Rumania — contained two key provisions: (1) to increase the voice of the developing countries in a reform of the world monetary system by asking the IMF to give sympathetic consideration to proposals to create a Committee of Twenty to advise the Board of Governors on reform, and (2) to give further consideration to the link between allocations of Special Drawing Rights and development finance. The final resolution recognizes

> that the subject of such a link deserves the most serious consideration and therefore *urges* the International Monetary Fund to pursue its consideration of all aspects of proposals for a link between SDR's and the provision of resources for development finance in the context of discussions on international monetary reform and having regard to the primary role

of SDR's as a reserve asset, and *invites* the Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund to present as soon as possible to the Board of Governors the studies required for decisions that are necessary on the possible implementation of a viable scheme.

This wording reflected extensive negotiation between countries wanting a decision at the conference to approve such a link and delegations recognizing that the International Monetary Fund was the proper body to make such a decision. Significantly, the Indian delegate speaking for the Group of 77 made an explanation that reaffirmed the primary role of the IMF in this matter. This was a prime example of the Group of 77's awareness of a basic factor underlying UNCTAD deliberations — that the assent of the developed countries is necessary for action on most trade and aid matters. (About three months after the conference the IMF Governors voted overwhelmingly to create the Committee of Twenty, in which developing countries would be represented, to design the reform.)

Another important decision was the unanimous adoption of the long resolution on measures to help the twenty-five "least developed," selected for this category by UN organs on the basis of low levels in per capita GNP, industrialization and literacy. Both the developed and the developing countries spent many days preparing proposals on this issue, and the effort was largely responsible for the Group of 77's delay in submitting their package of resolutions to the conference. The Group finally approved compromise language in the first two operative paragraphs of the resolution, which stated that the special measures in favor of the least developed should be "supplementary" to measures for all developing countries and should not injure or prejudice the interests of other developing countries. Other provisions included special measures for the least developed in commodity agreements, aid programs, transfer of technology, shipping, and trade promotion, and similar actions by the communist countries of Eastern Europe and international organizations.

At the next-to-last meeting of the conference, a potentially significant action was taken in admitting Bangladesh. Two representatives from Dacca had sat patiently in the galleries for five weeks, waiting for their country to become eligible to participate in UNCTAD. Their patience was rewarded when Bangladesh became eligible by virtue of being admitted to a specialized agency of the UN, the World Health Organization.[7]

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[7] UNCTAD is not a specialized agency; it is a conference set up by the General Assembly and its secretariat is part of the UN Secretariat.

The new state appears to meet the criteria established for a "least developed" nation. Bangladesh, with its seventy million people, has a larger population than all the other twenty-five "least developed" nations put together.

Another major initiative at the conference was the resolution introduced by the developed nations to make special provisions for the developing countries in the GATT tariff negotiations in Geneva in 1973. This resolution was adopted without objection. If the GATT negotiations are successful, this action could turn out to be one of UNCTAD III's most worthwhile accomplishments.

In acting on these and many other important matters, the conference illustrated UNCTAD's major function, namely, to put in concrete form proposals of the developing countries for assistance in the trade and aid field. Aid items are only part of a long list of specific proposals that include commodity agreements, trade preferences, restrictive business practices, export promotion, shipping, insurance, tourism, science and technology, regional integration, the seabeds, and releasing resources saved from disarmament.

It is not easy to evaluate the importance of the resolutions by showing how they eventually result in action and benefits. Many observers, particularly in the news media, impatient over the weeks of talk and debate over the wording of resolutions, have dismissed the UNCTAD conference as a talk shop. Others, who see the UN system as a whole and follow its workings, realize that UNCTAD's purpose is not to take action at the conference, but to reach agreements that will be carried out by other organs. UN Secretary-General Waldheim explained this clearly in his plenary speech to the conference on April 13 when he pointed out that UNCTAD does not have power to enforce its recommendations; "executive power" rests with governments. He gave three examples of "successes" that resulted from UNCTAD recommendations: the discussion and adoption by the General Assembly of the International Development Strategy, the acceptance by rich countries of a system of preferences for manufactured products of poor countries, and the creation of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

Preferences are probably the most concrete example of progress. Six countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom and France, announced at Santiago that they had put their trade preferences for the developing countries into effect in 1972 — the implication being that this action, called for in previous UNCTAD resolutions, had been taken before UNCTAD III convened. The United States could only state that it would introduce preference legislation when the situation was ripe for action, and an election year did not present such an opportunity.

There has been significant progress toward another major aim of UNCTAD, that of financial transfers to the developing countries amounting to 1 per cent of the developed world's GNP. Except for the United States, the developed countries have achieved .95 of 1 per cent; at present U.S. transfers amount to only about .65 of 1 per cent of GNP.

In the commodity field the conference spurred the negotiation of a cocoa agreement. The text of an agreement was approved in October 1972 in Geneva, and the agreement came into effect in 1973. Washington did not approve the agreement. Many resolutions adopted in Santiago related to aid and trade policy on which action will be taken in other international organs and in the countries concerned. Action pertaining to trade will occur in GATT, but certain resolutions ask UNCTAD itself to analyze restrictive trade practices and to support and assist the export efforts of the developing countries. In the international finance field, aid targets were reaffirmed and recommendations were made to soften the terms of loans. In the area of "invisibles," resolutions were approved that called for specific measures to lower freight rates, increase participation of developing countries in shipping activities and insurance, and provide assistance to tourist industries.

Committee 5 prepared a resolution in which communist countries agreed to a list of actions that would encourage imports from developing countries and require the communist states to carry out related trade policies. The conference resolution to assist the "least developed" countries contained many specific provisions in the above fields. The resolution on the transfer of technology encourages developed nations and their industries to facilitate the transfer of technology to developing countries through a list of specific measures, one of which would be a joint study by UNCTAD and the World Industrial Property Organization on possible international legislation affecting patents and licensing agreements.

CONCLUSIONS

UNCTAD's major function is to formulate development policies, not to carry out action programs. Developing countries, after consulting together, put their proposals in resolution form, and then in UNCTAD meetings they negotiate with the developed countries and hammer out resolutions agreeable to both groups. The final resolutions are a guide for action programs in other UN agencies and in about 140 nations. Those who are impatient to see results often underestimate the importance of UNCTAD meetings because they do not realize that governmental processes by their very nature cannot show quick payoffs.

The series of UNCTAD meetings and conferences has resulted in guidelines for action that fall within the framework of the international system of trade, monetary affairs and aid. On the occasions when developing countries have passed resolutions for rhetorical or doctrinal reasons, they have had little or no effect. But when they have negotiated and compromised with the developed countries, they have achieved concrete results in areas such as tariff preferences, increased levels of aid, export promotion programs, increased UN technical assistance, and special programs for the "least developed" countries. The process is firmly based on the premise that the world is interdependent and problems of development and trade require international cooperation.

The developed countries take UNCTAD seriously in preparing for its meetings and implementing its resolutions through the slow process of legislation, governmental programs, and action in international agencies. UNCTAD serves a valuable purpose with its educative and political processes that permit the developing world to express its impatience with existing trade and development policies.

Academicians and government officials can learn much from UNCTAD proceedings. There is a temptation for us to treat development problems lightly and focus on generalities, such as capital output ratios, planning, underemployment, industrialization, mass poverty and unemployment, whereas UNCTAD meetings rarely discuss such topics. The participants concentrate on concrete development policies; their proposals involve many difficult political and economic decisions — particularly for developed countries. The UNCTAD process asks problem-solvers in the developed world to grapple with such items as tariff preferences, monetary reform, commodity agreements, barriers to imports, restrictive business practices, tied aid, and lower interest rates on loans.

These topics bring development problems close to home. They require governmental action to support changes in our laws, to support increased appropriations for aid, to lower tariffs, to redirect aid efforts, and to carry out many other complex policy changes. They raise a host of difficult questions for academicians and policymakers: What is the real level of the United States' trade barriers in comparison with those of other developed countries? How does this affect the exports and the economic situation of developing countries? Why has U.S. aid as a percentage of GNP lagged? Why is the United States one of the few developed countries that has not approved tariff preferences for developing countries? In short, UNCTAD meetings demonstrate that the real economic world is interdependent and that economic progress depends on wide-ranging political and administrative actions by developed and developing countries alike.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMBAT AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS: FIGHTING WHILE TALKING IN KOREA, 1951-1953

by Wilfred A. Bacchus

NEGOTIATING from strength is a venerated principle — one that is still highly respected in spite of the difficulties encountered in applying it to recent armed conflicts. With the advent of nuclear weapons, and limited wars waged in the shadow of such weapons, the political ramifications of this principle introduce a new and paradoxical problem for diplomacy. Strength on the battlefield is not only much harder to measure; such strength, however measured, may be meaningless if a government does not appear united in its determination to press military might in pursuit of the objectives with which it entered the conflict in the first place. "Strength" now encompasses, more than ever before in history, the political as well as military capacities of combatants in a limited war. The principle is also strained when limited war is waged against enemies seemingly convinced of the "historic inevitability" of triumph for their political system.

This article attempts to bring into sharper focus the concurrent military and diplomatic activities during the Korean truce negotiations, in order to consider evidence of a relationship between the use of force and the resolution of conflict in a limited war. The two-year negotiation process that produced a prolonged state of armistice in Korea affords a more suitable basis for examining this relationship than the more complex and tenuous course of negotiations undertaken to end the Vietnamese conflict. In the Korean War, in which military men also conducted the truce talks, the frustrations inherent in the restrained use of combatant power are reflected in the following statement by Admiral C. Turner Joy, the first Chief Negotiator for the United Nations Command:

> The armistice negotiations were profoundly affected by the restraints imposed on the United Nations Command forces in Korea. United Nations Command forces were not allowed to attack their enemies in the most effective manner nor with the most effective weapons. In consequence, the United Nations Command could never exert the decisive military pressure of which it was capable. United Nations Command

negotiators at Kaesong and Panmunjom were not in a position to deal from maximum strength, and well did the Communists know it.[1]

In that war, truce negotiations were limited by mutual consent to the problem of disengagement — to halt the fighting. The United Nations, because of little confidence in the trustworthiness of the enemy regimes, felt constrained to require armistice conditions that could ensure the security of the South Korean people following the withdrawal of all international forces. Under those circumstances, it was naive to think that, while the enemy force was still not severely crippled, the negotiations could be kept "nonpolitical." Nevertheless, a limited scope of negotiations was prescribed so that the negotiators could deal with only the most pressing problem: bringing an end to the fighting. Events during the negotiation period and subsequently proved that, as in prior wars, armistice negotiations and the terms they established would greatly influence any political settlement to bring about true peace in Korea.

The necessity for closely coordinating the military and diplomatic arms of a country's policy is better understood today than it was twenty years ago, but there continues to be a critical disjunction in the control of the two processes within the highest levels of government in the United States. It may have been good fortune that the United Nations Command, already charged with military operations in Korea, was given full charge over armistice arrangements. As a result, instructions to the negotiators came from the President by way of his military arm, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than via the State Department and its overseas missions. This was less than a deliberate choice, influenced mainly by the expectation that the negotiations would be quickly concluded. Before we delve into the negotiations themselves, however, some basic terms and relationships require definition.

A Concept of the Negotiation Process

The two principal concepts that must be clarified are those of "limited war" and "negotiations." Limited war is usually defined in terms of its objective: warfare in which something less than total defeat of the enemy is intended. In the case of war between a major power and a lesser force, however, this concept is wholly one-sided, since the lesser power logically could entertain no higher objective. *Limited war* in this study will denote a conflict characterized by the adoption of objectives judged to be attainable *without* the commitment of all available military power to the war effort. By this definition, what amounts to a limited war from the viewpoint of one combatant nation may be an unlimited war from the adversary's perspective. Until the intervention of the Chinese "volunteers," this was the case in the Korean War; it remained true in a relative sense after the Chinese intervention.

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[1] C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 165-166.

The *negotiation* process consists of the formalized accommodation of wills and interests of disputing parties on particular matters. Genuine negotiations are possible only when both parties find reason to believe that an agreement acceptable to their interests can be consummated. This definition does not preclude the use of negotiations by one or both parties in a conflict in order to distract, confuse or divide the enemy, hoping thereby to forestall the opponent's coercive efforts. In a limited war, each of the parties must believe that the enemy will accept settlement of the conflict in preference to an expansion of the war designed to improve the terms of settlement. This does not deny the possibility that one or both sides will exploit the availability of reserves of military power as a diplomatic device. However, the capacity to threaten is a double-edged sword in truce negotiations: helpful as a substitute for the actual use of force in a manner that might provoke counteraction, but also potentially counterproductive to the extent that the weaker party may not be immediately prepared to put his trust in any cease-fire arrangement.

The concept of bargaining positions is often used as a negotiations framework. By this, we mean mutual recognition of a conscious difference between what is initially demanded at the conference table and what the party expects as the final solution. Part of the negotiation process necessarily entails discovery of the opponent's "bargaining zone," i.e., that area lying between his optimal and minimal levels of expectation concerning the outcome. An essential element of true negotiations is the tabling of proposals that are seriously expected to lead to an agreement. These proposals ordinarily must lie within or near the boundary of the opponent's bargaining zone.[2] The process also normally requires some alteration of the initial demands in order to formalize the fact that each side is willing to accommodate the interests of the other to a degree. To guard against the possibility of one-sided bargaining concessions, a certain amount of military pressure and coercion is required. Thus, each negotiator is involved in a constant process of adjusting his assessments of the opponent's military power and political unity. He has to evaluate whether the strength and resoluteness of the enemy are weakening or increasing, in spite of the fact that it is a "limited war." Judgment in these areas is hazardous, answerable in the ultimate sense only by further continuation of the war.

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[2] Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 220-221; and Fred C. Iklé, *How Nations Negotiate* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 206-210.

Several factors could be introduced in any examination of the interrelationship between combat and diplomacy. In the present study, the independent variable will be the degree to which the difference in demands made by the opposing parties is reduced to zero. Dependent variables, in the limited war context, consist of comparative assessments by each side of the coercive capability displayed by the other, and the imputed constancy of purpose. The two operative variables one wants to judge, therefore, are *relative combat power* and *relative political stability.*

For the present case, one could seek to identify, quantify, and then sum up all the factors that make up combat power and political stability. On either a grand or modest scale, however, such an attempt is more apt to obscure than to clarify, given the present capacity for empirical comparison of those two variables or their components. In particular, there is no reliable known means to define and measure the political stability of a regime for purposes of accurate comparison. However, the sum effect of military and political factors in a limited war situation can and should be treated as two variables operating along a continuum. Each party in the Korean War chose to launch attacks on the other at certain times, and each ultimately chose to cease fighting along the existing line of combat and to comply — or at least pledge to comply — with certain truce agreements. Analysis of the behavior of the two parties prior to and during the negotiations can obviate the theoretical necessity to separate and evaluate the many components of the two political and military variables.

Undoubtedly there is value in recognizing mutations in the political unity of each party, as indicated by such things as leadership changes in organizations holding powers of decision over either military actions or bargaining positions. However, it is postulated that unity in the political decision-making apparatus will be reflected in the intensity and integration of efforts exerted toward the achievement of major objectives, either at the bargaining table or on the battlefront. Thus, a decision to wage a strong offensive in the field reflects an affirmative judgment on these two points: (1) that one's forces can successfully carry out the offensive action, and (2) that, if by chance the mission should prove too costly or be a failure, sufficient political support exists to continue the present regime in power.

It does not necessarily follow that either party is less united in its war effort if it chooses to emphasize diplomatic initiatives in preference to greater use of force, or if it tends to separate diplomatic and military initiatives sequentially, as the North Korean and Chinese leaders did. Though there were differences in political style, the important, integrating point is that negotiations continued to be based on the belief that, ultimately, the resolution of issues would be accomplished by these parleys. To sum up, the political unity of each party is manifested by the scale and consistency of its combat efforts, and the relative military capability is reflected in the effects achieved as a result of the offensive actions launched.

Limited war, exemplified until recently in its most intense form by the Korean War, is highly influenced by political considerations, especially by consistency of intentions. The decision-making authority is the logical starting point for examining the factor of consistency. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is presented as the first of two initial bases for considering the Korean negotiations:

Hypothesis 1: Successful negotiations require a politically stable decision-making body, the orientation or composition of which appears unlikely to be altered appreciably within the near future.

The other basis for evaluating the Korean case concerns the creation of conditions that tend to alter an opponent's demands to the ultimate point of convergence with one's own. Hence:

Hypothesis 2: Successful negotiation from strength requires inducing the opponent to recognize that he will not be able to gain immediate or long-term objectives by pursuing any alternative actions to which he may have recourse.

The act of bringing the enemy to such an appraisal of his options normally involves extensive use of coercive power. The intensity of enemy efforts and the resulting effects of combat and negotiations constitute two variables that can be measured in the Korean case. They were the principal indicators available to the negotiators — and such indicators were available in Korea to a greater extent than to the Viet Nam peace negotiators in Paris after 1968. They have therefore been selected for correlation with the independent variable: progress toward the ultimate solution in the armistice agreement of July 27, 1953. Before examining the negotiations process that began in July 1951, we must recall the preceding year of intense fighting, inasmuch as that period conditioned so heavily each party's judgment of the relative combat power and political stability of the opponent.

The Pre-negotiation Period

The relative strength of opposing ground forces committed prior to the start of truce negotiations constitutes the most logical and concrete basis for comparing the military power of the combatants. Such a comparison is flawed, however, by the circumstance that the United Nations Command maintained almost three times as many men in reserve or in noncombatant activities as it did in the front lines, whereas the communist forces committed a much higher proportion to combat. Moreover, Communist China had recourse to a vast reserve of troops in Manchuria, variously estimated at one or two million, while the United Nations Command could muster few troops not already at or near the Korean battlefront. The United Nations' reserve strength lay in its naval and air forces, which continuously controlled the sea and air space of the Korean peninsula.

At the outbreak of hostilities, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) outnumbered the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) in ground forces by about two to one, and boasted nearly complete superiority in firepower and air support. By August 1950, forces defending the Pusan perimeter were still somewhat inferior to enemy troop strength, even though they had been hastily bolstered with elements of five U.S. divisions. After the Inchon landing in September 1950 and the capture of about 135,000 North Koreans – including many later screened out as civilians and released – comparative ground strength significantly favored the United Nations Command.[3] But following the massive entry of Chinese regular forces into the war in late November of that year, the balance of ground force strength tilted back in favor of the communists, and was reversed only for a short period during the summer and early fall of 1951. As subsequent discussion will indicate, those two periods of UNC superiority witnessed the most significant concessions by the communist leadership toward the ultimate truce settlement. Table I shows the comparative ground

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[3] United States, Department of the Army, *Korea—1950* (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, GPO, 1952), p. 151.

TABLE I

COMMUNIST AND UNITED NATIONS GROUND FORCES, JUNE 1950 TO JULY 1951[4]

	June 25 1950	*mid-Aug. 1950*	*mid-Oct. 1950*	*Nov. 25 1950*	*July 10 1951*
Communist	135,000	105,000	90,000	480,000	460,000
Korean-UNC	65,000	92,000	190,000	360,000	550,000

strength of the two sides over the first year of the war, up to the time truce negotiations began.

The communist forces launched three full-scale offensives between their initial attack in June 1950 and the opening of truce negotiations in July 1951. During the same period, the United Nations Command mounted three counteroffensives of similar intensity. In the climactic period between mid-September 1950 and mid-January 1951, the Inchon landing and breakout from the Pusan perimeter nearly achieved the destruction of the NKPA. This was, in fact, the primary objective assigned to the army corps that landed at Inchon, and it was much more successful than General MacArthur's UNC headquarters realized at the time. One postwar analysis concluded that only about 25,000 NKPA soldiers slipped through the pincers movement linking the Inchon-Pusan forces, although at least an equal number of North Korean troops melted into the countryside to escape capture, later to become a dangerous guerrilla force.[5]

Having failed to destroy the North Korean army in order to create conditions for a durable peace, the United Nations Command launched the ill-fated Yalu offensive in October 1950. It is important to note, however, that the decision to pursue the North Korean forces was largely instrumental in prompting a fundamental change in the character of the war — one that gave the United Nations offensive much more of a political than a tactical character. Originally, General MacArthur had been restricted in the use of South Korean forces north of the 38th Parallel, but the untenability of this constraint soon became apparent in attempting to carry out the original mission to destroy the enemy army. Inasmuch as the United Nations at the time recognized only one Korea and perceived the 38th Parallel as never more than an administrative line separating the occupation forces, one wonders why such voluntary constraints on the UN forces had been considered. In any event, the political realities and the realization that the North Korean forces were vastly inferior led to the United Nations General Assembly resolution on October 7, 1950, which changed the objective of the UNC to include the forcible reunification of the Korean peninsula. Thereafter, guidance to General MacArthur regarding how far northward he was to carry his offensive became more and more ambiguous, until by mid-November he had been left to his own discretion.

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 77, 232; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, GPO, 1966), pp. 77, 513; and David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), pp. 16, 43, 48, 148, 184-185.

[5] Robert D. Heinl, *Victory at High Tide* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), p. 248.

When Chinese communist regular forces entered the war with a massive attack late in November, the only thing that saved the UN forces from slaughter or capture was the availability of a large naval force to remove and re-land more than 100,000 troops from Hungnam. After this near-disaster, the enlarged conflict took on a seesaw pattern that featured three more large-scale offensive operations. First, the rebuilt United Nations Command regained most of the ground lost south of the 38th Parallel, as Figure 1 shows, and advanced about ten miles beyond it along the central and eastern portions of the front. Then a communist "human sea" spring offensive between late April and mid-May 1951 moved the front thirty miles south, but failed to retake Seoul or seriously cripple the UNC army. This was immediately followed by another counteroffensive that carried the United Nations forces back across the "38th" to points thirty or more miles north of that line — a few miles north of the present dividing line in Korea, as Figure 1 indicates.

The foregoing account can be examined on two bases: the extent of offensive pressure exerted by each party and the effects attained. The advance from the Pusan perimeter to the vicinity of the Yalu River may be discounted as a factor influencing the decision to open truce negotiations, coming as it did before China's entry into the war. As MacArthur declared at the time: "We have a new war." In the period between January and June 1951, the movement of the front lines back and forth across the 38th Parallel was much more relevant to subsequent decisions at the negotiation table. The movement during these six months, the last phase of any appreciable frontal mobility during the war, represented a fairly accurate picture of the relative force each side



FIGURE 1

THE SHIFTING
BATTLEFRONT:
JANUARY-JUNE 1951[6]

Wonsan
Kosong
Iron Triangle
Pyonggang
Kumsong
Chorwon
Kumhwa
Punchbowl
Kaesong
38th Parallel
Panmunjom
Munsan
Tactical Salient
(May 16-19)
Seoul
Inchon

Key to Front-line Symbols

- ● ● ● ● ● ● First Communist Offensive (January 24, 1951)
- — — — — UNC Spring Offensive (April 21, 1951)
- ● | ● | ● | ● Second Communist Offensive (May 19, 1951)
- ——— UNC Summer Offensive (June 24, 1951)
- X X X X X Present Truce Line (DMZ)

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[6] United States, Department of the Army, *Korea, 1951-1953* (Washington: Office of Chief of Military History, GPO, 1956), Maps 1-7, *passim*.

was able to exert, whether such force was limited by the counter-pressure of the opponent or by instructions from the political superiors of the military commander. It was the high-level decision of the United Nations, and the U.S. government in particular, that brought the action to a standstill after truce negotiations began.

The numbers of casualties each side suffered, and the ratio of casualties between the two sides as the action shifted from offense to defense, were also of relevance in judging the effects of the combat efforts adopted. Not surprisingly, the loss ratio heavily favored the United Nations Command, since the communist forces threw masses of troops into their offensive thrusts and willingly expended more thousands in resisting UN offensives. Since this massive use of troops and their expendability in the achievement of objectives typified the communists' conduct of the war, the mere measurement of casualty rates has no significant bearing on the decision to negotiate a settlement. Up to the final United Nations thrust that carried the front to the vicinity of the present truce line, communist losses were about fifteen times the number inflicted on the United Nations Command. This was also the approximate ratio during the May-June 1951 period of UNC offensive efforts, although at the start of that drive the communists lost nearly twenty-five men for each one lost by the United Nations.[7]

After the action settled into an essentially static mode in anticipation of truce talks early in July 1951, the ratio of losses fell to less than 12:1. Fewer of those losses were in prisoners captured, and more in either killed or wounded; overall losses dwindled to about one-third of the numbers lost per day during the earlier fighting.[8] The most that can be gleaned from analysis of casualty rates is that, in general, relatively static combat favored the communist forces regarding loss ratios and significantly reduced the total number of casualties, the factor about which the United Nations Command was most concerned. Thus, both parties became more amenable to a stalemate and to negotiations in preference to any large-scale resumption of the seesaw offensive war.

How did combat actions affect attitudes toward seeking peace through negotiations? One highly significant overture for a truce preceded the Yalu offensive and the October 7, 1950 resolution by the UN General Assembly, which authorized General MacArthur to take steps to "ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."[9] By the first week of October, the Soviet Union could see that the war was going badly for the North Koreans, that the General Assembly was preparing to broaden the war aims of the United Nations Command to include the reunification of Korea under armed supervision, and that the Chinese People's Republic was probably ready to enter the war. Whether the Vishinski cease-fire proposal of October 3 was motivated by a genuine wish for peace, a pragmatic desire to settle now rather than face defeat, or the political urge to retain Soviet primacy in North Korea is impossible to answer on the basis of evidence available in the United States. We do know that, until the Korean War began, U.S. efforts to induce Soviet cooperation with respect to a reunification of Korea had been unavailing. It can be surmised that it was the threat of losing all influence in North Korea, as well as the impending debate in the General Assembly on the resolution calling for the forcible reunification of Korea, that led the Soviet Union, through Delegate Andrei Vishinski, to propose that, along with a cease-fire and a withdrawal of all non-Korean armed forces, there should be nationwide elections conducted by a commission, jointly drawn up by the North Korean and South Korean Assemblies, and supervised by a United Nations observer organization.[10]

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[7] For the specific figures on which this statement is based, see indexed summaries of the *New York Times,* May 25, 1951 through July 14, 1951.

[8] *Ibid.,* July 12-14, 1951.

Between January and June 1951 a number of official and private meetings were staged with Soviet, Chinese and North Korean leaders in an effort to bring about an agreement on holding peace talks. The communist leaders also were calling for peace talks, but with the proviso that two commitments be agreed upon as "essential preconditions to negotiations": (1) recognition of the Peking government as the only legitimate Chinese government, entitled to the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council; and (2) a commitment by the major powers to

[9] United Nations, General Assembly, *Official Records*: *Fifth Session, Supplement No. 20*, A/1775 (New York: United Nations Press, 1950), pp. 9-10.

[10] See *New York Times*, October 3, 1950, pp. 1, 10. The Vishinski proposal, defeated by a 5-46 vote, is essentially what the United States tried to bring about in Korea in the 1945-1947 period. Thereafter, the United Nations, through a temporary commission on Korea, attempted to hold elections throughout the country but was prevented from crossing north of the 38th Parallel, with the result that one legitimate nation, the Republic of Korea, was created by elections in May 1948, and one *de facto* government, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, was proclaimed in September 1948. Only the Republic of Korea had been recognized by the United Nations at the time of the Soviet proposal. For further documentation and discussion, see United States, Department of State, *The Record on Korean Unification, 1943-1960* (Washington: GPO, 1960), pp. 5-12.

give priority to a discussion of the "Formosan question" in the United Nations General Assembly.[11] This "ransom" was omitted for the first time on April 16, 1951, when the North Korean Foreign Minister addressed a proposal to the General Assembly.[12] Interestingly enough, the bid came only five days after President Truman had summarily relieved General MacArthur; even more significantly, however, it occurred immediately after the communist forces had retreated more than sixty miles in the face of a United Nations offensive that carried the war back to the north side of the 38th Parallel for the first time since the evacuation from Hungnam.

The United States rejected the North Korean proposal as "propaganda," partly because it seemed to harmonize with growing demands by peace groups in the United States for an end to the fighting, partly because of low confidence in the communists' liaison (India), and partly because of the similarity it bore to an Arab-Asian "neutral nations" peace plan that had already been turned aside. Actually, a major obstacle was the division of opinion in the United States between peace advocates and those who wanted force used either to punish or to eliminate the communist regimes of China and North Korea.

Two months later, while United Nations forces were once again advancing, Soviet Delegate to the UN Jacob Malik on June 24 advanced a simple proposal that peace talks could begin if the United Nations wanted to end the war. The United States responded on June 30 with a concrete proposal of its own for negotiations: the plan to begin talks aboard the Danish hospital ship *Jutlandia,* which would be anchored in Wonsan Bay. Without answering that proposal, Chinese leaders on July 2 proposed the opening of negotiations at Kaesong. Rather than proceed with the then imminent capture of that city, the U.S. government directed the United Nations Commander to halt his advance and accept the Chinese offer without further question.[13] That response, which created the impression of urgency and readiness to make important concessions to end the war, adversely affected subsequent negotiations. At least three months elapsed before the Kaesong arrangement was rejected and Panmunjom was substituted as a site for the truce talks. More than simply that delay, the Kaesong decision probably helped to prolong the eventual negotiations by impressing the communist negotiators from the outset that the United States was far more anxious for peace than they were.

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[11] See *New York Times,* January 12, 1951, pp. 1, 4, and January 14, 1951, p. 1.

[12] *Ibid.,* April 17, 1951, p. 1.

[13] Patrolling forces of the United Nations Command had entered Kaesong unopposed on June 22, and again on July 5. See *ibid.,* June 22, 1951, p. 1; July 5, 1951, p. 1.

The unity of the United States leadership was seriously breached during this pre-negotiations period by the Truman-MacArthur dispute. Ostensibly the breach in command ended with the sudden recall of General MacArthur on April 11, but the controversy triggered by it grew in intensity at least until late June 1951, while the Senate conducted lengthy hearings into U.S. military and foreign policy toward the Far East. This debate did not restrain General Van Fleet's Eighth Army from resuming the offensive after stopping the communist spring attack on May 19, but it did dictate the establishment of limited objectives for the army's advance beyond the 38th Parallel, including setting a predetermined line across the peninsula that would ultimately become the basis of the truce boundary. Like his predecessors, Van Fleet personally favored a stronger drive against the enemy, but there were also good reasons for limiting the action to this general area of Korea. As MacArthur stated in his dramatic speech before a joint session of Congress on April 19:

> . . . if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy used his full military potential.[14]

It is difficult to judge the impact of this controversy on the North Korean and Chinese leaders. Would the alternative favored by some American officials — buildup for a broader war to bring down the Chinese communist regime — have stiffened their resistance or made them more eager to settle? During this time, they surely were aware of the growing publicity attending the demonstrations of various American peace movements, but their ability to evaluate these happenings is open to doubt.[15] As the controversy intensified, and expanded into a review of the United

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[14] Douglas MacArthur, *Duty, Honor, Country,* a reprinting of three famous speeches by MacArthur (New York: Rolton, 1962), p. 16. Also see MacArthur's biographic work, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 404.

[15] For example, there were nationwide marches by the American Peace Crusaders, and violence-marked peace demonstrations in San Francisco at the time of President Truman's meeting with MacArthur and his recall from the Far East. See *New York Times,* March 16, 1951, p. 27; April 18, 1951, p. 6.

States' China policy, it spawned an increasing number of peace initiatives, some of which apparently had Moscow's support.[16] In the final analysis, China and North Korea seemed more reluctant than the Soviet Union to begin negotiations during the spring of 1951. The successful May-June offensive by the United Nations Command must have influenced their willingness to talk. Yet, their intransigence at the negotiating table indicates clearly that the communists counted on reaping the benefits of American eagerness to halt the fighting.

THE EARLY PERIOD OF NEGOTIATIONS

Most of the progress toward ultimate agreement on the terms of the armistice took place in the five-month period between October 25, 1951 and March 25, 1952. The only significant agreement that had been reached prior to this period was the adoption of the agenda, a task that consumed three weeks and eleven plenary sessions. Progress began after the negotiations had been moved to Panmunjom following a month and a half of tempered optimism, and two months of utter frustration, accompanied by fresh fighting.

A recess in the talks at Kaesong had been unilaterally imposed by communist negotiators on August 22, 1951, ostensibly because of a bomb attack inside the neutralized zone. That "attack" appears to have been a crudely fabricated pretext for stalling, while party leaders thrashed out the party "line" over the question of abandoning the original dividing line along the 38th Parallel. The only issue that remained on March 25, 1952, following five months of real progress, was whether prisoners of war were to be forcibly repatriated or permitted to reject repatriation. Two side issues, the communist negotiators' nomination of the Soviet Union to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and prohibition of the rehabilitation of military airfields following ratification of the armistice, quickly became trade-offs when the United Nations negotiators presented their total solution — the final "package plan" proposal of April 28, 1952.

At the second meeting at Panmunjom on October 28, 1951, three days after resuming the talks, the communists agreed to the principle of settling the truce boundary along the then current line of contact. By that time they had good reason for conceding the point, because the United Nations Command was in the midst of a strong offensive drive that was halted only when the truce agreement had been settled. The September-October offensive of 1951, while it moved the front line no more than ten miles northward at any point, nevertheless strongly influenced the subsequent negotiations. Heavy fighting for the Punchbowl, Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge demonstrated both the ability and the determination of the UN Command to force the communists into new and less favorable defensive positions, barring the resumption of earnest negotiations for a truce. However, as General Van Fleet pointed out, stirring the fighting spirit of United Nations forces and their determination to carry the war to the enemy became difficult after the lull of July-August, once hopes for peace had been raised.[17] The lull had also allowed communist forces to dig in for a standstill war.

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[16] *Ibid.*, May 27, 1951, Section IV, p. 5. Concerning the Soviet Union, see *ibid.*, May 19, May 24 and May 27, 1951, v.p.

The UNC fall offensive terminated when liaison meetings reopened between subordinates of the two chief negotiators at Panmunjom in mid-October, although some last-minute skirmishing developed as soon as the surveying team began laying out a demarcation line across the peninsula along the "line of contact." In retrospect, it seems that the communists were trying to embarrass the United Nations negotiators by seizing one or two hills through "human sea" assaults immediately after the surveyors had marked them out on their maps as lying south of the dividing line. On the other hand, there may have been diehard troop commanders among the North Korean or Chinese forces who did not want to settle for peace. In either event, the response of UN forces was to press a counterassault until the position in question had been retaken, along with some additional ground.[18] Those who have seen the area along the present DMZ can recognize that the terrain on either side of the truce line, from the center to the eastern coastline, was of no economic value, though it was of considerable importance to military forces seeking to solidify their defenses. In the end, negotiators for the communist forces settled in late November for that condition they had aspired to from the moment the negotiations had reopened: a *de facto* cease-fire arrangement at the fighting front while they pressed their same objectives in the battle of words in the truce tent. They insisted on limiting discussions to the first item on the agenda, the settling of a demarcation line, because this was the point on which they felt vulnerable. By insisting that each item be finalized as it came up, they hoped to ensure that the truce line would remain fixed while they negotiated for other points which were by then of greater importance.

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[17] *Ibid.*, October 1, 1951, p. 3, and "UN Ground Commander Reports on Summer Campaign," *Department of State Bulletin*, October 8, 1951.

[18] Arleigh A. Burke, "The Hazards of Negotiating with the Communists," *Reader's Digest*, October 1968, pp. 122-123. Admiral Burke was one of the original members of the UNC's negotiating team.

Although UNC negotiators had entered the truce tent with an edge in troop strength, this did not hold for long. Casualties for UNC personnel, which had fallen to about 400 per week prior to the fall offensive, more than trebled in September and October 1951, while for the enemy they only doubled (i.e., from 8,400 to 17,000 per week). The ratio of losses, which had been as high as 20:1, fell to 14:1. Moreover, the resumption of negotiations did little to reduce the United Nations' casualty rate, and the ratio of communist to UN losses actually declined slightly as 1951 drew to a close. Communist forces, after being pushed back steadily during the months preceding the decision to reopen negotiations, nearly doubled their forces in Korea by year's end. Table II shows that by July 1953 each side had fielded nearly three times the number of troops deployed in Korea when China entered the war.

TABLE II

COMMUNIST AND UNITED NATIONS GROUND FORCES, JULY 1951 TO JULY 1953[19]

	July 1951	*Dec. 1951*	*July 1952*	*Dec. 1952*	*July 1953*
Communist	460,000	800,000	860,000	900,000	1,200,000
United Nations	550,000	600,000	678,000	768,000	932,000

It was the increase in casualties that had the greatest impact on the conduct of the war, once the truce talks had begun. Statesmen and high-level figures in the U.S. government, sensing a weakening of support at home for continued operations in Korea, imposed restrictions on the military leaders. As a consequence, the Eighth Army came to rely heavily on artillery to soften enemy resistance before U.S. attacks and whenever the enemy took the offensive.[20] The communists, meanwhile, were busily bunkering reverse slopes of the jagged mountains where artillery could not easily penetrate. Both developments tended to limit the conflict to a relatively static duel for hill positions, usually captured at heavy cost. On the less hilly western third of the front, where all aspects of ground warfare could be more mobile, the agreement to neutralize the Kaesong-Panmunjom truce site prevented a more aggressive operation against the communists.

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[19] *Korea, 1951-1953, op. cit.*, p. 277; Hermes, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 513; Rees, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-246, 406.

[20] See *New York Times*, October 1, 1951, p. 3 (Van Fleet report), and October 2, 1951, p. 5 (Hanson Baldwin comment on Van Fleet report). This special report was issued primarily to answer public criticism raised by the casualties we had suffered in seizing "worthless real estate."

United Nations negotiators seemed to have won a round with the establishment of the fighting front, rather than the indefensible 38th Parallel, as the truce dividing line. However, the communists were bidding to win the remaining rounds by default, unless ground combat could be revitalized to measurable UNC advantage. Only UNC pressure upon the enemy in the field had led to the opening of negotiations and then had produced the fruitful five-week period of agreements immediately preceding the current impasse. When the first agenda item was finally initialed to signify interim agreement on November 27, a compromise had been incorporated whereby the line was to remain the permanent truce line, *provided* all other agenda items were also agreed upon within thirty days. Of course, by late December the communist front lines could be so heavily bunkered that there would be little chance of any real change in the positions of the two sides, even in the unlikely event that the United Nations Command chose to launch an attack during the harsh winter season or the muddy spring thaw.

The petty quibbling and maneuvering that took place before the truce-line question was settled strongly suggests that the communists had carefully stalled the agreement until they could assure themselves that there would be no further offensive effort by the UNC until late spring of 1952, at the earliest. For their part, the United Nations negotiators protested this *de facto* cease-fire concession to the deciding authorities in Washington, and accepted the thirty-day compromise only under compulsion. The vain hope that this time limit might prod the communists into accepting a total solution within thirty days soon proved baseless. With that agreement in their pocket, North Korean and Chinese negotiators had no reason to cooperate further with the United Nations Command.

For the next eighteen months — from November 1951 to May 1953 — the cul-de-sac was the prisoner issue, on which the United Nations had taken a moral stand it could not abandon, namely, the principle that no prisoner should be forced to return to his former country. Yet another factor that tended to invite delay rather than concession on any point was the impending Presidential election in the United States, since the incumbent, President Truman, had determined that he would not run again. The situation left no alternative but stalemate. One local offensive effort in June 1952 managed to gain a few advantageous outpost positions communist forces were not able to retake, but this had no visible effect on the negotiations, which were soon to be completely broken off, this time by the United Nations Command. After June 1952 the fighting front remained relatively quiet and stable, while eyes turned to the political scene in the United States. The sharp fighting that erupted in October at the initiative of the communists seems to have been intended to sway American voters toward Adlai Stevenson in the last stages of the campaign when General Dwight D. Eisenhower appeared likely to be the winner. Another motive may have been related to the assumption that American commanders, in their reluctance to absorb higher casualties at that time, might retreat rather than resist heavy enemy attacks. Once again the communists were proven wrong; when the offensive and counteroffensive actions drew to an end, the battle lines emerged unchanged.

Thus, during the stalemate and throughout the remaining period of negotiations, the communists maintained numerical superiority in front-line forces but were unable to force the United Nations Command to give up contested vantage points more than briefly. The UN Command seemed capable of mounting stronger offensive drives than its opponents, as shown in May-June and September-October 1951. Yet, the constraints placed on the command denied it freedom to apply the coercive force that was necessary, while also foreclosing any concession on the political issues, so that there was no way to bring the conflict to a satisfactory conclusion. Whether the first year had afforded an opportunity to end the war by a decisive victory, as MacArthur declared, or whether it was from the beginning destined to be inconclusive, as General Ridgway maintained, is still an open question. We are, however, led to the following conclusions:

(1) The communist forces were anxious to begin negotiations, but were not interested in an early settlement, preferring only temporary relief from the effects of the United Nations' sustained offensive of the spring and summer of 1951.

(2) When the United Nations Command relaxed its military operations after July 1951, the communists were under no pressure to settle issues in the truce tent; instead, they chose to try to outmaneuver or outwait their opponents.

(3) The UNC offensive launched in the fall of 1951 motivated the communists to return to the truce talks, and even to make some concessions in order to be relieved of the pressure of the UNC attack.

(4) Resolution of the remaining issues was again stalemated after October 1951, when the communists recognized that, although they could not drive the United Nations Command out of Korea, they faced no major combat pressure with the signing of the temporary truce-line agreement.

Looking ahead to the eventual agreement on the Korean truce terms, the above conclusions suggest two additional hypotheses relevant to the final phase of the war and the truce negotiation process.

Hypothesis 3: A losing combatant normally requires a period for adaptation, after suffering reverses in battle, before it will offer better terms or accept less favorable terms to settle the conflict.

Hypothesis 4: Additional coercive force may have to be applied against a party to a conflict proven weaker than its opponent before it will take the final step of capitulating to the terms it has been offered.

These hypotheses, along with the previous two, will now be examined in connection with the final period of the Korean War, from February through late July 1953. Once again, we are looking for evidence of the relationship between military factors, political factors, and the processes used in concluding the armistice agreement.

CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

It would strain credibility to suppose that the North Korean and Chinese leaders gave in on the remaining issues simply because this was the logical response to the perseverance of the United Nations Command, and because they were growing weary of a war they could no longer hope to win. What caused the communists to accept terms in 1953 that they had rejected more than a year earlier? The military pressure hypothesis plainly does not hold well, for the war was in virtual stalemate when the final, four-months stage of productive negotiations began. It was only when the prospects of a settlement became quite promising that some of the toughest, bloodiest fighting of the war erupted at the instigation of the communist forces. The explanation, therefore, rests in a combination of the lessons already learned on the battlefield and several essentially political events that entered the equation as 1952 drew to a close.

In considering this final phase of the negotiations, we must recognize that the fundamental impediment to a resolution of the prisoner issue related to vast differences in ideology. To the communists it was inconceivable that the United Nations Command would hold out indefinitely, absorbing an average of 30,000 casualties per year, simply to ensure the freedom and welfare of 90,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners who allegedly intended to resist forcible repatriation. From their perspective, even the tacit inference that such large numbers of their personnel would rather not return to their families and homelands under communist control was intolerable because of the "field day" this would give to Free World propaganda. In the end this bitter pill had to be swallowed for the sake of a cease-fire arrangement, giving greater substance to the hypothesis that the communists would eventually respond to force. Because our own broadcast services and spokesmen in the United Nations and elsewhere refrained from making political capital of this "black eye" on communist claims to Utopia, the enemy negotiators found ways to ease the stigma and quickly wrap up the truce arrangements at a time when other events crowded for public attention.

Several political leaders with direct influence on the bargaining positions had been replaced during the final year of the war. Although the advent of new policy voices could only confuse things and delay settlement, postwar analysis and the opinions of chief participants on the United Nations side suggest that the changes had little effect, with two major exceptions. In May 1952, General Matthew Ridgway was replaced by General Mark W. Clark, a man seasoned by his postwar experience in Austria in dealing with Soviet communists at the negotiation table, and for that reason a bit more inclined to apply military pressure. At roughly the same time, General William K. Harrison replaced Admiral C. Turner Joy as the chief United Nations negotiator. The United Nations Commander also elevated the South Korean representative at Panmunjom to the status of participant rather than observer, reflecting the new realities as South Korean forces came to outnumber those of the United States and other nations at the fighting front. South Korean President Syngman Rhee won reelection in a lopsided, if also undemocratic, plebiscite in August 1952, but Rhee's often strident voice had not really impacted significantly on the course of negotiations prior to April or May

1953. Two events that spelled the difference between stalemate and agreement were the landslide election of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as the next President of the United States and the death of Joseph Stalin.

Not long after Eisenhower won the election, he fulfilled a campaign pledge by traveling to Korea to see for himself what could be done to end the war. On the basis of Eisenhower's "mandate for change," General Clark and other Far Eastern field commanders felt that he might opt for an all-out action to end the war either by forcing the communists to sue for peace or by pushing them behind the Yalu River. In fact, by his own predilections and the strength of the popular vote he had won, Eisenhower was personally committed to pursuing peace through negotiations, much to the disappointment of military chiefs on the scene. However, he did several things that kept the communists guessing, and the evidence shows that they may have fundamentally misjudged the new President. One may assume their guiding premise was that a renowned general who had led his allied troops to victory in Europe would be much more inclined to press aggressively for a military solution to the impasse than President Truman, who had kept the military forces in check.

When Eisenhower returned to the United States in December 1952, he held a lengthy private meeting with General MacArthur, which gave strong encouragement to rumors of a new United Nations offensive. Feints were made in an amphibious assault behind the front lines near Wonsan, and only a few weeks after Eisenhower's inauguration new orders to the U.S. Seventh Fleet lifted earlier restraints, in effect "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist forces so that they could at least threaten, if not actually carry out, an attack on the mainland of China. Nuclear weapons of a tactical nature were moved to U.S. bases on Okinawa — they could not be landed in Japan or Korea because of restrictive provisions in alliance agreements — and the Eisenhower Administration let it be discreetly suggested in diplomatic circles, notably by India, and at the Panmunjom liaison staff meetings that the United States was actively considering the use of atomic bombs to end the war if the communists did not come to terms soon.[21]

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[21] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change, 1953-1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 179-181; Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: Harper Bros., 1956), pp. 115-117. In his preface to *Korea, 1950-1953* (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1969), p. 9, Edgar O'Ballance observes: "It was only when they thought atomic weapons were about to be used against them that

Stalin had exercised direct control over political decisions pertaining to the Korean conflict, just as he had wielded absolute power over affairs in the Soviet Union. The extent of Soviet authority over the Chinese and Korean war effort is evidenced not only by the nature of the communist alliance system at the time and Soviet provision of almost all the war matériel, but also by information concerning the origin and conduct of the war. The unique, monolithic nature of Stalin's authority strongly suggests that, until his death, peace through negotiations in Korea was impossible. Communist dogmas – the historical inevitability of the triumph of Marxism-Leninism, the infallibility of the great Stalin's decisions, the decadence of capitalist leadership – weighed against an agreement. To settle for a draw in the contest and an uneasy truce in the same general area of the peninsula where the war had begun threatened the foundation of Stalin's power and authority. Thus, the death of Joseph Stalin on March 5, 1953 presented a new opportunity for peace, especially since it ushered in a period of internal rivalry and instability within the Kremlin.

Events in Korea at the time of Stalin's death seemed to bear directly on the way combat and truce negotiations proceeded. Beginning in late February, communist forces launched a series of strong offensives aimed at taking coveted UNC positions in the Pork Chop Hill area, and these continued without success until mid-April, by which time earnest negotiations had begun. The UN Commander's letter suggesting that at least sick and wounded prisoners be exchanged, as required by the Geneva Conventions and strongly urged by the Executive Committee of the Red Cross Societies at Geneva two months earlier, would have reached communist leaders about ten days before Stalin died, having been turned over at Panmunjom on February 22, 1953. Only a week or so after top-level Chinese and Korean leaders had returned from the burial rites in Moscow, and some intensive conferences at the Kremlin, the real break in the deadlock came: their March 28 response not only gave consent to the "Little Switch" prisoner exchange but also suggested that this act be followed immediately by renewed negotiations to settle the entire prisoner issue.

A prompt reply from the United Nations Commander showed unmistakable interest in a truce, but held to the former line that negotiations could be resumed only if the communists accepted

the Communists concluded an armistice agreement." Many other memoirs and books reflect this idea, even though most are inclined to count nuclear threats as only one of the factors in the decision to arrange for peace in Korea.

one of the three "final offers" of the United Nations Command or had something concrete of their own to propose. An immediate, lengthy statement from Premier Chou En-lai on March 30 essentially accepted the United Nations prisoner proposal, leaving in question only a few details concerning the length of time prisoners were to be subject to "explanations" by communist comrades under the auspices of the neutral nations commission. The fact that three more months elapsed after the "Little Switch" prisoner exchange had been completed on April 26 is directly attributable to President Rhee's obstinate determination to resist a solution that left Korea divided. In the end, he too had to bow to pressure, and the armistice was finally concluded on July 27, 1953, along the same frontier and on the same terms offered a year earlier.

Intentionally or not, the enemy solved the "Rhee problem" for the United Nations Command in the most effective way possible. On June 10, with armistice arrangements proceeding in executive sessions (i.e., with the press and observers excluded), the communists directed full-scale attacks against the heavily fortified United Nations positions, *carefully taking aim only at those sectors defended by South Korean Army forces.* Those attacks were in division strength or larger, and in each case the result was to force the ROK units back several miles. After a lull in fighting at the end of June, during which the front had been reinforced at several points by additional South Korean forces — and with the signing of the armistice agreement only two weeks away — the Chinese attacked again on July 13, once more throwing massive strength against ROK Army positions. The carnage in those two thrusts was unprecedented: in only eight days of hard fighting in June, the Chinese lost 6,600 men, and the South Koreans 7,400; in seven days of combat in July, Chinese losses amounted to more than 72,000 of which 25,000 were killed.[22] The prosecution of the war during the final three months was actually more intense than at any previous period, as the following table of losses shows.

TABLE III

CASUALTIES DURING THE APRIL TO JULY 1953 PERIOD[23]

	April	*May*	*June*	*July*
Communists	10,500	16,454	36,346	72,112
United Nations	4,343	7,570	23,161	29,629

[22] *Korea, 1951-1953, op. cit.*, pp. 282-283.
[23] Hermes, *op. cit.*, p. 477.

The communists' purpose in launching such heavy attacks on the eve of an armistice may not have been as irrational as it appears at first glance. In propaganda terms, the six-mile advance they registered could be publicized as proof of their superiority over the South Korean and United Nations forces, at a time when the realities of the military situation were being reflected in final, secret sessions at Panmunjom. On the other hand, the inability of communist forces to accomplish more in these offensives may have been the proof needed to convince communist leaders of the basic necessity to accept a negotiated solution along the existing line of combat. The few miles of territory gained were of little value, but the "lesson" taught to Rhee and his ROK Army might have justified the absorption of even higher casualties. In any event, the mutual commitment to a negotiated solution remained firm, even when Rhee, on June 17, impetuously directed the release of some 27,000 prisoners of war guarded by his men but under UN command. That action delayed but did not alter the final armistice agreement.

Conclusions About Truce Negotiations

The Korean War experience in general bears out the two principal hypotheses regarding the essentiality, especially in limited war, of a strong, stable political regime to direct war policy, and of the vital role coercive pressure on the opponent plays in achieving success in negotiations commensurate with the margin of military superiority a given side enjoys. The inconsistencies in enemy behavior, and the two-year delay in arriving at an armistice arrangement after the enemy recognized that he could not win on the battlefield, clearly indicate the complexity there may be in negotiations to bring about peace in a limited war. The United Nations Commanders' difficulties in dealing with South Korean President Syngman Rhee also illustrate the problems that beset an international authority responsible for affairs which impinge upon the sovereignty of an invaded nation, and the touchiness of diplomacy in the face of sometimes unreasonable nationalism.

If conclusions are to go much beyond the foregoing generalizations, however, some device becomes necessary to demonstrate the relative combat intensity, the effects on the comparative strength of opposing forces revealed through that combat, and the relationship of pertinent events to the occasions when significant bargaining took place. Although the relative position of the front line, shown in Figure 2, is an important index of which side is carrying on a successful campaign, after the first year (when truce negotiations had begun) the front changed very little, remaining about twenty miles north of the 38th Parallel from the center through the easterly half of the Korean peninsula. Relative combat intensity, as plotted on Figure 2, requires more attention, so that we may analyze more closely the five occasions indicated by the arrows along the oscillating curve. "Maximum Effort" in military parlance represents such intense fighting that it could be sustained for only one or two weeks before physical and logistical endurance limits intervened to reduce combat sharply. "Full Engagement" means a level of warfare in all sectors of the front that is at or near the maximum sustainable level of combat. This would most typically be a major campaign, for which planning and preparation might for several weeks precede commencement of the operation. "Local Campaigns" represent an effort confined to a specific sector of the front, ordinarily engaging forces no larger than a division. "Local Patrolling" signifies that there is no planned effort to capture an objective area, and entails essentially routine operations with a company or perhaps a battalion on the move, joined with enemy forces.

In light of Figure 2's schematic representation of combat and its effects, let us consider the three occasions in the pre-negotiation period when hope of a settlement might have been encouraged. (1) The Vishinski peace offer of October 3, 1950 was in some ways the most significant, since it went farther than any offer before or since in proposing to reunite Korea via a supervised, peacefully conducted plebiscite. By benefit of hindsight, it seems to have been quite sincere, but it was premature. The United Nations Command had by then foreseen the total collapse of the North Korean People's Army and was not inclined to stop and negotiate for what it thought it could impose by force. (2) On April 16, 1951, the North Korean Foreign Minister offered for the first time to settle the conflict without reference to the extraneous issues pertaining to China. Coming amid the agitation attending General MacArthur's recall, that offer was also ignored, but it may have been sincere since the communists, though waging offensive war for over two months, had actually been forced back north of the 38th Parallel at most points. (3) The Malik proposal, unencumbered with *details,* triggered the Kaesong truce meetings, after the UN Command had advanced even farther across the 38th Parallel in steady pursuit of the enemy.

Truce negotiations became quagmired only twice over a major

FIGURE 2

COMBAT INTENSITY AND EFFECTS VERSUS TIME RELATIONSHIPS[24]



Figure 2 (continued)



[24] Data for the figure were taken from the Department of the Army accounts, *Korea—1950* and *Korea, 1951-1953, op. cit., passim*; Hermes, *op. cit.*; and Rees, *op. cit.*

issue, and each of these was rapidly settled once pressure or a change of political leaders had occurred. On both occasions talks were suspended indefinitely, and it was the North Korean-Chinese governments that asked for their resumption. The first time, the communists broke off the talks on August 22, 1951, but came back on October 21 anxious to settle for the current line of contact as the truce DMZ. They had good reason to do so, as we have seen, since they were in steady retreat after more than a month of relentless attack. What they were losing at the front line, they were able to consolidate for the next several months — as it turned out, indefinitely — by waiting until winter overtook any United Nations desire to resume the offensive. All of these circumstances clearly support Hypothesis 2 with respect to the necessity of applying force to bring about greater commitment to a negotiated solution.

The Chou En-lai letter of March 30, 1953, which accepted the United Nations demands on the prisoner-of-war issue reflects less the effects of coercive pressure and more the consequences of Stalin's death, although there is no way to measure how much the "get tough" hints of the Eisenhower Administration might have contributed. On that occasion the communists had taken some ground from the UN forces, but that fact seemingly did not alter the field commanders' recognition of the necessity to secure at least a draw in combat while pursuing the best possible settlement through negotiations. Obviously, they must have given considerable credence to the threats of a wider war if a suitable armistice could not soon be achieved. The real question in their minds — which they raised candidly in their first communication to the United Nations Commander after Rhee's troops on the night of June 17 had released 27,000 prisoners unwilling to be repatriated — was not whether the United Nations wanted to disturb truce negotiations, but rather whether the United Nations in fact controlled the "Rhee clique" and, if it did not, what assurance there could be that South Korea would be made to live up to the armistice terms. As was pointed out above, it was communist military force that served to bring President Rhee to the realization that his nation could not fight on alone.[25]

Two supplementary hypotheses have been stated; they attempt to specify how the weaker side can be made to accept the fact of its weakness and to bargain in earnest for peace. The essential points concern the *necessity* and *timing* of applying sufficient force to obtain the desired results. Communist behavior in the Korean War was quite consistent with the doctrines of "protracted conflict" and "historic inevitability." However, both Lenin and Mao Tsetung caution that it is necessary to avoid a decisive engagement when victory is uncertain. The enemies' behavior from the onset of the stalemate in Korea in mid-1951 confirms that there was consensus on this point, yet the war went on. It took two months of suspended negotiations in the fall of 1951 before North Korean, Chinese, and – one supposes – Soviet leaders reached agreement to settle along the existing line of combat rather than the 38th Parallel. When negotiations resumed, with communist forces in steady retreat, agreement to United Nations demands was obtained within six days. Likewise, when liaison meetings for the wounded prisoner exchange (Little Switch) began on April 6, 1953, full agreement and all necessary arrangements were achieved in five days. In the latter case, however, the agreement materialized only after a year of fruitless struggle and the death of the Soviet dictator. It does not yet appear feasible to assign precise terms to the timing factor, but the circumstances support both hypotheses in the general sense that time to adapt policies and added force to overcome hesitation are necessary before the weaker opponent in a limited war situation will yield. President Rhee also had to back down from his adamant stand concerning the partition of Korea after his field forces had been humbled in the bloody clashes of June and July 1953.

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[25] Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper Bros., 1954), pp. 282, 291-294.

Where does the Free World stand, then, if force is necessary in order to resolve limited conflict? Must restraint be a wholly one-sided proposition? Consider the famous attack on the Suiho hydroelectric dam, long before the end of the stalemate, in which this and other nearby targets were destroyed or damaged in an effort requiring pinpoint accuracy to avoid letting our bombs fall on the other side of the Yalu River. This had been considered an untouchable sanctuary for years. Yet, when it was struck, neither retaliation nor frontal escalation by enemy forces resulted. There was instead only prolongation of the war; the restraint demonstrated by the communist forces was based on the rational recognition that a final, vengeful blow would be counterproductive to their long-term interest.

On the basis of this study, one can reasonably conclude that force is a necessary, but not invariably sufficient, condition for attaining success in negotiating a truce in a limited war. At the same time, since the argument for waging conflict on a more decisive level is apt to be popular, one needs to distinguish between obtaining a truce and negotiating a (presumably final) peace settlement. The very concept of limited war is undermined for the weaker side once the more powerful party abandons what had been rational, initial restraints. Subtle but important differences can be distinguished between the violation of the Yalu sanctuary for the Suiho attack, which was aimed at crippling warmaking potential, and the amendment of the earlier United Nations stand on October 7, 1950, which in effect authorized General MacArthur to attempt the forcible reunification of Korea. It is possible to argue that there might be a peaceful, unified, noncommunist Korea today, accomplished with perhaps 100,000 fewer casualties on our side, if the United Nations Command had accepted the Vishinski formula when it was offered on October 3. Once the political objective of reunification was injected into the conflict, powerful resistances arose to prevent a negotiable peace. These barriers have only slowly and partially eroded in the ensuing decades.

ELITE IN CRISIS: THE FAILURE OF MUJIB-YAHYA-BHUTTO NEGOTIATIONS*

by Rounaq Jahan

THE partition of India and the birth of Pakistan in 1947 has often been explained in terms of elite conflict. The conflicting interests of the rising Muslim middle class and the pre-existing Hindu middle class could not be reconciled in the framework of a united India: hence, the creation of two separate states. After independence Pakistan continued to be ruled by a small elite with a narrow base of social support. The masses in whose name the new state was created played no role in policy inputs, and even the various pressure groups,[1] whom the elite presumably represented, had little to say in the decision-making process. The ruling elite was remarkably free of constraints arising from its constituencies. Elite bargaining, maneuvering and alliances were, therefore, relatively easy and flexible, narrow power interests being the general guiding principle.

But the social change and modernization that Pakistan underwent, especially during the decade of Ayub Khan's administration (1958-1968), resulted in the multiplication and strengthening of the various social groups, and they made increasing claims on the political system.[2] Elite bargaining gradually became more complex and tenuous. The mass movement of 1968-1969 that led to Ayub's fall from power brought into the limelight a number of mobilized and semi-mobilized social groups. Though the martial law of 1969 put the lid on the movement and sent these groups away from the streets, neither the ruling elite nor the counter elite[3] could ignore them or their demands.

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*Adapted from a paper presented at the National Seminar on Pakistan and Bangladesh, held at Columbia University in February 1972. Throughout the article reference is made to East Pakistan rather than Bangladesh, because that is the term that obtained prior to March 25, 1971.

[1] Pressure group is used as a general term in this article, to include both formal and informal groups; pressure group and social group are used interchangeably.

[2] For a detailed discussion of this thesis, see my *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), and S. J. Burki, *Social Groups and Development: A Case Study of Pakistan* (forthcoming, Harvard University Press).

[3] The term counter elite simply refers to the elite in both East and West Pakistan who challenged the regime and wanted a transfer of power. It includes Bhutto in the West and Mujib in the East.

Soon after taking power, the military regime of Yahya Khan adopted a number of conciliatory policies specifically designed to placate the groups spearheading the mass movement. New education and wage policies were announced to meet the demands of students and labor, and pay scales for the salaried professionals were improved. To pacify the political parties, the other key group of the mass movement, the regime promised an early return to democracy and constitutional rule, and set a countrywide general election date as a first step toward the transfer of power into civilian hands.

If the military regime was somewhat responsive to the various social groups, the counter elite could hardly be expected to be oblivious of them. Indeed, during 1969-1970 the different political parties carefully cultivated these groups. But as the constituencies became more assertive, the elite lost some of its freedom of bargaining. The failure of the Pakistani elite to resolve the political crisis of 1971 can best be understood in the context of the increasing constituency pressures on the elite.

This article will examine some of these conflicting pressures and show that the three principal figures of Pakistan, President Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, failed to come to an accommodation because their respective constituencies often looked upon their interests as mutually exclusive. It will also point out that while there were some real constraints on the elite, their misperceptions of each other's constraints and the consequent lag in elite communication played a key role in their failure to come to a settlement. The first section of the article analyzes the constituencies of the three leaders and focuses on the pressures they brought to bear on the leadership. The second section discusses the electioneering strategies of the three leaders which explain in part their postures and policy options during the crisis. The third section deals with the crisis at length, emphasizing the dynamics of the interaction between constituency constraints and elite responses that led to the breakdown of negotiations.

THE THREE LEADERS AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES

We begin with three questions: What were the constituencies of the three leaders? To what extent were the constituencies' interests in conflict? How autonomous were the leaders? Answers to these questions will shed some light on the strategies followed in attempting to resolve the political crisis of 1971.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman

By all accounts Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was a charismatic figure in 1970. But his emergence as a leader of vast popular appeal was a relatively recent phenomenon. As Mujib himself described it,[4] he spent many years at hard work with the party organization before reaching the top. An understanding of his rise to eminence is useful because it reveals his constituency support. Mujib began his political career as a student leader and spent his early years with the party organization. When the Awami League was established in 1949, he was its first assistant general secretary, at the age of twenty-nine; three years later he became general secretary, continuing in that position until 1966. During the 1950's he consolidated his hold on the party and was instrumental in strengthening the Awami League organization throughout East Bengal, but he was still not the parliamentary leader of the party, and indeed, in 1957, when he was given the option to stay either with the parliamentary party or the party organization, he chose to remain with the organization.

Mujib's metamorphosis from an organization man to a charismatic leader came in the 1960's. After H. S. Suhrawardy's death in 1963, the Awami League suffered a leadership vacuum. As Mujib remained in the background with the organization, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan from West Pakistan was made the party president to play up the Awami League's "national" image. But Nasrullah's unimaginative leadership did nothing to improve the League's strength. After the election of 1965, when he saw the Awami League slipping in popularity,[5] Mujib felt the need to revitalize the party and decided to step forward as the leader. Soon after assuming the party presidency, he launched the Six Points movement,[6] which not only brought the Awami League into the limelight again but made the program's advocate a popular hero.

[4] In his interview with David Frost on television, in February 1972.

[5] In the 1965 National Assembly election the Awami League won only six seats, the National Democratic Front five seats, and the National Awami Party two seats. In the Provincial Assembly election the Awami League won eleven seats and the NDF three seats. Though the elections were indirect and the results in no way indicated the Awami League's real strength in the country, the fact that it had won so few of the opposition seats worried Mujib.

[6] The Six Points movement was launched to popularize Mujib's Six Points program, enunciated in February 1966. Envisioning a loose federation for Pakistan, it gave the federal government power in only two areas, defense and foreign affairs. It provided for two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings of Pakistan and vested the power of taxation in each unit, with the federal government to receive a fixed tax share. The federating units were also to control foreign trade and their own foreign exchange earnings. Finally, they were to have their own militia. The Six Points program was, thus, a radical demand for autonomy for

The ruthless suppression of the movement by the Ayub regime and Mujib's arrest gave him the halo of martyrdom. Throughout 1966-1968, while he was in prison, his popularity increased. The Agartala conspiracy case,[7] instead of destroying his support, helped to build it by magnifying his role as the champion of Bengali rights. By early 1969 when Mujib was freed from prison and was welcomed in Dacca by an unprecedented show of popular support, he stood well above the other leaders and even above his own party.[8] The election of 1970, in which he and his party won 167 out of 169 East Pakistani seats, institutionalized his standing as the supreme leader in East Pakistan.

If the Six Points movement, whose main thrust was the demand of autonomy for East Pakistan, is regarded as the turning point in Mujib's rise to charismatic leadership, one obtains a clearer picture of his constituency support. From the beginning, the Awami League was mainly an East Pakistan party. Suhrawardy's repeated efforts to make it a national party were never successful. It started in 1949 as the spokesman of the budding vernacular elite[9] and increased its mass support by championing the cause of the Bengali nationalist bourgeoisie.[10] From its inception it espoused full regional autonomy for East Bengal and recognition of Bengali as a national language. It drew its major support from students and middle-class groups, i.e., lawyers, businessmen and literati professionals. Students were a key group since they worked as political broker between the Awami League and such other semi-mobilized and unmobilized groups as labor and peasants.

Suhrawardy's efforts to build the Awami League into a national party floundered on the conflicting interests of his bourgeois constituencies in East and West Pakistan. This inner conflict depleted the League's strength in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Mujib, in launching the Six Points program in 1966, appears to have made

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East Pakistan. The movement promoting it depended heavily on symbolic manipulation of Bengali nationalism. It included a call to popularize the use of the Bengali language.

[7] Thirty-three East Pakistani politicians, civil servants and army personnel were charged with conspiracy to bring about East Pakistan's secession from the center. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was one of the defendants in the case.

[8] Mujib's stature can be gauged from the fact that his unconditional release from prison and participation in the Round Table Conference of February-March 1969 was regarded as essential not only by his own party members but also by the leaders of the other parties. It was generally believed that no settlement could work unless it had Mujib's agreement.

[9] For a detailed analysis of the gradual rise of a vernacular elite in East Pakistan, see *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, op. cit.*

[10] For a Marxist interpretation of the Awami League, see S. F. Levine, "The Peoples League Party," in A. M. D'yakov, editor, *Pakistan, History and Economy* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Science, Institute of Oriental Studies, 1959).

up his mind to give up his West Pakistani constituency[11] and maximize support in East Pakistan. The program's demands for autonomy helped him to gain favor in almost all of the mobilized groups of East Pakistan. The rising Bengali business class, which was in part the creation of Ayub's economic policies, was won over to the Awami League because the Six Points meant for it elimination of big-business competition from West Pakistan. Labor and peasant support was gained because the Awami League argued that an end to the exploitation of East Pakistan would lead to a better standard of living for the common man. It was, however, the students and the professionals who remained the Awami League's major constituencies. A survey of the Awami Leaguers elected to the National and Provincial assemblies in 1970 shows that the overwhelming majority belong to the middle-class professions. Out of 287 Awami League members interviewed, 78 were businessmen, 77 lawyers, 28 doctors, and only 50 were landlords or farmers; the remaining 54 belonged to miscellaneous professions, including teachers and journalists.[12] Since the middle-class groups wanted a share in the national pie, they looked upon the West Pakistani bourgeoisie, who had dominated the circles of power for so long, as their natural adversaries.

Thus, though Mujib was supreme over his party and other leaders, he attained his popular appeal by exploiting his image as the champion of Bengali rights. His rise to fame was so closely interwoven with his Six Points that it was difficult for him to reject or amend them when Bhutto's demand to this effect precipitated the political crisis between East and West.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

By 1970 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had also emerged as a charismatic leader. His rise to fame was more meteoric than Mujib's. He came to public life first as Ayub's protégé, when he became a minister in Ayub's cabinet in 1958, and he remained in the cabinet until 1966, all the while escaping the unpopularity of the other ministers. In part this was because as Foreign Minister he was closely associated with Ayub's policy of Sino-Pakistan friendship, which was popular with almost all sections of the people. But it was his anti-Tashkent stand that made Bhutto the darling of the

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[11] After Mujib made the program public, it was severely criticized by the Awami League's president, Nasrullah Khan, among others. The party underwent a schism between pro- and anti-Six Pointers, the latter being generally from West Pakistan.

[12] The breakdown comes from my recent interviews of members of the Bangladesh Constituent Assembly. Data on the members' income and family background also reveal their middle-class station.

West Pakistani youth in the aftermath of the fateful 1965 war with India. Even though he was involved in the disastrous policy of confrontation with India, by dissociating himself from the Tashkent settlement he managed to escape the anti-regime sentiment emanating from the war, and in fact he became a catalyst of opposition sentiments that helped to unseat Ayub in 1969. It is interesting to note that in 1971 Bhutto pursued a similar strategy. Though his anti-Six Points stand and insistence on power-sharing precipitated the military's confrontation with the Awami League, he quickly dissociated himself from the regime, escaped the stigma of the disastrous policy, and finally inherited power after the military defeat.

While Bhutto chose an independent course for himself from 1965 onward, he became a leader to be reckoned with only after spearheading the mass opposition movement in West Pakistan in 1968. His subsequent arrest by the Ayub regime helped to increase his popularity, as was the case with Mujib, and when he was released from prison in February 1969 he was the hero of the mass movement. But he still had strong competitors for political power, such as Daulatana, Wali Khan, Nasrullah and Qayyum. Only after the election of 1970, which marked the end of the "old guard" leadership in West Pakistan, did Bhutto emerge as the supreme leader. His position, however, was not yet comparable to Mujib's; Bhutto's party won the majority of seats in the Punjab and Sindh only — the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan were not under his control.

As mentioned, Bhutto's major constituency was the youth of West Pakistan. Besides the students, his other support groups were labor, literati professionals and lumpenproletariat (i.e., the newly mobilized groups created by Ayub's economic policies but denied participation in the system), as well as a section of the ruling civil-military bureaucratic elite who were dissatisfied with the system and wanted change. These constituencies consisting of disparate elements made his party, the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), somewhat different from leftist parties elsewhere. Indeed, Bhutto's appeal was not so much leftist as nationalist in the sense of being statist, which goes far to explain why his party never gained a foothold in East Pakistan.[13] Like Mujib's in the East, Bhutto's base in the West was made up of students and petty bourgeois groups who were outside the system and demanded an immediate share in power. Conflicts between the two leaders were thus innate in their respective constituency support. Bhutto, however, had one advantage over Mujib: because he never took a firm stand on any particular issue, he was in a relatively better bargaining position.

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[13] Bhutto's concept of a strong center, his anti-India posture, and his prior association with Ayub denied him support in East Pakistan. The students, who formed his major constituency in the West, were in the East already recruited by the Awami League and the leftist National Awami Party.

General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan

Unlike Mujib and Bhutto, Yahya Khan had no aura of charisma. His leadership in the military was not comparable to Mujib's in the Awami League or Bhutto's in the People's Party. Yahya was the head of a clique of generals who came to power in 1969 through a coup. Even though he was not an undisputed leader as Ayub had been, he was a shrewd man who always managed to land on the winning side of factions within the military. He was the youngest general in the Pakistani army and was for a long time an Ayub protégé.

Yahya's constituencies obviously were the military and the old ruling elite, who brought him to power as a defensive maneuver when their position was endangered by the mass movement of 1968-1969. The Round Table Conference (RTC) of leaders convened in February-March 1969 to resolve the country's political impasse failed because the ruling elite was not willing to accede to any fundamental restructuring of power. Ayub in his farewell speech made it explicit that Mujib's alternative demands – for full regional autonomy for East Pakistan and dissolution of the single administrative unit of West Pakistan – were not acceptable as they threatened the position of the military and Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan.[14] The Yahya regime sought a new political order which would, with some concessions to the counter elite, maintain the status quo. The interests of Yahya's constituencies were therefore in conflict with both Bhutto's and Mujib's. The military was especially apprehensive of Mujib and his Six Points, which they felt were a potential threat to their financial support, and hence against their institutional interests.

Thus the three leaders had different constituencies with divergent and potentially conflicting interests. Of the three, two stood above their constituencies, though Mujib had some built-in constraints.

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[14] Rejecting Mujib's constitutional formula, Ayub said in his farewell speech, "it is being proposed that the country be divided into two parts, the center be made a weak and helpless organ, the defense forces be paralyzed completely and West Pakistan's political position be ended. I cannot preside over the destruction of my country." See *New York Times*, March 26, 1969.

THE ELECTION STRATEGIES OF THE THREE LEADERS

It is useful to analyze the election strategies of the three leaders, for some of these strategies limited the scope of post-election elite bargaining and realignments.

Yahya Khan: The Yahya regime took the unusual step of setting a general election date because the 1968-1969 mass movement indicated clearly that the old ruling elite needed new allies in order to maintain its power. The regime expected that the election would either bring to power parties on the right that would not threaten the old elite fundamentally, i.e., the PDP (Pakistan Democratic Party) or the *Islam pasand* parties,[15] or distribute votes to a large number of parties, so that no party would gain a viable majority and the military would be able to preserve its position by working as a mediator and balancer among them. The general expectation was that the Awami League would at best win a bare majority in East Pakistan, which would make it possible for the ruling elite to keep the League out of power; or, should it come to power by dint of West Pakistani alliances, it would be forced to water down its Six Points and consequently not be a threat to the military. During the election campaign both Mujib and Bhutto complained of the regime's active support of the *Islam pasand* parties.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Mujib's election strategy was to obtain a commanding majority in the National Assembly by maximizing support in East Pakistan, a feasible strategy since the East was allocated the majority of Assembly seats by legal order.[16] He looked upon the election as a mechanism that would not only bring him to power, but also help him to win the Bengali rights he championed. During electioneering he had to fight groups to the left and to the right of the Awami League and he emphasized his image of a Bengali nationalist to undercut both groups' support. The Right was easier to deal with. Since Six Points was portrayed as a Magna Charta of Bengali rights, parties to the right of the Awami League, which wanted a strong center, were easily discredited. The Left was a different story. Like the Awami League, it also championed the Bengali cause, and in fact went a little further: maintaining that Bengali rights could not be achieved through electoral and constitutional process, it demanded an immediate armed struggle. After the devastating cyclone of November 1970, Maulana Bhashani, leader of the pro-Peking faction of the National Awami Party, not only voiced the demand for an independent East Bengal but announced his party's decision to boycott the election.[17]

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[15] During electioneering the Pakistani press called the right-wing Islamic parties *Islam pasands.*

[16] The Legal Framework Order, under which the 1970 election was held, recognized the principle of one man, one vote and thus allocated a majority of seats to East Pakistan.

Pressed by the leftist propaganda playing up the futility of the electoral process, Mujib had to show that he could win people's rights without a revolution, by participating in the election. He concentrated on getting his East Pakistan constituency to roll up an overwhelming majority, which he thought would ensure his attainment of power. Mujib's major campaign theme was the promise to frame the constitution on the basis of the Six Points and Eleven Points programs,[18] which, he argued, would usher in a new political order based on regional and human justice. Though the Awami League put up a few candidates in West Pakistan, their defeat was a foregone conclusion and no hard campaigning was done for them. For his West Pakistani alliance Mujib did not depend on the Awami Leaguers but on the regional autonomists of the West, the same strategy that the Bengali leaders had followed in the 1950's.[19]

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: While Mujib always preferred the electoral process as the instrument for the transfer of power, Bhutto had an ambivalent attitude toward elections. When the PPP was established, Bhutto declared it to be both a revolutionary and a constitutional party. In 1968 he announced his candidacy for the Presidency under Ayub's system of indirect election, but a few months later he refused to participate in the Round Table Conference, choosing the mass movement as the proper vehicle for the transfer of power. During electioneering he alternately showed his constitutional and revolutionary faces. His strategy was to pull all the anti-regime forces together, and especially to exploit the new social groups and their demands brought to the surface during the mass movement. Because his party was an amalgam of forces, he appealed to different groups in different languages, and kept his platform relatively vague. The People's Party promised Islamic socialism but the precise nature of that socialism was not spelled out. Bhutto's major campaign theme was the promise of change from the "old guard" leadership. His party did not contest seats in East Pakistan, but his alliance strategy was to keep the maximum number of options open. Although in a PPP pamphlet written in 1967 he had criticized the Six Points and by implication called for a strong center,[20] he refrained from criticizing or publicly rejecting the Six Points program because, as he wrote later, he wanted to keep the way clear to bargain with the Awami League.[21] Thus Bhutto's expectation was to secure enough seats to put him in a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the other parties, especially the Awami League.

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[17] The leftist parties in East Pakistan went through an internal struggle over the question of election boycott. In the pro-Peking NAP faction, the Toha group (Marxist-Leninist) wanted to boycott the election but Bhashani did not, and on this issue Toha left the party. Bhashani at the last moment boycotted the election in spite of his initial decision to participate.

[18] The Eleven Points were demands formulated by the students in East Pakistan in 1969, during the mass movement. Their program incorporated the autonomy demands of the Six Points and a number of demands specifically affecting students. It also called for a socialist economy.

[19] Bhutto charged repeatedly that there was a plan drawn up in London (and hence called the London Plan) by which Mujib had entered into an informal agreement with the West Pakistani autonomists and the Council Muslim League leader, Daulatana.

The election results caught everybody by surprise. The Awami League won a landslide victory in East Pakistan (167 out of 169 seats) and a comfortable majority in the National Assembly (167 seats out of 313). The People's Party became the second largest party in the National Assembly with 81 seats, won mostly from the Punjab and Sindh. Hence, the outlook for the three leaders was a period of post-election maneuvering and readjustments. The military's main hope that a PDP-*Islam pasand* alliance would come to power had been nullified, but the second strategy, that of acting as a mediator, still had possibilities, especially since the PPP and the Awami League appeared to represent conflicting interests and to be proceeding on a confrontation course. Following the election, Bhutto's insistence on power-sharing and the amendment of the Six Points created a crisis situation in the country in which the military could maintain the balance and thus hold on to its key role.

The election outcome far exceeded Mujib's expectations. It gave the Awami League such a commanding majority in the National Assembly that Mujib would not have to seek an alliance to come to power. Yet this overwhelming victory also meant that the pressure for carrying out the electoral mandate was great.[22]

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[20] *Foundation and Policy* (Lahore: PPP, n.d.), pp. 81-88.
[21] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *The Great Tragedy* (Karachi, 1971), pp. 18-20.

Bhutto was left with the greatest freedom of action. His dominance of the Punjab and the Sindh placed him in a strong bargaining position with the Awami League and the military, and his post-election strategy was one of minority dictatorship — a policy similar to the one followed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in the 1930's and 1940's. Bhutto's aim was to head a new government, and he declared that he was not willing to sit in the opposition for the next five years. Thus while he had more flexibility than Mujib, because he was not limited by a clear-cut mandate or a specific platform, his desire to push his way to power immediately had an adverse effect on the prospects of elite accommodation. Let us now consider the policies and responses of the three leaders during the crisis of 1971.

THE CRISIS OF 1971

East Pakistan reflected the confident mood of Mujib and his Awami League, following the election, and there was no talk of secession. The Awami League was busy preparing the mechanisms for assuming power. Elections to the party's various parliamentary offices were held, and League advisers worked on the details of a draft constitution. Mujib himself played up his image as the leader of the majority party in the National Assembly. He interpreted the election victory as a *de facto* transfer of power to him as the head of government, as is the custom in a parliamentary democracy, and chided Yahya for not briefing him on foreign policy issues.[23] But transfer of power to Mujib also meant transfer of power from the center to the East. To symbolize this shift, he stayed in East Pakistan after the election in spite of Bhutto's invitations to visit the West. While previously Bengali leaders had always gone to West Pakistan for bargaining, Mujib saw to it that Bhutto and Yahya came to Dacca for negotiations. His refusal to visit West Pakistan after the election was consistent with his earlier demands that the capital be transferred to East Pakistan,[24] but the whole idea of shifting the power center from

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[22] After the election Mujib declared that he had no power to change the Six Points; since he had won an electoral mandate on that issue, it had become public property.

[23] Mujib's criticism of Yahya occurred in February 1971, in the wake of the hijacking and destruction of an Indian plane at Lahore.

[24] Even during the Six Points movement in 1966, Mujib offered to drop his demands if the capital was shifted to Dacca. After his release from prison in 1969 he again urged that the capital be transferred to Dacca.

West to East was interpreted by Bhutto and Yahya as yet another sign of Mujib's secessionist tendencies. This was just one of the many misperceptions of the elite that led to the slow building up of the crisis.

While Mujib and the Awami League were confident of their electoral strength, they shared with their constituencies a nagging suspicion that the West Pakistani elite would never voluntarily give up its paramountcy. The suspicion was natural, for the Bengali counter elite's previous attempt to get to power had been foiled by the ruling group in the West.[25] Now, the regime's delay in convoking the National Assembly, and signs of increased military preparedness in East Pakistan, were regarded by the Bengalis as evidence of bad faith on the part of the military. Yet in spite of great apprehension about what the regime might be planning,[26] Mujib and the Awami League went ahead with preparations to participate in the National Assembly. That they did not work on a contingency plan, in case the Assembly were quashed, belies the regime's and Bhutto's claims that the League was preparing for secession. Between December 1970 and February 1971 the Awami League was preoccupied with drafting a new national constitution and selecting prospective officeholders. Moreover, Mujib's call for a *lathi* (stick) in a public speech on January 3, which Bhutto interpreted as a threat against West Pakistan, was in fact meant as a warning against the Left in East Pakistan.[27] It appears that until the end of February Mujib was interested above all in being the Prime Minister of Pakistan; he calculated that, given the Awami League's overwhelming popular support and the militant mood of the people in East Pakistan, the

[25] Mujib, in his famous March 7, 1971 speech, eloquently expressed this view. He said, "The history of the last twenty-three years is the history of the agonizing cry of the Bengali. . . . it is the history of the tears of an oppressed people. We gave blood in 1952. In 1954 even though we won the election we were not given the opportunity to rule. By promulgating martial law Ayub Khan kept us in bondage for ten years. In 1966 the Six Point formula was submitted before the people and for this many of my brothers were murdered. . . ."

[26] That the Awami League was aware of the danger of military action was made evident by Mujib's repeated warnings against any conspiracy to thwart the people's mandate. After the March 1 announcement that the National Assembly was being postponed, Mujib told reporters that he had received reports about a conspiracy to obstruct the transfer of power to the people's representative. See *Dawn* (Karachi), March 2, 1971.

[27] After the election, one of the Awami League members of the Provincial Assembly, a former student leader, was killed in Pabna, reportedly by the Left. Some of the League's supporters wanted to take a retaliatory step. Knowing that any break in law and order might give the regime an excuse to delay the Assembly session further, Mujib urged restraints on his followers. He said that when the time came *he* (not the Left) would give the call for revolution and asked the people to be ready with a *lathi* (stick).

regime could not rationally take the decision to set the National Assembly aside.

Although the emergence of Bhutto in the West and Mujib in the East foretold of conflict to come, the country felt a sense of crisis only at the end of January, when Bhutto came back from Dacca having failed to gain concessions from Mujib. The full details of the Mujib-Bhutto talks have not yet been made public.[28] From all accounts it appears that Bhutto's demands for power-sharing were rejected. After his disastrous experience of participating in a coalition in the 1950's, Mujib was reluctant to share power, especially since his comfortable majority meant that he did not need to. Bhutto then fell back on his anti-Six Points stand as a bargaining point, but his lack of an alternative set of proposals impeded the process of negotiation. The Awami Leaguers knew that Bhutto opposed the Six Points, but he had been purposely vague about specifics and they did not know what viable alternative he had in mind.

On returning from Dacca Bhutto counseled Yahya to delay calling the National Assembly session, so as to give him more time to bargain with Mujib. He hoped that by mobilizing West Pakistani sentiment against the Six Points he could pressure Mujib into sharing power with him. Mujib felt the pressure but decided to counter it by picking up the all-too-willing support of the anti-Bhutto minority parties in West Pakistan. Outmaneuvered, Bhutto on February 15 announced his decision to boycott the proposed National Assembly session of March 3. At the same time he called on Mujib to give him some assurance that his voice would be heard in the constitution-making process. Mujib refused to come to any settlement with Bhutto outside the Assembly, though in an apparent response to Bhutto's apprehension about the Six Points, he declared that the plan would not be imposed on West Pakistan and that any reasonable alternative suggestion would be considered by the Awami League in the National Assembly.[29]

Bhutto's decision to boycott the Assembly session had little impact on the other minority parties of West Pakistan except for the Qayyum Muslim League (QML). As the opening day neared, some members of the QML and the PPP grew restive. To increase the pressure on both the regime and Mujib, Bhutto decided to put his revolutionary foot forward. At a well attended public meeting in Lahore on February 28, he called for the observance of a strike from "Khyber to Karachi" on March 3. He threatened the West Pakistani members participating in the Assembly with "liquidation" and "revenge" and asked Yahya either to postpone the session or extend the time limit of 120 days applying to the Constituent Assembly in order to facilitate the continuation of his dialogue with his "elder brother" Mujib.[30]

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[28] Bhutto gives his version in *The Great Tragedy, op. cit.* No account is available from Awami League sources apart from a brief reference in the publication of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, *Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents* (1971).

[29] *Dawn,* March 1, 1971.

On March 1 Yahya announced his fateful decision to postpone the scheduled March 3 National Assembly session *sine die,* citing Bhutto's unwillingness to participate as the primary cause for his action, and urging the political leaders of East and West to come to a reasonable understanding on constitution-making.[31] Bhutto's and Yahya's later allegations that Mujib overreacted to the postponement clearly showed their misperception of the Bengali mood. When Yahya's announcement was heard in Dacca, at midday on March 1, there was an immediate and spontaneous strike. Within an hour, a student meeting held at the Shahid Minar under the auspices of the pro-Moscow faction of the East Pakistan Students Union (EPSU) demanded a unilateral declaration of independence and Pakistani flags were burned.

Mujib and his thirty-man Awami League parliamentary board were at that time meeting at the Hotel Purbani to discuss the League's draft constitution. As a vast crowd (who on hearing the news had armed themselves with the *lathi* and were apparently anticipating a call for revolution) gathered outside the hotel, Mujib made his first response to Yahya's action. Condemning the postponement of the Assembly, he called for a general strike on March 2 in Dacca and on March 3 throughout East Pakistan. But he asked his followers to launch a peaceful, constitutional movement, insisting that his was a democratic party which believed in the democratic process.

The Bengalis had reacted angrily because they looked upon the postponement as one more example of West Pakistan's imposing its will on East Pakistan. The Assembly session had been postponed to accommodate Bhutto, a West Pakistani, even though he was the leader of a minority party, over the repeated protests of Mujib, a Bengali, who was the leader of the majority party, thus flouting democratic principles. The postponement was also interpreted as an indication of the regime's opting for the military solution, because along with it the governor of East Pakistan, Admiral Ahsan, with whom Mujib had had good relations, was relieved of his duties. General Yaqub, the military commander in East Pakistan, was named governor and martial law administrator, at the same time that a new regulation was introduced giving the martial law administrator wide powers of censorship.

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[30] *Ibid.* The Legal Framework Order stipulated that the Constituent Assembly would have to complete the task of constitution-making within 120 days or be dissolved.

[31] *Ibid.*, March 2, 1971.

Faced with a military threat, Mujib rejected the option of a unilateral declaration of independence and armed struggle. Instead he chose to launch a nonviolent noncooperation movement, which gave him the opportunity to combat the military on his own strong ground.[32] His strategy was to build such unprecedented popular pressure as to deter military action and force the regime to negotiate with him.

On March 2 and 3 Dacca and East Pakistan were completely shut down by the general strike. Public meetings and rallies held in Dacca called for a declaration of independence. The curfew imposed on the city for the two nights was a mistaken policy, since mass efforts to break it resulted in the loss of a number of lives, which further inflamed the volatile situation. The worsening state of affairs in Dacca coupled with the increased militancy of students and labor, including his own supporters in the East Pakistan Students League and the *Sramik* League, led Mujib to harden his bargaining stand. On March 3 in a public meeting at the *Paltan Maidan*, he demanded the withdrawal of troops to the barracks and the transfer of power to the civilian government, and set March 7 as the date when he would announce his next program of action, thus giving the regime three days to respond positively to his demands. To increase the pressures on the regime, Mujib also asked the people to stop paying taxes to the government.

The regime's first response to Mujib's demand for a transfer of power was an invitation to a Round Table Conference of leaders

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[32] In the period after March 25, Mujib drew some criticism for not declaring independence on March 1. It was argued that a declaration of independence would have limited the number of Bengali casualties, since the military used the time between March 1 and March 25 to build up its strength. This argument is not too convincing. If the army had followed the same policy as it did after March 25, the number of casualties would have been high anyway. Besides, by continuing the noncooperation movement for three weeks Mujib helped to build resistance throughout East Pakistan so that when the military took action in Dacca, thinking that this would smash resistance elsewhere, the opposite occurred. A March 1 declaration of independence followed by military suppression could have taken the districts by surprise. Above all, Mujib tried to keep the movement nonviolent and constitutional, in keeping with his earlier stand.

(RTC) to be held on March 10. But after the failure of the 1969 conference, the RTC mechanism was thoroughly discredited in East Pakistan. So while Bhutto and the other West Pakistani leaders accepted the invitation, Mujib and Nurul Amin, the two East Pakistani leaders who were to attend, declined. Between March 3 and 7 Mujib came under tremendous pressure from the radicals of his own party to declare the eastern province's independence in his March 7 speech.[33]

On March 6, on the eve of that speech, Yahya issued his second response: he called the National Assembly into session on March 25 without any precondition, although to pacify Bhutto he reiterated the Legal Framework Order's provision that the final authentication of a new constitution depended on the President. But this effort at conciliation was too little and too late. The Dacca crowd expected to hear a declaration of independence from Mujib the next day, and the mere acceptance of an upcoming date for a National Assembly session would have been a terribly disappointing anticlimax. Mujib needed to give his supporters an attractive alternative to independence, and only an immediate power transfer to the Awami League would suffice. Only if he could be invested with power immediately could he tell supporters and foes alike that the system was responsive and that there was no need for independence.

In his March 7 speech, Mujib laid down four preconditions for joining the National Assembly session: the rescinding of martial law, the return of soldiers to their barracks, a public inquiry into incidents of massacre by the armed forces, and the immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people. To maintain his pressure on the regime, he simultaneously announced the launching of the nonviolent noncooperation movement which put him in complete control of East Pakistan. The entire East Pakistani administration, even Bengalis serving in the central government agencies and the civilian branch of the armed forces, complied with Mujib's call for noncooperation. The power transfer was not only complete, it was also peaceful. Even though police and administrators were nowhere in sight, the preservation of law and order was generally good.[34] Faced with Mujib's *de fac-*

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[33] The initiative in calling for independence came from the pro-Moscow faction of NAP and Ataur Rahman's National League. The Awami League student and labor organizations felt the pressure and in their March 3 and later rallies they also called for independence.

[34] None of the newspaper reports of that period, either national or international, cite any serious breach of law and order in East Pakistan. Even the Government of

to transfer of power, Yahya came to Dacca on March 15 to work out a political settlement of the crisis. The minority party leaders of West Pakistan also came to Dacca and demanded an interim arrangement under which power on the national level would be transferred to Mujib. Bhutto decided to stay in West Pakistan in spite of Yahya's invitation to join the Dacca talks.

Detailed information about these Mujib-Yahya talks is still lacking.[35] From published accounts it appears that after an initial period of difficulties, Yahya agreed in principle to Mujib's four conditions. When the two leaders had reached a broad agreement, advisers and experts from both sides met to work out the details of an interim arrangement for the transfer of power. It was agreed that the interim arrangement should approximate the final constitution to be approved by the National Assembly. Pakistani newspapers from March 18 to 23 reported optimistically on the prospects for a political settlement, and Mujib himself told reporters that progress was made in his talks with Yahya.[36]

From Karachi, Bhutto watched the progress of the talks with apprehension. On his way to Dacca, Yahya had met with Bhutto in Karachi on March 14 and the latter had agreed to Mujib's four conditions.[37] But on the same day Bhutto insisted that any interim power transfer arrangement would have to give power to the two majority parties, i.e., the PPP and the Awami League — a demand quickly repudiated by the minority parties of West Pakistan.[38] On March 19, when a breakthrough in the Dacca talks appeared imminent, Bhutto issued a threatening statement to the effect that a sellout of West Pakistan would not be tolerated and that the PPP would prepare for action. One of the PPP leaders, J. A. Rahim, called the interim arrangement reportedly agreed upon by Mujib and Yahya a massive betrayal of West Pakistan.[39] The same evening Bhutto received an invitation to join the Dacca talks and was assured by Yahya that the precondition he had set would be met: he would have a chance to negotiate with Mujib.

On March 20 the advisers of Yahya and Mujib agreed on a draft proclamation, to be issued by Yahya, containing the outline of the

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Pakistan's *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan* (Islamabad, August 1971) fails to note a breakdown of law and order in the pre-March 25 period.

[35] *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan* gives the regime's version of the story. Bhutto tells his version in *The Great Tragedy*. No detailed account has been issued from Awami League sources thus far.

[36] *Dawn*, March 20, 1971.

[37] Bhutto, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-36.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38; also *Dawn*, March 17, 18, 1971.

[39] *Dawn*, March 20, 1971.

interim arrangement for the transfer of power to Mujib.[40] It provided for an immediate end of martial law and a transfer of power to elected representatives in the five provinces without such transfer taking place in the center. It also provided for the division of the National Assembly into two committees to frame separate reports on the basis of which the constitution would be formulated. Autonomy granted to East Pakistan was patterned on the Six Points, while the degree of autonomy to be granted to the four other provinces (in the West) was left to negotiation. Awami League sources later claimed that the provisions for two National Assembly committees and different levels of autonomy were decided on as a response to Bhutto, to accommodate his stand that there were two majority parties in "two Pakistans."[41]

Bhutto arrived in Dacca on March 21. There Yahya Khan told him that he was willing to announce the draft proclamation if the PPP and the other parties agreed to it.[42] But when Bhutto met with Yahya and Mujib the next day, he voiced his objections — principally against the provisions for the two committees of the National Assembly, and the differential quantum of autonomy for the two wings of the country, which he argued would inevitably result in the separation of East and West Pakistan. Ironically, Bhutto thus rejected that part of the scheme which the Awami League had specifically included to accommodate him.

Bhutto's alternative suggestions were that the National Assembly be called into session first, to approve and authorize the proclamation, or that he be allowed more time to negotiate directly with Mujib.[43] But the plea for protracted negotiations was not sympathetically received by the Awami League. By that time the pressure on Mujib either to obtain a quick settlement or declare independence had neared the explosive point.[44] On March 23, in an aides' meeting, the Awami League presented a draft proclamation elaborating on the amount of autonomy for East and West Pakistan that would characterize the interim period. East Pakistan's was based on the Six Points, and that of the four provinces of West Pakistan on the 1962 Constitution. The draft also provided that East Pakistan would control its own foreign exchange earnings and take over tax-levying authority.[45]

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[40] For the details of the agreement, see *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan*, pp. 19-20.

[41] *Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents, op. cit.*, p. 102.

[42] Bhutto, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

[44] Bhutto (*ibid.*, pp. 44-45) reported that on March 22 Mujib told both Yahya and Bhutto that he was under tremendous pressure and that Bhutto should accept his formula *in toto* and resolve the conflict quickly.

The Awami League's draft proclamation was discussed on March 23 and 24. According to the *White Paper* published by the Government of Pakistan, the regime objected to a number of points: (1) splitting the National Assembly into two committees, which the draft now called conventions; (2) use of the term *confederation;* (3) dropping the provision for the President's authentication of the constitution as required in the Legal Framework Order; (4) withdrawal of the center's emergency powers over East Pakistan; (5) limitation of the central tax-levying power; (6) limitation of the center's power in defense and foreign affairs.[46] These objections showed that the regime had had second thoughts about its March 20 agreement in two essential areas, i.e., splitting the National Assembly into two bodies, and the extent of East Pakistan's autonomy on the basis of the Six Points. Nevertheless, Awami League aides were made to understand that the regime had no serious objection to the Six Points per se.[47]

The Awami League agreed to a few amendments suggested by the regime and pressed for the draft's quick acceptance. Tajuddin Ahmad, general secretary of the party and one of the advisers participating in the Dacca talks, said on March 24 that time was running out and that the proclamation should be issued within the next forty-eight hours. To understand why the Awami League was not willing to prolong the negotiations as demanded by Bhutto and Yahya, one has to look at the mounting pressures under which it was carrying on the discussions.

Containment of the diverse forces importuning Mujib for action was becoming problematic. The nonviolent noncooperation movement had been in effect since March 1, but it was difficult to keep such a prolonged mass movement nonviolent. As days went by without any significant conciliatory response from the regime, the demand for an immediate declaration of independence earned wider support. Mujib met with pressure not only from the other parties but also from the radicals within his own party. By mid-March the Dacca University Central Students Union (DUCSU), which had played a leading role in all previous political movements in East Pakistan, swung its support to the demand for independence. Four members of DUCSU, who happened to be leaders of the East Pakistan Students League, the student party affiliated with the Awami League, formed a *Sadhin Bangla Kendriya Chatra Sangram Parishad* (SBKCSP) (Independent Bangladesh Central Students Action Committee) and began a program of paramilitary training in various educational institutions. A number of arms stores were looted and guns were stolen from a few houses. But though the students' enthusiasm was high, their preparations to wage an armed struggle for liberation were amateurish and unorganized.[48] Some radical leaders of *Sramik* League, the Awami League's labor front, also demanded a declaration of independence. Even the Awami League's "high command" was split on the issue.

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[45] For details see *White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan,* pp. 65-66.
[46] *Ibid.,* pp. 61-75.
[47] *Bangladesh: Contemporary Events and Documents,* pp. 100-102.

While the militancy of the students and radicals of the party was a pressure from within, the military buildup was a pressure from outside. Signs of increased military preparedness had been visible in Dacca since February, and after March 1 the pace was accelerated as troops and supplies were flown in from West Pakistan. A full army division was brought in during March and commando groups were reportedly sent to participate in sabotage actions that heightened tension among communities. The military buildup was a provocation, given the mounting militancy of the students and the masses. Small-scale confrontations became frequent. There was a serious clash on March 19 at Jaydebpur, a few miles north of Dacca, when the people obstructed the military's effort to get supplies from the local market. On March 24 in Chittagong a crowd estimated at a hundred thousand set out to block the army's attempt to unload the munitions ship *M.V. Swat.* In the resulting firing numerous people were killed. Animosity toward the non-Bengali population also increased, and a riot in Chittagong led some panic-stricken non-Bengalis to migrate to West Pakistan. The plight of these groups was used as a counterpressure on Yahya, who hardened his negotiating stand.

Under pressure from both sides, Mujib managed only with difficulty to contain his friends and foes. SBKCSP declared March 23 a resistance day and celebrated the day by raising Bangladesh flags on housetops, and holding a parade of the paramilitia and a procession that inevitably ended at Mujib's residence, where the students raised the Bangladesh flag. It is interesting to note that Mujib himself did not raise the flag at his home despite the

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[48] The number of students undergoing paramilitary training was small, and their training was not rigorous. The action program was more symbolic than real.

SBKCSP's call for a show of colors. Throughout March Mujib carefully refrained from any gesture that might be interpreted as secessionist; the Awami League newspaper, *Ittefaq*, did the same and also came under attack from the radical students. Until the very end Mujib hoped to obtain a peaceful settlement. Awami League aides were expecting Yahya's announcement of the draft proclamation even on March 25. But without formally notifying Mujib of the failure of the talks, Yahya suddenly left Dacca on the evening of March 25, and that night the Pakistani military initiated the campaign in East Pakistan that ultimately led to the breakup of the country and the birth of Bangladesh as an independent, sovereign state.

CONCLUSIONS

Even a cursory review of the Mujib-Yahya-Bhutto negotiations leaves one with a number of puzzling questions. Perhaps we can find partial answers to some of them.

(1) *Since the counter elite — Mujib and Bhutto — were mainly interested in the transfer of power, why could they not come to a settlement with each other and present a common front against the regime, i.e., Yahya?* As pointed out above, Mujib and Bhutto failed to accommodate each other, and thus permitted the military to maintain its key role of arbitrator, because both were essentially bourgeois politicians, with bourgeois and petty bourgeois constituencies who found their interests irreconcilable. Neither really wanted to share power. Particularly after winning an absolute majority in the National Assembly, Mujib wanted to form his own party government at the center, but even earlier, after his release from prison in 1969, when he rejected the principle of parity and demanded recognition of the principle of one man, one vote, this was an indication that he wanted to dominate the center as well as control East Pakistan.

For Bhutto and the West Pakistani leadership in general, there was a psychological difficulty in accepting the idea of Mujib's domination of the center. That Mujib was no Nazimuddin, Mohammad Ali or Nurul Amin (all satisfied with token Bengali participation in the national government) was obvious, and hence Bhutto's insistence on power-sharing.

Mujib rejected Bhutto's early demands because he was against power-sharing per se. By the time he had become more amenable to the concept, as the crisis built up from the middle of February 1971 on, it was no longer feasible to negotiate directly with Bhutto. Bhutto was never a popular figure in East Pakistan. Because of his association with Ayub in the past, and his stand against the Six Points in 1966, he had earned the displeasure of the Bengalis. After February 1971, when he called the Dacca session of the National Assembly "a slaughter house," and his persistent demands brought about the postponement of the new National Assembly, Bengali displeasure turned to wrath. He became the main target of attack in public rallies. His frequent meetings with Yahya, the generals, and the members of the civil service were interpreted in Dacca as signs of his collaboration with the regime.

How unacceptable to the Bengali public Bhutto was as a partner in power, was clearly indicated by two incidents mentioned in his own book (though he failed to realize their proper significance). After the National Assembly session had been postponed, Bhutto sent a cable to Mujib calling for direct negotiation and accommodation. When the newspapers published reports that the cable was under review by the Awami League, the popular response was sharply negative. The next day the Awami League's general secretary, Tajuddin Ahmad, issued a statement denying that the cable was ever under consideration. Again, when Mujib met Bhutto on March 21 at the President's house in Dacca, he told members of the press that he met President Yahya and Bhutto happened to be present. Obviously Mujib was acutely aware that his constituencies were opposed to his coming to any "deal" with Bhutto, whom they regarded as the villain of the piece. A Mujib-Bhutto accommodation under such circumstances was extremely unlikely.

(2) *Why did Yahya and Bhutto take such a strong anti-Six Points stand after the election when they did not do so before?* From the beginning both Bhutto and the military had strong reservations about the Six Points. They did not voice them before the election for they felt that the Awami League would fail of an absolute majority in the National Assembly and would be forced to amend the Six Points in any coalition. After its landslide victory the League found it difficult to amend the Six Points because the program represented its electoral mandate.

(3) *Did the military use the Dacca talks as a cover for a military buildup and only go through the motions with respect to finding a political settlement?* A simple answer to this question eludes us. The military did start its preparations in mid-February 1971 — using the tension with India as a pretext — well before the postponement of the National Assembly session and the beginning of the

noncooperation movement in East Pakistan. During March, while negotiations continued, the army built up its strength. Awami League sources claim that as the League's firm stand on the Six Points program became evident in the post-election period, the Yahya regime planned military action as a last resort. The regime's strategy was to provoke the Awami League into making a unilateral declaration of independence, which would provide the army with the justification for a crackdown in the East.[49] The removal of Admiral Ahsan from the governorship of East Pakistan, the appointment of General Tikka Khan (nicknamed the "Butcher of Baluchistan" for his ruthless suppression of the Baluchi movement) as his substitute, and Yahya's forceful speeches in the first week of March, all seemed to indicate a plan of military action.

The massive response to Mujib's call for noncooperation and the militancy of the Bengali mood led the regime to try political negotiations while keeping the military option open. It is probably safe to conclude that Yahya planned military action if Mujib did not come to a settlement acceptable to both the military and Bhutto. As Mujib was under pressure from his radicals, so Yahya was from his hawkish generals who wanted to crush Bengal once and for all. During the protracted negotiations the hawks in both camps got the upper hand and a mutually acceptable formula was hard to find. The military lost on every move in the political game and decided to go for the military solution.

One of the lasting lessons of the Dacca negotiations is that a political settlement is difficult to come by if the military option is kept open, for the temptation to go for the final solution is always great. Only when the military solution is totally rejected can the contestants rationally negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement.

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[49] From a personal interview of Dr. Kamal Hossain, Foreign Minister, Government of Bangladesh. According to Dr. Hossain, who was one of the three Awami League leaders participating in the negotiations in March 1971, the Awami League was aware of the military preparations and indeed anticipated military action, but thought that the military would strike near the end of the National Assembly session when the constitution would be more or less completed.

THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN PENETRATION

by Nicholas O. Berry

IN 1963 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began extensive hearings on the activities of nondiplomatic representatives of foreign principals in the United States.[1] The committee was concerned about the impact of these representatives on the making and implementing of American domestic and foreign policy. Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, with his characteristic zeal to educate the public, wanted to remedy what he believed to be a situation of public ignorance regarding external influences on solely national policy. Americans were unaware, for example, that agents of foreign governments and economic interests had contributed funds to the campaigns of prominent Congressmen and planted news and editorials in American newspapers.

The Fulbright hearings resulted in new laws prohibiting campaign contributions by foreign principals and tightening the disclosure provisions of the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act. They also resulted in shifting the research approach of a segment of empirical theorists in international relations away from a rational policy model[2] to various types of penetration models.[3] The work of John Herz and others preceded and stimulated this shift.[4]

For the most part, however, the attention of these theorists has been focused on the strategies, agents, channels and targets of penetration. Little work has been done on how a government can manage the penetrators in order to control their impact on the decision-making process.[5] That, therefore, will be one task of the present effort. For if state power means success in shaping the decisions of foreign governments toward the nation-state's goals, and the method for doing this entails penetrating foreign political systems, it follows that a crucial aspect of power relations among states includes strategies by which governments manage foreign penetration in order to limit its effects on their decision-making. Expressed another way, state power in international politics not only depends on penetrating and affecting the decisions of other states, it also depends on controlling the foreign penetrators at home. A government that cannot control its own policymaking as a result of external interference will not have much impact abroad.

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[1] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, Activities of Non-diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States* (88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963), Parts 1-4.

[2] See Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, September 1969, or David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, October 1961, for a description of the rational policy model. Essentially this approach treats the state as a "billiard ball." Government is *the* actor, seeking goals, rationally choosing among alternatives, and evaluating consequences in terms of costs and benefits.

[3] Those working on this approach include Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (New York: Random House, 1965); Richard W. Cottam, *Competitive Interference and 20th Century Diplomacy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967): James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, in R. Barry Farrell, editor, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966); and Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, December 1967.

[4] John Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

Conceivably, a government can penetrate and influence a foreign political system to the point where that system generates no objectives that might require negotiations or compromises by the penetrating government. As many leaders of traditional, emergent or totalitarian states realize, the management of foreign penetration constitutes a prerequisite for the maintenance of their own domestic and foreign policies. One African foreign minister candidly admitted that his ministry devoted most of its time to keeping track of the activities of foreign trade, intelligence, business, aid and diplomatic personnel within his own country. Large, economically-developed, democratic states, as will be explained, have fewer problems, but problems nevertheless, in managing foreign penetration. Therefore, it is important for a fuller development of international theory to systematize how a government can maintain its policies by managing foreign inputs to its political system.

The thesis of this study is that governments now have a gamut of strategies to manage foreign penetration and consequently have largely ensured the preservation of their political function. If this is true, the Cold War is finished as a belief system and as a pattern of actions. Likewise disposed of is the prediction that the nation-state system is obsolete because of its permeability and some new system must rapidly take its place. Instead, sovereignty among the 140 or so existing states has received a new lease on life. Before we were fully aware of the operation and effect of penetrating agents or transnational actors, governments vulnerable to foreign penetration were already — on a hit-or-miss basis at first —bringing the penetration under control. The Cold War format suffered as a result. It suffered because the major states' purpose of competitively penetrating opponents and nonaligned states to win new allies or adherents was thwarted and proved a costly gamble. Weak states, in the center of U.S.-USSR competition, have grasped the means of controlling the making and implementing of public policy to their own purposes. They can manage foreign penetration. The disintegration of the two contending blocs, beginning over a decade ago, foreshadowed the present realization that Cold War actions are no longer viable. Even some weak allies in both blocs adopted penetration management strategies that allowed them to slip out of orbit.

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[5] Exceptions are Cottam, *op. cit.*, Chapter 1, and Karl Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in Farrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-24.

Still, the penetration model should not be abandoned. Besides not being fully conceptualized as yet, the model has the advantage of directing attention to the very heart of international politics — the clash of people struggling over policy formation and execution.

We will first describe penetration and its management. Then we will show that the evidence points to a higher capability in penetration management than to successful penetration itself, with the result that the Cold War is anachronistic and a new *modus operandi* is developing. Specifically, we will proceed from (1) a classification of foreign penetrators and the political roles they play, to (2) an analysis of the vulnerability of various types of political systems to penetration, (3) a description, with illustrative cases, of the strategies available to governments for managing foreign penetration, from full encouragement to total suppression, and (4) the effects of penetration management on the Cold War format.

FOREIGN PENETRATORS AND THEIR ROLES

In general, let us propose that government and nongovernment agents of foreign states perform roles and functions largely determined by the structure of the political system they penetrate. Whether as an interest group, communication channel, political party, administrative agency or revolutionary movement, they must operate as part of that political system and its social setting.

Few analysts in the past have asked the question: Where does international politics take place? Often one might have thought mid-ocean was the point of contact.[6] Even speaking of the "world arena" or the "international political system" helps little in conceptualization and theory building. The advantage of the concept of penetration is that it directs attention to the locus of politics between states: their society-based political systems or their political creations, international organizations. "International politics" is a label that refers to a situation and process whereby agents of states are participating in the political systems of other states. The purpose underlying international politics, as we have stated, is to get foreign governments to make and carry out policy decisions that complement one's own policy objectives. The real linkage between international and domestic politics is that the latter is the building block of the former.[7] Hence, we must inspect each political system involved in policy decisions on an issue, and that means looking at the capabilities of the actors, both foreign and domestic, who affect policy decisions. In order to influence political systems, foreign agents (or messages) must become a part of the political life of these systems. That is, they are forced to move toward conformity with the political system they penetrate by observing the distribution of power and the customary way of performing political functions. And that brings us back to an inspection of interest group, communication channel, political party, administrative agency and revolutionary movement functions.

Interest Group

Interest groups raise and define issues, build political support for an issue so that decision-makers will consider making a policy decision, provide services to decision-making allies, and affect the procedures for administration and enforcement if the law or policy is enacted. When foreign agents act as an interest group — their most common role — they normally accept the legitimacy of the political system but seek to affect specific policy. The target of interest groups depends on where the power to make the decision they want lies, whether with the public, other interest groups, parties or various branches of government.

Official diplomatic agents play this role continually. Within embassies and consulates the division of labor reflects the interest group function. There are specialists in public and press relations, military affairs, trade and economic policy, and cultural and educational exchange. Nondiplomatic agents play the interest group role as well. Over 400 agents of foreign principals are registered with the United States government.[8] The vast majority are American citizens. They can have, and have had, substantial influence in shaping American policy decisions, although their overall influence in the United States is generally low.

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[6] This is the great weakness of the rational policy model in presenting the state as an impermeable decision-making object.

[7] A nation-state does not have two political systems, one for domestic politics and one for international politics. Those who believe there are two political systems, either empirically or normatively, fail to see the essence of international politics, namely, penetration.

The case of John O'Donnell, an agent of the Philippine Sugar Association, illustrates how effective someone performing this function can be.[9] O'Donnell defined a Philippine-American issue growing out of the unpaid World War II damage claims of Filipino citizens, helped to mobilize Congressional support for a bill of settlement, provided services and testimony that facilitated getting the bill through a House subcommittee and onto the floor, and eventually saw it passed.[10] Numerous cases of American business agents abroad doing much the same thing have been well documented, including the Aramco[11] and United Fruit Company[12] operations.

Communication Channel

Communication channels function to carry messages that inform, stimulate, redirect, depress or deceive an audience. When foreign agents act as a communication channel, they usually accept the legitimacy of the political system but seek to affect general policies by influencing the attitudes and opinions of a mass audience in the target state. When their main task is communicating back to their principals, their role consists of reporting intentions, actions and capabilities of the host government. We are dealing with propagandists or information agents on one hand, and espionage agents or reporters on the other. The Voice of America, Radio Moscow, the BBC and Radio Havana exist to provide messages in the same manner as "domestic" radio stations. Hired public relations personnel, press relations sections of embassies, and overseas libraries are used similarly, as are students, scientists, government dignitaries, athletes, musicians and ballet troupes. The Cultural and Educational Exchange Agreement signed between the USSR and the United States in November 1957 (and renewed every two years) was clearly designed by both governments so as to use the participants in the exchange as communication channels. Each target audience was roughly the same. The Soviets wanted to put cross pressures on the American middle and upper classes in order to moderate their anti-communism, and the United States desired to arouse the Soviet intelligentsia to political action. The fact that the messages originate in another state in no way alters their role and function in the political system; they are, in effect, part of the domestic mass media.

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[8] Senate Hearings, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[9] See my unpublished dissertation, *Representation and Decision-Making: A Case Study of Philippine-American War Claims* (University of Pittsburgh, 1967), for an extensive analysis of the interest group function.

[10] The law was later amended to prevent O'Donnell and others from collecting large fees from the claimants. This action was a direct result of the Fulbright hearings in 1963.

[11] John Marlowe, *The Persian Gulf in the Twentieth Century* (London: Cresset Press, 1962).

[12] H. Bradford Westerfield, *The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1963), pp. 422-442.

Political Party

Party functions include recruiting candidates and appointees, developing party programs, financing election campaigns, purges or coups d'état, and publicizing and legitimizing candidates. Foreign agents have had a part in all of these operations at various times. When they so perform, they normally accept the legitimacy of the political system but reject its overall policies. By achieving a change of political leadership, they can bring about new government policy orientations. They can even make government policy themselves if their sponsored candidates capture office. To go a step farther, in rare cases the state itself may be annexed. Hitler, for example, used the Austrian Nazi Party, backed by the threat of military penetration, to have Seyss-Inquart appointed Chancellor of Austria in 1938. The Anschluss Law incorporating Austria into the German Reich followed shortly thereafter.[13]

The normal pattern, however, finds the foreign agents seeking a general policy reorientation. To illustrate, it is widely known that between 1950 and 1953 agents of the U.S. government sponsored, financed and publicized the rapid political ascendancy of Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines. Washington clearly accepted the legitimacy of the Philippine government but strongly objected to its overall policies, namely, its ineffectual anti-Huk program, its fiscal, monetary and commercial policies, and its laws preserving an old-line agricultural elite and land system.

Foreign agents who play party roles include intelligence personnel, businessmen, advisers to "fraternal" political parties (e.g.,

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[13] Described in Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-39.

Comintern agents under Stalin), refugee leaders (such as Arafat in Jordan), and military personnel stationed in the host country.

Administrative Agency

Administrative functions include mobilizing resources, carrying out projects, enforcing law and preserving order, and reporting the effect of the law's application upon society and social problems. When foreign agents act as an administrative agency they accept the legitimacy of the political system but do not believe in the government's capability to implement its own policies or enforce its own laws. Their role is to make sure that the host state's policies impact upon the citizens of that society so as to enhance their principals' foreign policy objectives. Often these objectives are designed to keep the government of the target state in power.

Administrative agents can be military units helping the government to fight guerrillas, agricultural experts developing new strains of wheat, or teachers, engineers, customs officials, medical teams or missionaries. The range goes from Soviet engineers constructing the multimillion-dollar Aswan Dam to a lone American Peace Corpsman teaching brickmaking in an isolated area of Colombia. The economically strong states penetrate and the economically weak states are penetrated, as a general rule, in the performance of administrative functions.

Revolutionary Movement

A revolutionary movement aims to separate the existing government from the people, destroy its instruments of social control, and replace it by taking over all its political functions. Foreign agents who play a part in a revolutionary movement reject the legitimacy, policies and administrative capability of the political system, and may even reject the independence of the state itself. As promoters of revolution, they attack the target government in order to destroy it and replace it with one more compatible with the goals of their principal. This is war. But war and revolution have the same process and purpose.

Examples abound. The Soviet military invasion and overthrow of the Hungarian government in 1956 found the political-military agents of the USSR performing the same functions as an indigenous revolutionary movement. India seized on the same role in severing East from West Pakistan. President Wilson sent U.S. Marines into Mexico to bring down the Cardenas regime, something he believed the Mexicans should have done themselves.

Germany and Japan engineered many revolutions in World War II, and the Allies accomplished theirs later, notably in Germany and Japan.

In summary, foreign agents can play and have played the gamut of political roles, either singly or in combination, in states to which they are assigned. They can intervene and have intervened in particular or all stages of the decision-making process. The first line of defense for any government, therefore, must be to manage this penetration. Some kinds of penetration may be encouraged and others not. In this regard, while certain strategies are suitable for managing each type of penetrating agent and his function, their actual use depends on the political system's vulnerability to particular forms of penetration. There may be no necessity to use the strategy available to manage a penetrating agent if vulnerability to that agent is low, but if vulnerability is high, extreme management strategies may be required. Thus, a state's strategy will depend on its vulnerability as well as on the type and function of the agent to be managed.

THE VULNERABILITY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS TO PENETRATION

Vulnerabilities relate to the basic characteristics of the target social system, such as the degree of integration of the social structure, the geographic accessibility of the country, or the amount of economic development attained. These distinguishing attributes facilitate the physical penetration of the political system in varying degrees and, once it has been penetrated, the likelihood of success in influencing policy decisions. We shall use Andrew M. Scott's terminology and label the "mechanics" of penetrating — that is, actually introducing the message or agent into the system — "technical access."[14] Getting a positive response, decision or outcome once the political system is penetrated will be termed "substantive access."

The vulnerabilities of a political system to technical or substantive access by foreign agents can be manipulated by government action, but only to a limited degree. The basic structures of a social system are difficult to change rapidly, although governments with high vulnerabilities have worked frantically in the Cold War to overcome this weakness. What government decision-makers have to face in formulating strategies to deal with foreign penetration is that they may be susceptible to both technical access by agents and messages and to substantive access or foreign influence. The following propositions suggest the important structural attributes that determine the vulnerability of a political system to foreign penetration.

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[14] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

1. *The greater the physical presence of nonmembers in a political system, the more vulnerable that government is to substantive access.*

This proposition should be obvious because the technical access problem has been solved, face-to-face persuasion and personal relationships can be utilized, the penetrating agents can organize and respond rapidly to political developments, and resources can be used directly, as in voting, shooting, bribing, publishing and negotiating, in order to influence the decision-making situation. The debate between James Rosenau and Wolfram F. Hanrieder[15] over whether a "penetrated system" requires the physical presence of nonmembers is decided here by determining whether an external source can have an effect on a policy decision. Radio Cairo or the U.S. Sixth Fleet may have substantial influence on the decisions of the Lebanese government without the physical presence of the message source or the U.S. Marines. Nevertheless, the physical presence of agents enhances substantive access.

2. *The greater the stability and legitimacy of the government, the less vulnerable it is to substantive access.*[16]

3. *The greater the social integration and economic development of a society, the less vulnerable its government is to substantive access.*

Both propositions are based on the fact that substantive access is facilitated if there are dissident factions or minorities in government or society. These groups can be organized and directed from abroad, whether Sudeten Germans, Northern Irish Catholics, Bengalis, or native Angolans. On the other hand, nationalism, wealth and legitimacy provide valuable resources for the government in any contest with foreign principals and their agents.

4. *The greater the geographic isolation, the less vulnerable the political system is to technical access.*

States dominating an isolated land mass, such as Great Britain, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Iceland, Ethiopia, the United States and Cuba, can more easily control the crossing of their borders by foreign agents. Today, however, electronic and aerospace developments have reduced the protection afforded by geographic isolation.

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[15] Hanrieder, *op. cit.* Rosenau's reply is contained in the same issue of the *American Political Science Review.*

[16] Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

5. *The larger the governmental sphere of the political system, the less vulnerable that government is to technical access but the more vulnerable it is to substantive access.*

6. *The smaller the governmental sphere of the political system, the more vulnerable that government is to technical access but the less vulnerable it is to substantive access.*

Governments that dominate the political system are more tightly structured, hierarchical and authoritarian. These states have fewer autonomous political institutions, such as parties, pressure groups, press and media, and undoubtedly the voter is less important. This orientation toward unity and social control has the effect of preventing "unauthorized" political actors from entering the system. Technical access is easier in political systems that approach the pluralistic model, because they possess fewer control mechanisms and too many factions to provide invulnerability.

With substantive access the reverse is true. If a small, authoritarian elite can be penetrated, direct, unity-shattering pressure can be exerted. All that is needed is one Rasputin. Public opinion can be largely ignored. Conversely, substantive access is most difficult in a pluralist political system where public opinion must be mobilized or where formal majority support must be generated through legislatures or pressure groups. Also, the more nongovernmental participants in the political system, the more numerous the sources of political demands. These multiple competing sources of demands can overwhelm and check those from abroad.

7. *The greater the perception of threat from foreign governments, the lower the tolerance level of penetration for agents of that foreign state.*[17]

Historical enmities build psychological barriers to the demands and rationalizations of agents from the threatening state. Suspicion and distrust of Western agents, for example, provide some invulnerability for the new states of Africa and Asia with regard to both technical and substantive access. Without a perception of threat, access is enhanced. Even now Philippine agents have almost open access to the American political system.

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[17] Cottam, *op. cit.*, has a seminal opening chapter, entitled "Tolerance Levels of Interference," where he begins a classification of types of interference and analyzes toleration levels using three aspects of relationships between states and six subindicators.

Within this framework strategies are formulated to encourage, suppress, limit and channel foreign penetration. Some strategies are suited to manage technical access and others to manage substantive access. Some apply only to particular types of agents and functions, others have broader applicability. The strategies described below are divided according to whether they are used to control technical or substantive access. Within each division, there is an indication of the type of agent and function the strategies are designed to manage.

STRATEGIES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF FOREIGN PENETRATION

Technical Access

A government's first line of defense for maintaining or expanding control over policymaking entails excluding foreign agents and messages from its political system. Without technical access, substantive access is impossible. What often appear to be moral, ideological or purely "domestic" actions of governments are frequently carefully planned strategies to regulate the technical access of foreign penetration.

The most blatant strategy involves the *nonrecognition* of, or the *breaking of diplomatic relations* with, foreign states. These moves severely restrict the entry of both government and nongovernment agents. For the latter, visas are not usually issued by the foreign government because it cannot ensure the protection of its nationals without the presence of diplomatic and consular personnel. This applies to tourists, businessmen, journalists, scholars and even to espionage agents who, if caught, have less chance of returning to their country in an exchange. Nonrecognition or breaking of relations is an all-purpose strategy that restricts all types of agents and the wide range of political functions they can perform. At the same time, states using this strategy tend to legitimize technical access by the states they do recognize. To illustrate, Fidel Castro provoked the 1960 break in relations with the United States in order to remove American government and business personnel. He feared that these Americans were likely to get involved in a variety of subversive activities, including those of a revolutionary movement, in an effort to prevent the restructuring of Cuba as a socialist society. By so doing, the Cuban government sanctioned, indeed encouraged, technical access by Soviet aid, trade and military personnel who would be inclined to perform administrative functions in support of the Cuban revolution. In light of Cuban domestic objectives, Castro's strategy was both rational and necessary.

Closely related to the above is the strategy of *restricting membership in international organizations.* Because international organizations legitimize the interpenetration of their members and grant *de facto* status to their governments, exclusion, expulsion and withdrawal from international organizations serve to deny technical access and discourage recognition. The United States reinforced its policy of nonrecognition of the People's Republic of China by blocking its entry into the United Nations. The Peking government's membership in the UN would have broken American diplomatic containment and opened Asia and much of Africa to a greater degree of Chinese penetration. The same rationale inspired the American-sponsored removal of Cuba from the Organization of American States. Washington feared, until recently, that both states had a high capability to instigate and support revolutionary movements. Another example of this strategy was the veto of British entry into the European Economic Community in 1963, which reflected de Gaulle's goal of restricting American access to and influence in the Common Market. He believed the unequal "partnership" between Great Britain and the United States made the former the agent of the latter. The Nassau Conference or "Skybolt affair" and the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 tended to confirm the French President's view.[18]

Economic nationalism and *nationalization* of foreign-owned property are policies with more in mind than promoting domestic social justice. They are equally well suited for removing agents and thereby halting the performance of interest group and political party functions by foreign businessmen and their governments. The strategy is especially applicable to foreign businesses whose governments are vulnerable to domestic business pressure and thus inclined to support business interests abroad. Working in tandem with their home government representatives, these foreign business agents have considerable resources, including local currency and wide contacts with people, with which to influence specific policy or to ensure a general policy orientation by aiding in recruiting and maintaining "friendly" politicians in office. In order to prevent or stop this condition, economic resources, used to support their influence within the political system, are taken away from the agents of foreign principals. Nationalization effectively removes the agents themselves. Increased taxation on Western exploitation of Venezuelan or Middle East oil, limitations on foreign ownership of stock set by many Third World states, import quotas on American goods in the EEC, "Chileanization" of American copper companies, and prohibitions on the use of U.S. Public Law 480 funds in India, the UAR and Pakistan, are all examples of strategies designed to inhibit technical access.

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[18] Britain's lack of a European orientation as well as her relationship with the United States convinced de Gaulle that British membership would alter the European character of the Common Market. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 233-234, 257-262.

Policies of *alignment, nonalignment* or *neutrality* are formulated primarily to prevent or eliminate the performance of revolutionary movement functions. Military alignments or alliances develop countervailing power for the purpose of deterring foreign military penetration. Policies of nonalignment or neutrality attempt to remove the state *as a threat to other states* in the hope of reciprocity. All three are strategies of the weak striving to improve their capability to control foreign military penetration. Belgium saw its policy of legal neutrality fail in both world wars and now seeks to preserve its control of the political function by means of the NATO alliance — the same objective, but now a different strategy. The highly vulnerable states of the Third World had little choice in selecting a defense strategy. Alignment was generally not an available option, unless a nation's leaders were willing to enhance the penetration of one side in the Cold War and thus risk compromising their direction of political functions. Alliances legitimize penetration by allies. While strong states use alliances to sanction their penetration of weaker allies, the latter use the former to increase their domestic capability to suppress revolutionary movements, whether indigenous or foreign-based. The relationship between the United States and Thailand in SEATO is a case in point.

Walls and *fences* are to agents what *jamming, censorship* and *banning* are to messages. When these strategies are employed, they can severely restrict the technical access of all types of foreign stimuli, with the exception of military penetration; in fact, foreign governments have no option but the military one if access to the target country's political system appears imperative. North and South Korea at one time suffered from this restriction in means. As our propositions on vulnerabilities suggest, the weaker the social structure and the more authoritarian the government, the more restrictions on technical access will be required in order to preserve government control over the political function. The Berlin Wall provides rich material for penetration analysis. West German penetration, essentially through the communication of messages stressing the Federal Republic's freedoms and affluence, had stimulated a substantial departure of East Germans westward via Berlin. East Germany was being crippled by the flight of its manpower, especially skilled workers. Because West Berlin occupied the center of East Germany, jamming and banning were impossible; hence, the East German government constructed the wall – more to keep East Germans in than to keep West German agents and messages out. West German penetration of East Germany declined, especially in the potent area of face-to-face communication, and the self-containment of the wall allowed the Ulbricht regime to reduce police control and stabilize the economy. Economic growth and an increased degree of government legitimacy resulted.

Harassment, demonstrations and *rioting* against a foreign state inhibit technical access by agents of that state or can force the removal of those already in place. This strategy can reduce the performance of interest group, administrative agency or political party functions by threatening the lives and property of foreign personnel and by eroding political support in the foreign state for maintaining the penetration effort. When burning USIS libraries came into vogue in the 1960's, it not only threatened lives and destroyed property, it also generated American Congressional opposition to the continuance of aid. As a result, programs and personnel were frequently reduced. In Czechoslovakia after World War II, the communists' control of the interior and defense ministries allowed them to harass American economic recovery personnel to the extent that President Truman, under some pressure, recalled them in early 1948. Consequently, noncommunist strength within Czechoslovakia declined and the communist coup d'état followed. Japanese student rioting in 1960 prevented President Eisenhower from visiting Japan and performing interest group functions on behalf of the security treaty. Not all harassments or riots are government sponsored, but they remain a strategy, nevertheless, for restricting technical access.

Another strategy consists of *increasing the threat perception* of the people toward agents of a foreign state. This serves to discourage technical access by creating an inhospitable environment for foreign agents: they will be avoided, mistrusted and isolated, for it will be risky for citizens to associate with them or sponsor their causes. Whether it is communists in the United States, or colonialists or neo-colonialists in the Third World, or capitalists in the USSR, the tolerance level is low and the guard is high.

Visa limitations and *immigration control* provide protection against technical access by all agents. The only thing required is the capability to enforce these two legal exclusions. The People's Republic of China granted visas solely to sympathetic Westerners until the table tennis affair of 1971. Australia maintains a non-Asiatic immigration policy to prevent its sparse European population from becoming a political minority. The Kennedy Administration revoked the visa of Michel Struelens, the Belgian organizer of the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters, after he succeeded in mobilizing considerable press and Congressional support for Tshombe's breakaway regime.[19] Of all the strategies to limit technical access, these two enjoy the greatest legal and public opinion sanctions, for controlling people within a territory is the essence of sovereignty and self-determination.

However, commonly sanctioned methods alone are often insufficient to manage technical access. Governments find they must employ strategies, such as building walls, which go against the ideals of a peaceful community of nations. That they frequently mask their strategies to preserve their images and prestige has confused many students of international politics who have accepted the mask at face value. We should not make that mistake. Preserving control of political functions lies at the root of all governmental action. Governments will use any means available for avoiding unwarranted sharing or domination of their political control of society. Clearly, this has been the orientation of nonaligned states as well as weak allies in the Cold War era.

Even with the full arsenal of strategies available to governments, absolute control over technical access is impossible. No state can be completely isolated because no government has absolute control over all the people or communications in its territory. As John Herz points out, the physical impermeability of states to foreign penetration is rapidly declining. In order to deal with the technical access a government cannot or will not control, it becomes necessary to select strategies for managing substantive access. This is a second line of defense.

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[19] Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 253-262, gives the Kennedy Administration's reasons for expelling Struelens.

Substantive Access

The *registration* of agents with the government and the *disclosure* of the foreign principal that employs the agent or sends the message constitute routine strategies for managing the performance of interest group and communication functions. Control comes from the *identification* of the external influence in the political system. Since popular sovereignty gives citizens acting for domestic interests legal and customary advantages in the articulation of political demands, identification of certain demands as having foreign support places them at a disadvantage. The greater the degree of nationalism in a society, the less foreign inputs will be valued. Americans who believed that the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan had too much influence in Congress used the general strategy of identification in the 1950's to reduce it. They labeled Chiang's paid agents and supporters "the China Lobby," a name that contained a hint of disloyalty. Senator William Knowland did not enjoy being referred to as "the distinguished senator from Formosa."

Foreign penetration is enhanced whenever agents or potential agents of foreign interests ("fellow travelers") succeed in becoming part of the decision-making process. *Purging officials, banning parties, exiling opponents* and *isolating dissident minorities* are strategies designed to remove them from positions of influence and thus eliminate this kind of substantive access. Each of the five types of political functions[20] can be regulated, as a few cases will illustrate. UAR President Anwar Sadat purged Vice President Ali Sabry and six cabinet ministers in May 1971, accusing them of plotting to overthrow the government. Regardless of whether the charge was true, these officials were known to have pro-Soviet views. Given the massive Soviet penetration of Egypt, Sadat felt he was in danger of losing even more control over government policy. In addition, the UAR for years has banned the Communist Party and from time to time jailed ideological allies of the Soviet Union. Diem in South Viet Nam resisted American efforts in 1961-1963 aimed at purging his brother Nhu, in order to prevent even more U.S. influence on Vietnamese policy and political recruitment. Nhu's hostility toward the United States provided a check and a buffer for Diem. Frustrated in the performance of interest group and administrative functions, American agents turned to party functions in their quest to remove both Diem and Nhu. In Cambodia after the 1970 coup d'état, the Lon Nol regime not only isolated the Vietnamese minority in the country, but literally forced them to flee to South Viet Nam. Lon Nol was determined that the feared Vietnamese, North or South, would not have a fifth column to use in their military penetration of Cambodia.

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[20] Interest group, communication channel, political party, administrative agency and revolutionary movement.

Legal prohibitions can proscribe the performance of certain political functions, such as making campaign contributions, importing and using weapons, or communicating with local officials. By strengthening controls over interest group, party and revolutionary movement functions, these prohibitions can protect against a political system's vulnerability. One of their primary purposes is to prevent the factionalizing of the political system. Contrary to appearances, Pennsylvania, Quebec and New York (state and city) may neither make their own foreign policies nor negotiate with foreign principals.[21]

Travel restrictions serve to limit substantive access by physically separating agents from the locus of political activity and decision-making. Overseas American aid and military personnel occasionally face this restriction in traditional or emergent societies. The Soviet Union maintains a twenty-five-mile travel restriction around Moscow for American diplomats. In response, the United States imposes the same restriction for Soviet diplomats in Washington and New York. Specific exceptions are made in both states. Most governments, in addition, restrict access to officials, installations and buildings considered sacrosanct for security reasons.

Nonaligned states with great need for the benefits foreign penetration can bring, such as economic aid, technical training, trade, social capital construction and military assistance, have successfully employed the strategy of *balanced competition.* This method of managing substantive access involves creating two or more contending penetrating forces — usually Western and communist agents. The indigenous government becomes the third party, constituting a force that can tip the balance of power one way or the other and thus maintain influence far beyond its own capability. The penetrating agents are forced to depend on and support the indigenous government or risk losing political influence to the other side. In effect, foreign penetration can be neutralized. It may even be successfully neutralized despite the fact that each foreign penetrator may have more capability for social control than the government.

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[21] In recent years the Pennsylvania Legislature considered banning foreign steel "imports"; Mayor Lindsay of New York City refused to greet King Feisal of Saudi Arabia and has taken a pro-Israel stance; and Quebec leaders planned to use de Gaulle's 1968 visit to Canada to gain concessions from the central government — until de Gaulle went too far in his "Quebec liberation" remarks.

A classic case of balanced competition involving all political functions is the current Royal Laotian Government of Souvanna Phouma. He has been able to limit American and North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao influence by keeping the capabilities of each side roughly equal. Considering that the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces control half the territory of Laos and can easily defeat the Royal Laotian armed forces if the latter are unaided — and that the U.S. government pays the Royal Army and the Meo tribesmen, supports the currency and provides food distribution, engineering, educational and transportation services — the long-term existence of Souvanna Phouma's regime testifies to the utility of a balancing strategy.

There are other examples. President Tito used the strategy after the Soviet decision to perform party functions in Yugoslavia in 1948: he invited Western penetration, including some measure of military assistance. India's policy is to keep the numbers of Soviet and American overseas libraries and information centers equal to the number of their consulates. Tanzania has American road-builders working parallel to China's railroad constructors. The strategy has its risks. If one side withdraws or threatens to withdraw, or if one side cannot be prevented from developing a preponderance of political capability by itself, the government will rapidly lose control over some or all political functions. Sukarno was such a victim when the Chinese-supported Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was overwhelmed by the Western- (and Soviet-) oriented armed forces.

Democratic states embody a natural competitive system or can easily create one for neutralizing foreign influence. President Roosevelt, for example, encouraged the White Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies to neutralize the influence of the America Firsters before U.S. entry into World War II.

Suppression is an option for governments possessing high military or police capability. It may be a necessity — no matter what the government's military or police capability — if foreign agents are performing revolutionary movement functions. Terror, imprisonment and extermination are effective also as means to stop the performance of party or interest group functions. Suppression involves the physical removal or the threat of removal of agents or their domestic supporters from the political system. Their physical removal ensures no substantive access. Hitler exterminated Jews to "purify" German culture and politics from "Zionist" internationalism and cosmopolitanism. Stalin ordered the dispersal of potentially disloyal tribes and nationalities. Franklin Roosevelt approved the incarceration of the Nisei in World War II in the belief that they constituted a dangerous fifth column. War definitely requires that agents actually performing revolutionary movement functions be physically removed from the political process.

Since the costs of suppression are high, alternative strategies are preferable, either conceived as a first line of defense in restricting technical access or as a means of decreasing the society's vulnerabilities to substantive access. For the latter, a strategy that stimulates *nationalism* and *government legitimacy* affords the greatest security for a state or a people. The burden is then on the penetrators in developing political influence. As Deutsch has stated, the greatest strength of a political system in resisting foreign influence comes from a close linkage between domestic groups and decision-makers.[22] This is one important reason why nation-building or integration in order to sustain the political function becomes the first priority of the governments of new states. This is also why nationalism, defined as a belief in societal membership, loyalty and political self-determination, will remain a premier belief system for the foreseeable future.

Nationalism is more a product of sovereignty than its maker. Faced with increasing penetration capabilities and international exchange necessities of trade and aid, governments are sometimes forced to use hypernationalism to maintain the state, and this has the consequence of placing burdensome and sometimes debilitating popular controls on officials. Most government leaders fear nationalism. Except for the threat of foreign penetration which could rob them of political rule, they would studiously avoid stimulating it. Government legitimacy alone would be sufficient to reduce the costs of governing. Legitimacy, unlike nationalism, reduces the risk of removal from office, of assassination, and of the creation of unwise policies. But what is feared may be preferable to what is feared more, i.e., foreign conquest, satellite status or neocolonialism.

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[22] Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR FORMAT

Research on the management of foreign penetration has been neglected by Americans because it was not a persistent American problem until the Cold War era. However, it has always been a problem for less isolated, less integrated or less developed states. For their governments, the development of management strategies constitutes a necessity. The preservation of control over political functions and success in attaining equitable foreign agreements depend on it. Maintaining political control at home is a prerequisite for success in influencing governments abroad.

We have suggested (a) that it is helpful to think that in their roles foreign agents are performing political functions which have to be managed, (b) that penetration can mean either the technical or the substantive access of agents and messages, (c) that different political systems have variable vulnerabilities to start with, and (d) that management strategies must conform to vulnerabilities as well as to the type of access and type of agent and function. There are many strategies available to governments. More often than not, governments employing penetration management strategies mask their efforts in order to hide their vulnerabilities and weaknesses. This has clouded the problem and made analysis difficult.

Now the clouds are dispersing. The almost unbridled enthusiasm once displayed by the two major Cold War states for the new techniques of penetration in attaining their goals has turned to frustration. The magic tools for capturing or molding the policies of foreign governments — military aid, technical assistance, peace-corps type volunteers, economic aid, cultural exchanges, propaganda and alliances — have consistently failed to obtain the far-reaching results hoped for. Latin America has not been liberalized or reformed in the direction of America's Alliance for Progress. The Middle East still bows East, not North. Africa, with difficult political control problems never before faced on such a scale, has yet to produce a single satellite for one of the major states. Most of the governments of South and Southeast Asia conduct domestic and foreign policies almost in complete disregard of the superpowers' foreign policy goals. Clearly, the collapse of the bipolar, competitive-penetration format of the Cold War and the shift to today's multipolar, regional check-and-balance format can be primarily attributed to the success of the nonaligned governments in managing foreign penetration. They have consistently frustrated the United States and the USSR.

In general, the nonaligned states set about to reduce vulnerabilities and to employ penetration management strategies as if acting in concert. A rough survey shows that in the past decade vulnerabilities for foreign penetration have been dramatically reduced almost everywhere. The level of government legitimacy, especially in Latin America and Africa, has risen sharply, mainly as a result of economic nationalism and greater citizen participation. Trends in social integration and economic development, both absolutely and in relation to expectations, have reversed and are moving in a positive direction. The somewhat favorable 1970 UN data on economic development are encouraging, and they do not even show that the lowering of expectations in the emergent states has produced more satisfaction and a climate for more deliberate economic planning. The growing nongovernmental sphere in nearly all political systems reflects expanding political awareness and participation. This in turn indicates the growth of a loyal opposition, the development of checks on foreign demands through greater pluralism, and a decrease in the tolerance level for sharing the political function with foreign principals and their agents. In using the full bag of management strategies, especially economic nationalism and balanced competition, the nonaligned states have blocked the political control objectives of both Washington and Moscow. One indicator of the superpowers' frustration has been the continuing decline in their bilateral foreign aid allocations.

Further proof of a generally higher capability in penetration management is offered by the fact that the more blatant strategies, such as nonrecognition, breaking diplomatic relations, building fences and walls, fomenting riots and destroying foreign property, have been less frequently used in recent years. Since each of these strategies is designed to control technical access, this indicates some confidence by the nonaligned governments that their political control is more secure, that they can manage the especially threatening performance of political party and revolutionary movement functions.

More precise surveys and case studies are needed, to be sure. For now, however, the evidence points in the direction of greater political control by governments over their societies, and therefore over the foreign elements within them. The resultant multipolarism, multilateralism and regionalism have already replaced the Cold War format. Thus, the movement toward completing the diverse nation-state system based on popular sovereignty will continue its tortuous path with less big-power hindrance.

The death of the Cold War is more a case of murder than of suicide. The nonaligned states fought and debilitated the political-control-oriented penetration of the United States and the Soviet Union. The nonaligned states, not the two major powers, killed the Cold War.

The use of the penetration model has facilitated this conclusion. The more a model fits reality, the more accurate will be the model's organization of data. For if international politics principally deal with the clash of people struggling over policy formation and execution, the crucial antecedent must be *the clash of people to determine which people will struggle over policy formation and execution.* "Who" actually participates in making policy shapes, and in many cases determines, what that policy will be. This is what penetration strategies and penetration management strategies try to resolve. As the survey of penetration management indicates, the formulation and use of a myriad of strategies has given governments the means of excluding, channeling or neutralizing foreign agents who seek to participate in the policymaking process. In great measure, domestic control over the political function has been preserved.

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Reviews

NASSER'S SUMMITRY*

by Willard Barber

In evaluating Gamal Abdel Nasser, André Malraux commented that "regardless of everything, regardless of success or failure, victory or defeat, Nasser will go down in history as the embodiment of Egypt, just as Napoleon became the embodiment of France." Malraux was not alone in this view. Nasser's charisma was noted in his personal summit meetings with Castro, Dulles, Eden, Chou En-lai, Tito, Nehru, Khrushchev, Nixon, Brezhnev, Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy, Hammarskjold, and others.

There are striking similarities between the publication of "The Pentagon Papers" and Mohamed Heikal's compilation of events and conversations marking out Nasser's foreign policy. In *The Cairo Documents* verbatim reports of private conversations between chiefs of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and Nasser, are given in detail, sometimes as excerpts, sometimes in full documentary text. Undoubtedly some of the government leaders whose thoughts and animosities Heikal has now laid bare will feel pangs of embarrassment, or remorse, or anger at the disclosure. Yet shadows of doubt overlay some of the paraphrased conversations between national leaders, particularly since several of the principals who are quoted are now deceased.

And who is Mohamed Heikal, the author of this intriguing account of Nasser's ubiquitous diplomacy during nearly two decades of power, i.e., 1952-1970? For several years he has been the editor of *Al Ahram,* a leading newspaper in Cairo, but of greater significance is his long-time role as confidante, adviser, and frequently trusted agent, during Nasser's presidency. More than that, he has continued in the same informal, unofficial, but powerful capacity with Nasser's successor, President Sadat. One would seek in vain for an American equivalent, but he would have to combine the functions of James Reston of the *New York Times* and Henry Kissinger of the White House. Heikal's status is also recognized in other capitals, though perhaps not so much in Washington. To illustrate that Moscow follows his comments with interest, on three successive days during March 1973, *Izvestia,* a daily newspaper, *The Literary Gazette,* a publication of the Soviet Writers' Union, and *Abroad,* a foreign affairs weekly, came out with sharp criticisms of Heikal's "unfriendly statements about Soviet policy," his "doubts about the sincerity of the Soviet people," and his "admiration of the anti-Soviet line of Premier Chou En-lai."

**The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationships with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* By Mohamed Heikal. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973. 360 pp. $10.00.

While observers of the international scene in 1973 may be conscious of the long-standing, if rather precarious, Moscow-Cairo connection, it should be noted that Nasser met with Chou En-lai at Rangoon in advance of the famous international conference held at Bandung in 1955 to lay the basis for common policies for the nonaligned nations. A close friendship quickly developed between the two, and they exchanged a number of visits during the 1960's. On one such occasion Chou En-lai remained in Cairo for twelve days and talked with Nasser no less than sixteen times. Chou was bitter about the contempt for China shown by the Western world, observing that "With all our centuries of civilization, with all our contributions to the human race, all we get from the West is humiliation." Nasser, on his part, said that China's success in atomic weapons was a triumph for the East.

During the rapid buildup of American forces in Viet Nam under President Johnson in 1964-1965, Chou titillated Nasser by telling him that "you should encourage the Americans to throw more soldiers into Vietnam. They will be close to China, within our grasp. They will be hostages. . . . Some of them are trying opium. And we are helping them. We are planting the best kinds of opium especially for the American soldiers. We want to demoralize them. The effect this demoralization is going to have on the United States will be far greater than anyone realizes." Nasser, not a man averse to gossip and intrigue, suggested to visiting Averell Harriman, a few months later, that the United States was falling into China's plan by sending yet more troops. But he did not reveal the opium tactic.

An unusual father-son relationship developed between Nehru and Nasser over years of intermittent conversations and correspondence. The Egyptian sought guidance in the realm of government planning. But India's long-range planning was interrupted by the Chinese invasion of the Himalayan borders. Near the end of his life, according to Nasser, Nehru lost his earlier aspirations to find a "third road" between communism and capitalism, and he died a disillusioned man.

In a totally different area, Nasser's mercurial nature as a statesman was revealed in his dealings with Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary-General. Publicly, and brusquely, Nasser condemned Hammarskjold during the recurring Congo crises, yet in specific votes at the United Nations the Egyptian delegation supported the work of the Secretary-General. After Hammarskjold's death, Nasser ordered the issuance of a commemorative stamp, bearing the legend "The Martyr of Freedom."

The theatrical meetings at UN headquarters in New York in 1960, between Castro, Khrushchev and Nasser, are related with gusto. Nasser also talked at that time with President Eisenhower, and his meeting with Harold Macmillan was the first official contact between Egypt and Britain since the Suez affair. "Che" Guevara, in the Castro entourage, confided to Nasser that Cuba was experiencing administrative and bureaucratic difficulties and complained that the newly installed officials "forget their revolutionary fervor in the arms of their beautiful secretaries."

Heikal's contribution to an understanding of the erratic Nasser is far from definitive. The present volume is devoid of index or bibliography, and is weakened by unclear chronology and some awkward translations. The tendency to gossip is not always curtailed. Can we be certain that Secretary of State Dulles told King Saud "the Middle East situation is very explosive and the detonator in the middle of the bomb is Nasser, so the most important thing is to move quickly and quietly and lift him out of position?" Placing these phrases within quotation marks does not necessarily convince the reader. According to Heikal, Khrushchev, in discussing Kennedy with Nasser, asserted that at the famous Vienna confrontation in 1961, "Kennedy came into that meeting like a peacock and he left like a drowned sparrow." Heikal also asserts that "There was nothing but distrust and dislike between Johnson and Nasser," and is caustic in his characterization of President Johnson's aides, Arthur Goldberg and Walt and Eugene Rostow.

More than once summit gatherings—sometimes called on the spur of the moment, without stated agenda or careful preparations—were compromised by faulty translations, resulting in misunderstandings. But actions, decisions and a resolution of dilemmas were often the result of the highest authorities being able to confer directly, privately and at length. (Nasser and Tito, for example, met thirty times.) Heikal's reporting yields insights and incidents hitherto unknown to the public. He is modest, and quite accurate, in confessing that he is not yet ready to embark on a definitive biography of the man who "started the basic social transformation of his country."

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE WORLD WAR II POLITICAL SETTLEMENT*

by Brenton H. Smith

No one, not even the authors, would claim that *The Semblance of Peace* covers a neglected subject in scholarship. Obviously it does not. It returns to a period in diplomatic history that has been gone over many times before. Noteworthy neither for the presentation of new evidence nor as the most detailed examination of events currently available, it is valuable as the mature judgment of veteran historians, Anthony Nicholls and especially Sir John Wheeler-Bennett.

Despite the title they have chosen for their book, these authors are primarily concerned with the World War II conferences and consultations that prepared the way for the postwar world. Since the major theme centers on the rival goals of the great powers, some topics of importance, such as the relations of de Gaulle with London and Washington, get scant attention. Actually only about a third

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**The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement After the Second World War.* By John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls. New York: Macmillan, 1972. 878 pp. $30.00.

of the book is devoted to postwar developments, and these have been carefully selected. Instead of trying to survey everything, the authors concentrate on certain efforts made to reach a settlement, e.g., the establishment of the UN, the conduct of war-criminal proceedings, and the negotiation of treaties of peace with the smaller Axis powers in Europe and with Japan. The book ends with the conclusion of the special treaty defining Austria's status in 1955. One may hope for a sequel describing the later situations of the 1950's and 1960's, but neither preface nor epilogue says anything about this possibility.

The authors do not avoid World War II issues and problems. They meet them head on. Among the first of these is the tired question of unconditional surrender. The answer they give is that unconditional surrender was required as an expression of moral and political purpose and that there is little evidence that it prolonged the war, as so often charged. Curiously, though, they are convinced that the Morgenthau plan of September 1944, arranging for the industrial crippling of Germany, did intensify the will of the enemy to resist. If carried out, it was also bound to mean a postwar Europe subservient to the Soviet Union, economically and otherwise. But Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls are making the mistake of judging policies by their results. Instead they should judge them by their apparent soundness or unsoundness at the time of their adoption. By such a standard both unconditional surrender and the Morgenthau plan are open to criticism, because both *could* have turned into assets for the enemy.

Meanwhile, the compensating moral-political advantages ascribed to these plans seem meager. Especially because no evidence is offered in these pages that strong parliamentary and public opinion demanded such pronouncements, it remains tempting to believe that British and American governments could have devised wartime policies more valuable for their own propaganda effort and less valuable for Nazi Germany's. What further weakens the argument for unconditional surrender is the authors' unwillingness to link it to a clear need to keep the Soviets from making a separate peace with Germany. They consider that development to have been most unlikely and feel that the Western allies were unnecessarily worried about it. In their view, as long as Hitler was winning, Stalin had too much of his own territory to lose to want a separate peace, and when it became obvious that Hitler was being defeated, Stalin had too much to gain to be so inclined.

The authors point out that fighting the war to wrest unconditional surrender from Germany meant that Britain would exhaust herself economically so thoroughly that she would lose her position as a great power. But they fail to see that Roosevelt and Churchill in February 1943 were unaware of the almost ineluctable consequence of unconditional surrender: a front line of Soviet power fixed far inside Central Europe. The Anglo-American leaders, ensnared by the idea that Germany had been treated with excessive leniency in 1918, were determined to crush her completely now, but in no sense did they pause to think what Europe would look like after the crushing took place.

The Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls account of international relations draws to a close in the mid-1950's, and because the primary materials they use were available then, they might conceivably have finished and published their study some fifteen years ago. It is good that they did not, for in the present work their analysis of the evidence is supplemented by their reaction to the "revisionist" and "New Left" interpretations that have been spreading in recent years. According to these interpretations the USSR was much less to blame than the United States for the breakup of the wartime alliance. The authors are scornful. Sticking strongly to the opposite view, which suffuses their whole work, they declare: "Between our views and those of the revisionists there is clearly a stark contrast which is irreconcilable." (p. 557.) Perhaps this urge to find fault and lay blame one way or another for the breakup of the alliance could be put to rest if writers were more willing to acknowledge that no real alliance ever existed. There was, it is granted, a formal alliance surrounded by vague and ambiguous pledges, but just as a formal constitution cannot act as a magic charm to turn an authoritarian society into a democracy, so a formal alliance cannot set up a real bond between nations whose purposes are patently incompatible.

That wartime allies generally disagree about postwar settlements is a platitude of history, but nowhere in the record of modern diplomacy is there an alliance so lacking in unity as the alliance that finally destroyed Hitler. The Western powers and the Soviet Union entered World War II in entirely different circumstances and with clashing ends in view. Anglo-American policy at the close of the war and afterward was consistent with the policy followed during the war years, and the same may be said for Soviet policy. So the search for some betrayal of nation against nation as the cause of the Cold War is a vain effort. What Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls need to say more emphatically is that the Cold War could have been avoided only if the Western powers or the Soviet Union had been willing to change course sharply in many essential areas.

In language far stronger than is common at present, Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls pass judgment on the whole modern course of Russian-Soviet foreign policy: "Readers of this book will have realized that it is the view of the authors, based upon careful research and analysis, that Russia's foreign policy, as disclosed during the war and practised thereafter, was a re-embodiment of those imperial ambitions which in the glory of the Tsarist expansionist period had led to the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War, the colonization of the Transcaucasian territories and of Manchuria, the penetration of the Balkans and the Middle East, and the threat to Britain's 'lifeline' to India. To this old-fashioned imperialist policy was added the further threat of the proliferation of Communism in Europe to the detriment of what the Communists themselves term 'bourgeois democracy.'

"It was in recognition of the threat inherent in this policy that, with supreme reluctance, the Western powers were constrained to accept the Soviet challenge and to make a brave and essential response of free men against aggression. It was completely irrelevant to the issue that both sides had very shortly before been engaged in a life-and-death struggle against a common aggressor from another quarter." In the process of reaching their goals "the Soviet leaders were prepared to employ all the means ready to their hand—conquest, malfeasance, duplicity, mendacity, obstruction, cajolery, and intimidation." (pp. 286, 556.)

On the subject of the postwar settlement the authors do not hesitate to compare the ambitions of Stalin with those of Hitler. Nor do they hesitate to compare Roosevelt's appeasement policy with that of Chamberlain. Churchill, minus the power of the U.S. and Soviet leaders, is aptly portrayed in the role Lepidus had in the ancient Roman triumvirate with Octavian and Antony. Simply enough, what Stalin desired in Europe was domination, and in the matter of Germany he favored a policy of dismemberment—or unification—insofar as one or the other at a given moment seemed to be the way to Soviet domination. But he did not insist on having everything for himself. Just as Hitler had been willing to allow the British Empire to control a great share of the world, so Stalin was willing to allow the British—and the Americans—to remain big and strong in many regions outside Europe.

Wheeler-Bennett and Nicholls also stress Stalin's ambitions in the Far East, ambitions that were largely satisfied at the Yalta conference. Noting President Roosevelt's willingness to concede Manchuria to the Soviets, the authors acidly remark that in the same circumstance the President was pressuring Britain to return Hong Kong to China at the end of the war. Especially odious in all this was the furtive dealing behind the back at the expense of the Chinese ally. "It is necessary," they say, "to go back to the days of Kaunitz and Talleyrand and Metternich to find a parallel for such duplicity of conduct among allies." (p. 352.) Eventually Stalin emerged as the winner in the contest, and his prize included much more than Manchuria. According to the authors, even before the end of the war he was duping gullible Americans with empty promises of good behavior while actually planning to help Mao to seize the whole of China—"playing the greatest game of bluff and deception of . . . his remarkably devious career."

PLANNING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN/PACIFIC REGION*

by Lawrence E. Grinter

Pacific Basin Development, edited by Harald Malmgren, resulted from a series of seminars sponsored

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**Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests.* Edited by Harald B. Malmgren. Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1972. 148 pp. $10.00.

by the Overseas Development Council in 1970 and 1971, involving government, business and university specialists. The book's central theme is the emerging political economy of the Asian/Pacific region and its implications for the United States. Subjects analyzed range from Japanese and American policies in the area to regional trade and investment opportunities, and although some of the supporting statistics were outdated by publication time, the component papers provide a valuable assessment of Asian/Pacific prospects.

Since 1960 the Pacific Basin has become the world's fastest growing trading region, and in terms of GNP the noncommunist countries constitute the most rapidly growing economic area as well. Nearly two-thirds of Asian/Pacific exports now go to other countries in the region or to the United States. In 1972 U.S. trans-Pacific trade became substantially greater than U.S. trade with the European Economic Community. (p. ix.) In short, the Pacific Basin increasingly resembles an economic unit with considerable potential.

Japan's immensely rapid growth has created a strong demand for trade and this is stimulating the area's industrialization. East Asia is Japan's most important market after the United States. Taiwan, Hong Kong and South Korea are moving into manufactures for the Japanese market. In turn, Southeast Asia supplies Japan with many of her raw materials. Japan's rate of trade has grown at an annual average of 16 per cent for the last fifteen years and is now in the 20 per cent bracket. Between 1960 and 1970 the growth rate of Japan's economy averaged a remarkable 11.4 per cent. (p. 4.) Her overall balance-of-payments surplus is likely to continue increasing.

Against the backdrop of Japanese predominance, economic forces at work in the less developed countries of the Pacific Basin are of mixed character. Favorable developments include technological breakthroughs, stepped-up grain production, and good export performance, particularly in manufactures. Impediments to growth include Western protectionist restrictions, Japanese economic dominance, and a severe problem of overpopulation in some countries. China remains in the background economically, although she now conducts over 80 per cent of her trade with the West and in Asia, particularly with Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore. (p. 11.) Moreover, the Chinese appear to be bringing their economy back into the international system; they are importing high-technology goods and exporting labor-intensive agricultural and manufacturing products.

American economic interests in the Pacific Basin pivot around our relationship with Japan. At both governmental and private-sector levels there are increasing opportunities for joint efforts. But strains continue, with emphasis on the worsening bilateral trade balance and the difficulty U.S. firms have had in penetrating Japanese markets. In the last ten years Japan has become the major capital-surplus and investment nation in Asia. In contrast, the United States is disengaging from Asia, falling back into protectionist policies. These trends, if they continue, could lead to pronounced Japanese economic domination of the area. Accordingly this book provides a baseline for accommodating planning decisions to these trends so as to realize a smoother balance in the growth of the region and capitalize on its potentials. The editor sets the tone with this admonition about past U.S. policy toward the Asian/Pacific countries: "Placing the military security of Southeast Asia, and of Taiwan and Korea, in an exclusive, central position in the American foreign policy planning process has tended to obscure the economic development of the area and the basic long-range economic influences upon it from outside." (pp. 17-18.)

In the introductory chapter Malmgren suggests that the broad view in planning the political economy of the Pacific Basin depends on finding solutions to three fundamental problems, namely, that the region's security remains a function of the balance of power among the United States, Japan, China and the Soviet Union; that Japan is the dominant factor economically, and this is causing considerable concern; and that most countries on the rimland of Asia share increasing economic interdependence with Japan, the United States and the Pacific generally, but at a significant disadvantage. To understand how these three macro-factors are affecting the area's developing political economy, the reader must refer to chapters in the book in a different order than they are presented.

Concerning the first factor, the power balance among the four major powers, in Chapter Six Soedjatmoko, former Indonesian Ambassador to the United States, cites six problems complicating the big-power equilibrium. The need is to: (1) avoid armed confrontation within the U.S.-China-USSR triangle; (2) keep Japan secure so that she does not find it necessary to go nuclear; (3) devise some sort of Asian/Pacific "concert of nations"; (4) make Southeast Asia's "neutralization" an acceptable goal; (5) encourage effective regional cooperation in Southeast Asia; and (6) see how economic development in Southeast Asia can be accelerated in cooperation with the major powers. (pp. 133-134.) While Soedjatmoko furnishes no blueprint for solving problems and tends to place emphasis on Southeast Asia to the exclusion of the two Koreas and Taiwan, the points he mentions are critical to achieving a stable equilibrium in the Pacific Basin.

The second macro-factor to be taken into account in long-range planning—Japan's growing economic predominance—receives detailed attention in Chapter Two by J. Alexander Caldwell, and in Chapter Three by Seiji Naya and Richard Schatz. After World War II, Japan faced a complete disruption of her trading patterns. By 1953 her trade with Southeast Asia still showed a marked decline from prewar levels. This situation compelled a drastic re-evaluation of

Japanese planning. However, in the midst of the retrenchment the outlook was improved by highly profitable U.S. special procurement contracts during the Korean War.

By the mid-1950's three major premises had come to underlie Japan's "doctrine of economic cooperation": (1) Japan must trade to survive, and, therefore, all programs must support Japanese commercial needs; (2) Southeast Asia would replace Northeast Asia and China as Japan's main source of raw materials and markets; and (3) the enormous importance of trade with Southeast Asia would compel Japan to aid private initiatives with public and quasi-public institutions. (p. 26.) In order to implement this doctrine, the Japanese, as donors, stressed production over social overhead projects, capital assistance over technical assistance, and aid concentrated in highly specific activities.

In the early 1950's, Japan's most important financial contributions to the Asian/Pacific countries were reparations to Southeast Asia. While the reparations were the beginning of Japanese foreign aid, they also opened up new markets for Japanese goods. From 1952 through 1959 the government combined economic cooperation with minor aid programs as it contributed to the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Colombo Plan. In 1957 Tokyo proposed the Southeast Asia Development Fund, and in 1958 it made an 18 billion yen ($50 million) long-term loan to India. "Thus, as the decade of the sixties opened, the way was clear for the Japanese government to take major new initiatives in its economic cooperation programs, in terms of both their organization and their scale. . . ." (p. 38.)

By the mid-1960's Japan had experienced phenomenal economic growth. In twenty years its GNP had increased from $15 billion to $200 billion, and per capita GNP went from $180 to $2,000. (p. 31.) Three domestic agencies were created to deal with international aid: the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund to grant low-interest capital loans, the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency to administer technical cooperation activities, and the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers to export technical skills. Japan joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and took part in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). At the 1964 UNCTAD session the less developed countries asked Japan to leave their bloc because she was too developed.

The late 1960's were years of political initiative as Japan became the equal of the United States in Asian economic affairs. The Japanese helped to found the Asian Development Bank and by 1970 Japan was a member of the Group of Ten, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Mekong River Group, and various IBRD committees. It pledged that it "would try to attain the [DAC/OECD] 1975 target of devoting 1 per cent of its GNP to net public and private flows to the developing nations." (p. 44.)

Nevertheless, the future of Japanese aid to the Pacific Basin is problematical. Two obstacles block public support of aid projects—fear of creating weaknesses in the home economy and the need to spend more on welfare measures and social overhead capital at home. In addition, Japan must decide how to offset its continuing payment surplus vis-à-vis developing countries; in Southeast Asia alone the 1968 surplus was $1.6 billion. Tokyo is aware of these issues. Still, the question is whether the government and the people will be able to move rapidly enough to harness the country's assistance potential or whether, by moving too slowly, Japan may experience difficult economic relations with the developing countries in the 1970's.

Concerning the prospects of American and Japanese trade, investment and aid for Asian/Pacific development, Naya and Schatz make these main points (pp. 61-71):

(1) The leading trading partners, exporters and contributors of aid and assistance to the developing countries of the Pacific Basin are the United States and Japan.

(2) The growth strategies of the region's developing countries vary greatly; "inward" looking countries such as Burma, Ceylon and India contrast with the "outward" looking units, Thailand, Malaysia and Taiwan.

(3) All the poorer countries have tended to complain that the developed countries' trade and agricultural policies, and the existing tariff system under GATT, are biased against them.

(4) The export patterns of East Asia and Southeast Asia diverge substantially when U.S. and Japanese markets are analyzed. East Asian countries rely heavily on the U.S. market; Southeast Asian countries rely on Japan.

(5) Japan has now replaced the United States as the major investor in the Asian/Pacific region. As of 1969, Japanese investment in Asia was valued at $600 million and by 1980 it may reach $5.5 billion. This investment acceleration has had a marked effect in Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia.

(6) The United States and Japan have provided well over 80 per cent of the total assistance to the Pacific Basin countries since 1965. Although U.S. aid has been almost totally a function of political, military and ideological concerns, Japan's aid has been fiercely economic in character.

(7) With the exception of organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and ASEAN, most attempts at regional cooperation in the Pacific Basin have not worked. ASEAN continues to be the most promising grouping in Southeast Asia. The problem, however, is whether Japan, the United States and Australia will focus their aid on projects that coincide with the regional organization's priorities.

In Chapter Four, Bernard Gordon makes three basic points with regard to the developing countries' viability, the third macro-factor in this roundup of assumptions about the future of the Pacific Basin. First, true economic "integration" in Asia is out of the question, although "cooperation" and "collaboration" are possible. Second, there are important subregions in Asia, and encouraging subregional groupings is the best approach to assuring viability across the entire region. Third, no "political" integration is being talked about in the Asian/Pacific area—none at all.

Elaborating on these constraints, Gordon argues that trade as an avenue to Asian integration is a poor prospect because of the absence of complementary economies and because most noncommunist nations conduct only 7 to 39 per cent of their trade with East and Southeast Asia. Singapore's view seems to typify these countries' reaction to regional cooperation: "What's in it for Singapore—today?" (p. 84.) However, given the Southeast Asian countries' dependence on Japan, their fear of Japanese domination is likely to be the *single largest incentive* leading them to economic cooperation. (pp. 85-87.) Some recent regional efforts have been undertaken by the Asian Coconut Community, the Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC), the Southeast Asia Iron and Steel Institute, the ECAFE-sponsored Asian Industrial Development Council (AIDC), and the Council of Ministers for Asian Economic Cooperation.

In conclusion, Gordon argues that ASEAN deserves special attention as the leading regional entity and a completely indigenous institution. It will make demonstrable progress, he believes, if the United States, Japan and Australia treat it as a functioning entity and reorient their specific assistance programs to take its projects into account. (p. 92.)

Regarding the role of the multinational corporation in the Pacific Basin, Robert Shaw and Donald Sherk make the point, in Chapter Five, that the region has one overriding resource: plenty of dedicated, low-skill, low-wage workers. For this reason, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia, in particular, favor labor-intensive industrial projects. (p. 96.) The problem for these countries is to channel foreign investment so that it creates jobs. Nevertheless, except for Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, the developing states of Asia have rising levels of unemployment and underemployment. (p. 99.) Consequently their reactions to multinational corporations (MNC's) are mixed. MNC's are feared as competition to national firms, but they are also an obvious conduit for technical know-how and capital. At the same time, organized labor in the United States tends to oppose MNC's because they can export capital and management, soak up cheap labor, and flood the U.S. market with competitive items produced at far less cost.

For MNC's to assist Pacific Basin governments in regional development, Shaw and Sherk maintain, they must reassure both the developed and the developing countries. To gain approval from the first group they must publicize the economic benefits of international production, put an emphasis on full employment policies, and encourage improved compensation assistance. (pp. 104-109.) To make headway with the developing countries, MNC's must help to achieve an effective ratio of labor to capital-intensive technology, enhance local production, and improve the climate for economic cooperation. (pp. 109-112.).

In summary, the prospects for balanced, equitably phased economic development in the Pacific Basin, according to these analyses, are problematical. But the Peking and Moscow summit meetings of 1972, the Smithsonian agreements of December 1971, and other negotiations have helped to smooth important aspects of the process. If global power politics are increasingly employed as a means of devising a more equitable world economic system, the Asian/Pacific region should be one of the major beneficiaries.

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Books Received

I. POLITICS, HISTORY, ECONOMICS

The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. By Daniel Bell. New York: Basic Books, 1973. 507 pp. $12.50. Professor Bell examines the progression of advanced societies into what he terms the "post-industrial" age. He focuses on changes already occurring in our society—e.g., in the structure of the economy, class stratification, and political institutions—in the context of a single unifying idea, namely, "the codification of theoretical knowledge," which shapes innovation in technology and social policy. He depicts the new "knowledge society" through use of statistical analysis and traditional inquiry, and explores other topics including technological forecasting and the role of politicians and technocrats in post-industrial society. The book has an extensive index and many data tables.

Essai General de Strategie. By Jean-Paul Chamay. Paris: Editions Champs Libre, 1973. 219 pp. n.p. (paper). An examination of traditional and contemporary literature undertaken to trace the evolution of strategic thought in Europe and the United States. Although much of the analysis is focused on military strategy, a major portion of the volume is devoted to the psychological and political determinants of strategy as well as alternative methodologies for the conduct of strategy.

The Fate of the Oceans. Edited by John J. Logue. Villanova, Pa.: Villanova University Press, for the World Order Research Institute, 1972. 237 pp. $1.95 (paper). Specialists from more than a dozen countries presented papers at the Villanova Ocean Conference of 1972, on such topics as a constitution for the oceans; UN ocean debates; ocean pollution along the Jersey shore; the law of the sea; ocean ecology, and the case for the U.S. draft treaty for an ocean regime. This book includes these papers as well as accounts of discussions at the conference, an index, and a schematic representation of the seabed and ocean floor as contained in the U.S. draft treaty under discussion at the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference.

Free Press, Free People: The Best Cause. By John Hohenberg. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 528 pp. $3.95 (paper). A history of media dissent from ancient times to the 1970's. Beginning with the dissent of the prophets of Israel, through which the "right of dissent against kings was enshrined," Hohenberg ambles from ancient Greece and China, through sixteenth to eighteenth century Europe, to the "violent journalists" of the American Revolution, the "Age of Imperialism," two world wars, a Cold War, the McCarthy era, and the politics of the 1960's. Finally, journalism in the 1970's is examined and the concluding chapter, echoing the title of the book, discusses new roles for the press, the relationship between television and the press, and the "free press on trial" situation in America and Europe today.

Government and Politics in the Twentieth Century. (Third edition.) By Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz. New York: Praeger, 1973. 278 pp. $9.00 ($2.95, paper). This book, published originally in 1949, utilizes the traditional approach to comparative government in dealing with the function, structure and style of politics. This edition contains additional analyses of the Third World, along with a new chapter on the role of force in political change. Other chapters, partly rewritten and updated, deal with government in contemporary society; three major patterns of twentieth-century government; the framework of "limited government"; channels of political action, i.e., elections, political parties and legislatures; political leadership and administration; belief systems and politics; the interrelation of national and international politics; and democracy in the modern world.

International Economic Peace Keeping. By Harald B. Malmgren. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973. 276 pp. $8.95 ($3.95, paper). Malmgren reviews world trade and monetary relations in the period beginning with President Nixon's August 15, 1971 economic measures and ending in midsummer 1972. He then provides a broad outline and detailed suggestions for new international trade negotiations and for reforming the world trading system.

International Law and Contemporary Commonwealth Issues. By Robert R. Wilson. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1971. 245 pp. n.p. Professor Wilson analyzes contemporary problems in international law among nations of the British Commonwealth. In discussing topics such as state succession, migration, communalism and defense, he scans the history and the current political scene of many Commonwealth nations, chief among them New Zealand, Australia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Rhodesia and Malaysia. There is also an appendix which includes a number of important documents and references.

Politics and Government. By T. H. Stevenson. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1973. 435 pp. $2.95 (paper). This introductory volume for undergraduate use surveys the nature of the state and sovereignty, constitutions and constitutionalism, political parties and interest groups, and the structure and function of government; the political systems of the United States, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and India; and the study of international politics, foreign policy, and international law and organization.

The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath. By Charles F. Doran. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971. 223 pp. $12.50. Basing his book on a comparative study of the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna, Doran discusses the politics of assimilation of defeated hegemonic states. In examining the political and economic causes of hegemony, he states that two conditions are necessary: elites and interest groups that demand an expansionist policy, and a superior capacity for war. He then discusses the military responses of a hegemonic state and the psychological results of its defeat. From his study, he develops a theory of hegemony and assimilation which he expands to include World Wars I and II, and concludes that all nations at some time exhibit expansionist tendencies which are, to various degrees, predictable.

Protagonists of Change: Subcultures in Development and Revolution. Edited by Abdul A. Said. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. 181 pp. $6.00 ($2.50, paper). A series of essays on development topics ranging from theory and development models to students, the military, and varying views of the future. Contributors include Irving Louis Horowitz, Stephen Hallmark, Charles K. Wilber, A. M. Halpern, John Bowling, Hans Morgenthau and the editor. Besides the topical divisions, the book is given over to geographical regions, including the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, Western Europe, the Arab world, and sub-Saharan Africa.

Revolutions of Our Time: Fascism. By Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf. New York: Praeger, 1973. 224 pp. $8.50. A German historian explores the multiple meanings of fascism and seeks the answers to such questions as: Who became fascists and why? What were the elements of fascism that attracted the masses? How did the driving forces of fascism—nationalism, militarism and racism—cut through society's accepted values?

The Socialist Register, 1972: A Survey of Movements and Ideas. Edited by Ralph Miliband and John Saville. New York: Humanities Press, 1972. 306 pp. $7.50. The ninth edition of *The Socialist Register* includes essays on theoretical and practical issues such as "Contradictions and Struggles in Northern Ireland," "Rent Strikes—Direct Action and the Working Class," and "The Radicalisation of Science." Two of the pieces focus on Africa and the final essay analyzes China's new rapprochement with the United States.

The United Nations and the News Media: A Survey of Public Information on the United Nations in the World Press, Radio, and Television. By Alexander Szalai. New York: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1972. 323 pp. $6.50 (paper). This comprehensive study of the global output of information on the United Nations, utilizing the tools of measurement and analysis developed by modern communications research, was undertaken by UNITAR in 1966. It assesses not only the extent to which the peoples of the world are already informed about UN aims and activities but the means by which their knowledge regarding the UN can be broadened.

World in Crisis: Readings in International Relations. (Fourth edition.) Edited by Frederick H. Hartmann. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 519 pp. $4.95 (paper). This fourth edition of Hartmann's *World in Crisis,* published first in 1952, contains articles and documents grouped in fifteen chapters around five central themes: Fundamentals of the State System, Relations of States, the Power Problem and Power Patterns, the Superpowers, and Contemporary Problems. Authors include Charles McClelland, Hedley Bull, Salvador de Madariaga, Sir Harold Nicolson, Walter F. Hahn, Henry Kissinger, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Charles W. Thayer, Fred Iklé, John G. Stoessinger, Inis Claude, Jr., Kenneth Waltz, J. William Fulbright, George Kennan, Vernon V. Aspaturian, Hans J. Morgenthau, T. C. Rhee, Bernard Lewis and Laszlo Hadik. There are, in addition, statements or speeches by Sir Eyre Crowe, Chou En-lai, Richard M. Nixon, Robert F. Byrnes, Nelson A. Rockefeller, Dean Rusk and Woodrow Wilson. The editor has contributed introductions to each section as well as three articles.

II. United States and Canada

The Book of Presidents. By Tim Taylor. New York: Arno Press (Quadrangle Books), 1972. A New York Times Book. 703 pp. $12.95. A comprehensive reference on the Presidents of the United States extending through the first term of President Richard Nixon. Devoting a separate chapter to each President, Taylor presents biographical information on their rise to national prominence, a detailed chronology of their decisions and actions, and material on their Vice Presidents, Cabinets and Supreme Courts. Appendixes include the Constitution, major acts and treaties, and a statistical summary.

The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. By Walter Lippmann. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 81 pp. $2.45 (paper). This small volume contains an introductory essay by Ronald Steel, the famous X article ("The Sources of Soviet Conduct," by George F. Kennan), Walter Lippmann's critique of Kennan's article, and a bibliography on the Cold War compiled by Steel.

Communication Is Power: Unchanging Values in a Changing Journalism. By Herbert Brucker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 385 pp. $9.50. A veteran journalist appraises the state of American journalism today. He assesses the impact of rapid technological change on newspapers and broadcasting; warns against the growing corporate control over mass media as a threat to our democratic system; emphasizes that editorial decisions must be made by independent journalists rather than by those concerned with profits; and argues strongly in favor of responsible, unbiased reporting and freedom of access by the press to courtrooms, documents and other sources often kept secret.

Creating a New World Politics: From Conflict to Cooperation. By David V. Edwards. New York: David McKay, 1973. 191 pp. $6.95 ($2.95, paper). Professor Edwards seeks to break away from the conventional ideological politics of hawks and doves who, he feels, share the same inaccurate and self-defeating assumptions about international reality. He calls for "an American foreign policy designed to begin reconstruction of international relations so that they are less violent and more cooperative, so that they contribute increased welfare rather than 'illfare' to the peoples of the world."

Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio. By James Aronson. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972. 327 pp. $8.95. A critique of the conduct of the American press in its function as a vehicle of public enlightenment. The author assesses the relationship of the "press elite" and the White House during the Nixon years, condemns the government's campaign to "intimidate" the public expression of variant views, and criticizes the elite press establishment for its unwillingness to assume an adversary stance to government: "I find entirely unacceptable the view that the public gets the news and information it wants, and the corollary notion that it gets what it deserves. How can the public know what it wants or deserves if successive national administrations in conjunction with the elite remnant do everything in their power to prevent it from understanding or even learning about the realities of policy?" Throughout the volume, Aronson addresses the impact of television and mass media news on public opinion, and his concluding chapter, entitled "Rock and Revolt," examines underground news media and their origins.

Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. By Stephen R. Graubard. New York: W. W. Norton, 1973. 288 pp. $7.95. An explication of Henry A. Kissinger's thought which not only provides a synopsis of his books but indicates the forces that have been influential in shaping his world view. The final section analyzes Dr. Kissinger's practice of international relations as reflected in recent U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise? By Robert W. Tucker. New York: Universe Books, 1972. 127 pp. $6.00. Professor Tucker scrutinizes the viability of America's Cold War assumptions and finds them outdated by the increasing power of others and the separation of military power from political influence. He argues that an isolationist America need not be an isolated America, since American foreign economic interests and other nations' need for American wealth and experience would continue. Core, or territorial, security would guide policy, with "benign neglect" applying elsewhere.

Nine Lies About America. By Arnold Beichman. New York: The Library Press, 1972. 314 pp. $7.95. The author offers a telling refutation to those who argue that the United States is "fascist," "genocidal," "corrupt," "insane," or otherwise delinquent. Examining each of these "lies" about the country, he chastises American intellectuals for what he believes to be their distorted logic in justifying violence, destruction and chaos. Among those subject to his criticism are Herbert Marcuse, Charles Reich, Paul Goodman, Susan Sontag, Abbie Hoffman, Allen Ginsberg, Philip Slater and Robert Heilbroner. To Beichman, critics who declare that American democracy is fraudulent, while nonetheless enjoying full civil liberties, are a basic threat to American freedoms.

Peace Movements in America. Edited by Charles Chatfield. New York: Schocken Books, 1973. 224 pp. $7.50 ($3.95, paper). These essays explore the roots, history and present nature of peace movements in the United States; personalities, including Crosley, Muste and Boulding; student groups, and the Cold War revisionists. The dominant theme is the dialectic between internationalism and transnationalism, i.e., attachment to a "higher" world reality, and the concluding section presents a symposium on "internationalism as a current in the peace movement."

Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget. By Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, Charles L. Schultze and Nancy H. Teeters. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1973. 446 pp. $3.95 (paper). An analysis of the 1974 federal budget and major options in the allocation of governmental funds, the nature and level of U.S. spending for domestic social programs, general revenue sharing, and the rising cost of defense. The authors assess changes and trends in the defense budget, focusing on strategic forces, general purpose forces, ground combat and naval capabilities, and the residual costs of the Viet Nam war.

The Seventies: Problems and Proposals. Edited by Irving Howe and Michael Harrington. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 519 pp. $12.50. These essays, originally published in *Dissent* magazine, edited by Irving Howe, discuss problems brought about by major social changes in the United States, such as poverty, racism, pollution, population growth, education and sexism. Essayists include Harrington, Howe, Alan Dershowitz, Lewis Coser, Arthur M. Schlesinger and Alice S. Rossi.

Three Crises in American Foreign Affairs and a Continuing Revolution. By Howard Trivers. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972. 220 pp. $6.95. In the first three chapters of this work the author, a former Foreign Service Officer, describes and analyzes three recent crises in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy: the building of the Berlin wall, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Viet Nam war. His fourth and final chapter assesses the impact of science and technology on foreign affairs, noting in particular the discrepancy between the rates of technological change and social change.

III. Western Europe and Atlantic Community

America and the World Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities. By David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. 371 pp. $12.50 ($2.95, paper). A review of U.S.-European economic relations from three perspectives: the history of the Atlantic community; the main issues supporting and nonsupportive of the Atlantic community; and the community's relationships with the outside world, particularly with Japan and the developing countries.

The Bormann Brotherhood. By William Stevenson. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. 334 pp. $7.95. Drawing upon interviews and recently declassified documents, the author analyzes the role of Martin Bormann in the Third Reich and describes the complex plan for the escape from Germany and reorganization of Nazi leaders at the end of World War II. The activities of the "brotherhood" of Nazis alleged to exist today are described in considerable detail.

A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna. (Revised edition.) By René Albrecht-Carrié. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 764 pp. $6.95 (paper). This second edition of Professor Albrecht-Carrié's standard diplomatic history of Europe since 1815, first published in 1958, brings the record up to the end of 1972. He devotes special attention in the new material to the loosening of alliances in Europe, the state of European integration, Britain's application for membership in the EEC and eventual admission, developments in French-German relations, and relations between the Eastern and Western blocs.

Europe: The Radical Challenge. By Hugh Thomas. New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 211 pp. $8.50. Hugh Thomas, noted for his previous Hispanic histories, in this short study leads the reader through a general inquiry into a series of problems and opportunities arising from the British entry into the European Economic Community. Britain's entry is considered from three positions—political, social and economic—and particular attention is given to the role of domestic British politics in the decision to join the Community.

Norway. By Ronald G. Popperwell. New York: Praeger, 1972. 335 pp. $11.50. In this comprehensive examination of the major political, social, cultural and geographic factors that have shaped the development of modern Norway, special emphasis is given to the role of industrialization and urbanization, the language question, the monarchy, the news media, and the arts and literature.

The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Volume IV. The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918. By Gerhard Ritter. Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1973. 496 pp. $18.00. This is the final volume in the late Professor Ritter's definitive study of German militarism. Volume I covered 1740-1890; Volume II, 1890-1914; and Volume III, 1914-1917. Here he examines in depth the period from the fall of Bethmann Hollweg in July 1917 to the collapse of the German state in November 1918. The central theme is the conflict between those who sought to end the war before Germany could be destroyed by internal revolution and military defeat and the militarists, especially General Ludendorff, who insisted on continuing the war.

Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971. By George S. Harris. Washington: American Enterprise Institute and The Hoover Institution, 1972. 263 pp. $4.50. In his consideration of U.S.-Turkish relations, Dr. Harris describes the origins of the alliance, traces the course of difficulties that have developed over the years, and analyzes their causes. Relying heavily on Turkish sources, he finds that disillusionment with U.S. policy over Cyprus and the changed international milieu, characterized by a relaxation of tensions and détente with the East, have been the more important sources of strain. One of the consequences, according to Dr. Harris, may be the undoing of the Turkish-American alliance in favor of a Turkish orientation toward Europe.

Values, Trends and Alternatives in Swiss Society: A Prospective Analysis. By Armin Gretler and Pierre-Emeric Mandl. New York: Praeger, 1973. 240 pp. $17.50. This study by two Swiss sociologists provides the latest available comprehensive data on all social, economic and political trends in Switzerland, with projections in many cases to the year 2040. Chapters are devoted to demography, labor force, conditions of women, the family, working time and leisure time, standard of living, property, urbanization, housing and social relations, political parties, and external influences.

IV. SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE

Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR. By William Taubman. New York: Praeger, 1973. 166 pp. $15.00. The author, a former exchange student at Moscow State University, examines urban development in the Soviet Union and concludes that it has been uneven, that housing and services lag behind industrial development, that noncity agencies have dominated city governments (soviets), and that city governments have been unable or unwilling to govern. Despite notable achievements in mass urban transit and medical care, Soviet city governments have lacked needed resources to solve other problems because central authorities, including industrial bureaucrats and the party apparatus, have concentrated their efforts on industrial growth at the expense of urban services.

The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties. (Revised edition.) By Robert Conquest. New York: Collier Books, Macmillan, 1973. 844 pp. $4.95 (paper). Relying heavily on Roy Medvedev's *Let History Judge,* the author finds that Stalin's Great Purge of 1932 is distinctive in three aspects: its scale, for millions perished and every member of the population was held under threat; its methods, in particular the device of the confession trial; and its secrecy, since for years nothing was officially said about the whole ordeal. Starting with the murder of Sergei Kirov, head of the party in Leningrad, the story proceeds through the "show" trials of Zinoviev and Pyatakov, the Ordzhonikidze "suicide," the crushing of the party, and the Bukharin trial. The climax came in the 1932 party purge by means of which Stalin established himself as absolute ruler of the Soviet Union.

Industrial Management in the Soviet Union: The Role of the CPSU in Industrial Decision-making, 1917-1970. By William J. Conyngham. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 378 pp. $9.50. In this study of the role of a revolutionary political party in forced industrialization, the author's basic conclusion is that the Soviet party performed important functions during the early phase of industrialization but that its usefulness has become increasingly marginal in the current Soviet situation. Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to a detailed analysis of the party's role between November 1962 and Khrushchev's ouster in October 1964, a period when the CPSU underwent radical structural reorganization and an expansion of its managerial functions.

The Judge in a Communist State: A View from Within. By Otto Ulc. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1972. 307 pp. $8.75. In 1959, disaffected by his involuntary role as a judge in the Stalinist Czech regime, Ulc fled to the United States. This book contains his description of the duties he was forced to perform and the effects of "socialist legality" on the people. "Totalitarianism maimed the soul of the nation," he says. "Moths of envy, jealousy and egotism have eaten away the national moral fabric." Yet he sounds an optimistic note, pointing out that "The passage of time is the hereditary disease of totalitarianism." Even though repressed by Soviet tanks, the experiment with limited freedoms in 1968 means that Czechoslovakia will not be the same as before.

The New Worker in Soviet Russia. By Irving R. Levine. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 191 pp. $5.95. A former Moscow correspondent for NBC News traces, in a popular style, the changing condition of the Russian worker under the various regimes since Peter the Great. He concludes that although many Russian workers are dissatisfied today by shortages, crowded housing and bureaucratic red tape, they are convinced that their system is preferable to all others and that the future will bring improvements in their way of life.

Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. By William C. Fletcher. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. 179 pp. $11.25. Contending that organized religion as a factor in the execution of Soviet foreign policy has been ignored for too long, Fletcher describes the role of Soviet religious organizations in support of foreign policy goals since World War II. Policy areas examined include the consolidation of control in Eastern Europe, East-West relations, and Soviet relations with the Third World.

Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria. By Nissan Oren. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 204 pp. $8.50 ($4.00, paper). Professor Oren, a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, assesses the historical importance of Bulgaria in relation to the Soviet desire to control the Balkan area. He considers Bulgarian politics as a microcosm of the global clash between peasant populism and communism, the former stressing land reform and the latter demanding a rapid conversion to urbanism and technology, and examines the effects of favoring urbanization at the expense of rural life and the farming economy.

Siberia and the Pacific: A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects. By Paul Dibb. New York: Praeger, 1972. 288 pp. $17.50. Siberia, stretching from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, is depicted as an area whose future impact may in some ways compare in historic dimensions with that occasioned by the economic development of North America. The author, a senior economist in the Australian Department of Defense, systematically analyzes the Eastern Siberian and Soviet Far Eastern economy sector by sector, and examines the prospects for increased Siberian trade with Japan, North Korea and other Pacific trading partners at a time when Soviet trade with China has been curtailed.

The Slovak Dilemma. By Eugen Steiner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 229 pp. $13.95. This case study in modern nationalism views the 4,500,000 Slovaks inhabiting the eastern part of Czechoslovakia as a separate Slav ethnic group. The first part of the book analyzes the history of the Slovaks through the Second World War, but the major concern is with their fate under communism. Dr. Steiner traces in detail various aspects of the post-1945 Slovak problem culminating in the downfall of Novotny and the rise to power of Dubcek, the Slovak communist leader, and describes the part played by Slovaks and Slovak nationalism in the events surrounding Dubcek's rise and fall.

Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record. Edited by Leopold Labedz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. 320 pp. $3.50 (paper). This is a collection of writings about Solzhenitsyn, widely acclaimed as the greatest living writer in the Soviet Union, even though his works have been banned there. Much of the volume consists of selections from Soviet critics (official and unofficial) of Solzhenitsyn's works, arranged to delineate the struggle between him and the Soviet Writers' Union and other official Soviet organs. Also included is Solzhenitzyn's moving Nobel Laureate statement on intellectual freedom.

Soviet Strategy—Soviet Foreign Policy. By C. G. Jacobsen. Glasgow: Robert Maclehose and Company, Ltd., 1972. 236 pp. $12.50. In considering the role of the military as a pressure group affecting Soviet foreign policymaking, Dr. Jacobsen contends that "although the armed forces constitute one of the policy-effecting instruments at the disposition of the political leadership, the armed forces establishment is integrated into this political leadership to an extent which entails considerable influence on the choice of instruments." In support of his thesis, he points to recent Soviet naval developments, increases in the Soviet defense budget, and the noticeable presence within the party system of military professionals. His conclusion is that while the Soviet party will not permit a challenge from the military to its societal role, the pressures in the international arena of the 1970's will require it to tolerate a greater degree of flexibility in regard to the military's position and influence.

The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union. By Marshall I. Goldman. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1972. 372 pp. $7.95. Dr. Goldman, whose articles on the same subject have appeared in *Science* and *The New Yorker,* has written a scholarly book bridging several disciplines. A central theme is that pollution of natural resources plagues the planned economy and free enterprise systems alike; rapid industrial growth rather than the form of government is the prime agent causing environmental havoc. For the Soviet

Union, the essential problem is that the state is both manufacturer and polluter, and its priorities lie with increased production rather than conservation. As the author points out, "a study of environmental pollution in the USSR is a prerequisite for anyone who believes that it is capitalism and private greed that are the root cause of environmental disruption."

Yugoslavia's Foreign Trade: A Study of State Trade Discrimination. By Ryan C. Amacher. New York: Praeger, 1972. 185 pp. $13.50. In surveying the development and current state of Yugoslavia's trade relations, Amacher evaluates the impact of economic reforms on the nation's international trade and examines the differences in Yugoslav terms of trade with Eastern and Western Europe.

V. Middle East and Africa

Africa: Problems in Economic Development. Edited by J. S. Uppal and Louis R. Salkever. New York: The Free Press, 1973. 353 pp. $11.95. This collection of readings on African development covers a broad range of topics under six general rubrics: the setting of development, economic policy and planning techniques, sectoral development, the development of human resources, public finance and taxation, and international economic relations. The papers contain a great deal of economic data, generally rely on specific case studies rather than a theoretical approach, and present many recommendations for public policy.

Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook. By Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, John N. Paden and Hugh M. Stevenson. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 483 pp. $29.95. This handbook makes use of recent techniques in political science and computer technology to draw up political, economic, social and geographical profiles of thirty-two black African nations. Issues dealt with include demography, ecology and pluralism, social and economic development, political development, security systems and stability, international linkages, and urban and ethnic patterns. The book has extensive notes and bibliographies, and a chapter to explain the theoretical context and justify the authors' methodology.

Employment, Incomes and Equality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. Report of an inter-agency team organized by the International Labour Office. Geneva: International Labour Office, 1972. 600 pp. 30 Sw. fr. (paper). This volume, similar to the others in the ILO's series on employment and development in Third World countries, contains detailed, technical descriptions of Kenya's economy, extensive economic data, including 129 data tables, and recommendations for public policy to increase productive employment.

From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism. By C. Ernest Dawn. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. 212 pp. $8.95. Professor Dawn focuses on the rise of Arabism in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He stresses the efforts of Sharif Husayn, Amir of Mecca, to consolidate his rule in Arabia, which led him into conflict with the Young Turk rulers and contributed to his support for the Syrian Arab nationalists and his alliance with Great Britain in World War I.

Man, State and Society in the Contemporary Maghrib. Edited by I. William Zartman. New York: Praeger, 1973. 531 pp. $15.00 ($6.95, paper). Professor Zartman, author of previous works on North Africa, has compiled a valuable collection of articles, many of which are translated from French or Arabic, on the Maghrib for the English-speaking reader. Preference in the selection is given to those employing a particular disciplinary approach and to those less readily available. Two articles are published for the first time. For comparative purposes, the book has been arranged by subject rather than by country, thus providing coverage of the common cultural backgrounds and contemporary problems of the several countries as well as their significant differences. It contains an excellent summary of research on North Africa and areas of study that have not yet been investigated. Maps, tables, a bibliographical essay and an index further enhance its value.

Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics. Edited by Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale. New York: The Free Press, 1972. 418 pp. $12.95. Twenty-three previously unpublished essays on the nine states of the southern African regional system provide a balanced, up-to-date and comprehensive review of the area's politics. The concluding chapter sketches a series of scenarios—projected to the year 2000—of the possible and probable interrelations among these countries.

South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute. By Solomon Slonim. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 409 pp. $13.50. This study of the legal and political disputes that have arisen over South West Africa begins with the historical context—the diplomatic compromise by means of which the mandate system was formed and South West Africa became a mandated territory, and the experience of the mandate system in operation. The author then examines in considerable detail the origins of the dispute between South Africa and the United Nations over international accountability for South West Africa; UN efforts unilaterally to exercise supervisory authority over the territory; the role and pronouncements of the Court; the UN act of revocation of the mandate, endorsed by the latest opinion of the Court; and the subsequent direct confrontation between the UN and South Africa over the future of the territory.

VI. East and South Asia

American Policy Toward Laos. By Martin E. Goldstein. Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1973. 347 pp. $15.00. Professor Goldstein traces American policy toward Laos since World War II, with emphasis on the period between the two Geneva conferences in 1954 and 1962. A final chapter treats the major post-1962 developments. The author, who is on the Widener College political science faculty, devotes considerable attention to U.S. economic and military aid programs in Laos, shifts in U.S. policy under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the three-way struggle in Laos among rightists, neutralists and communists, and the relationship of the Laotian conflict to the broader Indochina fighting since 1945.

Asia: A Selected and Annotated Guide to Reference Works. By G. Raymond Nunn. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1971. 223 pp. $12.50. More than 900 books and periodicals, over two-thirds of them in English, are cited in this guide to reference works on Asia. In addition to bibliographies, the guide lists encyclopedias, yearbooks, biographical dictionaries, atlases, gazetteers, and sources of statistical information. It includes materials published through the fall of 1970.

Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia. By Michael Leifer. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1972. 173 pp. $6.00. Among the recently decolonized states of Southeast Asia, "nationbuilding" has become a commonplace expression of governmental intent. This study of political life in the region draws an important distinction between political integration and the more ambiguous ideal of national integration. The author argues that the urgent task facing the new states is the creation of a viable statehood, which cannot wait upon the prior creation of a national consciousness. He also examines the experience of interregional conflict and the prospects for closer association among the independent states.

Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970's. Edited by James William Morley. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. 249 pp. $9.50. The six contributors to this collection of essays touch on many aspects of Japanese security policy: the role of economism as it affects balanced defense, the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the stability of the conservative party leadership, attitudes of powerful business interests, the impact made by changes in U.S. policy during the Nixon Administration, and Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia. "A Forecast with Recommendations" by the editor concludes the volume.

The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic, and Military Importance. Edited by Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell. New York: Praeger, 1972. 457 pp. $25.00. The twenty-three papers published in this volume were delivered at a conference in March 1971, sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, by specialists such as Auguste Toussaint, Charles Issawi, T. B. Millar, John Franklin Campbell, A. A. Castagno, Coral Bell, Guy J. Pauker, Norman D. Palmer, John M. Steeves, O. M. Smolansky, Howard Wriggins, Laurence W. Martin and Jacques Freymond. The papers analyze the shifting balances of power in the Indian Ocean and its military-strategic and commercial significance; describe the natural resources of the area; discuss the importance of the Indian Ocean from the perspectives of Iran, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian peninsula, the Red Sea and Suez, the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia, Australia, Indonesia, South and Southern Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon; and examine the interests in the area of the USSR, the United States, Japan, China, Britain and Western Europe.

Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area. By Kiyoshi Kojima. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. 195 pp. $10.00. A description of the Japanese role in the Pacific economy and the advocacy of a Free Trade Area in the Pacific form the substance of this volume. The author discusses the impact an FTA might have on Japan, the developing nations of Asia, the United States, and the liberalization of international trade and monetary reform.

Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924-1929. By Nobuya Bamba. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 1973. 440 pp. $10.50. In this socio-psychological approach to the study of Japanese diplomatic history in the latter half of the 1920's, the author describes the conflict between two key diplomats of the period, Shidehara Kijuro and Tanaka Giichi, over Japanese foreign policy goals. He explains how these diplomats' contrasting personalities and cultural identities influenced Japanese diplomacy, especially toward China.

Korea: A History. By Bong-youn Choy. Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1972. 474 pp. $12.50. This survey of Korean history covers more than 2,000 years, though it concentrates on the period from 1910 to 1973. The author discusses the immediate post-World War II developments, the Korean War, the military coup d'état of 1961, the economies of South and North, prospects for the country, and the impact of external forces, notably Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, on Korean development.

On the Other Side: 23 Days with the Vietcong. By Kate Webb. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972. 160 pp. $6.95. UPI correspondent Kate Webb recounts her twenty-three days as a Viet Cong prisoner in Cambodia in April 1971. She describes the grueling marches, life in the camps, and the attitudes of her Viet Cong captors.

Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941. Edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, with Dale K. A. Finlayson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. 801 pp. $25.00. At a conference held at Lake

Kawaguchi, Japan, in July 1969, Japanese and American scholars presented papers examining various aspects of U.S.-Japanese relations in the decade prior to Pearl Harbor. Now published, these essays explore the roles of the foreign affairs, war and navy ministries in Tokyo and Washington, as well as the influence and views of political parties, the press, interest groups and other organizations.

The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties. By Hungdah Chiu. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 178 pp. $10.00. Since the PRC has not yet acceded to the 1969 Vienna Convention governing the interpretation and application of treaties, the author maintains that it is essential for other nations conducting relations with China to be aware of how the PRC has chosen to execute the 2,000 treaties to which it has become a party. Relying heavily on Chinese sources, his analysis covers the communist regime's theory and practice in regard to treaties through 1969.

The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea. By Se-Jin Kim. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. 239 pp. $9.25. Se-Jin Kim analyzes the role of the military in South Korea with special attention to the 1961 military coup d'état. After tracing Korean military involvement in politics back to the legacy of Japanese rule and before, the author examines civil-military relations and the rise of the military after the Korean War, the demise of civilian rule, the military's consolidation of power after the coup, and the record of military rule from 1961 to the present. The book contains documents and a bibliography.

Race and Politics in Urban Malaya. By Alvin Rabushka. Stanford: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1973. 148 pp. $6.50. In 1967 Professor Rabushka conducted the first public opinion poll in Malaya, on matters of race and politics. On the basis of that survey he has written a systematic analysis of interracial attitudes and interactions in the two major cities, Kuala Lumpur and Penang.

VII. Latin America

The Dominican Intervention. By Abraham F. Lowenthal. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 246 pp. $10.95. The brief here is that American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was the result of established premises and procedures of American policy rather than of individual errors. The author, who was living in the Dominican Republic at the time of the intervention, makes extensive use of primary sources, including numerous interviews that he conducted, to sustain his thesis. The intervention is placed in historical context and the development of the crisis is described in detail.

The Era of Trujillo: Dominican Dictator. By Jesús de Galíndez; edited by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973. 298 pp. $8.95 ($4.50, paper). The Dominican lawyer, Jesús de Galíndez, exiled in 1946, wrote this critical study of dictator Trujillo as a Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia University. On February 27, 1956, he presented it to a faculty committee; thirteen days later he was kidnaped and disappeared and presumably was murdered. Professor Fitzgibbon has edited the manuscript and updated it to include the last five years of Trujillo's rule, 1956-1961. The author provides an introductory summary of the "Era of Trujillo" and then treats such topics as the constitution, elections and resignations, human rights and political arrests, the single-party system and controlled labor unions, social institutions, the personal style of the "benefactor," Trujillo's anti-communism and foreign policy, the positive results of the regime, and Trujillo's political opposition.

Monographs and Reports Received

Canada's Maritime Forces. By Colin S. Gray. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Wellesley Paper No. 1, January 1973. 79 pp. $1.75.

Canadian Military Professionalism: The Search for Identity. Edited by R. B. Byers and Colin S. Gray. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Wellesley Paper No. 2, February 1973. 84 pp. $1.75.

The Changing Face of Hong Kong: New Departures in Public Policy. By Alvin Rabushka. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, and Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, AEI-Hoover Policy Study, No. 6, July 1973. 79 pp. $3.00.

The Energy "Crisis" and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Robert E. Hunter. New York: Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series No. 216, June 1973. 79 pp. $1.25.

Genoa Plus 51: Changing Soviet Objectives in Europe. By Franklyn Griffiths. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Wellesley Paper No. 4, June 1973. 68 pp. $1.75.

International Repertory of Institutions for Peace and Conflict Research. Paris: UNESCO, Bureau of Documents and Publications, Reports and Papers in the Social Sciences Series, No. 28, n.d. 91 pp. $3.20.

The People's Action Party of Singapore: Emergence of a Dominant Party System. By Thomas J. Bellows. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Series, Monograph Series No. 14, 1973. 195 pp. n.p.

Population Pressures and Resource Exploration in the North-East Atlantic. By Jon McLin. Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, West Europe Series, January 1973. 15 pp. 50 cents to subscribers; $1.00 to others.

Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of the Ash Council Proposals. By Roger G. Noll. Washington: The Brookings Institution, Studies in the Regulation of Economic Activity, 1973. 116 pp. $2.50.

Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies. By Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman. Washington: The Brookings Institution, Studies in Defense Policy, 1973. 94 pp. $1.95.

Studies on Chinese External Affairs: An Instructional Bibliography of Commonwealth and American Literature. By Roger Dial. Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Reference Paper, June 1973. 182 pp. $3.50; $2.50, student.

Ten Years of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963-1973. By Jozef Goldblat. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 11, August 1973. 34 pp. no charge.

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